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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research problem
The growing research on fiscal and political federalism in economics (as well as
rational choice political science) basically shares two main assumptions regard-
ing federal institutions: it takes democratic and symmetric federations as the
reference point. Democracy means that the decision making is based on elec-
tions and/or referenda, which effectively constraint the actions of politicians.
Symmetry means that the ”degree of devolution” for all regions is identical. In
particular, if both federal and regional budgets are funded by a common split
tax, the de-jure retention rate is identical for all states. It goes without saying
that there is a multitude of models looking at economic asymmetry between
regions: most federations include states or regions with significantly different
economic potential, population and territory, obviously influencing both their
comparative economic performance and their behavior in the federal bargain-
ing.1 However, the economic asymmetry does not (necessarily) provide an iden-
tity mapping into the asymmetric devolution in terms of formal institutions and
informal policy making (what I refer to as ”asymmetric federation” in this pa-
per): this issue requires careful analysis. Although these assumptions are helpful
to derive valuable insights in the development of federations, it is obvious that
they do not cover the variety of institutional and political environments existing
1For example, in Argentina four industrially dominant provinces and the federal district of
Buenos Aires account for 78% of the nation’s industrial production and 70% of the population.
In Australia New South Wales includes 35% of the population, whereas Tasmania accounts
for less than 3%. In Germany the largest Land North Rhine Westphalia accounts for 21% of
the population of the federative republic, whereas the city-state of Bremen includes less than
1%. In India Uttar Pradesh includes 16% of the whole population, and Sikkim less than 0.1%.
The largest U.S. state California accounts for 11% of the population, and the smallest state
Wyoming includes less than 1% of the population. The largest Brazilian state Sao Paulo is
more than 100 times as large in terms of population, as the smallest one (Roraima). Yukon
includes less than 0.1% of the Canada’s population and Ontario 38%. Even in Austria, which
is significantly smaller, than other federations mentioned above, the largest Land of Vienna
is about 30 times as large in terms of population, as the smallest one (Burgenland).
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in federal systems.
First, it is safe to claim that the fiscal capacity of individual regions (i.e. the
resources they keep to implement their economic policy) is heterogeneous in
virtually all federations. However, this difference can simply be an outcome of
the free discretion of regional governments over their own tax rates and bases
(as in the U.S.), of the application of identical rules to regions with different
endowment (for example, if there are several split taxes with different de-jure
retention rates, and regions have different endowments in terms of tax bases,
unavoidably the overall share of tax revenue kept by individual regions will be
unequal) or of the redistribution of the common pool of resources at the federal
level through transfers. However, another reason for the differences in fiscal
capacity (which I focus on in this paper) is that the rules applied to individual
regions are different. This form of asymmetric federalism (as it is usually re-
ferred to in political science) is typical for a wide variety of countries.
For example, the developing Spanish federalism is asymmetric per construc-
tion: the autonomous regions (communidad autonoma) were not established by
the constitution, but the latter institutionalized a procedure, which could be
used for their creation, as well as for ”accepting” responsibilities. Specifically,
the retention rates for shared taxes are not identical over the communities; two
of them enjoy special ”foral regime” with higher fiscal independence. The same
is true for the British devolution: the degree of autonomy of Wales and Scotland
is set separately, as well as the (possible) autonomy of England (McGregor and
Swales, 2003). Federal entities in Belgium and Canada enjoy partly different
rights: Canada is a prominent example of unilateral concessions to a particular
region of the federation in order to maintain the unity of the federal state (Que-
bec). India originally included four types of states depending on their historical
origin (British rule, former principalities etc.) and currently still has specific
regulations for ethnic minorities (Rao and Singh, 2004). At the moment let me
put aside the question why this particular form of federalism appears at all:
although the results of bargaining over varying retention rates may be identical
to that of bargaining over transfers when retention rates are identical, there are
countries where regions obviously prefer the former to the latter. In this paper
the existence of asymmetries is assumed as given. More importantly, it seems to
be the core of the ”autonomy” arrangements in unitary states, when individual
regions receive special status and higher autonomy in economic decision-making
(in political science often referred to as ”federacies”).2
Second, although there have been important changes over the last decade,
2An incomplete list of this arrangements includes Alan Islands in Finland, five special
regions (Sicily, Sardinia, South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Valle d’Acosta) in Italy, Zanzibar
in Tanzania, the Atlantic Cost in Nicaragua, Corsica in France, Minadanao in Philippines,
Gagauszia in Moldova, West Papua in Indonesia, Bougainvillea in Papua New Guinea, Green-
land and Faeroes in Denmark, Madeira and Azores in Portugal, Jersey and Man in the UK,
Xianggang in China, Crimea in Ukraine or Karakaplpakstan in Uzbekistan.
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the modern political economics (including economics of decentralization) is still
to an important extent the economics of democracies. However, the political
regime is yet another reasonable ”candidate” for influencing the degree of de-
centralization. Although, as it will be discussed below, there is some research
dealing with effects of the democratization on the process of devolution, there is
still at least one neglected area: internal political differences between different
levels of government in a federation. Regional differentiation of the level and
the type of democracy is quite typical for federations in developing and tran-
sition countries. The first source of the variation is the (relative) weakness of
the federal center, often unable to control the development of regional political
institutions and therefore limit the diversity of regional political equilibria (Mc-
Mann, 2006). The second source is the need to compromise with regional elites
in the process of democratic transition, leading to ”pockets” of democracy or au-
tocracy. In several cases the very ability to carry out the democratic transition
may be associated with an ”implicit contract” with the regional elites, main-
taining their autocratic rule. Finally, economic and ethnic differences among
regions lead to a strong differentiation of the bargaining power of individual ac-
tors; in a world where these actors bargain not only within rules, but foremost
about rules, it leads to the differentiation of political institutions.
This trend has been observed in different parts of the world. In Latin Amer-
ica Brazil, Argentina and Mexico included regions with different political sys-
tems (Gibson, 2004): for example, the transition from the dictatorship of the
Institutional-Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico started with the develop-
ment of individual democratic regions; however, even after the democratization
occurred on the federal level several regional leaders maintained their quasi-
authoritarian power. In India regional governments were able not only to
change the specifics of regional political systems, but also to establish signif-
icantly different economic systems.3 The traditional channels of control of re-
gional governments through the constitutional court, the federal legislature or
the national political culture are much weaker in these countries, than in the
developed world. However, one should not necessarily be looking for developing
countries and weak democracies to find examples of different political systems
in one federal structure. Quite a few of the U.S. states in the early 20s century
were controlled by powerful political machines eliminating any free competition
at the elections; the dominance of the Democratic party in the U.S. South was
based on various voting restrictions (like literacy tests), introduced to under-
mine the electoral basis of the opposition (see Besley et al., 2007, for a survey of
anecdotal evidence). The ’subnational authoriatrianism’ has also been reported
in Spain and Southern Italy.
On the contrary, autocratic states sometimes include regions with a higher level
of democratization. The traditional monarchies of Central and Eastern Europe
3For example, in West Bengal, where the Communist Party maintained the power
monopoly for decades (Chen and Sil, 2007).
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in the 19s century partly included regions significantly more successful in terms
of the democratic development. A good example is the special status of Finland
in the Russian Empire. The territory maintained its own parliament (though
no publicly elected legislature existed in Russia) and a legal system, which was
quite developed even as opposed to other European countries of that period (for
example, Finland was among the first territories in the world to provide women
voting rights). Autocracies sometimes allow limited political competition on
the local level (like China, which has recently introduced free elections on the
village level, see Thurston, 1998), maintaining absolute control over political
developments on the federal or central level. The reasons why a non-democratic
center credibly commits (and maintains the commitment) to allow free elections
on the regional or local level can differ and include some sorts of political exper-
iments or outcomes of internal power struggles and external pressure. However,
systems with more advanced democratization on provincial level sometimes re-
sult from a slow overall democratization process, like in Mexico; in this case,
however, they are likely to be less stable (Diaz-Cayeros, 2003).
Finally, formal pure non-democratic federations seem to be a relatively rare
phenomenon in the modern world (an example is probably the United Arab
Emirates), since a non-democracy has difficulties in maintaining rule of law
necessary to establish clear separation of powers between the federal and the
regional level. However, in a broad sense, non-democratic political system with
independent regional and central elites and a relative balance of power between
them determining the distribution of the fiscal revenue are often present in large
countries, if the political control of the center is not absolute. Latin Amer-
ica experienced a significant move towards decentralization under authoritarian
leaders (Eaton, 2006), and so does China today.
The existence of asymmetric and / or non-democratic federations and the qual-
ity of policy making and governance in these structures is per se an interesting
question for political economics. What is, however, even more important is that
asymmetric federations often provide unique laboratories to test a multitude
of general questions of public and political economics in an intranational set-
ting. It is well known that the international samples of countries suffer from
important problems: quality of data may often be incompatible, there is a se-
lection bias and / or small-sample problem etc. Hence, using the intranational
variation of the parameter of interest may become an interesting alternative,
especially because country knowledge may make specific strategies of identifica-
tion (unavailable in general settings) useful. This thesis attempts to apply the
asymmetric federalism case in two main frameworks.
First, it looks at the problem of the endogenous decentralization - a field
growing extensively over the last decade (Lockwood, 2006). Unlike the tradi-
tional implicitly or explicitly normative fiscal federalism, the endogenous de-
centralization approach does not deal with the optimal centralization and the
power allocation between the center and the regions, but rather studies the (in-
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ternal) processes within a federal system that lead to a specific allocation of
decision powers or fiscal revenue. Basically, it comes down to a (supposedly)
simple empirical question: why are some countries more (de)centralized than the
others? Unlike the dominant literature on endogenous decentralization, using
either international setting (Pryor, 1968; Oates, 1972; Kee, 1977; Pommerehne,
1977; Bahl and Nath, 1986; Wasylenko, 1987; Patsouratis, 1990; Vaubel, 1996,
2009; Panizza, 1999; Cerniglia, 2003; Garret and Rodden, 2003; Diaz-Cayeros,
2004; Stegarescu, 2006; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2006; Letelier, 2005; Treisman,
2006) or internal decentralization within regions (mostly in the U.S. and Switzer-
land, cf. Pryor, 1967; Litvack, Oates, 1970; Giertz, 1976, 1983; Mullen, 1980;
Wallis and Oates, 1988; Baker, 2000; Feld et al., 2008), the first three papers
of this thesis specifically use the setting of an asymmetric federation to study
the determinants of decentralization. Second, the existence of the subnational
variation of political regimes provides an interesting field for research on the
comparative performance of democracies and autocracies. Although
the ”democracy-and-growth” studies include literally hundreds of papers and
thousands of regressions (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008), virtually all of
them, once again, restrict their attention to comparing performance of different
countries (or of individual countries over time). Here, once again, looking at
panels of regions might be an advantage, as it is discussed in this thesis.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of four papers. The first three deal with the prob-
lem of endogenous decentralization in asymmetric federations, including those
with variation of political regimes. To start with, the first paper (Chapter 2)
considers the problem from a broad perspective. Using the data from the Rus-
sian Federation in 1995-1999, it looks at three measures of devolution: fiscal,
regulatory and constitutional decentralization, and attempts to find out their
interrelation and their driving factors. Basically, there are two main findings
from the chapter. First, three aspects of decentralization (although evolving
simultaneously and influenced by interacting (or even identical) agents) do not
seem to be correlated. Second, the set of determinants of the decentralization,
for which the zero effect could be rejected, is also different: while for the fiscal
decentralization bargaining power and preferences seem to play the crucial role,
regulatory decentralization is influenced by bargaining rules and path depen-
dence factors. The sets of outliers for different dimensions of decentralization
also differ.
This result challenges the traditional approach to empirical studies of decen-
tralization, which take a variety of post-constitutional indicators as proxies for
allocation of authorities. Hence, it becomes important to study the factors in-
fluencing the divergence of de-jure power and de-facto control over resources.
Therefore in the next step (Chapter 3) the thesis looks at a specific mechanism of
fiscal decentralization in an asymmetric federal structure. Once again, I use the
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data for the Russian Federation (for 1995-1999 and 2000-2006) to test different
hypotheses regarding the strategic tax collection behavior as a driving force of
the fiscal decentralization. In a centralized federation where regional and federal
budgets are financed by taxes (mostly) determined by the federal parliament,
regions, if they are able to control their tax authorities, have incentives to ma-
nipulate the tax collection and tax auditing effort for various reasons. If there
is a huge tax avoidance (and therefore the tax collection measures are limited
and unable to cover all taxpayers), one of the outcomes of the strategic tax
collection may be shifts of the retention rates; thus even centralized federations
become subject to the de-facto devolution. The chapter indeed finds evidence
of the strategic tax collection as factor of the fiscal decentralization in Russia.
Both Chapters 2 and 3 included a measure of democracy in individual regions
among covariates; however, it did not produce significant and robust results.
Therefore Chapter 4 looks at the problem from a theoretical perspective: it
constructs a very simple model of an asymmetric federation, where regional
and federal governments may have (potentially different) democratic and non-
democratic political regimes, and looks at the properties of mapping from eco-
nomic and political fundamentals (heterogeneity, size of regions, secession costs,
political regimes) into retention rates in a setting allowing for secession. There
are three main results to be reported. First, as expected (and as demonstrated
in the previous chapters for the Russian case) regions with a large territory, low
secession costs and a high ”preference distance” from the federal government
have larger retention rates. Second, the degree of decentralization in a pure
democracy (where both regional and federal governments are democratic) is
higher, than in a pure non-democracy only for specific conditions on preference
distance / information flows. Finally, hybrid regimes (where federal and regional
governments have different political systems) are more centralized, than pure
non-democracies.
While Chapters 2 and 3 had the problem of endogenous decentralization in an
asymmetric federation in focus, and Chapter 4 looked at asymmetric federation
with various level of democracy, Chapter 5 specifically concentrates on the sub-
national variation of democracy in order to study the ”democracy-and-growth”
nexus. Looking at a sample of Russian regions in 2000-2004, it uses various
techniques to regress the annual growth rates on the degree of democracy and
the size of bureaucratic apparatus in individual regions. The main finding is
that the democracy has a robust U-shape impact on economic growth: hybrid
regimes perform significantly worse than both democracies and autocracies.4
The findings for bureaucracy are less robust: in cross-sections and panel data
settings without region fixed effects, the bureaucracy increase seems to hamper
economic growth; the result vanishes for estimations with region fixed effects.
Finally, the chapter reports some results on the interaction of democracy and
4It should be noted that I use different definitions of a hybrid regime in chapters 4 (a
country with different political regimes on different levels of government) and 5 (a region
which combines features of democracies and non-democracies in the regional political system).
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size of bureaucracy.
Individual specific results of the chapters are summarizes in the respective con-
clusions; however, there at the end of the thesis I discuss some general results
which could be obtained from both theoretical and empirical discussion.
1.3 Institutional details on the Russian federal-
ism
1.3.1 Asymmetric federalism: Russian style
As shown above, there are three empirical papers and one theoretical contribu-
tion in this thesis. For all three empirical chapters the source of data is a sample
of Russian regions for different periods; the theoretical model is also interesting
in turms of explaining the Russian devolution (although naturally not limited
to this particular case). Hence, it seems appropriate to provide some basic in-
formation on the functioning of the Russian fiscal and political federalism in the
Introduction, since this information might be relevant for all further chapters of
the thesis.
Russia of the 1990s is in fact a good example of an asymmetric federation and
of high variation of political regimes within one country. The basic elements of
asymmetry were already inherited from the Soviet period: the post-Soviet Rus-
sia includes 89 regions (their number changed over time, see also Figure 1.1)
with partly different status. While 21 territories are called ”ethnic republics”
and exhibit a variety of elements of statehood, other regions (oblast or krai)
have evolved from traditional administrative territorial units5 or (autonomous
okrug) are even subordinate to other regions. The Soviet fiscal system (which
still exists in several former Soviet republics like Uzbekistan) was de-jure asym-
metric par excellence: each year the central government set individual retention
rates for individual regions and individual taxes (with tax rates and bases set
on the federal level). In the early 1990s this formal structure was filled with
the real bargaining; the retention rates for individual taxes / regions changes
on quarterly or half-year basis. The negotiations were basically implemented by
the federal government and a coalition of ethnic republics with more credible
threat of (at least, partial) secession than that of administrative units. The Fed-
eral Treaty of 1992, which acted as the predecessor of the current constitution,
granted special privileges to one particular type of subnational jurisdictions -
the national republics (Ross, 2000:406).
In 1993-1994, this initial pure bargaining structure experienced two major changes.
The first was an increasing level of the formal centralization. When the presi-
dent managed to consolidate power on the federal level after the dissolution of
5Yevreiskaia autonomous oblast has a similar status, although formally belongs to national
units of the Federation.
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Figure 1.1: Map of Russia
the old parliament (Supreme Council) in autumn 1993, the situation changed;
the new constitution of 1993 accompanied by the introduction of several basic
acts on inter-budgetary relations in 1994 established the de jure assignment of
responsibilities and of tax revenues between different levels of government. On
the one hand, the constitution proclaimed an identical status of all “subjects
of the Federation” (the official designation of all regions regardless of their sta-
tus). However, previous norms, as well as the informal bargaining processes
granted the national republics special privileges. On the other hand, the new
Russian federalism was based on a high degree of centralization of tax author-
ities. The exclusive list of taxes was set by the federal parliament, originally
in the Act on the Fundamentals of the Tax System, and after 1999 in the Tax
Code. There was one notable exception from this regulation: the Presidential
Decree No. 2268 signed on December 22, 1993, allowed the regional and local
authorities to introduce their own taxes. However, though several regions used
these possibilities, most taxes introduced by the regions did not even cover their
administrative expenses (although they still influenced the economic processes
as they were used to manipulate the competition between businesses to support
privileged business groups, see East-West Institute, 2001). In 1996 the Decree
was abolished, and although some regions continued using their “own” taxes,
their influence on tax revenue was fairly low. The federal government also set the
rules for calculating the tax base for all taxes. Consequently, there is only one
unified tax collection system in Russia; all taxes are administered by the federal
government.6 In a similar way, Russia became a highly centralized federation
in terms of the regulation of economic and social activities: major standards
6Some details on Russian tax system are described in Appendix A.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of regions according to the retention rates.
Source: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Trea-
sury, Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, 1999
in most areas were set on the federal level, while the regional governments had
only limited ability to modify them.
Under the fiscal constitution described above de jure the only source of fis-
cal asymmetries in the tax revenue could be the differences in the tax base
endowments (any changes of federal legislation, like new tax rates or new taxes
simultaneously hit all regions). Indeed, this de jure highly centralized federal
structure was implemented in an extremely heterogeneous country. Different
regions of Russia are characterized by different resource endowments and indus-
trial capacities, different population specifics and different access to transporta-
tion infrastructure and markets. The asymmetries in tax revenue distribution
have been enormous. In the period between 1994 and 2006 the share of taxes
received by the center from different regions varied from practically zero (Sakha
in 1994 and 1995) to more than 95% (Kalmykia in 2005 and Voronezh in 2005).
Figure 1.2 presents the distribution of Russian regions according to their share
in the tax revenue from their territory. The question is, however, whether the
tax base composition is the only factor driving the heterogeneity.
Therefore in order to explain the fiscal asymmetries in Russia the second change
of the Russian federalism should be considered: the increasing bilateral and uni-
lateral activity of regions circumventing the formally highly centralized federal
law. Partly this activity took place within the framework of direct bilateral bar-
gaining between federal and regional governments, leading to the establishment
of formal power-sharing treaties which are often referred to as elements of an
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asymmetric federation (Stoner-Weiss, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova,
2004, Chapter 4). The process was to a certain extent induced by the Federal
Treaty: as two republics refused to sign the Treaty (Tatarstan and Chechnia),
and two of them (Bashkortostan and Sakha) insisted on special clauses with
larger economic rights, the way was open for the establishment of a bilateral
treaties system beyond the constitutional level. In 1994 Tatarstan and the fed-
eral center signed a special agreement with a broader scope of authorities of
the regional government, which included both re-allocation of tax income from
several taxes from the federal to the regional budget and the right to set break-
down of distribution of other taxed on a bargaining basis.
By the end of 1996 about 26 power sharing agreements with different regions
were in power, and to June 1998 their number reached 46 (i.e. more than a
half of the Russian regions). In addition more than 500 subordinate treaties
between different governmental bodies were put into action (cf. Obydenkova,
2008). What is, however, very important is that at this stage the bargaining
between the federal government and the coalition of republics was replaced by
bilateral bargaining between the federation and the individual territories (Fil-
ippov et al., 2004). The spread of power sharing agreements seems to suggest
the existence of domino effect; however, in reality the degree of autonomy in-
corporated in individual acts varied significantly (Martinez-Vazquez, 2002); a
large majority of regions did not really aspire higher autonomy, preferring to
benefit from the bandwagon effects (Gel’man, 2006).On the other hand, federal
law (parliamentary acts and presidential decrees) was used to give additional
authorities to regions.7
More important is the unilateral activity of regions leading to devolution. Its
most prominent form was “the war of laws” (introduction of regional legislation
running contrary to the federal one). While it does not automatically translate
in fiscal asymmetries, it certainly influenced the structure of Russian regulatory
federalism: as a result, Russian regions obtained significantly different degree
of autonomy, resulting into substantial differences of regional legal regimes and
economic policies (Polishchuk, 2001). Moreover, the unilateral devolution in fis-
cal area included decisions to prevent the local tax authorities from transferring
the tax revenue to the federal government – a kind of “tax separatism”.
The negotiated bilateral treaties, wars of laws and unilateral concessions cer-
tainly had an impact on the developing asymmetric federalism. However, it
would be by far too simplistic to reduce the observed fiscal asymmetries exclu-
sively to this feature. Although the significant differences between the federal
and the local regulation existed until the early 2000s (Chang, 2005), the possi-
bilities for the regions to manipulate the transfer of tax revenue to the federal
7The earliest decrees were set in 1992 and covered regions like Tyumen, Karelia (granted
the right to use 90% of federal taxes collected on its territory in 1992-1994 for funding of its
development fund) or Ingushetia (since 1994 businesses registered in this republic did not pay
federal taxes).
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government went down relatively quickly. While in 1993 about 30 regions de-
clared plans to “withhold” the federal share in the tax revenue, not a single one
really implemented them. In 1996 St. Petersburg was the only region with-
holding 20% of the land tax revenue. There were only few attempts of open
“budgetary separatism” in the 1990s. After the crisis of 1998 several regions
announced the decision to block the federal portion of the tax revenue, and the
parliament of Kalmykia (one of the national republics in the Southern part of
Russia) decided to stop payments to the federal budget, but quick and severe
actions of the federal center (e.g. the Ministry of Finance stopped funding any
federal programs on the Kalmykian territory) resulted in the abolition of this
regulation. Moreover, the major advantages obtained by the regions in bilat-
eral treaties were of non-fiscal nature – control over oil and gas exploration in
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Tatneft, the Tatarstan’s oil company, became one
of the largest in Russia) or for the diamond industry in Sakha (the ALROSA
holding). The first two treaties with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan allowed these
republics to receive all royalties from the natural resources instead of the federal
center. However, Sakha, the third region, was only able to enforce the special
privileged regime to use part of the federal taxes collected on its territory for the
funding of federal programs, i.e. a limitation was put rather on the expenditure
than the revenue side of the budget. The later treaties either did not include
any fiscal arrangements or were mostly based on the Sakha scheme. Some of
them (e.g. Sverdlovsk) set a clear right of the regions to stop transferring taxes,
if the federation does not follow its expenditures obligations. Hence, the search
for further fiscal mechanisms of asymmetric devolution becomes important.
The political asymmetry in Russia went down in the 2000s under the new ad-
ministration of Vladimir Putin. One of the first acts of the new president was
to regain control over the federal political structures in regions (what was called
“strengthening the vertical of power”): in 2000 seven new federal districts were
established in which presidential representatives (mostly with a background in
the military or security service) obtained the right to oversee the selection and
placement of personnel in the local branches of federal authorities (Ross, 2003).
Furthermore, the regional governors lost a significant part of their influence
because of institutional changes (like the reform of the upper chamber of the
Russian parliament, the Federal Council, or the right of the president to remove
a governor from his office; see Hyde, 2001) accompanied by a strong public sup-
port for the new president. Meanwhile the degree of asymmetry between regions
in tax distribution remained significant: Magadan was able to get about 98% of
the whole tax revenue in 2003 and may be compared with the most “secession-
ist” republics of the early 1990s. Indeed, the standard deviation of retention
rates increased significantly in the last six years (Figure 1.3 ). Therefore even
the Putin period seems to be interesting from the point of view of this paper.
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Figure 1.3: Standard deviation of the region’s share in the tax revenue from its
territory.
Source: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service, Federal Trea-
sury, Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, 1999
1.3.2 Variation of political regimes in Russian regions
As discussed above,the variation of retention rates (and, as I will show in what
follows, other decentralization indicators) makes the Russian asymmetric fed-
eralism a reasonable laboratory for studying endogenous decentralization and
its mechanisms. However, Russia is also a clear case of variation of subnational
political regimes. One could probably claim that the first differences in the struc-
ture of political systems in Russian regions occurred even before the transition
started: in the Soviet Union several national republics were able to establish
a de-facto higher autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the central government,
which, however, did not intervene in the local political process. The collapse
of the Soviet Union initiated a complex set of bargaining processes between
the federal government and the regions and of internal conflicts within regions.
And, as already mentioned, the first set of bargaining processes established the
structure of asymmetric federalism, where regions achieved different degree of
political autonomy, and a relatively weak federal center. Therefore - the second
set of bargaining processes - individual regions received the opportunity to de-
sign their own political system independently as an outcome of internal power
struggles. From mid-1990s all regional governors were elected by a popular vote
(although several regions practiced direct elections even earlier, in spite of di-
rect restrictions of the federal center). It increased the autonomy of regional
political systems, but did not guarantee their democratic nature: regional elec-
tions could be easily manipulated by the authorities. Both formal and informal
rules of elections also became subject to the bargaining process. Factors like
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ethnic and economic legacies of the Soviet period, specifics of regional leader-
ship and particular effects of economic transition for individual regions seem to
have a profound impact on the paths of formation of political systems (Hale,
2003). Further factors like political culture, initial economic development and
proximity to the EU could also have influenced the diversity of political systems
in Russia (Obydenkova, 2007). The resulting differences often resembled those
between independent states rather than regions of one country (Gel’man, 2008)
Gel’man (1999) provides a comprehensive review of the factors and driving
forces of the development of regional political regimes. He basically confronts
four scenarios of transition. In several regions a dominant actor was able to
establish a near-monopoly and therefore create a quasi-authoritarian system
similar to those of Central Asian countries or Belarus.8 Other regions provide
examples of an elite settlement based on a compromise of main conflicting groups
over the crucial aspects of policy (Nizhniy Novgorod), while the competition be-
tween clans remained an important factor of regional politics (Sharafutdinova,
2007). Yet another outcome suggests that conflicting regional elites develop in-
stitutions to avoid the ”winners takes all” outcomes (Udmurtia). The range of
different political systems in Russia varied from the pluralist democracies (St.
Petersburg) to autocracies and even ”warlordism” (Primorski krai, see Kirkow,
1995). Regional elites maintained different degree of control over the media and
over regional economies (which could also be used as an additional power source
if present or weaken the incumbents if absent).9
To conclude, the formation of political systems in the Russian regions through-
out the 1990s has been an outcome of the competition and conflict between
several centers of influence: governor, regional legislature, heads of largest mu-
nicipalities (e.g. capital of the region) and federal bureaucrats. Towards 1999-
2000 these conflicts diminished significantly, and a political equilibrium was
achieved (Turovskiy, 2003). It does not imply, that the incumbents could al-
ways win the elections (although there seems to be a trend to lower turnover of
8The most well-known examples of these groups are regions where the old Soviet elites
maintained their dominance behind the new ideological facade. For example, in Tatarstan
the leadership of the local Communist party was successful in shifting its power first to the
Supreme Soviet (regional parliament), and then to the office of the regional president Mintimer
Shaimiev, which than created a successful political machine dominating both regional and fed-
eral elections. In Bashkortostan the collapse of the Comunist party power caused competition
between the Supreme Soviet and the regional government, ending up in the formation of a
stable autocracy following that of Tatarstan. In other regions, like Mordovia or Mariy El, re-
gional elites failed to consolidate their power in spite of attempts to catch up with Tatarstan
(Matsuzato, 2004). On the other hand, in Kalmykia the newcomer Kirsan Ilyumzhinov suc-
cessfully challenged the existing regional elites, only to establish his own version of regional
authoritarianism with strict control over political processes and economic assets in the region.
9The variety of political systems reflected itself in the variety of formal institutions (al-
though Russian politics diversity is much higher than that of formal structures): from pres-
idential republics to parliamentary systems (Udmurtia, Khakassia) and more complex or-
ganizations with a governing council comprised of representatives of different ethnic groups
(Dagestan) (Kozlov and Popov, 1999:185-194).
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governors starting with 1999, see Nureev and Shulgin, 2006; Titkov, 2007), but
rather means, that the structure of veto players and of the formal and infor-
mal rules governing the way (and the possibility) of power transition was set.
The main factors influencing the political development of Russian regions in the
2000s became the activity of the federal center, trying to limit the degree of
regional autonomy. Several measures of the federal sector (e.g. the introduc-
tion of the new federal act regulating regional elections in 2002, see Konitzer
and Wegren, 2006) could indeed influence the political systems in different re-
gions (though the ability of the federal center really determine the electoral
outcomes remained relatively weak, see Chebankova, 2005). In fact, through-
out this period the federal government focused rather on establishing control
over the regional elites than on intervening in their internal politics.10 However,
these shocks either uniformly impacted all regions, or, more important, did not
depend on economic performance of the regions.11 Hence, regions still remained
politically diverse, and their political systems were mostly inherited from the
struggles of the 1990s (for details see Gel’man, 2008). Once again, there seems
to be enough space for studying the theoretical problems discussed above in this
empirical setting.
10Although some notable exceptions, like St. Petersburg, should also be mentioned.
11The Moscow Carnegie Center reported an index of democratization for individual Russian
regions for the periods of 1991-2001 and 2000-2004 (which will be discussed in greater detail in
the chapter 5). A simple correlation between the change of the democracy index of Carnegie
Center from the 1990s to 2000s (difference between the new and the old index) and the gross
regional product (GRP) per capita in 2000 yields insignificant correlation index of 0.256; the
correlation between average growth rates and the change of democracy index is even smaller (-
.0622). Moreover, the correlation between the old and the new index is 89 percent, suggesting
a high persistence in the political organization of the regions. Nikolai Petrov (2005), who was
responsible for the project of the democratization index for Russian regions implemented by
Carnegie Center, notes that although there have been several changes between 1991-2001 and
2000-2004, they are mostly of ”symbolic” nature.
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Chapter 2
Constitutions, Regulations,
and Taxes: Contradictions
of Different Aspects of
Decentralization
2.1 Introduction
One of the main problems for the empirical literature on decentralization, its
driving forces and economic impacts, is that the decentralization is really diffi-
cult to measure. The traditional indicators like retention rates or subnational
share of public expenditures have all been discussed and thoroughly criticized.
There are at least two aspects able to cause trouble while brining the theory on
fiscal federalism to the data. First, it is crucial to distinguish among the con-
stitutional and the post-constitutional stages of decentralization. Allocation of
authorities as specified in the fundamental acts of the federation does not nec-
essarily map into the allocation of de-facto authorities and, even more, of fiscal
flows. Second, at the post-constitutional level there is always a gap between
the fiscal and the regulatory decentralization; since both aspects are crucially
important for the performance of federations, any empirical approach ignoring
one of them is likely to face problems while identifying the ceteris paribus effect
of the devolution.1 The aim of this chapter is to explicitly confront different
concepts of decentralization using a single dataset. The objective is rather pos-
itive than normative: first, I try to establish a correlation between different
aspects of decentralization, and second, look at the driving forces determining
1In this chapter (as well as throughout the thesis) I use the terms “devolution” and “de-
centralization” as synonyms, what is probably slightly sloppy if one looks at precise definitions
applied in political science, but is reasonable for a study of an asymmetrically decentralized
country.
24
the decentralization outcomes. From this point of view the chapter is also an
exercise in empirical endogenous decentralization studies.
It is difficult to find a reasonable empirical playground for comparing dimensions
of the decentralization, mostly because the decentralization beyond simple al-
location of revenues and expenditures is very hard to measure. As already
mentioned, this chapter takes advantage of the process of asymmetric devolu-
tion in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, and uses Russia as the laboratory
for comparing different aspects of decentralization. Given the combination of
high formal centralization in Russia with significant de-facto asymmetry, I use
three proxies to measure the degree of devolution achieved by individual re-
gions. First, a more traditional indicator of tax retention rates is applied to
measure the degree of the fiscal decentralization. Second, I use the data of the
Federal Register to obtain the share and the number of regional acts directly
contradicting federal law, thus accounting for the regulatory decentralization on
the post-constitutional level. Finally, I construct an index to obtain the degree
of autonomy incorporated in regional constitutions (using their version as of in
late 1990s), therefore measuring the constitutional decentralization.
The main finding of the chapter is that the fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional
regulatory decentralization and decentralization incorporated in constitutions
seem to be virtually unrelated to each other; moreover, different factors iden-
tified in the theory are at work for different aspects of decentralization. It is
necessary to point out that it does not follow unambiguously from the theoret-
ical reasoning that different dimensions of devolution should be correlated. On
the one hand, different preferences and rents in different policy areas are likely
to result in different levels of decentralization. On the other hand, correlation
is likely to occur as a consequence of bargaining, where different aspects of de-
centralization become subject to package deals and therefore the outcomes turn
out to be interdependent. The results of this paper, nevertheless, are relevant,
first, because our knowledge of interrelation of dimensions of decentralization is
extremely limited (and hence it is difficult to confront any theoretical result with
reality), and second, because of somewhat simplistic treatment of decentraliza-
tion in many empirical papers using just one ”true” measure of decentralization.
The latter could be justified if the dimensions of decentralization are correlated
- so, an empirical investigation seems to be of interest.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the problem
of measuring the degree of decentralization in the literature. The third section
presents different dimensions of decentralization and looks at their correlation.
The fourth section focuses on determinants of endogenous decentralization in
Russia and the econometric problems of the analysis. The fifth section reports
the main results with respect to the driving forces of decentralization, and the
last section concludes.
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2.2 Measuring the degree of decentralization
Since decentralization seems to be one of the main concepts for economic and
political reforms in both developing and developed countries, there exists a
multitude of intersecting and diverging theoretical and empirical concepts for
measuring decentralization, often applied as “proxies” for one another (Sharma,
2006). To start with, the main problem of the literature is actually not the choice
between the “centralized” and the “decentralized” government, but rather be-
tween the political, or constitutional (which in turn may refer to the autonomy
of decision-making, autonomous appointment of governments and their ability
to participate in federal decision-making), and the administrative (which mostly
refers to the construction of public administration, i.e. deconcentration of bu-
reaucracy) decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001; Ali, 2002; Schneider, 2003). For
a large country (in terms of population or territory) the administrative decen-
tralization is unavoidable and undisputable simply because of technical reasons
of governability. Hence, the question for the optimal degree of decentraliza-
tion usually refers to the decision-making autonomy of regional governments
(although a world with agency problems and power asymmetries administrative
decentralization may “turn into” the political autonomy of regional governments
through the informal migration of authority).
A further distinction should be made, as already noticed, between the (already
defined) constitutional decentralization and the post-constitutional decentral-
ization. The post-constitutional decentralization reflects the outcomes of the
political process, once the constitutional rules are set, rather than the rules
themselves. The distinction is particularly simple in the fiscal matters: the con-
stitutional decentralization implies the right of regions to independently decide
on revenues and expenditures of their budgets; the post-constitutional decen-
tralization, however, means just the allocation of funds between center and
regions. In countries like Germany regions receive a substantial portion of the
tax revenue, but have virtually no right to decide on the bases and the rates
for taxes (which are then federal or joint responsibility). In what follows fiscal
decentralization refers exclusively to these post-constitutional outcomes (as it is
the case in almost all empirical studies, though not all of them acknowledge it).
The situation is slightly more complicated, if one looks at the regulations. The
constitutional decentralization, once again, means the allocation of decision-
making rights on standards and norms for the economic activity. However, this
allocation may be different from the “real” significance of regional and federal
regulations for economic agents. For example, it is possible that one of the
parties (either center or states) is more active in filling their “regulatory niche”
with acts and norms, than the other. Once again, regulatory decentralization in
this paper refers to the post-constitutional “relative importance” of the federal
and the regional law for economic agents. Obviously, it is a vague concept,
which I will, however, operationalize in what follows.
This chapter therefore looks at three concepts of decentralization: constitu-
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tional and two post-constitutional (regulatory and fiscal2) dimensions of devo-
lution. The literature often attempts to combine the constitutional and the post-
constitutional analysis constructing a measure incorporating both (more simply
accessible) outcomes of regulation and (more problematic) allocation of authori-
ties; it may, however, be reasonable, if possible, to look at these issues separately.
The constitutional level is usually more stable, than the post-constitutional out-
comes, although in the developing countries it may also become quite volatile
and even determined by individual personnel decisions (and then the same post-
constitutional allocation survives a sequence of changing constitutional rules).
The list of the post-constitutional dimensions may be expanded to include fur-
ther aspects of governance (say, the allocation of personnel between levels of
political system, cf. Treisman, 2002); however, even measuring three main di-
mensions of devolution is a non-trivial task.
The literature on fiscal decentralization usually relies on indicators like share
of subnational (tax) revenues and / or expenditures, which are, in spite of com-
mon usage, also very often criticized both because of measurement problems
(impact of tax and non-tax revenues, spatial allocation of federal expenditures,
influence of interbudgetary transfers) and especially because they ignore the
degree of autonomy (i.e. constitutional decentralization) in the decision-making
with respect to fiscal matters (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Hence, there have been
a number of attempts to correct the data incorporating the degree of fiscal au-
tonomy in the analysis (Stegarescu, 2005). The regulatory decentralization is
obviously much harder to measure, since the variety of policy aspects to be
considered may be huge. On the other hand, it is also more difficult to come to
data for the international analysis, and the intranational variation may be insuf-
ficient. Hence, scholars usually focus on specific aspects of regulation providing
a suitable basis for the analysis. For example, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee
(2002) test the impact of preference heterogeneity on decentralization by study-
ing the liquor control rules in the U.S. municipalities. Traub and Sigman (2007)
examine the “voluntary decentralization” in the area of several health and safety
laws in the United States.
The constitutional decentralization has been subject to a great variety of stud-
ies. The most popular approach is to construct an index, incorporating several
aspects of decentralization as well as may be several outcome measures. Marks
et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review of these indices (as well as con-
struct their own one). An alternative could be to measure the actual policy
interconnection between different levels of government. Sheng (2007) studies
the biographies of party secretaries in China to understand the logic of political
decentralization, and Landry (2004) looks at the tenure duration and promotion
patterns of local officials as response to formal decentralization. Finally, special
political situations may provide source for analysis of constitutional decentral-
2The concepts may be similar to fiscal and regulatory interjurisdictional competition
(Oates, 2002).
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ization. For example, Hennessey (2008) discusses a specific experiment of home
rule establishment for American municipalities.
In spite of the obvious importance of the topic, the literature explicitly com-
paring different dimensions of decentralization is very small (Treisman, 2002;
Schneider, 2003; Blume and Voigt, 2008) and focuses only on international
comparisons. A related analysis is done by Liu (2007), who performs a cluster
analysis of different dimensions of decentralization in order to identify the typical
combinations empirically observed, and Falleti (2004) in a case study of Latin
American countries, who investigates the dynamic interaction of different as-
pects of decentralization. Finally, Treisman (2002) and Blume and Voigt (2008)
look at the correlation of different forms of decentralization and socioeconomic
and political country characteristics, including country size, ethnic division,
colonial origin, economic development and level of democracy. However, data
compatibility across nations adds an additional dimension to the measurement
problem. Hence it is reasonable to look at different dimensions of decentral-
ization and their origin using the intra-national variation of decentralization,
which, however, to my knowledge have never been considered empirically before.
Once the subnational variation in taken into account, a further distinction
should be made. First, one can focus on the decentralization within subnational
units, if they are different enough. For example, Feld et al. (2008) perform an
analysis of fiscal decentralization within the cantons of Switzerland, using the
extreme heterogeneity of their financial constitutions. Second, however, one
can benefit from existence of asymmetric federations and look at the variation
of degree of devolution achieved by each region versus the central government.
This chapter, as discussed, follows the second path.
2.3 Dimensions of decentralization in Russia
2.3.1 Measuring decentralization in Russia
As already mentioned, this paper looks at three dimensions of decentralization
in Russia. The fiscal decentralization is measured by the traditional variable
of tax retention rate (share of regional government in the overall tax revenue
collected from its territory). Although the data is published by the Federal
Statistical Authority (Goskomstat) on the annual basis, in order to ensure com-
patibility with other data, which are available only in a cross-section, I take the
average over 1995-1999 (with 1995 being the first year after the reform of the
federalism in 1994, establishing the existing system of interbudgetary relations
in Russia, and 1999 being the last year of the Yeltsin’s presidency before the
re-centralization attempts under Putin started). The panel data opportunities
for this dimension of decentralization are explored in the next chapter.
A unique advantage of the Russian dataset is that one can use a specific mea-
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sure for the regulatory decentralization encompassing multiple dimensions of
economic regulation. As already mentioned, the regional legislation in the late
Yeltsin period included a large number of significant contradictions to the fed-
eral law. Although the federal law existed, regional courts and regional police,
captured by the local governments, usually enforced the local law – so, the
federal acts simply did not matter for economic agents. After the start of the
Putin’s presidency, one of the first steps of the new government was to revise
the regional law in order to ensure the predominance of the federal legislation.
As part of this effort, the Ministry of Justice established the so-called Federal
Register (federal’nyi registr), or catalogue of regional acts (both of the legisla-
tures and of executive bodies, but incorporating legal norms) in power at that
moment. The acts included in the Register should pass an examination by
the expert commission established by the Ministry of Justice, which determines
their compatibility with the federal law. As a result, a statement is published,
which is then included in the file in the Federal Register as well. The acts con-
tradicting federal law should be abolished or changed; however the file in the
Register remains, even if the act is not valid any more. Although originally the
Register was unable to cover all regional acts (a revision process certainly takes
time), after several years one can be sure that most acts passed by the regions
were included in the Register.
I use the Register statistics as published by the Ministry of Justice on De-
cember 31, 2006 and calculate two indicators. First, I take the share of acts,
which were assessed as contradicting the federal law, in the total number of acts
for which an expert opinion is present (which is, as one should mention, smaller,
than the overall number of acts included in the Register), as indicator of the
degree of regulatory devolution achieved by a particular region. In order to
understand this variable, one should recall, that de-jure the Russian Federation
has been an extremely centralized political entity in terms of regulatory author-
ities, mostly vested in the central government. However, due to its weakness
regions basically received the option to “re-design” the federal law simply by
making their own acts. Hence, if the share of these acts is high, the regions
have “re-designed” the federal legislation to a greater extent and the central
regulations matters less for economic agents. In theory, higher decentralization
implies that the regional government makes different law than the federal one
(of course, in certain settings both governments produce identical policies – but
then the debate on decentralization is economically meaningless). If the share
of contradicting acts is high, it means that the regional policies are really dif-
ferent (and, in particular, “more different” than for the regions with low share)
from the federal standards, and hence, regions achieved substantial degree of
devolution.
This measure may, however, face two problems. First, it may be too small
because of the acts passed after 2001 in the Putin’s period (when the war of
laws was reduced significantly) and included in the Register. A solution were to
take an earlier date for the Register; but in this case one runs into a problem of
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potentially neglected “old” acts, which may be still under revision. Second, it is
possible that the acts are more likely to be passed in general if the region is will-
ing to violate the federal law: if it does not desire it, it just remains silent over
a certain area of regulation, which is then covered by the federal acts. Hence,
I also use the total number of acts contradicting the federal law as a proxy for
the regulatory decentralization. As shown below, both values are significantly
correlated, but it is still necessary to look at both to establish the robustness of
the results.
The devolution at the constitutional level in Russia is, as usually, a relatively
tricky part for an empirical study. There is a certain literature addressing
this problem by examining the reasons for establishment and for the duration
of power-sharing agreements (Dusseault et al., 2005; So¨derlund, 2006; Oby-
denkova, 2008). Obviously, the existence of a power-sharing agreement may be
treated as an indicator for higher constitutional devolution. However, there is
no research looking at the content of the treaties.3 This chapter does apply
a different measure of constitutional decentralization, looking directly at the
content of the regional constitutions. In the Soviet times, all union and au-
tonomous republics already obtained a constitution, mostly built according to
the same scheme. After the collapse of the USSR, most republics adopted new
constitutions. Moreover, other regions (without the status of republics) also
passed their articles (ustav). The constitutions were quite similar in terms of
guarantees and rights declared to their citizens (and hence, there is no variation
in their socio-economic content, unlike in case of, say, OECD constitutions, see
Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2008), with may be the only exception of the agricul-
tural land private property. However, they varied quite substantially in terms
of the design of political system and also the distribution of power between the
federal government and the region. It is particularly true for the constitutions of
20 republics,4 since articles of other regions were more homogenous (although
also partly incompatible with the federal law). I use six main dimensions of
divergence in term of center-region relations for the republican constitutions (as
they were valid in 1999) in order to construct the index. The dimensions include
(see also Bartsiz, 2001):
• property on the the natural resources (regions, in spite of the federal
regulation, declare natural resources – mostly mineral – their possession
or take over the right to regulate the resources access regime);
• international agreements (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, de-
clare their right to sign the international agreements with other countries
independently from the Russian Federation);
3Although, as discussed in the Introduction, the content of the treaties was not identical
(Martinez-Vazquez, 2002), the degree of autonomy can be reasonably approximated by the
duration of the agreement. As already mentioned, in the earlier treaties the powers of regions
were mostly larger, as specified in later treaties, when the very procedure and structure of a
treaty was standardized (Boltenkova, 1998; Kurnyshov, 1998; Solnick, 2002).
4There are 21 republics in the Russian Federation, but Chechnya is excluded from analysis
given the lack of somehow reliable data.
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• state of emergency (the region takes over the right to declare the state of
emergency, or restricts the right of the federation to declare the state of
emergency on its territory);
• restrictions on regional branches of federal government (this feature ap-
plies basically to one region, Dagestan, which restricts the right of federal
agencies to establish their local branches on its territory by requiring a
special agreement);
• restrictions on validity of federal acts (the region requires federal acts to
be ratified by the regional legislature; declares its right to (temporary) put
federal law out of action; declares the priority of regional law at least in
the area of shared responsibility of the federation and the region and / or
reserves the right to take over the federal responsibilities if the federation
does not implement them) and
• special regime of interbudgetary relations (Bashkortostan and Sakha re-
serve their right to determine the share of the federation in the over tax
revenue from the region; Tyva maintains its own customs service).
Naturally, many of these provisions have never been implemented in practice.
But it is exactly what this chapter intends to test: is there any relation between
“higher autonomy” declared in the constitution and the outcomes of the decen-
tralization process as measured by the fiscal and regulatory decentralization?
I construct the index as follows: the region with respective provision receives
1, otherwise 0. Hence, the index may vary from 6 (all provisions contradicting
federal law implemented) to 0 (no provisions implemented). The components
of the index are reported in the Appendix B.1.
Obviously, all three indicators applied in this chapter are far from being perfect.
The problem of the fiscal decentralization is that formal indicators of tax struc-
ture do not cover a high variety of financial flows between the center and the
regions and between the regions and the economic actors (e.g. non-monetary
transactions, barter, and redistribution of property rights, see Eckardt, 2002).
Even despite the relatively high centralization in the field of taxation, regional
governments still have sufficient additional powers via related business groups
and banks etc (Rosefielde and Vennikova, 2004). Moreover, the use of parafiscal
funds was quite common in the 1990s.5 Put it differently, tax retention rates
may have little in common with the actual ability to produce public goods. The
indicator of regulatory decentralization may be distorted by the fact, that fed-
eral controllers of the Ministry of Justice were not entirely impartial in terms of
5For example, in Kalmykia, one of the Russian republics in the Southern region, com-
panies after registration paid a special “registration fee” to a so-called “Fund of Presidential
Programs”. Even in the modern Russia, where the degree of federal control over these schemes
is significantly higher, regional governments have enough opportunities to let the businesses
“voluntary” pay for some regional projects, creating an additional tax, which is not covered
by official statistics.
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Table 2.1: Correlation of different aspects of decentralization
Fiscal Regulatory (share) Regulatory (number) Constitutional
Fiscal 1
Regulatory -0.020 1
(share) (0.852)
Regulatory 0.071 0.686*** 1
(number) (0.513) (0.000)
Constitutional 0.170 0.087 0.084 1
(0.475) (0.715) (0.724)
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are p-values. *** significant at 1% level.
allocating their effort among regions (though a relatively late data of the Fed-
eral Register status employed here should guarantee that all regions have had
enough time to be thoroughly controlled) and the decisions on compatibility
with the federal law. Finally, the constitutions discussed rarely address directly
the issues of fiscal and regulatory decentralization; the index applied is rather an
indirect measure. Nevertheless, the status of the data is still better than in most
other cases, and hence one can at least try to establish statistical regularities in
terms of interrelation between different aspects of decentralization.
2.3.2 Interrelation of dimensions of decentralization
The first problem to be considered in the framework of this chapter is whether
different dimensions of decentralization are related to each other. Table 2.1 re-
ports simple pairwise correlations between four indicators used in this chapter.
First of all, one can see that there is virtually no correlation between different
aspects of decentralization. The same holds if other control variables are taken
into account. Hence, one can conclude, that different aspects of decentralization
process in one country, based on interaction of identical agents with (obviously)
identical preferences, result into different outcomes.
However, the absence of correlation is to a certain extent an outcome of out-
liers – individual regions with strong deviation from the common trend. For
example, excluding Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Republic and Taimyr from the
sample, one obtains significant positive correlation between fiscal and regula-
tory (share) decentralization (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 ).6 For the regulatory
decentralization measured by the number of negative conclusions of the experts
of the Ministry of Justice, the result is robust to outliers, and it is obviously
difficult to carry out this analysis for constitutional decentralization, which is an
6Three regions mentioned belong to the so-called “tax havens”, i.e. regions pursuing an
internal offshore strategy in order to attract capital, partly due to abovementioned special
regulations. Taimyr is a difficult case from the point of view of the fiscal decentralization; the
tax revenue is strongly dependent upon the activity of the largest company, Norilski Nikel,
which has actively implemented tax optimization schemes (for example, in 2000 and 2001 the
activity of this company from the point of view of VAT optimization effectively led to negative
tax revenue of the regional budget).
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Figure 2.1: Correlation of decentralization indices; red line - total sample, green
line - excluding four outliers
ordered variable. Nevertheless, even if it is the outliers which drive the absence
of decentralization, it still does not change the fact, that different aspects of the
decentralization process follow different paths.
2.4 Endogenous decentralization in Russia: data
and empirical strategy
2.4.1 Factors of decentralization
Although so far I have focused on measuring decentralization in Russia, the
aim of this exercise is to empirically identify the factors determining the degree
of devolution achieved by individual regions according to different dimensions.
From this point of view it is necessary to identify the variables able to serve
as proxies for the main theoretical factors of devolution. Simplifying a lot, one
could probably distinguish among five main hypotheses regarding the process of
decentralization. First, the decentralization depends upon the trade-off between
preference heterogeneity (or other forms of heterogeneity, which may be easier
to measure, like income) and benefits from centralized public goods provision
and insurance (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). For an asymmetric federation it
basically implies that regions with higher “preference distance” from the rest
of the country are likely to be more decentralized. Second, the federations de-
sign specific redistribution schemes between regions, which may influence the
resulting demand for decentralization (on both rule and policy level) (Buchanan
and Faith, 1987). Third, the decentralization may result from the rules (both
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Figure 2.2: Correlation of decentralization indices; red line - total sample, green
line - excluding four outliers
written and unwritten) regulating the bargaining process between the federal
government and the regions and from the relative bargaining power of the parties
(Filippov et al., 2004). Fourth, the political system (dictatorship vs. democracy;
parliament vs. referendum; presidential vs. parliamentary republic) can be im-
portant for determining the structure of the decentralization (Feld et al., 2010;
see also Chapter 4). Fifth, the outcome of decentralization may be impacted by
interest groups on federal and regional level (Ruta, 2007). One should, however,
not forget that the decentralization may simply result from the persistence in
policies and politics, and hence, be outcome of the path dependence. Thus it
is necessary for find variables to measure all factors mentioned above in the
particular case of the Russian asymmetric federalism:
Bargaining power: First, it is reasonable to assume that bargaining power is
related to the region’s economic endowment. I apply four indicators to measure
these factors: territory, population, average income per capita and share of oil
and gas extraction (particularly important for Russia). The choice of variables
seems to be relatively straightforward given the economic structure of Russia
and availability of data. Second, the bargaining power could come from the
region’s ability to secede, which seems to play an important role in the design of
the Russian federalism in the 1990s (Dombrovsky, 2006). This effect is captured
by two variables: dummy for border region and geographical distance between
regional capital and Moscow. Third, one more variable in this selection may
be share of urban population (higher bargaining power of metropolitan areas),
which, however, may also reflect preference heterogeneity.
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Bargaining rules: The main problem for measuring this indicator is that Russia
at least formally is characterized by a uniform political system. Nevertheless, I
use the following proxies: (1) formal status of the region – dummy for republics
and dummy for autonomous okrugs; (2) dummy for power-sharing agreements
(though this variable is particularly problematic due to the endogeneity problem
- power-sharing agreements are both result and consequences of bargaining) and
(3) degree of tensions between the federal center and the region: I use the MFK
Renaissance and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs RUIE
indices of tensions to account for this effect.7
Preferences: In a semi-authoritarian country like Russia in the 1990s the im-
pact of public preferences may be significant, but should not be over-estimated.
Gel’man and Popova (2003) describe the differences of preferences in terms of
“market for symbolic goods”, where regional governments act as the “supply
side” and play the crucial role. I use three variables to measure potential dif-
ferences in preferences: (1) the preference difference may result from the ethnic
composition of the region, which is measured by the share of ethnically Russian
population8 and (2) the “distance” of the average income per capita in the re-
gion from the average over the whole Russian Federation.
Political institutions: Since Russian regions are characterized by a wide variety
of political arrangements, it is also reasonable to look at specifics of regional
politics. I look at two indicators: (1) the level of democratization, estimated by
an index of Carnegie Center, which I will discuss in details in Chapter 5 and (2)
the power concentration within the office of the the regional governors (there
are three indices available for the Yeltsin period: Jarocinska (2004), RUIE and
Urban Institute (UI)).
Redistribution: The most obvious way to capture this effect is to include a
measure of the federal transfers in the regressions, although one, once again,
may run into significant endogeneity problem.
Lobbying is measured by the index of regulatory capture, developed by Slinko,
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005). Since the lobbying activity in Russia is
mostly intransparent, it is hardly possible to cover it with other variables.
7It may seem to be strange to include bargaining rules in the analysis, if one recalls that
in Russia unilateral devolution often implied direct violations of federal law. However, even
in these cases, the desire of regions to ignore federal legislation depends on the “costs” and
the “benefits” of autonomy, which, in turn, may be functions of bargaining rules. Or, stated
otherwise, rules of the higher order explain why actors ignore or follow rules of the lower order.
8For the Russian Federation this indicator makes more sense than, say, religion or lan-
guage. First, in Russia the ethnic identification is very important, partly because it was en-
forced through the government for the last eight decades – from the establishment of national
republics by the Communist Party to the requirements to put ethnic origin (nacional’nost) in
passports abolished only recently. Second, religious and linguistic self-identification is usually
highly correlated with ethnicity (of course, there are deeper differences like more or less “ac-
tive” participation in the religious affairs, or degree of command of a language, but they are
also much more problematic to measure).
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Path dependence could be most simply measured by the status of the region
(for the period of the mature Russian federalism after adoption of the con-
stitution in 1993). Hence, significant results for dummy republic and dummy
autonomous region have a double interpretation in terms of rules of bargaining
and path dependence. However, for this study I use a specific indicator of dec-
larations of regional elites (based on event count by Dowley (1998) for the early
1990s9). The declarations of the first year of independence seem to be a good
proxy for the orientation of the regional elites, which could be preserved in the
future.
The variables of bargaining power, bargaining rules and preferences are expected
to have a positive sign, i.e. increase the degree of devolution; the variables of
redistribution, on the contrary, should have a negative sign, decreasing the de-
sire of the region to achieve higher autonomy. It is difficult to make predictions
for political institutions and lobbying, since the literature is inconclusive. More-
over, the path dependence variable is likely to have a positive sign, since the
active declarations of regions in the early 1990s could in fact map into higher
devolution. Details on the data are reported in Appendix B.1.
One can immediately see that this broad selection of variables faces three prob-
lems: multicollinearity, endogeneity and measurement error. On the one hand,
many of the variables are highly correlated with each other, partly by construc-
tion (i.e. tension indices include the existence of power-sharing agreements;
power indices include natural resources etc.). The problem of collinearity is
especially important for the income per capita and distance from the average
income per capita (although one should notice, that the second is not a linear
transformation of the first; so, collinearity is not perfect). It is also acute for
dummies republic / autonomous region and the share of Russians (since the au-
tonomous territories are in fact per construction of the Soviet territorial design
regions where the share of Russians is usually smaller).
The endogeneity problem is always present in research on endogenous decen-
tralization. For Russia the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, one
can disregard several “traditional” dimensions of endogeneity like the mobility
of population (as a factor influencing both ethnic composition and population
size), partly because of short time horizon of the analysis, but partly because of
the Russian specifics (like low population migration). However, there are also
dimensions where endogeneity may become of greater importance; in particu-
lar, it is true for “bargaining rules” variables like power sharing treaties and
fiscal transfers. The decision to establish a power sharing treaty (usually re-
sulting from a long bargaining period) and the decision to manipulate federal
9This variable does not represent the current power and aspirations of governor, first,
because of the time lag, and second, because of the shift to less public political environment
in the second half of the 1990s (as opposed to the early period of Russian post-Communist
evolution).
36
law / introduce a regional constitution with strong degree of devolution could
be made simultaneously; retention rates obviously depend on federal transfers,
if one takes the effect on tax effort into account. Finally, the problem may be
even greater because of time-invariant dependent variables, which prevent me
from exploiting the time variation of controls. In several cases (constitutional
decentralization, existence of power-sharing agreement) I just “fixed” a partic-
ular moment in time, when the variables were measured, what is, of course, a
huge simplification, which is unavoidable given the quality of data.
Finally, measurement errors are particularly important for what one may call
“expert opinion” variables: democratization, tensions, lobbying, declarations of
regional elites, but also power sharing treaties (the point is that in Russia the
existence and the structure of treaties were often not disclosed or only partly
disclosed; so, the variable capturing only the “main” treaties may simply lose
too much information). One should notice, that the “expert opinion” variables
are particularly problematic from the point of view of the endogeneity and mul-
ticollinearity problems as well.
2.4.2 Econometric strategy
I attempt to partly fix these problems by using the following procedure. In
the first step I estimate the “basic” specification, which does not include “ex-
pert opinion” variables. Since most decentralization indicators do not vary over
time, I estimate a cross-section for 88 Russian regions (i.e. all regions including
Chechnya) and average time-varying variables over 1995-1999. The choice of the
period is, as already mentioned, straightforward: the reforms of 1994 established
the basic structure of the modern Russian federalism, and in 2000 the reforms of
Putin significantly reduced the ability of regions for asymmetric devolution (for
example, the regional legislation and constitutions were standardized according
to the federal law).
For the fiscal decentralization and the share of negative conclusions to all con-
clusions as indicator of the regulatory decentralization the simple OLS could
be applied. The number of negative conclusions is a count variable, and hence
a Poisson or a negative binomial model should be applied. Because the data
are characterized by overdispersion, I estimate the negative binomial model (al-
though I have also estimated the Poisson model and did not find any significant
differences). Finally, constitutional decentralization is measured by a discrete
ordered variable. A usual approach to estimate is the ordered logit. In order
to solve the multicollinearity problem, I estimate two “basic” specifications for
each dimension of decentralization: with distance from average income and with
average income per capita. I also exclude the share of Russians at this stage,
since it is highly collinear with the dummy republic, in all six regressions.10 In
10It is an interesting question whether it makes more sense to include the share of Russians
or dummies autonomous okrug and republic in the analysis. From the theoretical point of view
the share of Russians is easier to explain, because the link to the preference heterogeneity is
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the regressions for the constitutional decentralization the share of Russians is
still included to control for potential effect of ethnic heterogeneity within the
sample of national republics, which, as I will show, is indeed significant.11 For
the fiscal decentralization I also include two variables measuring the structure of
the tax base, since the composition of tax revenue may as well have an impact
on the outcome (as it is discussed in the next chapter): the volume of retail
trade and net profits of the enterprises.
The next step aims to look at the measurement error and multicollinearity
problems more closely. First, I re-estimate the regressions by varying the sets
of controls and also by adding the “expert opinion” variables one by one. In
this case I am rather interested in the robust results, which keep constant over
different specifications, than in the analysis of each individual specification. Sec-
ond, as a “limiting case” for this analysis I take a completely agnostic view on
the validity of variables and theories and perform an extreme bounds analy-
sis. Obviously, for the extremely small sample of constitutional decentralization
these experiments are limited in terms of selection of variables simultaneously
included in regressions; it is inevitable, but, of course, means that I may have
lost the “precisely correct” specification in my estimates.
The third step of the analysis finally focuses on the endogeneity problem. It is
important to notice, that an unambiguous solution of this issue is hardly possible
in the framework of this study. First of all, there is no clear set of ”hypothesis-
driven” variables extended by a set of controls. In fact, almost all variables
I use (with the exception of tax base variables for fiscal decentralization) are
driven by hypotheses. Hence, however, one requires a large list of instruments
to achieve at least exact identification in the first stage - a task certainly beyond
any reasonable research exercise. Moreover, cross-sectional data with relatively
small sample exacerbate the problem of low efficiency of IV estimator. Hence,
what I am doing in what follows is in fact only a partial solution: I restrict my
attention to results, which remain robust at the second step of the econometric
strategy; therefore I ignore the problem of endogenous controls (the usual way
to deal with this issue – exclusion of potential endogenous controls and analysis
of robustness of results with and without them – is per construction performed
at the second step). As I will show, most of the “suspicious” variables actually
turn out to be insignificant, thus “resolving” me from the endogeneity prob-
lem, so, part of the problem disappears “by default”, although the cautious
obvious. However, for the Russian Federation it seems more suitable to focus on institutional
variables. First, the effect of ethnic composition of the population on policies in the short
run automatically goes through the specifics of political institutions - in this case, republican
status. Second, since Russia is a semi-autocracy at best, public preferences may be less
important than the preferences of political elites – and for the latter republican status is very
important (cf. Obydenkova, 2008). Finally, since the status of a republic was usually granted
by the Soviet government (all current republics were either republics or autonomous oblast in
the RSFSR), it is not subject to reverse causality problem.
11I have also estimated respective specification for other dimensions of decentralization,
but did not find any significant results for the share of Russians.
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interpretation of the results is necessary. There are also cases when two-stage
estimation techniques are required. Of course, in this situation the results are
based on ”hope” that the omitted variable bias through the exclusion of endoge-
nous controls and the bias from reverse causality from endogenous controls do
not run in the same direction (and hence the results become not robust in these
two settings). Hence, the results of this paper in terms of endogeneity analysis
should be treated with great caution.
2.5 Endogeous decentralization in Russia: re-
sults
2.5.1 Basic results
As the first step in the analysis I consider the “basic” specifications without
“expert opinion” variables”. The results are reported in Table 2.2. As usually,
for the OLS specifications I check the distribution of residuals using the Jarque-
Bera test; if it is significant, I estimate regression after exclusion of outliers until
the test becomes insignificant. A reasonable interpretation is possible only for
results, which are robust to this modification. However, the omission of outliers
has virtually no effect on the outcomes of the estimations.
There are several results interesting from the point of view of the theoreti-
cal predictions. The fiscal decentralization (specifications (1) and (2)) seems to
be particularly driven by the bargaining factors; especially regions with large
territory and large distance from Moscow are likely to have higher retention
rates. Interestingly enough, though the income per capita is insignificant, the
distance from average income has a significant negative impact on the degree
of devolution in fiscal area. This is a surprising result, since it means that re-
gions with higher preference distance are likely to have lower retention rates.
One possible interpretation could be that not only the size of the distance, but
also its sign matters: relatively poor and relatively rich regions have different
expectations towards federation. However, replacing the measure of distance by
the simple difference between average income in the federation and the regional
income yields insignificant results. Hence both too large and too poor regions
accept lower retention rates. It is obvious that for poor regions lower retention
rates may be associated with expectation of higher redistribution through the
federation.12 It is however more problematic for rich regions. Yet another ex-
planation could be the desire of the federal government to control rich regions
and to limit their autonomy – logic similar to the appointment policy of Chinese
government (see Sheng, 2007).
12Although fiscal transfers are not significant in the specification in this chapter, they are
in a panel data setting discussed in Chapter 3.
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Table 2.2: Factors of decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: regulatory, fiscal and constitutional decentralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Negative Negative Ordered Ordered
binomial binomial logit logit
Fiscal Fiscal Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Constitutional Constitutional
(share) (share) (number) (number)
Territory 0.051** 0.051*** 0.002 0 0.129 0.119 8.957 6.247
(0.020) -0.017 (0.012) (0.012) (0.085) (0.086) (8.482) (9.804)
Population -0.01 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.140*** 0.140*** 1.378 2.044
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.035) (0.867) (1.775)
Oil and gas 0.015 0.159 0.042 0.041 0.46 0.442 95.876 124.153
(0.180) (0.132) (0.04) (0.036) (0.307) (0.286) (143.094) (172.252)
Income per capita -0.042 -0.019 -0.087 1.84
(0.043) (0.012) (0.091) (6.492)
Distance from average income -0.102** -0.019 -0.082 13.23
(0.046) (0.013) (0.094) (19.367)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.09 0.123* 0.043* 0.039 -0.188 -0.213
(0.071) (0.066) (0.025) (0.025) (0.199) (0.201)
Dummy republic 0.028 0.038 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.581*** 0.579***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) (0.120) (0.121)
Distance from Moscow 0.010** 0.009** 0.006* 0.006* 0.057** 0.053** 0.837 1.364
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.022) (0.726) (1.754)
Dummy border region 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.006 0.065 0.066 -1.857 -2.453
(0.022) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.103) (0.102) (2.694) (4.226)
Share of Russians -13.396** -10.592
(6.583) (7.801)
Urbanization 1.134 1.312 -0.636 -0.765* -2.44 -3.175 212.057* 281.125
(1.109) (1.062) (0.472) (0.454) (4.135) (4.038) (113.072) (185.913)
Fiscal transfers -0.14 -0.106 -0.003 0.009 0.154 0.205 17.297* 21.011
(0.104) (0.104) (0.039) (0.040) (0.415) (0.429) (9.758) (19.225)
Retail trade 0 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.004 -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.597*** 0.583*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 5.173*** 5.185***
(0.083) (0.086) (0.036) (0.037) (0.368) (0.382)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 20 20
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.037 0.49 0.503
R2 0.277 0.321 0.407 0.404
F-stat 10.57*** 9.90*** 7.53*** 8.10***
Wald Chi-stat 90.61*** 91.28*** 26.08*** 36.63***
J.-B. test 195.3*** 134.3*** 56.37*** 63.15***
LR proportional odds test 32.28 31.44
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors applied. For the analysis of outliers see Appendix B.2.
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Figure 2.3: Population and total number of acts assessed by the Ministry of
Justice in the Federal Register
For the regulatory decentralization (specifications (3) and (4)) results for the
specification with number and with share of negative conclusions vary slightly.
First, one finds a strong and significant effect of the rules of bargaining / path
dependence factors: republics are on average able to achieve higher degree of
devolution, although I was unable to find any effect of the republic status for
fiscal decentralization. Distance from Moscow is also significant and positive,
but it is partly non-robust to outliers (for share, but not for number of negative
conclusions).13 Moreover, regions with larger population seem to have higher
number of violations; for the share of violations results are non-robust to speci-
fication. However, population seems to be highly correlated with number of acts
issued and assessed (because, say, large regions issue more acts or the Ministry
paid more attention to large regions; see also Figure 2.3 14), so the result can
come from this feature.
The estimations for the constitutional decentralization (specifications (5) and
(6)) are especially problematic because of small sample. It is surprising that
one obtains a reasonable statistical significance for this sample at all. Neverthe-
less, some results should be mentioned. First, in the specification with average
13The reason could be the presence of Primorski krai: a territory with a very specific “war-
lordist” political system may have generated an overproportionally high number of violations
of federal law, but may as well be especially “interesting” for federal officials of the early
Putin period responsible for the construction of the Federal Register. Nevertheless, estimates
without Primorski krai also reveal significant effect of the distance.
14The graph excludes City of Moscow as an outlier. However, it has an extremely high
number of acts assessed and very high population, thus confirming the correlation.
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income per capita urbanization and fiscal transfers seem to have significant and
positive effect on devolution; while the first effect once again confirms the the-
ory, the second may in fact indicate the presence of reverse causality in the data:
regions with higher autonomy have also received higher “pacifying” transfers.
Moreover, share of Russians has a significant and negative impact; unlike other
specifications, where it seemed to matter only if the dummy republic was ex-
cluded (as I will show in what follows), for constitutional decentralization one
finds an additional direct effect even for the sample consisting of republics –
regions with lower share of ethnic Russians seem to have higher level of consti-
tutional devolution. These effects, however, vanish if the distance from average
income instead of average income is used.
Several robustness tests can be implemented at this stage. First, I estimated all
regressions including both distance from average income and average income per
capita. For the fiscal decentralization distance is still significant and negative,
while income is not; for the regulatory (both share and number) and constitu-
tional decentralization both variables are insignificant. Hence, my results are
robust to this modification. Second, I account for the fact that dependent vari-
ables in specifications (1) – (4) are bounded from above by performing log-odds
transformation (Log (Variable / (1- Variable)) and re-estimating the regressions.
Basically, all results are robust, but urbanization and dummy autonomous re-
gion lose significance. Third, since the variables might be determined jointly, I
also estimate pairs (1) and (3) and (2) and (4) as seemingly unrelated regressions
(for other variables using system of equations is unreasonable; it is impossible
to use linear- and non-linear models in one system, and reducing all models to
linear form guarantees misspecification of at least one equation, and therefore,
of the whole system). Once again, the results are robust, with the only excep-
tion urbanization for regulatory decentralization in specification with distance
from average income.
2.5.2 Modified specifications and expert opinion variables
The next step of my analysis is, as mentioned, to look at the variations of speci-
fications of regressions, and also at potential impact of expert opinion variables.
The individual regressions are reported in Appendix B.2. I construct all specifi-
cations using the same logic. Each of the first three dimensions of decentraliza-
tion is covered by 28 regressions: 14 with average income per capita and 14 with
distance from average income. In each of these six subgroups the first five regres-
sions are modifications of the basic regression, accounting for individual factors
of decentralization. The first and the second regressions experiment with proba-
bly the most reasonable variables for the Russian devolution: bargaining power
and dummy republic / autonomous okrug. Given strong democratic deficits in
Russia and potential endogeneity of fiscal transfers, as well as unclear impact
of urbanization on power distribution, these variables should be most likely to
influence the structure of decentralization. Further regressions explore the role
of ethnic heterogeneity. The third regression estimates a specification including
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share of Russians, dummy republic and dummy autonomous okrug; the fourth
regression drops the dummies. The fifth regression is the “basic specification”
reported above. Further nine regressions add the expert opinion variables one
by one. Of course, if different expert opinion variables measure the same thing
(like different tension indices), I include only one of them (they are also usually
highly correlated); otherwise the variable, once included, remains in the specifi-
cation – so, I basically move towards regressions with larger number of controls.
For the constitutional decentralization, since the sample is smaller, I necessarily
have to focus on smaller number of specifications with a limited selection of
controls.
In order to make the comparison of the outcomes more transparent, I sum-
marize the results in the Table 2.3. As in case of the basic regressions, for the
residuals from the absolute majority of the OLS regressions the Jarque-Bera
test is highly significant, I also control for potential effect of outliers, excluding
the observations until Jarque-Bera becomes insignificant. The list of outliers for
regulatory and fiscal decentralization differs dramatically: while for the regula-
tory decentralization the main outliers are City of Moscow (due to its obvious
status of the capital and “closeness” to the federal government) and Primorski
krai, for the fiscal decentralization the list of outliers mostly includes tax havens
in different combinations (see next chapter for a more detailed discussion), sev-
eral autonomous regions (Taimyr and Aginsk Buryat), as well as two republics
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which received a special tax regime through the
power-sharing agreement. City of Moscow and Republic of Sakha are also listed
among the outliers. Difference in the list of outliers may also confirm that the
regulatory and the fiscal decentralization were driven by different factors. More-
over, the estimations confirm that the choice of dummy republic / autonomous
okrugs over share of Russians was correct. First, if all three variables are in-
cluded, share of Russians is never significant (although dummy republic may
remain significant). Second, if the dummy republic was significant and positive
in the initial specification, after it is dropped and replaced by the share of Rus-
sians, the latter becomes significant and negative.
However, generally speaking, the results of the analysis of this stage hardly
provide new insights explaining decentralization among Russian regions. Most
results reported so far are robust to the variation of specifications and inclusion
of expert opinion variable. The latter are actually insignificant or not robust to
the selection of controls. Negative sign for oil and gas share observed in some
specifications may just come from a statistical fluctuation.15 Expert opinion
variables specifications become interesting only for constitutional decentraliza-
tion (where their robustness is most questionable). The most robust outcome is
that republic with larger distance from average income have a higher devolution
15One should recall, that in the 1990s oil extraction was controlled by the private business,
and even state-owned gas giant Gazprom was virtually outside of the control of the federal
government – so, an effect of significant federal pressure through control over businesses is
hardly present here.
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Table 2.3: Expert opinion variables and different specifications: summary of
results
Indicator Fiscal Regulatory Regulatory Constitutional
decentralization decentralization decentralization decentralization
(share) (number) (ordered logit)
Territory ++ + +
Population (+) +++ +
Oil and gas - +
Income p.c. - -
Distance from average income - - - - ++
Dummy autonomous region (-) + - n.a.
Dummy republic + +++ +++ n.a.
Distance from Moscow ++ (++) +++ +
Dummy border region +
Urbanization (+) - +
Fiscal transfers ++
Tensions
Power sharing agreement
Democratization - +++
Power -
Declarations
Regulatory capture
Notes: three signs mark a variable which has identical significant effect in all specifications.
++ mark variable which has identical significant effect in most in specifications including
full sample. + marks variable which significant effect in at least one specification. () indicate
that the result is not robust to outliers. Share of Russians not included in the table, since its
significant and negative sign crucially depends on presence of dummies republic /
autonomous region
index. This is predictable given the hypotheses discussed above. Democracy
level has a strong positive impact on the level of declarations. Thus, at least
for the constitutional decentralization democracy indeed seems to be a factor
supporting the desire for autonomy. However, the small sample for the consti-
tutional decentralization makes the analysis of course problematic. Moreover,
while in the basic specifications the likelihood ratio test did not suggest a viola-
tion of proportional-odds assumption, this is not the case for specifications with
expert opinion variables. The usual way to solve the problem is to estimate the
generalized ordered logit regression; however, in a very small sample with four
cut-off levels it is extremely problematic. 16
16Nevertheless, I still tried to apply this method for all regressions where proportional-odds
assumption might be problematic. Unfortunately, most results are extremely non-robust (and
also do not confirm observations for ordered logit). Nevertheless, the results with respect to
distance from the average income and fiscal transfers seem to be relatively robust in terms of
sign and significance. The only interesting observation is that more variables get significant
for higher cut-off levels – though the sign varies from level to level. Small size of the sample
does not allow further investigation. Democracy level turns its sign; now it becomes negative
and significant. A conservative approach would allow me to claim that there is a relatively
stable positive association between fiscal transfers and distance from the average income on
the one side and constitutional decentralization on the other; further outcomes are not robust
and may be driven by the specification and (violated) proportional-odds assumption.
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2.5.3 Extreme bounds analysis
A more formal way to approach the problem of robustness of specifications,
which becomes crucial in a small sample environment, is to implement an ex-
treme bounds analysis (EBA). Once again, this method has its merits and de-
merits. On the one hand, it is a more systematic analysis of effect of specification
on estimation outcomes. However, on the other hand, while so far my selection
of specifications was at least partly driven by the structure of theories, the EBA
simply looks at all possible combinations of regressors. Theoretically, it is possi-
ble that the “true” result is reflected just by one specification, which is “lost” in
endless combinations of EBA. Hence, it is important to interpret the results of
EBA in a conservative fashion: while they are unlikely to give evidence against
the influence of certain parameters on decentralization, if the covariates survive
the EBA, it provides additional argument in favor of the influence.
The basic approach to the EBA was developed by Leamer (1978); this chap-
ter applies both most popular versions of extreme bounds analysis used in the
literature. The original suggestion (see e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992) was to
estimate the upper and the lower bounds by taking all possible combinations
of regressors and to look at the smallest estimate minus two standard errors
and at the largest estimate plus two standard errors. If the null is within the
interval formed by the upper and the lower bounds, the impact is not robust.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes a less extreme version of the approach, consider-
ing the entire distribution of the coefficient. In this case the coefficient is robust
if the CDF(0) statistics is sufficiently high. Most applications of the EBA in the
literature assume some variables to be present in all regressions (mostly because
of theoretical results or research traditions) and vary the rest. Unfortunately,
the literature on endogenous decentralization is too young to develop similar as-
sumptions. So, I take all possible combinations for all possible variables (from
bivariate regression to regression with all possible covariates). Unfortunately, in
this setting the multicollinearity can impose very high volatility of coefficients
over regressions; however, there is no better theoretically motivated alternative.
The EBA for fiscal and regulatory decentralization is performed for 16 variables:
territory, population, share of oil and gas, income per capita, distance from av-
erage income, dummy autonomous region and dummy republic, distance from
Moscow, urbanization, fiscal transfers, tensions (RUIE), power (Jarocinska),
dummy power sharing agreement, democratization, declarations and regulatory
capture: so, regressions include from 1 to 16 covariates. I do not perform EBA
for constitutional decentralization, given that the sample is extremely small.17
Of course, for the EBA for each variable I use only regressions including this
variable. As a robust result I consider only variables with CDF(0) > .95 as in
Sala-i-Martin (1997).
17However, experiments with EBA for constitutional decentralization were performed, and
yielded no robust covariates surviving the extreme bound analysis.
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The results are reported in Table 2.4. From the point of view of the origi-
nal Levine and Renelt approach, there is not a single variable with both upper
and lower bounds strictly larger (or smaller) zero. This is hardly surprising and
quite typical for empirical research. However, the Sala-i-Martin approach yields
some robust variables, mostly identical to those reported above.
For the fiscal decentralization I find a robust and positive impact of the size
of the territory, of the population and of the distance from Moscow, as well
as robust negative impact of distance from the average income and of popula-
tion. The results fit the previous observations with the only exception of the
population, which turns out to have a robust impact because of a multitude of
regressions where territory is absent (and population is highly significant and
negative). This is to a certain extent an artifact of the extremely agnostic per-
ception of the set of controls applied here.
Nevertheless, the observation is interesting, because it is counterintuitive: it
seems that large regions (by population) have smaller bargaining power vis-a-
vis the federal center, while large regions (by territory) have larger one. One
should be aware of the fact that for the Russian data territory and population
are negatively correlated: in Russia large regions in terms of their territorial size
are almost always located in the Siberian part of the country and exhibit very
small population (not just in terms of density, but also in absolute numbers).
One conclusion from this result may be that territory is indeed a strong bar-
gaining instrument in the center-region relations in Russia and population does
not really matter - and becomes significant only if territory is dropped and thus
the correlation between territory and population influences the results. Since
almost all papers in economics define ”size of the nation” in terms of population
(cf. Alesina and Spolaore, 2003), this result is particularly important: probably,
geographical territory is an aspect which is worth thinking about.
For the regulatory decentralization measured by the share of acts I find a robust
and positive impact of distance from Moscow and of the dummy republic. These
results just confirm the regularities reported above.
For the regulatory decentralization measured by the number of acts the EBA
establishes positive and robust impact of population and of dummy republic and
distance from Moscow (once again, as above), as well as of territory (again, one
may be dealing with statistical artifact similar to that for fiscal decentralization)
and declarations. The last result is interesting; it means that active proclama-
tions of secessionist or autonomist desires in the early 1990s effectively led to
higher regulatory devolution. Since the declarations variable is measured for the
early 1990s, and the majority of the acts were passed in the second half of the
1990s, there is obviously no reverse causality. However, there may be measure-
ment problem: for example, experts of the Ministry may pay more attention to
the regions which were likely to challenge federal government in the early 1990s.
Declarations are also highly correlated with the dummy republic, so the result
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may come from regressions where this variable is absent. Moreover, unlike pre-
vious results, the EBA finds a negative and robust effect of dummy autonomous
okrug. The interpretation is identical to that for dummy republic: subordinate
status of autonomous okrugs as second-level “subjects of the Federation” seem
to make them less active in developing the legislation contradicting the federal
one. However, the outcome may be driven by regressions, where population is
excluded: an autonomous okrugs are extremely small in these terms.
In the Table 2.5 I estimate the regressions, including only robust variables.
The results support the intuition and the outcomes of basic specifications: for
regulatory decentralization territory and for fiscal decentralization population
turn to be insignificant; declarations and dummy autonomous okrug are insignif-
icant. Excluding Primorski krai from regressions for regulatory decentralization
does not change the results.
2.5.4 Endogeneity
The last part of the analysis, finally, directly considers the problem of endogene-
ity. Although it was expected to generate substantial problems, actually, most
variables used in the specifications are either stable over time or time-invariant
and therefore unlikely to be subject to reverse causality (territory, population,
distance from Moscow naturally, dummy republic or dummy autonomous okrug
because they were completely pre-determined by the Soviet territorial organi-
zation) or insignificant. Obviously, time-invariance solves the reverse causality
problem, but still calls for caution in terms of possible common cause for the
covariate and the dependent variable, which may create endogeneity bias. This
common cause could be rooted deeply in the historical development, and there-
fore difficult to control for statistically. One could probably cautiously claim
that for the Russian data and five variables mentioned above this problems
are less pronounced because the center-region bargaining for autonomy is an
extremely recent phenomenon not really rooted in the history (due to the po-
litical structural break in Russian development in 1990-1991), but even in this
case an unambiguous clarification is difficult. Moreover, as already mentioned,
the results which remain robust in most specifications one should also hardly
be worrying about the problem of endogenous controls: obviously, exclusion of
variables may create an omitted variable problem, but it is unlikely to run in
the same direction as the reverse causality.
Therefore one could cautiously conclude that for five variables mentioned the
endogeneity problem is probably less likely to influence the estimation results.
One should notice that it is impossible to make any claims with respect to the
results for which the null hypothesis was actually not rejected or happened to
be rejected in a non-robust fashion through different specifications: for this
variables endogeneity bias may make me ignore actually existing effects - once
again, a reason for caution.
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Table 2.4: Extreme bounds analysis of the determinants of decentralization
Variable Average Average Lower bound Upper bound CDF(0) No.
coefficient standard error CDF(0) regressions
Fiscal decentralization
Territory 0.041 0.015 -0.02 0.149 0.997 32767
Population -0.015 0.006 -0.041 0.018 0.987 32767
Oil and gas -0.015 0.058 -0.472 0.28 0.601 32767
Average income per capita 0.039 0.044 -0.238 0.39 0.812 32767
Distance from average income per capita -0.116 0.048 -0.501 0.205 0.992 32767
Dummy autonomous region -0.029 0.045 -0.313 0.271 0.742 32767
Dummy republic 0.017 0.033 -0.159 0.146 0.698 32767
Distance from Moscow 0.009 0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.998 32767
Urbanization 0.837 1.236 -4.514 5.891 0.751 32767
Fiscal transfers -0.026 0.09 -0.513 0.356 0.615 32767
Tensions (RUIE) 0.004 0.13 -0.064 0.081 0.62 32767
Power -0.018 0.019 -0.136 0.092 0.83 32767
Power sharing agreement 0.011 0.017 -0.057 0.085 0.743 32767
Democratization -0.003 0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.941 32767
Regulatory capture -0.005 0.053 -0.204 0.171 0.538 32767
Declarations 0.033 0.026 -0.074 0.139 0.9 32767
Regulatory decentralization (share)
Territory 0.008 0.011 -0.041 0.061 0.762 32767
Population 0.003 0.004 -0.016 0.018 0.76 32767
Oil and gas 0.019 0.032 -0.259 0.16 0.723 32767
Average income per capita -0.003 0.023 -0.169 0.188 0.559 32767
Distance from average income per capita -0.008 0.027 -0.253 0.187 0.622 32767
Dummy autonomous region -0.006 0.021 -0.16 0.115 0.609 32767
Dummy republic 0.052 0.017 -0.026 0.138 0.999 32767
Distance from Moscow 0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.019 0.968 32767
Urbanization -0.821 0.506 -2.894 2.346 0.946 32767
Fiscal transfers 0.049 0.042 -0.167 0.259 0.878 32767
Tensions (RUIE) -0.015 0.01 -0.068 0.025 0.927 32767
Power 0.009 0.012 -0.044 0.083 0.78 32767
Power sharing agreement -0.017 0.012 -0.058 0.017 0.929 32767
Democratization -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.709 32767
Regulatory capture -0.013 0.039 -0.176 0.114 0.627 32767
Declarations 0.017 0.013 -0.058 0.065 0.904 32767
Regulatory decentralization (number)
Territory 0.164 0.091 -0.256 0.636 0.965 32767
Population 0.106 0.037 -0.084 0.255 0.998 32767
Oil and gas 0.259 0.343 -1.674 1.609 0.775 32767
Average income per capita 0.012 0.211 -2.046 1.741 0.522 32767
Distance from average income per capita 0.093 0.25 -2.034 2.572 0.645 32767
Dummy autonomous region -0.76 0.181 -2.45 0.287 0.999 32767
Dummy republic 0.526 0.173 -0.401 1.268 0.999 32767
Distance from Moscow 0.055 0.024 -0.044 0.173 0.989 32767
Urbanization -4.495 4.574 -31.708 20.473 0.837 32767
Fiscal transfers 0.343 0.448 -2.298 2.641 0.778 32767
Tensions (RUIE) -0.148 0.097 -0.718 0.237 0.936 32767
Power 0.146 0.12 -0.418 0.965 0.889 32767
Power sharing agreement -0.05 0.114 -0.411 0.394 0.67 32767
Democratization 0.001 0.01 -0.045 0.042 0.538 32767
Regulatory capture -0.141 0.402 -1.604 1.258 0.637 32767
Declarations 0.273 0.138 -0.401 0.846 0.977 32767
Notes: all regressions estimated with OLS (fiscal decentralization, regulatory
decentralization as share of contradictions) and negative binomial (regulatory
decentralization as number of contradictions). All estimates use robust standard errors.
Average indicators weighted by the value of log likelihood. CDF(0) calculation approach
assuming normal distribution (case 1 by Sala-i-Martin, 1997) is used. Robust variables are
marked bold. Retail trade and net profit from are not included in the fiscal decentralization
regressions to avoid the multicollinearity.
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Table 2.5: Regressions with robust variables according to the EBA, 1995-1999,
dep. var.: fiscal and regulatory decentralization
(EBA1) (EBA2) (EBA3) (EBA4) (EBA5)
OLS OLS OLS Negative binomial Negative binomial
Fiscal Regulatory ) Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory
decentralization decentralization decentralization decentralization decentralization )
(share) (share) (number) (number)
Territory 0.045*** 0.089 0.145**
(0.015) (0.081) (0.072)
Population -0.009 0.109*** 0.098***
(0.007) (0.026) (0.024)
Distance from average income -0.048***
(0.012)
Distance from Moscow 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.056*** 0.035**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) (0.015)
Dummy republic 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.587*** 0.617***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.167) (0.160)
Dummy autonomous okrug -0.214 -0.154
(0.144) (0.134)
Declarations 0.044 0.024
(0.137) (0.130)
Constant 0.648*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 4.946*** 5.031***
(0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.358) (0.343)
Observations 88 88 87 88 87
R2 0.229 0.288 0.304
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.034
Primorski krai included Yes Yes No Yes No
Note: see Table 2.2
There are, however, several cases when the endogeneity problem may be driv-
ing the robust results. The most troubling cases are distance from the average
income for fiscal and constitutional decentralization and fiscal transfers and
distance from the average income (both robust results) for constitutional de-
centralization. In what follows I examine the problem more closely, using the
instrumental variables techniques. One should notice, that the chosen instru-
ments are often not unambiguous; hence, the results should be treated with
caution.
In case of fiscal decentralization the link between fiscal policy and economic
performance in Russian regions is questionable (as I will show in the following
chapters), probably indicating that the endogeneity problem may not be crucial.
The choice of instruments is not so simple: although virtually all variables are
related to growth, all variables may act as proxies for preference distance and
thus impact the decentralization. The theory existing so far does not allow us
to make a clear choice. My choice of instruments is primarily empirically moti-
vated (and hence should be treated with extreme caution): an instrument I use
in this setting is the absolute value of the difference between the mean number
of conclusions (positive and negative) in the Federal Register for a region and
the number of conclusion for this specific region (denoted as ”differences in con-
clusions” henceforth). The variable is significant in the first stage (the F-value
is, however, much smaller than 10 suggesting a weak instrument problem) and
insignificant in the second stage.
The instrument used looks like an analogue of the distance of the number of acts
(or conclusions) in a particular region from the federal average. Assuming the
density of regulation has an impact on economic performance, it is likely to influ-
ence distance from average income. In the empirical case of this paper it is also
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unlikely to be related to fiscal decentralization, because, as shown above, fiscal
decentralization and regulatory decentralization have little in common (though,
once again, here my argumentation comes from the empirical observations and
is therefore flawed). It is also difficult to come to a conclusion why the number
of acts in a region may impact its devolution from the taxation point of view.
Moreover, although the degree of devolution may have an impact on the policies
of the Ministry of Justice, the latter most certainly does not look at fiscal affairs
(which are far outside of its field of responsibility).
In Table 2.6 I report some specifications for the IV estimator. Although the
result yields the expected sign, it is not always significant, partly depending
upon specification and choice of controls.
The problem of endogeneity for constitutional decentralization may be more
important. There is a substantial literature linking interbudgetary grants to
loyalty of Russian regions to the center (Treisman, 1996, 1998; Solanko, 1999;
Popov, 2004; Jarocinska, 2004; Dombrovsky, 2006): the question is whether it
is the “loyal” or the “secessionist” regions receiving higher amount of funds, but
for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient that the link might exist. Higher
declared autonomy may as well have an impact on political process and thus
on democratization levels. However, for a sample of 20 observations it is hardly
possible to solve the problem. Moreover, IV estimation in models with discrete
outcomes can be problematic, since it generally does not provide point identifi-
cation. Point identification is possible with triangular models, which, however,
impose restrictive assumptions (cf. Chesher, 2008). One of the possible ways
to at least approach the problem is to apply a two-stage ordered logit model
(for specifications where proportional odds assumption was not violated) with
Murphy-Topel standard error correction; implementation of this approach for
applied research is discussed by Hole (2006). I have experimented with this
approach, using as the instrument for distance from average income, as above,
differences in conclusions; and for fiscal transfers the average retail trade in the
region is applied.18 Unfortunately, the experiments with different specifications
give insignificant results, though the sign remains after the instrumentation.
Hence, the effects are likely to be caused by endogeneity.
2.6 Conclusion
Decentralization encompasses multiple aspects with partly sophisticated connec-
tion to each other. This chapter tried to look at both interrelation of different
aspects of decentralization and the factors of the endogenous devolution using
18This instrument may be a good predictor for fiscal transfers, because it is an important
indicator for the tax base generated by the regional economy. On the other hand, the variable
is unlikely to have any effect on constitutional decentralization; the only way how the variable
could have an impact on the decentralization process is through income per capita, which, as
already mentioned, turned to be insignificant. In fact, both instruments are highly significant
in first-stage OLS regressions and insignificant while added to ordered logit regressions.
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Table 2.6: Endogeneity of distance from average income, 1995-1999, dep. var.:
fiscal decentralization
(IV1) (IV2) (IV3) (IV4)
IV IV IV IV
Territory 0.043** 0.047** 0.052** 0.052**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022)
Distance from Moscow 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.007* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Oil and gas 0.046 0.057 0.004 0.005
(0.124) (0.132) (0.521) (0.396)
Distance from average income -0.066* -0.088* -0.02 -0.02
(0.039) (0.050) (0.181) (0.148)
Dummy republic 0.01 0.002 0.002
(0.033) (0.043) (0.037)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.067 0.027 0.027
(0.044) (0.118) (0.087)
Retail trade 0 0
(0.002) (0.002)
Net profit -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
Population 0
(0.017)
Constant 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.628*** 0.628***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.051)
Observations 88 88 88 88
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.229 0.236 0.236
F-stat 11.20*** 7.28*** 12.81*** 19.71***
First stage: t-stat for external instrument 4.55*** 3.98*** 1.63 2.13**
Note: see Table 2.2.Instrument is difference in conclusions for distance from average income
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the example of the Russian Federation. In an asymmetric setting with weak
rule of law and public hierarchy different forms of devolution became subject of
bargaining between the federal government and the regions. However, identical
agents seem to generate completely different outcomes for different components
of the decentralization process. In particular, I looked at the decentralization at
the rules level, i.e. allocation of authorities set by regional constitutions, as well
as at the decentralization at the outcomes level, i.e. split of tax revenue and the
regulation authority. Indeed, constitutional and both post-constitutional level
forms of decentralization are not correlated to each other. It is important to
notice, that the chapter does not attempt to reveal a “true” or “correct” mea-
sure of decentralization: all three dimensions may be relevant depending upon
the particular policy and research question – one should just carefully identify
what one is looking for.
Moreover, different aspects of decentralization are driven by different sets of
factors. While fiscal decentralization is influenced by some bargaining power
(territory, distance from Moscow) and preference (distance from the average
income) parameters, regulatory decentralization is heavily determined by the
bargaining rules and / or path dependence (status of the republic). Distance
from Moscow seems to be the only variable influencing both dimensions of de-
centralization. Generally speaking, geography (distance from Moscow, territory
of the regions) appears to be a very strong factor influencing the endogenous
decentralization. Since Russia is a relatively well developed country (and does
not have the “classical” problems of developing world, where certain parts of
the territory may be simply cut off from the central administration), this re-
sult is especially interesting. Finally, the sets of outliers for regulatory and
fiscal decentralization differ completely. Constitutional decentralization seems
to be related to parameters like distance from the average income and fiscal
transfers; however, estimations are extremely problematic due to small sample,
proportional-odds assumption and endogeneity and do not seem to be robust in
the extreme bounds analysis.
There are a number of limitations for the study from the point of view of the
generalization of results. First, all indicators have limited ability to measure
the underlying decentralization concepts. Second, the contradiction between
unilateral and bilateral devolution and formally highly symmetric design of the
Russian federalism may influence the results. Third, I am considering a rel-
atively short time period in an unstable institutional, economic and political
environment. For example, the data includes the period of economic crisis in
1998, which had a profound impact on the behavior of all bargaining parties.
Finally, this chapter has only limited ability to resolve the endogeneity problem
(as usually); hence, the results should be treated rather like correlations than
causal links. Nevertheless, it still provides additional evidence in favor of the
suspicion that different aspects of decentralization are really different from each
other in terms of determinants and outcomes, what may be quite important for
the empirical studies of the factors and impact of decentralization.
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The result of the chapter is certainly intriguing from the point of view of the
standard empirical analysis of decentralization: it shows that post-constitutional
and constitutional indicators do not necessarily correlate. One could probably
claim that the constitutional indicator I use does not explicitly include data
for the allocation of fiscal and regulatory authorities. However, the problem
is actually even broader: from the constitutional point of view Russia should
not experience any systematic asymmetry for budgets and regulations (with the
only exception of that caused by differences in tax bases). And, while regulatory
decentralization may be probably explained by the weakness of the central gov-
ernment unable to control regional jurisdictions, fiscal decentralization, given
the technical aspects of tax collection in Russia, is particularly surprising. So,
the question becomes whether the retention rates simply ”mismeasure” the true
allocation of authorities (and hence are just a statistical coincidence), or they do
represent some systematic differences in economic policies. The very fact that
the retention rates are correlated with a set of theoretically predicted variables
suggests that the second claim is true; but it is still necessary to understand
which factors actually drive the post-constitutional redistribution of fiscal flows.
The next chapter presents some evidence regarding one of these mechanisms,
based on manipulations with tax auditing and tax collection.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Tax Collection
and Fiscal Decentralization:
The Case of Russia1
3.1 Introduction
Economic analyses of decentralization usually focus on formal rules determin-
ing the allocation of public revenue, expenditure or fiscal responsibilities. The
empirical indicators of decentralization are treated as (noisy) measures of allo-
cation of power by law. It happens though that the de-facto distribution of fiscal
resources deviates substantially from what is set in the legal norms. The real
issue is not simply to measure fiscal decentralization, but to distinguish between
de-facto and de-jure fiscal decentralization and understand the reasons for the
emergence of the gap. These reasons have however not been explored in the
literature. In this chapter we look at one particular channel of distribution of
fiscal resources, which is present in centralized federations with administrative
powers of the sub-federal jurisdictions (administrative federalism) in which the
federal government sets tax rates and bases, and the rules of tax collection. In
this framework de-facto fiscal decentralization is defined as an increase of the
tax retention rate, i.e. the share of tax revenue generated from a certain ter-
ritory obtained by the regional government; and in this sense decentralization
can vary among different regions. Then regional governments can manipulate
tax auditing and tax collection such that de-facto shifts in fiscal decentralization
occur.
Specifically, there is no reason to believe that regions (if they control tax collec-
tion activi-ties) are equally thorough to enforce tax laws, when a larger share of
1The chapter was written together with Lars P. Feld; hence the use of pronoun ”we”
throughout the chapter
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tax revenue collected is attri-buted to the federal government, as compared to
taxes, which mostly benefit regional budgets. One particular result of ”selective
application” of legal procedures is the emergence of tax arrears, which can be
defined as the ”uncollected” portion of taxes (see below for a more detailed defi-
nition). It is possible to hypothesize that tax arrears would mostly accumulate
on the expense of the federal center, i.e. taxes with a higher regional share are
more actively collected than those mostly attributed to the center. Obviously,
this behaviour would result in de-facto fiscal decen-tralization (in contrast to de-
jure decentralization). The federal center can also be interested in the ”hidden”
re-centralization through strategic tax collection without changing the formal
rules of the game. In this sense the behaviour of the tax authorities is strategic,
i.e. distribution of effort between different taxes is not random, but rationally
determined through the interaction of the regional/ federal governments and
the tax administrators.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to empirically investi-
gate strategic tax collection as a tool for de-facto fiscal decentralization (as well
as one of the first to address the issue of strategic tax collection at all). We
test conjectures on strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian
Federation, which is an interesting case for such an analysis due to sig-nificant
shadow economy and tax avoidance which form the basis for selective tax au-
diting and collection, and unilateral evolution in the 1990s and recentralization
in the 2000s that provide for a laboratory to study the impact of shifts of rel-
ative bargaining power between government levels. The downside of studying
Russia consists in potential difficulties in modelling Russian fed-eralism econo-
metrically. On the one hand, Russia has been an extremely asymmetric country
both in terms of constitutional, political, economic and fiscal structures. This
suggests a potential impact of influential cases on the estimation results. On
the other hand, the transition from Yel-tsin to Putin poses additional modelling
problems, for example the timing of changes. We employ a variety of estimation
techniques to account for these challenges. Given the available data, we focus
on strategic tax collection, i.e. manipulation of efforts by tax authorities after
”uncovering” the hidden part of the tax base that is supposed to be collected,
and disregard strategic tax audit-ing, i.e. manipulation of efforts to ”uncover”
the hidden part of the tax base in the first place.
The chapter contributes to two strands of the literature. First, there has been
relatively small and mostly theoretical research on determinants of strategic tax
collection and tax auditing by regional governments in centralized federations
(Cremer and Gahvari, 2000; Cai and Treisman, 2004; Stw¨hase and Traxler,
2005). The claim that some regional governments are relatively lax in their tax
auditing as compared to others has been made for Germany (Baretti, Huber and
Lichtblau, 2002), Belgium (Cremer and Gahvari, 2000) and Spain (Estreller-
More, 2005). Naturally, this issue becomes more important in developing and
transition economies, since a deficit of the rule of law provides for additional
opportunities for regional governments and enterprises to collude. However,
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the empirical research on strategic tax collection is still very limited, especially
because it is difficult to come up with a reasonable proxy for tax collection
and auditing activity. The Russian Federation provides us with this proxy,
which is certainly imperfect, but at least makes the empirical research in the
field generally possible. Several papers use this advantage in different micro-
and macro-level settings (Treisman, 1998; Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2004;
Slinko et al., 2005; Yakovlev, 2006), but the link between strategic tax collec-
tion and fiscal de-centralization has not been explored so far.2 Moreover, unlike
the existing research on the Russian federalism, our data set covers the period
between 1995 and 2006, and therefore does not only include the first term of
Yeltsin’s presidency, but also his second term and a significant part of Putin’s
first and second terms. To our knowledge, this chapter is thus also one of the
first attempts to empirically studying the changes in Russian fiscal federalism
under Putin in the 2000s.
Secondly, the chapter contributes to the literature on positive analysis of factors
of decentralization, as it has been described in the Introduction to the disser-
tation. It does so by considering the impact of strategic tax collection on fiscal
decentralization, but also by looking at other determinants of decentralization
in Russia, which yield a number of interesting insights. The chapter is orga-
nized as follows: section 2 describes the basic logic of strategic tax collection in
centralized federations with different allocations of de facto bargaining power
between levels of government. It also clarifies the concepts of tax auditing and
tax collection as they are used in this chapter. Section 3 shows why Russia is a
good laboratory for studying this effect. Section 4 describes the data, and the
section 5 discusses the econometric methodology. Sections 6 and 7 present our
findings and discusses their potential implications. The last section offers some
conclusions.
2In that respect this chapter is complementary to Treisman (2003) who discusses the
influence of decentralization on tax arrears of Russian regions in the period of 1994-1997.
According to his results, regions with larger en-terprises have higher tax arrears, the election
of a Communist governor is positively correlated with tax arrears, and territories in which
the share of regional government increased most in the previous year had lower tax arrears.
In contrast to our analysis, he considers the tax arrears as an outcome of preceding fiscal
decentralization. The idea is that observing its retention rate the regional governments make
the decision on tax auditing and collection efforts. Though probably applicable for the early
period of development of the Russian Federation, this approach seems to be less reliable if
we consider its later political-economic structure based on administrative federalism. In a
centralized federation, de jure retention rates are identical for all regions (as it is the case for
Russia); differences in retention rates (fiscal asymmetries) arise from differences in economic
structure predetermining the tax base and the activity of tax collection agencies, i.e. tax
auditing and tax collection. This line of causality is also of greater scientific importance, it is
applicable not just to Russia, but is a general issue of centralized federations.
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3.2 Tax auditing and tax collection in a central-
ized federation
We start with considering a general (and unavoidably simplified) setting, which
should then be adapted for the institutional specifics of the Russian case. The
existing literature on strategic tax auditing (see e.g. Sto¨whase and Traxler,
2005) models the auditing effort as a probability p of detection of tax evasion
(which is a choice variable for the tax authority given that the tax rate is ex-
ogenous). For our purposes we transform the concept as follows. Assume that
there exists a population of firms in the economy with overall real profit πR
(instead of profit one could consider any other tax base); however, the officially
declared profit, which should be used as the tax base, is πD < πR. The gov-
ernment does not take the declarations of firms for granted and implements tax
auditing measures in order to find out real profit. Then on average, assuming
the detection probability p, the uncovered profit of the firms after tax auditing
is πD+ (πR - πD)p. For any p < 1 (i.e. when the auditing is imperfect) the
detected profit after tax auditing is smaller, than real profit.
However, it would be too simple to assume, that the government is indeed
able to tax the detected profit. The results of tax auditing are usually sub-
ject to lawsuits and further execution procedures by law-enforcement agencies,
i.e. to tax collection activity. Loopholes in tax laws in developing or transition
countries and extreme complexity of the tax system in many developed coun-
tries provide for large opportunities to challenge the results of tax auditing.
However, the decision of the court heavily depends upon the effort invested in
preparing the case by the prosecutor, i.e. the tax authority. Moreover, in a
developing or transition economy with poor rule of law the enforcement pro-
cedure is also non-trivial and requires additional investments. So, there is yet
another choice variable for the tax authority: the probability of collecting the
detected tax (say, r). Then the tax base used for calculating the taxes due
is in fact πD+(πR–πD)pr, while the difference between this tax base and the
detected tax base (1–r)p(πR–πD) represents the uncollected tax arrears. The
structure of the tax base is represented in Figure 3.1. Naturally, the situation
can be much more sophisticated, if time delays and fines are taken into account.
In order to describe the application of tax collection and auditing in a federation
we consider a simple principal-agent framework, where a local tax authority
(agent) acts on behalf of two principals: the federal and the local (regional)
governments (as both gain from tax collection). The results of the agent’s ac-
tivity depend upon his effort and the environmental characteristics. Agent’s
utility is derived from potential benefits provided by the principals (e.g. direct
(formal and informal payments), non-monetary benefits, career advancements
etc.). Obviously, negative benefits (punishments) are possible. On the other
hand, an agent’s activity is constrained by his resources, which could be used
for tax auditing and collecting effort, i.e. tax service (given its resources) is
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Figure 3.1: Tax base after tax collection and tax auditing activities
unable to collect the total taxes due anyway. We assume that the resources
for tax auditing and collection are exogenous. Moreover, the agent can choose
between allocating effort in auditing and collection of “federal” or “regional”
taxes (or taxes with a higher share of the federal or the regional governments).
However, this allocation decision is only partly observable by the principals,
whose monitoring capacity is unequal. Hence, the principals cannot completely
distinguish between the results of the agent’s activity caused by environmental
characteristics or by allocation of his effort. Each principal maximizes his own
tax revenue regardless of the revenue of the other principal (of course, in the
real world federation may care for regional tax collection - then, however, we
simply do not find the effect in the empirical application). The agent’s benefits
depend upon the principal’s assessment of the agent’s efforts for collecting taxes
attributed to this principal regardless of total tax auditing and collecting effort.
Note that there is no incentive for the agent to reduce her overall effort, since
it only reduces the benefits; so, the decision variable is the allocation of tax
collecting activity.
This setting gives rise to at least two alternative scenarios (which correspond
to two phases of development of the Russian federalism). In the region-centered
environment the regional government has a double advantage over the federal
center: first, it has better instruments to observe both effort and environmental
conditions and, second, it has a relative advantage in bargaining power. Hence,
the benefits from the regional government are higher than those provided by
the federal government (and potential punishment also exceeds that of the fed-
eral center), as regional governments can effectively “protect” the agent from
potential federal punishment, and its resources for punishment and the benefits
for the agent exceed those of the federal center. Moreover, the agent’s ability
to “cheat” is higher with respect to the federal center than with respect to the
region. Thus, it is more likely that the agent directs his efforts in a way to better
satisfy the requirements of the local than the federal principal. Assume further
that different agents in different regions face different tax collection constraints
(because of economic heterogeneity of regions); however, the federal center is
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“equally weak” vis-a`-vis different regions.
Since the tax revenue potentially originating from the tax base generated by
the economy is not fully collected by the tax authorities, enterprises form tax
arrears (both formally claimed by the tax collection service and successfully
“hidden” from the state, i.e. (1–r)p(πR–πD) and (1–p)(πR–πD)). Then, strate-
gic tax collection and auditing influence the distribution of tax arrears: tax
arrears are larger for taxes, which are less thoroughly collected (given similar
tax bases). From this point of view one can claim that under the conditions
described above tax arrears for regional taxes are smaller than those for fed-
eral taxes (note, that in a setting with joint taxes the distinction is less strict;
one can rather argue, that taxes are more or less attractive for the federal or
regional governments). If tax arrears accumulate to the detriment of federal
taxes, the ratio of federal taxes to total taxes collected goes down (since both
the numerator and the denominator are equally affected), resulting in effective
fiscal decentralization (as defined above). Ceteris paribus, regions with higher
tax arrears therefore achieve higher fiscal decentralization. Obviously, bargain-
ing power of the federal center also varies differently in center-region relations.
Hence, for the sake of the empirical analysis, one has to control for potential
political variables influencing the ability and the willingness of the regions to
bargain with the federal center in order to establish the ceteris paribus condition
(i.e. the price of decentralization as defined by Congleton et al., 2003).
The second (federation-centered) scenario implies a shift of the bargaining power
balance to the federal center and an increase of its monitoring abilities. Hence,
the incentives for the agent are reversed: it can derive higher utility (from bene-
fits and avoiding punishments) from directing tax collection and auditing effort
into federal taxes. Note, that there are no changes of agent’s or principals’
utility functions in this setting: we assume only changes of monitoring capacity
and bargaining power. The shifts of strategic tax auditing and collection be-
havior result from actions of the agent facing constraints of limited ability to
collect taxes in general, while the principal’s action has only an indirect impact
(from bargaining over “protecting” the agent from the punishment by another
principal). The logic is exactly reverse to that of the region-centered case: tax
arrears are mostly accumulated on costs of regional governments; in the ratio
of federal tax revenue to total tax revenue the increase of tax arrears affects the
denominator much stronger than the numerator, and the regions with higher tax
arrears achieve lower fiscal decentralization.
A simple model can be helpful to understand this reasoning. Consider a region
in a federation, where two taxes with strictly separate tax bases are collected.
Denote the contested tax bases as TL for the local (regional) tax and TC for
the central (federal) tax (i.e. the portion of the overall tax bases for taxes Land
Cclaimed by the tax authority, but rejected by the taxpayer) and the declared
and uncontested tax bases as TUL and T
U
C respectively (i.e. the portion of the
overall tax base which is accepted by both taxpayer and tax authority). There-
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fore Ti = (π
R
i − πDi )pi and TUi = πDi , where i ∈ {L;C}. We disregard the
tax auditing activity and focus on tax collection (in fact, both tax auditing and
tax collection run in the same direction, so this simplification is possible). The
tax rates of both taxes for the tax bases are constant and exogenous τ (the
equal tax rates are without loss of generality). The coefficients αC and αL mea-
sure the monitoring capacity and bargaining power of respective governments
(which, in fact, run in the same direction in our story); eLand eC denotes the
tax collection effort of the tax authority to collect the regional and the federal
tax respectively, so that tax arrears a(.) are functions of respective efforts. We
focus on strategic tax collection: so, both principals and the agent know the tax
base. There is no effort necessary for collecting the uncontested tax base. Tax
arrears are defined as a share of the tax base, so that the collected tax for the
government i is (1−α(ei))Ti = (πRi −πDi )piri and a(ei) = 1–ri. The overall tax
collection effort in the region is constrained by a certain level E, so that eC +
eL = E. Therefore the problem for the tax collection authority can be written
as follows:
max
eL;eC
eαLL + e
αC
C − c(eL; eC) (3.1)
s.t.
eL + eC = E (3.2)
eC ≤ E (3.3)
eL ≤ E (3.4)
where c(.) denotes the cost of tax collection, which is increasing and strictly
concave in both arguments (the functional form of influence of alphas on the
function is without loss of generality: any increasing function of respective e and
alpha would suffice; in a similar way, c(.) is simply a differentiable continuous
function, which may as well be a function of the sum of eC and eL). The reason
for the construction of the objective function is that the principals (federal and
regional governments) provide benefits/ punishments according to the efforts
of the tax authority for “their” own tax. The last two restrictions ensure that
there is no need to increase tax collection efforts beyond a certain threshold
(simply speaking, when the tax base is completely collected). We assume that
at least one of these conditions is binding: otherwise there is a certain tax
base, which the tax collection authority is not able to collect at all. Obviously,
the problem has a corner solution: for αL> αC the tax collection authority
invests its efforts only in regional tax collection, and vice versa. Only if the
respective tax collection is complete (one of the last two conditions is binding),
the authority proceeds with investing in tax collection of the weaker government.
The share of the regional government in overall tax collection is then denoted
by:
s =
TUL + (1− α(eL))TL
TUL + T
U
C + (1− α(eL))TL + (1− α(eC))TC
(3.5)
Consider four regions, which are denoted A, B, C and D. All regions have iden-
tical tax bases for both taxes, and therefore TL, TC , EL and EC are the same.
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Regions A and C have identical (large) overall tax arrears a(eL)TL+ a(eC)TC ,
and regions B and D have identical (small) tax arrears, so that tax arrears of
A are larger than of B. A and B have higher bargaining power vis-a`-vis the
federal center and αL> αC , and for regions C and D the opposite holds. There-
fore, differences in tax arrears between A and B and C and D arise through
the overall restriction on tax effort E (which is larger by the second region in
each pair). Considering regions A and B (the region-centered scenario) it is
straightforward that they both collect the total regional tax and form federal
tax arrears: then A has larger federal tax arrears than B, and both have iden-
tical (zero) regional tax arrears (this is of course an extreme simplification of
reality, where regional tax arrears can arise even in spite of effort invested by
the respective government – from the empirical point of view one can look at it
as the “noise” in the data); hence sA > sB (where the superscript denotes the
respective region), On the contrary, for C and D (the federation-centered case)
both regions have identical (zero) federal tax arrears and C has larger regional
tax arrears than D. Then sD > sC .
As we show in the next section, these two statements give rise to two hypotheses
we can test. In fact, one could say that in a federation-centered case a region
with huge tax arrears is extremely centralized, and in a region-centered case
the same region with the same tax arrears is extremely decentralized. However,
any empirical specification has to control for differences in tax bases and in bar-
gaining power. Obviously, the retention rate per se is of secondary importance,
since the government is looking at the absolute size of its budget. It is hence
important to notice that the “fiscal decentralization” as defined in this section
is just a by-product of the decisions of governments, motivated by the desire to
increase their overall fiscal revenue, which can, however, be used in an empirical
study to identify the behavior of interest.
3.3 Strategic tax collection and Russian fiscal
federalism
The ideal playground for studying the strategic tax collection problems should,
as it follows from our previous discussion, have two main features: high central-
ization of formal fiscal authorities (but possible decentralization of tax adminis-
tration) and low external constraints E making manipulation with tax collection
effort attractive. In what follows we will try to show that the Russian federalism
indeed meets these two criteria.3 With respect to the first characteristic, it suf-
fices to refer to the discussion of the asymmetric fiscal federalism in Russia in the
Introduction to the thesis to see the major research puzzle: highly centralized
fiscal federalism is combined with enormous degree of fiscal asymmetry in terms
of retention rates. Further subsections deal with other components required to
3In what follows we refer only to the revenue side of the fiscal structure. The expenditures
side, which has been more decentralized, is outside the scope of this chapter.
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Figure 3.2: Tax arrears in the Russian Federation (as of December 31 of respec-
tive year).
Source: Goskomstat
justify the use of Russian sample for studying strategic tax collection.
3.3.1 Manipulation of tax collection effort
Throughout the last two decades the tax collection in Russia remains a difficult
task. First, Russia experienced increasing tax evasion in the first ten years of
transition resulting from a deficit of current financial assets and the so-called
“mutual arrears networks” (unsettled claims of enterprises persisting for years)
of the early 1990s, of low tax morale and of a legitimacy deficit of the state as
well as inefficient enforcement (see e.g. Yakovlev, 1999, Wintrobe, 2001 or Alm
et al., 2006). In 2002-2003 the share of the shadow economy accounted for 48.7%
of Russian GDP (Schneider, 2005). After 2000, a consolidation of government
(with increasing pressure of tax authorities and state-loyal decisions of courts),
internationalization of Russian businesses requiring an increase in transparency
(Yakovlev, 2005) and advancements in tax reform (Jones Luong and Weinthal,
2004) seem to have made evasion less attractive. Moreover, the tax burden was
weakened by the introduction of the flat tax on personal income. Although em-
pirical studies on its effect are inconclusive (Ivanova, Keen and Klemm, 2005),
it appears that it mainly affected tax revenue because it has facilitated tax
collection and thus reduced the extent of tax evasion. After a permanent in-
crease of tax arrears as a share of GDP or budget tax revenue, this indicator
seems to go down since 1999 (Figure 3.2 ). Nevertheless, tax evasion remained
an important problem for the Russian economy. Even in 2003-2004 it exceeded
40% of taxes paid when considering the so-called “spacemen schemes” (which
include the creation of a short-life firm) of an average firm only (Mironov, 2006).
In the world of huge tax evasion, tax collection authority is obviously unable
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to track any hidden source of revenue. However, not only the tax audit was
problematic; tax collection has also not been an easy task because of huge en-
forcement problems enforcement problems for the tax administration (Shleifer
and Treisman, 2000). In fact, in the 1990s companies often voluntarily declared
tax arrears (i.e. claimed but unpaid portion of taxes), since the general deficit of
liquidity and the virtually absent bankruptcy law allowed them to operate even
without paying the taxes, which they recognized. The latter became subject of
various “mutual recognition” schemes, i.e. joint cancellation of fiscal claim of
the government to the enterprise (for the regional portion of taxes) and of gov-
ernment’s debt to the enterprise (e.g. for goods and services), often providing
substantial gains to (mostly regional) bureaucrats and politicians, not only in
form of individual payments, but also through re-allocation of control over at-
tractive assets and financial flows for themselves and their privileged companies
or electoral support (Treisman, 1998a; Kuznetsova et al., 2002).
On first sight, this setting seems to be a violation of the basic model described
in the previous section; however, in fact it just shifts the problem of tax collector
on a different level. Instead of finding out the “hidden” tax base the issue is to
force the enterprises to comply with a specific scheme of settlement for tax debt
allowing the government to receive certain gains from the taxpayer. Once again,
in an environment where liquidity deficit is omnipresent, the tax collector has
to allocate its effort to force the taxpayer to comply with a settlement scheme
preferred by a certain principal. In fact, the only difference is that as a result
of strategic tax collection preferred principal receives not the fiscal revenue, but
other benefits, while the arrears disappear through mutual recognition. The
other principal remains with her own tax arrears. Obviously, in this environ-
ment tax audit is irrelevant, but tax collection is still a problem. Moreover,
the recognition schemes were often an outcome of bargaining. Pappe (2000)
suggests that governmental agencies were likely to lose in a confrontation with
private businesses during the period studied (including tax matters); however,
if consolidated, they were able to succeed in any conflict. Thus, the efforts with
respect to negotiations over concerted action of different agencies could be also
manipulated, heavily affecting results.
Though the issue of claims settlement became less important since the liquidity
crisis went down, the “traditional” problem of “finding out” the “true” tax base
also remained a huge issue for the Russian tax collecting authorities throughout
the last two decades (under both Yeltsin and Putin). In this setting, strategic
tax collection also played an important role. As mentioned above, one of the
channels of strategic tax collection is the allocation of efforts in lawsuits. In
Russia, a lawsuit in taxation matters has not just been a formal step, as one
probably would expect given the low degree of judicial independence in Russia:
Russian tax authorities are notorious for a relatively low success rate in the
court. This is true not only for the period of the “weak state” under Yeltsin,
but also (contrary to the common belief) under Putin. According to the data
provided by the federal tax authority itself, in 2001-2005 72% of all disputes
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were settled in favor of the taxpayers. Moreover, even weighting by the size
of the claim, the rate of success of taxpayers in 2001-2003 exceeds 60% (and
reaches 80% in 2002), though it decreases to less than 50% in 2004 and 32% in
2005.4 In a random selection of 160 deals in transfer pricing matters in 2002-
2004 tax authorities lost about 84%, mostly because of lacking evidence and
bad documental backing of deals (Rodionov, 2005). The officials are often not
thorough enough while preparing the documents for the court. This effort is,
however, crucial for the outcome of the legal procedure. Hence, manipulating
this effort in an environment of large tax avoidance, tax authorities can pursue
the goals of strategic tax collection.5 Notice, that although individual claims of
the tax authority might as well be erroneous (or used as a source of rent-seeking
of uncontrolled bureaucrats), in aggregate in an economy with huge tax avoid-
ance they are likely to be correct.
To conclude, there are reasons to believe that the Russian federalism meets
two main requirements for studying strategic tax collection. However, these re-
quirements are sufficient to expect the presence of strategic tax collection, but
not enough to predict the potential main beneficiary of the strategic tax collec-
tion (and therefore identify the federation-centered and region-centered designs,
necessary to formulate empirical hypotheses). This is what we will attempt in
the following subsection.
3.3.2 Informal practices and tax collection under Yeltsin
and Putin
The discussion of the fiscal federalism in Russia under Yeltsin makes it reason-
able to look for instruments which are able to establish a link between economic
heterogeneity and political asymmetry to fiscal asymmetry. From this point
of view the de jure structure of the tax system should be confronted with the
de facto organization of tax collection and distribution in Russia. Technically
speaking, the federal tax administration collects all tax payments from individ-
uals and legal entities on an account in the Federal Treasury (Kaznacheistvo)
that are then distributed between different governments and governmental en-
tities. That means that all regional governments just receive their portion of
tax revenue from the federal tax service (Lavrov, 2005). The federal tax service
4By the way, this difference also supports our idea of strategic tax collection: obviously,
tax authorities seem to put more effort in disputes with larger prize to win.
5The fact that tax authorities often address taxpayers with claims which they cannot
justify is acknowledged by the high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Finance (see e.g. the
interview of Ilya Trunin, head of the Department of Tax Policy, to polit.ru, 2008, January
17). Often the tax administrators are guided by a formal or informal plan, setting their goals
to the “overall tax collection”, and therefore have clear incentives to set higher claims, given
their effort to collect them cannot be monitored completely. Even an unjustified claim is not
“completely lost” for the tax authority. The taxpayer also compares the expenses of a legal
process to defend her rights (involving substantial costs) and the benefits; in case of a smaller
claim the decision could be just to “pay and forget”. However, the costs for a taxpayer depend
on the efforts the tax administrators put into their claim.
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does formally not rely on regional administrations from the point of view of tax
collection or enforcement, nor does it require any cooperation from the regional
governments. There are also no regional law enforcement agencies (several at-
tempts to introduce a “municipal militia” were crushed by the federal center)
and no regional courts.
However, the real bureaucracy of the federal tax service does not operate as
smoothly as prescribed by the law. The main reasons for that are typical for
the Russian bureaucracy in general (and, actually, for most bureaucracies of
developing and transition countries): low qualification of public officials, often
abuses of power by public officials, high corruption etc. In this imperfect world
regions could use a variety of strategies to shift revenue in favor of their bud-
gets, e.g. “monetary surrogates” and non-cash tax collection, extra-budgetary
financial establishments with quasi-mandatory contributions of private entities
etc. Some of these institutions flourished in the 1990s, while others managed to
survive in the 2000s, and have been well studied in the literature (e.g. Genkin,
2000, Lavrov et al., 2001, Gaddy and Ickes, 2002). We focus on one particu-
lar strategy, which could drive the development of the retention rates, i.e. the
“capture” of local tax administrations by the regional governments. Regional
politicians and bureaucrats were able to develop personal relations with the of-
ficials of tax services, who, because of absent territorial rotation, stayed in their
offices for years. Given the bad federal financing of the public service, regions
could provide additional benefits for the employees of regional tax collection
authorities (e.g. housing assistance). Finally, although formally tax admin-
istrators were completely autonomous, in reality the cooperation of regional
governments was quite helpful or even necessary to deal with large taxpayers
with significant political capital which became an issue of bargaining between
governments and agencies (Enikolopov et al., 2002; Dabla-Norris et al., 2000).
This environment facilitated the emergence of tax arrears.
Of course, it would be farfetched to claim that all regional tax authorities were
successfully “captured” by the regional governments: in fact, conflicts between
regional governments and federal branches were also present. However, capture
seems to be an important factor determining the behavior of a great number
of local tax collecting agencies. Moreover, the use of different strategies may
be complementary. For example, the abovementioned “mutual recognitions”
for regional portions of tax arrears seem to have significantly exceeded those
for federal portions of tax arrears, thus, once again, reproducing the de-facto
fiscal decentralization result (see Schetnaya Palata, 2000); in order to facilitate
mutual recognition schemes (and to get benefits from them) governments used
quasi-money, extra-budgetary funds etc. However, the support of tax authority
is of course key to any endeavor dealing with taxes calculated according to the
law. Anyway, the environment observed in the Russian Federation in the 1990s
resembles the region-centered setting described in section 2; therefore the fol-
lowing hypothesis could be formulated.
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Hypothesis 1: In the 1990s (under Yeltsin’s presidency) regions with higher
tax arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus higher fiscal decentraliza-
tion in terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal center.
As already mentioned, political changes under the administration of Putin seem
to reduce the willingness and the ability to manipulate taxation in favor of the
regions. Nevertheless, the tax avoidance remained huge, and there is also no
evidence that the quality of bureaucracy in Russia increased. Given the shifts
of bargaining power between the federal center and the regions one could thus
expect that the strategic tax collection behavior changes in line with the second
(federation-centered) setting, giving rise to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: In the 2000s (under Putin’s presidency) regions with higher tax
arrears are more likely to exhibit ceteris paribus lower fiscal decentralization in
terms of tax revenue attributed to the federal center.
In fact, the measures of the federal center to improve monitoring and control
over regional branches of federal ministries seems to set incentives necessary for
the local tax authorities. Consider the most obvious way of providing incen-
tives for the local officials: personnel policy. Unfortunately, there is no empirical
evidence with respect to personnel changes in the regional tax authorities. How-
ever, there is some anecdotal evidence from other regional branches of federal
law enforcing agencies, that the federal government started an active personnel
restructuring since 2001 in order to ensure higher loyalty of regional authori-
ties to the federal center and to break the informal connections between local
governments and local branches of federal agencies. For example, in 2001 the
Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (which is also responsible for the police in
Russia) changed the heads of its regional branches in 7 regions; in 2002 it were
13 regions, in 2003 25 regions and in 2004 22 regions. Most successors of the
heads of regional police offices were not appointed from the regional staff, like
it used to be the case in the 1990s; mostly they came from other regions or
from the federal bodies of the Ministry (Voronov, 2005, see also Petrov, 2009,
for discussion of other federal agencies). It is likely, that other local branches of
federal ministries expected similar changes (which were only partly reported by
the press). But even if there were no direct changes in the tax collection service
since 2000, the very experience of other ministries and services could have a
strong impact on the behavior of regional authorities.
However, the principal-agent framework presented above does not provide any
arguments regarding strategic tax collection under increasing centralization,
typical for Putin’s presidency. On the contrary, since the influence of regional
authorities went down, there seem to be no reasons for continuing strategic
tax collection; the federal government, regaining control over regional tax au-
thorities, could implement its aims through formal legislation (and indeed, the
tax reforms since 2000 partly aimed at increasing the share of tax collection
attributed to the federal government). An alternative point of view is offered
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by the discussion of the semi-authoritarian regime in Russia, mostly originating
from political sciences. The main idea of the approach is to differentiate be-
tween “classical” authoritarianism, in which the central government is able to
enforce its objectives against other political groups via direct pressure, and the
“hybrid regime”, or “semi-authoritarianism”, in which the central government
enforces its aims through indirect or hidden channels, imitating the “formal”
democratic framework of developed countries (Olcott and Ottaway, 1999; Lev-
itsky and Way, 2002; Furman, 2007). Technically, one assumes the additional
constraints for the federal center to change the institutional environment in its
favor.
This “imitation” results from a variety of reasons. First, unlike “classical”
authoritarian regimes, semi-authoritarian governments have a vested interest in
the integration in the international community and hence in complying with the
rules of democratic societies (at least formally). Second, it can follow from a
relatively weak power concentration (as compared to “classical” authoritarian-
ism”), which makes the use of “indirect channels of control” inevitable. The idea
is that of the “blackmail state” described by Darden (2001): the federal gov-
ernment is interested in semi-illicit activities of regions to obtain an additional
instrument of control. Formal redistribution of tax revenue between the cen-
ter and the regions could be politically undesirable after certain thresholds are
passed; so, the federal center may also be interested in strategic tax auditing
as a “hidden” instrument to ensure the re-centralization goals while formally
complying with the “rules of conduct” established for democratic federations
in the international community. Hence, the semi-authoritarian approach also
provides some background for Hypothesis 2.
3.4 Data
Our analysis covers the period of 1995-2006 (12 years), which includes prac-
tically the whole history of Russian federalism – from the period of “regional
feudalism” in the mid 1990s to the current “vertical of power” under Presi-
dent Putin. The analysis covers all regions of the Russian Federation excluding
nine autonomous okrugs6 and the Chechen Republic for which no reliable data
are available. Thus, we observe 79 regions annually.7 Following the discussion
above, we estimate the influence of tax arrears (as explanatory variable and
6One autonomous okrug (Chukotka) is not part of another member of the Federation;
therefore Goskomstat provides statistical data for this region in full scale, and it could be
included in our research.
7We are forced to exclude Kalmykia in 2006, since in this year it reported negative revenue
of the federal govern-ment from its territory (because of the VAT repayment). This is not the
first time in the history of the Russian fe-deralism a region reports negative tax collection:
in the early 2000s Taimyr autonomous okrug (not part of the sample) reported negative
fiscal revenue of the regional government due to tax optimization by Norilsli Nikel, its largest
taxpayer. Moreover, for Kurgan and Tula in 2005 retention rates larger of 100% were obtained;
the data seems to come from statistical artifacts of comparing information of different sources
and hence were also excluded.
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proxy for tax collection efforts) on the distribution of tax revenue between the
center and the regions, controlling for alternative factors. From Hypotheses 1
and 2 we expect a positive sign of tax arrears in the regressions with fiscal de-
centralization as dependent variable in Yeltsin’s governing period and a negative
sign in the Putin period.
The empirical regression estimated is specified as follows:
SHARE = α0 + α1 ARREARS+ α2TAX STRUCTURE + α3
LEGAL CONTROLS + α4POLITICAL CONTROLS + ǫ.
where
• SHARE denotes the share of regional government in the overall tax rev-
enue of the region (retention rate);
• ARREARS denote the tax arrears;
• TAX STRUCTURE denotes the control variables associated with differ-
ent tax structures in different regions;
• LEGAL CONTROLS denote the control variables due to the legal struc-
ture of the federal organization in Russia and
• POLITICAL CONTROLS denote the control variables due to political
asymmetry of bargaining power and of preferences in Russia.
In what follows, we discuss the variables of the regression in greater detail.
SHARE: This indicator is obtained by dividing the revenue of the regional
government from taxation originating from a certain region by the overall tax
revenue from its territory. We use the “consolidated” regional government in-
cluding both government of the region and local governments.8 A higher share
represents less centralization as defined above.9
ARREARS: An advantage of the Russian dataset is that there are data available
on tax arrears for most of the regions and at least from 1995 onwards as reported
by the federal statistical authority. The reported tax arrears in Russia include
(1) tax obligations, which are claimed by the tax authorities, but were not paid
8Throughout the chapter the consolidated regional budget comprises the overall budget
of the region and all subordinated jurisdictions (municipalities). Since Russian regions are
highly centralized and municipalities depend on the regional governments in their essential
tasks, this is a reasonable indicator to use.
9Since the variable is bounded between zero and one, it is sometimes suggested to perform
a log-odds transformation (log (SHARE/(1-SHARE)) to obtain the independent variable. We
have used it for robustness checks and did not find any significant differences in the results of
the estimations.
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by the taxpayer (nedoimka), (2) restructured tax liabilities (e.g. when the pay-
ment of taxes was officially delayed), (3) tax liabilities not collected in due time
because of the bankruptcy of the taxpayer, (4) tax liabilities, currently under
collection by the court executives (bailiffs) and (5) liabilities from stopped tax
collection activities. This measure has certain advantages and disadvantages.
For example, it can also be influenced by events like bankruptcy of large taxpay-
ers or “wrong” claims of tax authorities, which could be later suspended by the
court. One should be aware that the measure is not an indicator of the shadow
economy and therefore does not measure the overall economic activity, which
is “ignored” (consciously or not) by the tax authorities and therefore does not
represent the tax auditing activity. However, it seems to be a good proxy for
tax collection activity as defined above.
The problem is unfortunately that, on the one hand, increasing tax arrears
may indicate less severe tax collection activities, but may on the other hand
result from more intensive tax auditing. The reasons are straightforward: tax
due identified by the tax collection authority is first registered as tax arrears
and later (often after a decision of a court) “transformed” into real tax pay-
ments. The main question is therefore whether tax collection or tax auditing
activity is really relevant for the Russian federalism. The arguments above do
not discriminate between these two processes. However, as already mentioned,
in the liquidity crisis environment under Yeltsin it was the tax collection, and
not the tax auditing issue, which dictated the fiscal process; under Putin tax
collection remained a non-trivial activity and therefore still constituted a sig-
nificant issue. Thus, our approach to the interpretation seems to be justified.
Finally, in section 3.7 we deal with alternative explanatory variables, which are,
unfortunately, available only for a short time period, and also provide some
tentative evidence in favor of our interpretation of tax arrears.
Tax arrears used in the study accumulate for all taxes due to all levels of gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation (i.e. include both “regional” and “federal”
taxes, as defined by the Russian tax law). The reason is the existence of joint
taxation which in fact forms the main revenue source for regional governments.
As already mentioned, any joint tax can be more or less attractive for regional
governments (or for the federal center) assuming different distribution of tax
revenue: therefore the tax collection effort could vary. It is probably helpful to
assume that different taxes are more or less attractive for different levels of gov-
ernment as opposed to each other rather than to use a dichotomy of “attractive”
or “not attractive” forms of taxation. The indicator used in regressions is there-
fore tax arrears per unit of gross regional product (the normalization is needed
to account for significant differences in terms of size of regions in Russia).10
We square this indicator in order to account for non-linearity in the relation
10A disadvantage of this proxy for tax collection effort is that we had to exclude nine
Russian regions (the so-called “autonomous okrugs” which are officially both members of the
federation and parts of other larger regions), for which GRP data are only available until
2000, for the aims of consistency of annual cross-sections.
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between tax arrears and decentralization.11 Indeed, the strategic tax collection
activity is non-trivial for tax authorities and associated with additional effort
for organizing strategic tax collection. Since this effort at least partly has the
character of fixed costs (or, at least, is decreasing with experience because of
learning effects), it seems to be reasonable, that only if tax arrears become very
large, the officials start really thinking about strategic tax collection; the in-
crease of tax arrears over-proportionally increases the incentives to engage in
this activity if high levels of tax arrears relative to the regional economy are
reached. For the panel data specifications we include two tax arrears indicators:
under Yeltsin and under Putin. Both are equal to tax arrears per unit of GRP
for the periods of administration of the respective president and zero otherwise.
So, we consider as an independent variable an interaction term between a time
effect and tax arrears.
TAX STRUCTURE: We include two variables accounting for economic differ-
ences among the regions. By including controls we, first, capture other factors
leading to asymmetries between regions in the tax split between the regional
and the federal budget. Mostly, they cover economic asymmetries or differences
in tax base endowments. Their major effect is that they influence the ability of
regions to collect different types of taxes. Under equal rules for distribution of
tax revenue from a region, great disproportions in the structure of tax revenue
effectively allow regional governments to have a different share in the tax rev-
enue of their territory. We control for variables roughly representing two sources
of taxation: the flow of economic activity (average income per capita) and the
stock of economic assets (capital funds).
LEGAL CONTROLS: Another group of controls represents formal factors lead-
ing to differences in tax sharing. From this point of view we include a dummy
variable for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. As mentioned above, these two re-
gions were the first to enter the direct bilateral bargaining with the federal
center in the early 1990s and to sign separate power-sharing agreements, which
allowed these republics to receive all excises and rental payments for the natural
resources instead of the federal center (Lavrov, 2005). Therefore it is reasonable
to assume, that these two regions have a significantly different share of taxes
attributed to their budgets. There are reasons to claim that the effect for these
two territories differed substantially under Yeltsin and under Putin; hence, the
regressions actually include two dummies: for these two republics in 1995-1999
(Yeltsin) and 2000-2006 (Putin).
POLITICAL CONTROLS: Finally, we include control variables capturing po-
litical bargaining power and preferences of the regional elite vis-a`-vis the federal
11Estimations without squaring tax arrears yield almost the same results: the effect for
Yeltsin survives and for Putin there are even more significant and negative outcomes (since
Kalmykia becomes more influential). Specifications with linear and squared term are hard
to justify theoretically, and, once performed, yield highly non-robust outcomes with mostly
insignificant coefficients.
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center. Naturally, these factors are partly captured by the tax arrears structure.
It has also been demonstrated by previous empirical studies cited above, that
political bargaining power plays a role. However, even if the other regions apart
from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan cannot directly influence the distribution of
tax revenue, they still have an opportunity to bargain with the federal center
in order to set taxes split in a particular way, which favors particular jurisdic-
tions given their endowment with a tax base. Therefore bargaining over policies
regarding the whole federation becomes an instrument of selective support of
different regions. There is some anecdotal evidence that strategically acting
governments influence the federal decisions on the distribution of overall taxes
(for the whole Russian Federation) to their advantage (see Petkov and Shklyar,
1999). Also, preferences account for a desire of regional elites to invest more
heavily in the bargaining process. From this point of view we estimate all regres-
sions with and without political variables, in order to check the robustness of
results (but only regressions with political variables are reported in the chapter).
The list of these controls is very similar to the previous chapter, but there
are several small modifications. Political variables, generally speaking, include
two main groups: differences in bargaining power and in political preferences.
The following bargaining factors are considered:
1. Economic potential of the region: territory, population and share of oil and
gas extraction in the region (due to importance of these resources for Russia).
The variables of economic potential (especially oil and gas share) represent both
political bargaining power and differences in the structure of tax bases and there-
fore have a double role in our model.
2. Formal status of the region. As mentioned, national republics are often ar-
gued to enjoy special privileges as compared to other units of the federation
(Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999); that is why we include a dummy for republics
in our regressions.
3. The ability of the region to secede (which is higher for border regions, for
regions with higher distance from the capital and for regions with lower share of
ethnically Russians). We include two variables to capture this effect: a dummy
for border regions and the geographical distance between regional capitals and
Moscow.
4. Over- (or under-)representation of the region in the lower chamber of the
Russian parliament. Since 1993 the Russian parliament consists of two cham-
bers: the Council of Federation, which includes one representative of the region’s
legislature and one representative of the region’s governor administration, and
the State Duma, which consists of 450 deputies, 225 elected by a system of
proportional representation and 225 elected in single member districts. The
mal-apportionment in the State Duma is of greater interest, since the mal-
apportionment in the Council of Federation is basically covered by the popula-
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tion variable among the controls (for influence of mal-apportionment on political
decisions see Samuels and Snyder, 2001).
5. Power concentration within the office of the regional governor or president
and conflict potential with the center. The most common way to measure power
is to discuss electoral statistics (share of governor in the latest elections or years
in office). The conflict potential with the center is often measured by the parti-
san status of the governor (e.g. Communist governors in the 1990s or support of
pro-presidential parties Nash Dom Rossiya, Edinstvo and Edinaya Rossiya in
the elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003). Other indicators and expert opinion could
be applied. They all are questionable to a certain extent: In Russia, cheating
and administrative manipulation of elections make their results less meaningful
for analysis. The Communist governors used to establish excellent contacts with
the center after their elections and expert opinion is always subjective. Never-
theless, in this chapter we reduce the variety of possible indicators to the power
index of Jarocinska (2004), partly including other indicators discussed above.12
6. Dependence upon federal transfers. High centralization of tax revenue re-
sulted in a relatively high dependence of many regions from the central transfers
to fulfill even their basic responsibilities. Once again, there is a de jure dimen-
sion of federal grants (which officially followed a predetermined scheme) and
de facto dimension (for example, political reasoning behind the grants distribu-
tion). The transfers are likely to influence both the size of tax arrears (since
they act, to a certain extent, as a substitute for regions’ own tax revenue) and
the degree of decentralization (through the regions’ bargaining position over
general rules of tax collection); hence, in order to avoid the omitted common
cause problem, we have to control for the impact of transfers. The issue of
transfers is interesting, as it represents a trade-off for the regions: to pay more
taxes and (probably) to receive higher compensation in form of transfers or to
pay little taxes and lose a claim for financial support from the center. In a real
world setting with asymmetric information it is possible that a region uses both
strategies or switches from one strategy to another. Regions with a relatively
high bargaining power can succeed in both strategies. We include the share of
fiscal transfers in total expenditures of regional governments to account for this
effect. Obviously, the timing of events should represent an important feature
from this point of view: if transfers are distributed before tax collection effort is
made, there should be no effect on tax collection. However, from the empirical
point of view this issue seems to be relatively intransparent. Governments col-
lect taxes throughout the year (partly on quarterly basis), and hence, there is no
12The index is calculated for 1995-2000; there is no information after 2000 available. Since
there have been a num-ber of significant political changes in Russia after this period, we
include, once again, two variables: Power (1995-2000) is equal to the actual variable in these
years and zero otherwise; Power (2001-2006) is equal to the power index in 2000 for the years
2001-2006 and zero otherwise. The interpretation of the respective coefficients, even if they
are similar, ought to be different: the latter rather reflects the path-dependent effect of power
asymmetries in the 1990s persistent even after Putin’s recentralization.
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clear “timing” vis-a`-vis transfer decisions. Moreover, the relations between re-
gional and federal governments could be analyzed as a repeated game for which
expectations should play an important role.13
The simplest way to measure the heterogeneity in political preferences is to
consider the ethnic composition of a region (share of non-Russian population)
as well as other socio-demographic indicators. In this study we included the
urbanization indicator, which proved to be significant in other empirical papers
on endogenous centralization.14 Moreover, there are significant differences in
the democratization levels of different Russian regions which also account for
heterogeneity of preferences (but also for peculiarities of regional political pro-
cess). We use the Carnegie Endowment index of democratization, which covers
all regions in our analysis and varies over time. Some bargaining indicators (like
average income per capita) also may be considered as a proxy for heterogeneous
preferences. A detailed description of all variables and the summary statistics
are provided in Appendix C.1.
3.5 Econometric strategy
As mentioned above, economic and political asymmetry of Russian federalism
and the transition from Yeltsin to Putin during the period of observation create
a series of econometric problems. Therefore we use a four-stage research strat-
egy.
First, in order to get a general “impression” on the specifics of the data, we
estimate individual annual cross section regressions by OLS. An advantage of
the Russian Federation is that the high number of regions renders this approach
statistically feasible. Already at this stage, as well as in the case of panel data
regressions, we perform a simple outlier control as an additional robustness anal-
ysis ensuring normal distribution of residuals in order to make correct inference
in a still small sample. Yet we do not take annual cross-sections as the main
13One should finally notice that a yet additional parameter of the fiscal system able to
influence the logic of our study is public debt. From the point of view of public debt, Rus-
sian regions and municipalities received loans and issued bonds of different types (Danielyants
and Potanina, 2007); moreover, in the 1990s it has been common practice for governments
in Russia to delay wages and salaries for public employees and officials, as well as other pay-
ments indefinitely. Tax arrears partly include delayed tax payments; that is why public debt
decisions can be (voluntarily or involuntarily) determined by the problems of tax adminis-
tration. However, this relation does not pose any problem for our empirical analysis given
the aim of this chapter. Another direction of causality (public debt influences the quality of
tax administration) is less reasonable: it is hardly possible to imagine a government relying
on debt if tax revenue is available (even if one ignores all budgetary principles, it is illogical,
since tax revenue is “cheaper”). There is still one aspect of the debt problems which is rele-
vant: if the payments to tax administrations are delayed, it will influence the quality of their
work. However, there is no data available to measure these delays for individual regional tax
administrations over the period of our sample.
14Although this indicator may also represent a higher bargaining power of metropolitan
areas.
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source of inference in our analysis; therefore the results are reported only in the
appendix.
Second, we address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (both region-
specific and time-specific) and run panel-data regressions with Newey-West cor-
rected standard errors. We estimate pooled cross-sections-time series models as
well as one way and two way fixed effects regressions (time and cross-section).
Regional fixed effects are helpful, as they account for unobserved heterogeneity
among regions, which seems to be very strong given the extremely asymmetric
spatial structure of the Russian economy and the political constitution of Rus-
sian federalism; pooled cross-sections and one way time fixed effects allow the
direct inclusion of institutional variables (which often do not vary across time)
into our model. Pooled OLS includes a dummy for all years when Vladimir
Putin was in office, so that one can directly observe the changes induced by the
transition of power. Under Putin the development of tax arrears and the dis-
tribution of tax revenue may be driven not only by strategic tax collection, but
also by tax reform described above. One can consider it an omitted variables
problem: the increase of both tax arrears and the share of taxes attributed to
the federal center are driven by a third variable (tax reform and intensification
of overall tax collection activity). Time FE and the Putin dummy are instru-
mental to cope with this problem.
In order to form separate variables for the Yeltsin and Putin tax arrears (as
considered above) and the dummy variable for Putin’s presidency we count the
year 2000 as the first year when Putin was already in office. Indeed, Putin
became acting president on December 31, 1999. The first shift in the structure
of federalism was in May 2000, as the president appointed his representatives
to the newly established “federal districts” in order to control local governors.
Moreover, the year 2000 was associated with a rapid change of informal rules of
the game; combined with expectations of further centralization by regional offi-
cials, one could expect the changes in strategic tax collection behavior already in
2000. However, since Putin’s rise to power was extremely quick and completely
unexpected for both population and local elites (in fact, in 1999 most influential
governors counted on the alternative candidate, former prime minister Yevgeniy
Primakov), one should not expect any changes in tax collection due to shifts in
expectations in 1999, and hence, it is reasonable to attribute this year to the
“Yeltsin period”.
Third, as mentioned above, the asymmetric character of Russian federalism
is likely to cause problems of outliers. In particular, this outcome seems to be
plausible for the Putin period, since the standard deviation of both fiscal decen-
tralization indicator (Figure 1.3 above) and tax arrears (Figure 3.3 ) increased
significantly. The latter trend can be attributed to increases of tax arrears in
a small group of regions, particularly in Kalmykia, where tax arrears exceeded
the size of its GRP or were nearly equal to it. Kalmykia did not show up as
outlier in the previous analysis based on large error terms; however, an extreme
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Figure 3.3: Statistics for tax arrears per unit of GRP in the sample of the paper.
Source: Goskomstat
size of the variable for this observation can still influence the outcomes of the
analysis. The reduction of standard deviation in 2006 is due to the already
discussed exclusion of Kalmykia from the sample.
Generally speaking, the situation in Kalmykia confirms the explanation pre-
sented above. During the 1990s this region functioned as a kind of “internal
tax haven”: extremely loyal policies of the local tax authorities combined with
the reduction of a region’s share in tax rates and privileged treatment of com-
panies with the majority of operations outside the region made it attractive for
a huge variety of firms, including several large oil giants, which used Kalmykia
for their transfer pricing design. On the other hand, the region had one of the
strongest authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Russia even compatible to that of
post-Soviet Central Asian republics (see Gel’man, 1999). The government of the
Republic dominated its economic structure. Kalmykia used to be not only one of
the strongest, but also one of the most eccentric regimes, often directly opposing
the federal government or declaring its region an “independent state” within the
Russian Federation. That is why after Putin’s rise to power Kalmykian presi-
dent Iliumdzinov had to have more fears than his counterparts in other Russian
regions. Kalmykia was also partly subject to business-government struggles of
the mid-2000s, associated with tax auditing of the largest Russian oil companies
like Yukos or Sibneft, previously using the Kalmykian offshore. The problem of
outliers requires careful econometric modeling.
The previous steps already included outlier control based on tests on normality
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of residuals. In the third stage, however, we explicitly address this issue using
two main instruments. First, we estimate least absolute deviation (median) re-
gressions with bootstrapped standard errors, which are known to be more robust
to samples with significant outliers. Second, we repeat all estimations performed
in the steps one through three excluding observations with very large values of
tax arrears and with known atypical tax policies. In particular, we exclude
three regions: Kalmykia, as well as Ingushetia and Altai Republic. Both latter
regions are well-known for using the described “tax haven strategy” based on
the special status obtained (unlike most other tax havens) through presidential
decrees to create a more favorable tax regime for companies incorporated in this
jurisdictions (partly only for specific large taxpayers associated with influential
multiregional business groups or privileged companies owned by the represen-
tatives of the regional elite). We have experimented with excluding further tax
havens (Mordovia), but the results do not change; in fact, virtually all results
are obtained immediately after excluding Kalmykia. These estimations for a
reduced sample often differ substantially from the estimations for full sample.15
The need to exclude outliers even in a region fixed effects specification is sup-
ported by highly significant Chow test: for both two-way FE and region FE the
joint significance test for the variables additionally included in the regression
and constructed by interacting all covariates with a dummy for these three re-
gions (but excluding the fixed effect itself) is significant at any reasonable level
(and equal to 21.44 and 40.97 respectively). Hence, the effect of these three
outliers is not captured completely by the intercept changes (implied by region
fixed effects); there seems to be a strong effect on the slope.
Fourth, we address the potential endogeneity bias due to a reverse causality
problem (fiscal decentralization may influence tax collection behavior). There
are theoretical reasons which make reverse causality questionable though. It
is not clear whether the bargaining and economic power of the region depend
upon the tax distribution or (as it is assumed by the empirical model) vice versa.
Theoretically, there are some reasons to believe that this problem is less rele-
vant for Russia. First, economic policies of Russian regions have been mostly
inefficient, and their economic success is mostly limited to agglomeration effects
or natural resources. Ahrend (2005) finds significant effects of fiscal policy on
economic performance which, however, vanish in his TSLS regressions. There
is some evidence from principal component analysis that fiscal policy can be
important for regional economic development reported by Mau and Yanovsky
(2002). However, Kolomak (2007) finds that investors are less sensitive to the
size or duration of tax exemptions, when implemented, than to the very exis-
tence of the investment law, and that the sub-federal tax exemptions are unable
15The choice of outliers in the paper so far has been motivated by the specifics of the
regions. One can take a more formal approach and simply use a trimmed sample: we do it
by excluding all regions which fall in 1st and 99th percentiles of the respective year. We still
obtain, for region and two way fixed effects, robust significantly posi-tive effects of Yeltsin tax
arrears (for median and least squares) and non-significant Putin tax arrears.
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to block an unfavorable industrial specialization and low development of infras-
tructure.
Second, since this chapter deals with asymmetric distribution of tax revenue
and not with differences in overall tax revenue, even effective tax policy does
not necessarily lead to biased results. There is no consistent point of view in
theory as to whether the federal center or the regions carry out more efficient
economic policies; and in Russia with its huge regional variety both variants
could be present. Therefore it is difficult to establish a clear backward causal
link between tax distribution and economic asymmetry. Nevertheless, Desai et
al. (2005) show, that there is a positive relation between some specific indica-
tors of economic performance of the regions and the retention of taxes.
Finally, endogeneity may arise if regions increase their tax administration effort
only if they are provided sufficient fiscal incentives in form of high retention
rates (see Weingast, 2007). However, first, this logic is more applicable for tax
auditing rather than for tax collection. Second, one should understand, that
in Russia retention rates represent outcomes of interaction rather than rules of
the game (which, as mentioned, require equal treatment of all regions). In fact,
one can be certain that the decision-makers in regional governments and tax
collection authorities simply do not know the retention rates (these values are
never reported and were calculated in a number of English-language publica-
tions obviously seldom consulted for regional governors). What they do observe
(and manipulate) is their overall fiscal revenue; decentralization is just an ex-
post result of the strategic tax collection and not its goal.
Nevertheless, in order to check for robustness of our results to potential en-
dogeneity we use two procedures. First, we estimate all regressions with lagged
variables (i.e. distribution of tax revenue in year t is explained by variables of
the year t-1). These estimations are helpful as tax collection of the current year
is partly calculated on the basis of past year’s revenues, which can be captured
by our additional analysis. However, according to our understanding of Russian
fiscal system, taxes are usually collected throughout the year rather than next
year (even for income tax collected by tax agents). Hence, in a rapidly changing
environment this specification may seriously miss true interaction of political
and economic variables.
The second approach is based on the instrumental variables estimator. We
use retail sales and net profits as instruments for both tax arrears under Putin
and under Yeltsin. Indeed, these variables may indicate the performance of local
enterprises, important for tax arrears formation. As these variables prove to be
largely insignificant in the panel and cross section OLS regressions and as there
are theoretical arguments that these variables influence tax arrears, they may
serve as (weak) instruments when no other, more suggestive instruments are
available. Using additional instruments suggested by Treisman’s (2003) specifi-
cation (share of agriculture and share of dominant enterprises) those turn out
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to be much weaker as instruments. In particular, the Hansen J test statistics
largely indicate over-identification. Unfortunately the quality of instruments is
much better for the Yeltsin than for the Putin tax arrears.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Strategic tax collection
The results of the four-stage strategy are reported in Tables 3.1-3.4 for panel
data and in Appendix C.2 for annual cross-sections. Panel data analysis (OLS)
and annual cross-sections yield different results. In annual cross-sections we do
not find any significant impact of the tax manipulation in the Russian Federa-
tion on the decentralization until 2000. Since 2000 we find strongly significant
evidence of influence of tax arrears on the distribution of taxes, and the sign
of the coefficient is negative in each cross-section, consistent with Hypothesis
2. However, the pooled cross-sections (both with and without year dummies or
Putin dummy) indicate a non-significant (although negative) sign of tax arrears
under Putin. This effect, however, vanishes in panel data if region fixed effects
are introduced. Given high complexity of time- and region-specific factors influ-
encing the strategic tax collection patterns, it is a sign of warning. This might
indicate an existence of a time trend in some other variables correlated with the
tax arrears and hence creating multicollinearity problem and calls to caution
in interpreting the results. Tax arrears for the Yeltsin period have the positive
sign predicted by Hypothesis 1, but are, however, mostly insignificant.
The Jarque-Bera test for all panel data and annual cross-section regressions
is significant, such that the hypothesis of normal distribution of residuals must
be rejected. This requires us to test on the robustness of the regression results
to outliers. While the estimations for Putin period are mostly robust to this
procedure, tax arrears for the Yeltsin period hold their sign after the exclusion
of outliers and even become significant in all panel data specifications (Appendix
C.2, Table C.4; Appendix C.3, Table C.5 ). Hence, provided the outliers are ex-
cluded, both hypotheses find some support. In order to check the robustness
of the results we exclude all political variables (given their relatively “vague”
nature, causing the threat of measurement errors) and control the restricted re-
gressions for the normality of residuals. Generally, this analysis does not change
our results (Appendix C.3, Table C.6 ) and even yield significant negative co-
efficients for Putin tax arrears in pooled OLS (indicating that our suggestion
of possible multicollinearity might be right). A further robustness check is to
estimate regressions for Yeltsin and Putin periods independently (i.e. assum-
ing that slopes of coefficients and intercepts are different for the two regimes).
We find no significant influences of tax arrears for the Yeltsin period (with an
unstable and only partly theory-consistent sign, see Appendix C.4, Table C.8 )
and non-robust impact of Putin tax arrears (see Appendix C.4, Table C.10 ).
78
As already mentioned, however, the estimation results seem to be heavily in-
fluenced by outliers. The results of the outlier-robust median regressions are
striking: we find support for Hypothesis 1 – a positive and significant impact of
Yeltsin tax arrears on the retention rates – in almost all specifications for the
full sample (Tables 3.1-3.4 ), and also for most specifications in estimations for
Yeltsin period (Appendix C.4, Table C.9 ). Putin tax arrears are insignificant
and non-robust in terms of sign (Tables 3.1-3.4 and Appendix C.4, Table C.11 ).
Moreover, after excluding three outliers with abnormal fiscal policies and/ or
extraordinarily large tax arrears – Kalmykia, Ingushetia and Altai Republic –
we find convincing support for Hypothesis 1 regardless of the specification, es-
timation method and sample (all years or only for the Yeltsin period). The
results for Putin tax arrears are not robust in terms of sign and mostly insignif-
icant. Hence, we find strong evidence that, controlling for outliers, regional
governments under Yeltsin were able to manipulate tax arrears in a way leading
to de-facto fiscal decentralization. The results for Putin period, if present, are
driven by several outliers and are not robust to the model specification.
Finally, we use several approaches to account for a potential endogeneity prob-
lem. The lagged variables specification basically does not support Hypothesis 1 :
Yeltsin tax arrears are mostly non-robust. The same is true for Hypothesis 2.
We caution however, that, as already noticed, given the institutional design of
the Russian fiscal federalism the lagged approach is not the most reliable one,
and hence, consider the results of these regressions as less convincing. Table 3.4
reports TSLS estimations for two-way fixed effects specification. For both spec-
ifications with and without outliers we once again find significant and positive
impact of Yeltsin tax arrears on the retention rates. Since the instruments for
Putin tax arrears are very weak, we also perform the TSLS estimation skipping
this variable, and the results do not change (yielding significance at 5% level in
full sample and at 1% level excluding three outliers). Finally, fiscal transfers,
being used as one of the control variables, are clearly endogenous. Hence, we
have also estimated all specifications and models without fiscal transfers and,
once again, did not find any significant differences.
3.6.2 Determinants of retention rates
Although our main aim is to test the strategic tax collection hypothesis in the
Russian sample, our results may also be instructive in terms of the analysis of
factors driving the differentiation of retention rates in Russian regions and thus
contribute to the understanding of positive determinants of fiscal decentraliza-
tion. From this point of view they are complementary to the results reported
in Chapter 2. The results of the panel data analysis partly follow the predicted
pattern: higher bargaining potential and/or higher heterogeneity as compared
to the Russian average lead to higher decentralization.
As expected, the dummy for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan for the Yeltsin pe-
riod has a positive sign and is significant in all specifications. In the annual
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cross-sections we find that the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have
a significantly lower share of taxes attributed to the center than the rest of the
members of the Federation until 2000 (when the centralization effort of Vladimir
Putin started). They seem to have lost their significant impact on tax collec-
tion even before the formal abolition of power sharing treaties in 2002. Even
more, for 2004 we find a negative and significant effect: it looks like the Putin’s
government specifically focused on reducing the fiscal autonomy of these two re-
gions. Similarly, it is significant in the Yeltsin regressions in Appendix C.4, but
insignificant in the Putin regressions estimated by OLS and negative and signif-
icant for some median specifications. In the panel data estimation the dummy
republic is significant and has a positive sign in the majority of regressions,
representing a higher bargaining power of republics and/or path dependency
effects. The dummy for border regions is also almost always significant and
positive, indicating higher bargaining power of potential secessionist territories
(or relative underdevelopment of the region requiring special treatment). Ter-
ritory is highly significant and positive, supporting the idea, that territory was
used as a bargaining argument in Russia. The effects of population are partly
significant, but the sign varies from specification to specification; it is negative
without region fixed effects and positive and significant with region fixed effects.
The latter sign seems also to be more in line with the hypotheses, while the for-
mer might come from the effects of interaction between territory and population.
However, we do not find any robust influence of the indices of power and democ-
racy on tax distribution (the result is sensitive to the specification of the model
because of multicollinearity problems, inevitable for an artificially constructed
index).16 It is possible to interpret this result as indicating a very low trans-
parency of tax relations between the Russian regions and the federal center.
A surprising result is, that regions with a higher share of Russian population
were associated with a higher share of taxes remaining in the region (as already
noted, this effect was probably achieved through the significance and the sign
of the coefficient in the early 2000s). To a certain extent it contradicts the com-
mon wisdom that the national republics were more secessionist and interested in
decentralization than Russian regions. Indeed, the dummy republic already cap-
tured potential secessionist tensions. Nevertheless, the result is still unexpected.
There are several explanations for this. First, regions may be more interested in
federal transfers than in taxes. It is true for both more powerful regions (which
gain from redistribution on the federal level) and heterogeneous poor regions
with large populations. Indeed, the model contains a significant positive effect
of fiscal transfers on tax distribution in favor of regions, which does not hold
after excluding outliers. Second, the treatment of the city of Moscow with a
16Power variable is in fact partly negative and significant, and the results seems to appear
more often for the 2001-2006 then for the 1995-2000 variable; hence, shadow of the past, as
in case of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, may support central government’s desire to reduce
the retention rates for formerly powerful agents (or reflect higher stability of power relations
than often perceived).
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relatively low share of tax revenue attributed to its government and excellent
indicators may influence the regressions. However, Moscow is not an outlier
(from the point of view of residuals), and so should not influence the robustness
of regressions. Third, it is possible, that higher power and higher heterogene-
ity cause an opposite effect: the federal government is even more likely to put
pressure on these regions. For example, a possible interpretation of the results
is that the centralization pressure from the center in the early 2000s was higher
for national than for Russian regions (as the latter were perceived as a larger
threat for the unity of Russia). The federal center seems to be more active in
suppressing wealthy regions than poor territories still depending on tax trans-
fers. This policy could include both, specific measures for individual territories
or a general design of the tax system. In fact, in the annual cross-sections the
share of Russians also has a positive sign; the significant results concentrate in
the 2000s (yet separate regressions in Appendix C.4 discussed below show that
the variable is significant for both Yeltsin and Putin periods).
The dummy for Putin’s office period is highly significant and negative for all
models in which it is included: it shows once again the centralization trend
in the Russian federalism under Putin. Moreover, controlling for time series
fixed effects or the Putin dummy does not change the results suggesting that
the omitted variables problem due to the Putin tax reform does not affect our
regressions. The tax structure variables were mostly unstable or even insignifi-
cant, thus supporting the extremely high importance of political factors for tax
assignment, which seems to be present in the 2000s. However, a surprising re-
sult is that separate regressions for Yeltsin and Putin periods yield basically the
same determinants of retention rates (with the exception of legal status dummy
for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). It may indicate that we need to re-evaluate
the common perception of crucial changes in the regions-federation nexus under
Putin vis-a`-vis the Yeltsin period. Under Putin fiscal transfers and democracy
seem to play a more important role. The former have positive sign (indicating
that the same regions receive higher portion of federal grants and enjoy higher
retention rates), but is, as mentioned, virtually impossible to interpret due to
the endogeneity. The democracy variable is significant and negative in median
regressions, but not significant in OLS.
Let us once again return to the comparison of this Chapter and the previous
one. On the one hand, as mentioned, there are no differences in terms of sig-
nificant results: distance from Moscow seems to be a strong predictor for fiscal
decentralization - and sets of outliers. Controlling for a significant variable of
tax arrears does not change the results. There are, however, some changes re-
garding the impact of dummy republic / share of Russians and dummy border
region; introducing additional variation over time and increasing the number of
observations makes them significant. From this point of view panel data setting
actually decreases the divergence between regulatory and fiscal decentralization
in terms of the set of driving factors. However, it is unclear whether a compari-
son of panel data and cross-sectional set ups is meaningful; assuming there were
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a way to get variation of regulatory decentralization over time (what is not the
case from the point of view of data at hand), one could probably obtain differ-
ent results for regulatory indicators as well. Finally, there is an even stronger
divergence between panel data fiscal decentralization results and constitutional
decentralization results: while in the latter share of Russians is increasing the
degree of devolution even for the subsample of republics, in the former it effec-
tively decreases the degree of devolution (controlling for the dummy republic).
Hence, the existence of a gap between constitutional and post-constitutional
results is confirmed (although different aspects of post-constitutional decentral-
ization seem to be closer to each other).
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Table 3.1: Panel data regressions (no fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS Median Median OLS OLS Median Median
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.048 -0.045 -0.038 -0.036 -0.417 -0.079 -1.702 -0.52
(0.032) (0.031) (0.298) (0.290) (0.594) (0.449) (1.450) (1.090)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 1.391 0.361 1.952*** 1.232** 2.501*** 1.665*** 2.174*** 1.305**
(0.998) (1.056) (0.541) (0.550) (0.486) (0.480) (0.558) (0.545)
Dummy Putin -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.061*** -0.073***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital funds -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.052** -0.055*** -0.076*** -0.103***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) -0.003 0.009 -0.037 -0.025 -0.026 -0.017 -0.061 -0.037
(0.044) (0.047) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040)
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.186*** 0.191*** 0.143*** 0.172***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035)
Political variables
Territory 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.023* 0.026** 0.020* 0.020* 0.007 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Population -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Oil and gas share -0.028 -0.02 -0.053 -0.015 -0.056 -0.05 -0.017 0.01
(0.057) (0.056) (0.066) (0.071) (0.062) (0.061) (0.076) (0.075)
Dummy border region 0.027** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.014 0.013 0.015* 0.019**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Distance from Moscow 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy republic 0.076*** 0.075** 0.064** 0.061*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.072***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.013 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Power (2001-2006) -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.017** -0.011 -0.022** -0.019** -0.013* -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Power (1995-2000) -0.021** -0.024*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016* -0.004 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal transfers 0.128** 0.143*** 0.051 0.094** 0.085** 0.099** 0.008 0.083*
(0.052) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.04) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045)
Democratization -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Russians 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.135*** 0.152*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.150***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.052) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040)
Urbanization 1.755** 1.802** 0.322 0.246 -0.392 -0.355 -0.715 -0.614
(0.728) (0.709) (0.557) (0.459) (0.586) (0.570) (0.502) (0.472)
Constant 0.459*** 0.488*** 0.525*** 0.526*** 0.586*** 0.608*** 0.598*** 0.541***
(0.105) (0.103) (0.083) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.076) (0.069)
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
No. obs. 945 945 945 945 910 910 910 910
R2 0.493 0.263 0.267 0.53
Pseudo R2 0.165 0.183 0.19 0.205
F-test 21.49*** 20.76*** 19.72*** 19.92***
Jarque Bera 234.7*** 235.3*** 390.0*** 429.0***
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are robust Newey/West standard errors for first-order autocorrelation (for OLS) and Bootstrapped standard errors
(bootstraps n = 1000) for median regressions; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % levels respectively. Significant results are marked bold.
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While for the panel data the set of outliers could be hardly interpreted,
the changes in the group of outliers throughout annual cross-sections (Appendix
C.2, Table C.4 ) allow for some interesting conclusions. The number of outliers
increased in the late 1990s-early 2000 and then went down again; it is the high-
est in 1998 (the year of the Russian financial crisis) and 2001 (when Putin’s
reforms were in discussion). This indicates an unstable situation in the Rus-
sian Federation in the “transition period” from Yeltsin to Putin, when regions
partly carried out “atypical” economic policies, which cannot be captured by
our modeling. Most outliers did not fit the general pattern for the Russian
Federation exactly in these years when these regions were more active in car-
rying out the already mentioned “tax haven strategy” (Ingushetia in the early
1990s, Mordovia in the early 2000s, Altai Republic throughout the period), i.e.
used legal possibilities provided by the presidential decrees or loopholes in the
legislation to create a more favorable tax regime for companies incorporated
in this jurisdictions (partly only for specific large taxpayers associated with in-
fluential multiregional business groups or privileged companies owned by the
representatives of the regional elite). Unfortunately, absence of transparent and
consequent information makes an ex ante control for this strategy in empirical
research practically impossible.
3.7 Number of tax audits and tax arrears
Previously we have mentioned that the size of tax arrears as proxy for strategic
tax collection has certain disadvantages. In particular, it may be difficult to
disentangle the effects of strategic tax auditing and strategic tax collection on
arrears; furthermore, strategic tax auditing might as well be of great interest for
research. Recently Russian tax authority started reporting an alternative indi-
cator, which may be used to complement our study: the number of tax audits
performed by the tax collector in a given period. Unfortunately, the results are
unavailable for the Yeltsin and early Putin period and cannot substitute our
previous study; however, we can use the new variable to perform a robustness
check. Basically, “tax audit” in these statistics means an auditing event when
the executives of the tax collection office visit the taxpayer’s premises and con-
trol the accounts and records. Tax audits may be performed by both individuals
and legal entities and are concluded with a statement by the tax collection of-
fice confirming the correctness of records or indicating violations of the tax law.
It goes without saying that the number of tax audits is a good proxy for tax
auditing activity.
We have collected the data on the number of tax audits reported by local tax
offices in Russia for the year 2006. Unfortunately, the data are available only
for a subsample including 68 regions. However, even this approach may yield
some interesting results. Table 3.5 reports the estimation results for the year
2006, including various measures of tax collection activity. We use the same
set of controls as in the previous exercise with the only exception of measures
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Table 3.2: Panel data regressions (time fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.:
retention rate
(10) (11) (12) (13)
OLS Median OLS Median
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.063** -0.061 0.054 -0.135
(0.026) (0.138) (0.319) (0.558)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) -0.29 1.026 1.080* 1.267*
(1.115) (0.748) (0.579) (0.726)
Tax structure
Average income per capita -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Capital funds -0.026 -0.044 -0.015 -0.034
(0.024) (0.037) (0.025) (0.037)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) -0.006 -0.056 -0.025 -0.062
(0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 0.221*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.156***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035)
Political variables
Territory 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.017*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Population -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Oil and gas share -0.062 0.023 -0.088 0.036
(0.064) (0.094) (0.066) (0.108)
Dummy border region 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.015 0.015**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Distance from Moscow 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy republic 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.091***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.002 0.005 0.001 0.008*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Power (2001-2006) -0.031*** -0.018* -0.028** -0.01
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Power (1995-2000) -0.013* -0.008 -0.003 -0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Fiscal transfers 0.163*** 0.123*** 0.131*** 0.080**
(0.052) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034)
Democratization -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Russians 0.197*** 0.178*** 0.164*** 0.176***
(0.059) (0.039) (0.043) (0.036)
Urbanization 2.972*** 1.357*** 0.762 0.193
(0.704) (0.460) (0.568) (0.450)
Constant 0.536*** 0.603*** 0.666*** 0.636***
(0.121) (0.092) (0.100) (0.087)
Outliers included Yes Yes No No
No. obs. 945 945 910 910
R2 0.468 0.414
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.312
F-test 19.46*** 24.84***
Jarque Bera 396.0*** 916.3***
Notes: see Table 3.1. Coefficients for time and region FE are not reported. Some controls
are dropped due to time invariance.
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Table 3.3: Panel data regressions (region fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.:
retention rate
(14) (15) (16) (17)
FE Median FE Median
Tax arrears squared (Putin) 0.041 0.041 -0.37 -1.073
(0.028) (0.250) (0.446) (1.502)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 3.705*** 4.578*** 4.131*** 4.460***
(0.760) (0.831) (0.735) (0.998)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Capital funds -0.086*** -0.123*** -0.073*** -0.121***
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035)
Political variables
Population 0.094*** 0.106** 0.056* 0.062
(0.036) (0.046) (0.032) (0.047)
Oil and gas share 4.204 5.907 1.401 4.686
(4.840) (7.801) (4.666) (7.218)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.018 -0.011 -0.014 0.006
(0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019)
Fiscal transfers -0.069 -0.167*** -0.231*** -0.243***
(0.069) (0.059) (0.051) (0.055)
Democratization -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Urbanization 0.432 4.288 4.959 7.861*
(4.155) (4.702) (3.846) (4.419)
Constant 0.742** -0.626 -0.337 -0.619
(0.327) (0.620) (0.297) (0.605)
Outliers included Yes Yes No No
No. obs. 945 945 910 910
Pseudo R2 0.332 0.338
F-test 11.27*** 12.62***
Jarque Bera 240.5*** 236.9***
Notes: see Table 3.1. Coefficients for time and region FE are not reported. Some controls
are dropped due to time invariance.
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Table 3.4: Panel data regressions (two-way fixed effects), 1995-2006, dep. var.:
retention rate
(18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
FE Median TSLS FE Median TSLS
Tax arrears squared (Putin) 0.015 0.028 -0.172 0.289 -0.049 -10.529
(0.020) (0.087) (0.875) (0.255) (0.529) (16.172)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 1.028 1.666** 53.811* 1.677* 1.666** 48.676**
(0.803) (0.739) (31.48) (0.862) (0.784) (20.087)
Tax structure
Average income per capita -0.007 -0.001 0.028* -0.004 0 0.036*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019)
Capital funds -0.060*** -0.067* -0.072** -0.056** -0.072* -0.054
(0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.023) (0.038) (0.044)
Political variables
Population 0.153*** 0.097** -0.163 0.113*** 0.097** -0.24
(0.040) (0.041) (0.180) (0.034) (0.042) (0.210)
Oil and gas share 7.341 5.285 -13.994 4.723 5.047 -12.575
(5.091) (8.386) (16.909) (4.902) (8.525) (9.577)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.008 0.005 0.046 -0.007 0.005 0.049
(0.012) (0.016) (0.037) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034)
Fiscal transfers -0.008 0.005 0.046 -0.007 0.005 0.049
(0.012) (0.016) (0.037) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034)
Democratization 0 0 0.012 -0.001 0 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Urbanization 0.033 2.473 8.03 3.451 5.341 5.211
(4.102) (3.720) (23.884) (3.940) (3.895) (10.336)
Constant 0.329 -0.439 0.627 -0.625 -0.747 1.733
(0.303) (0.522) (2.086) (0.493) (0.540) (1.664)
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes No No No
No. obs. 945 945 942 910 910 907
Pseudo R2 0.477 0.476
F-test 18.19*** 6.10*** 18.86*** 4.11***
Jarque Bera 854.5*** 1266***
F-test first stage (Putin) 2.15 3.68**
F-test first stage (Yeltsin) 3.88** 5.68***
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2. For TSLS robust Huber/White standard errors are applied.
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of power and democracy (which, as discussed, are obviously outdated for the
second term of Putin administration).
We obtain the measures of tax collection and auditing by dividing tax arrears
and number of tax audits by GRP and squaring the result, as in the previous
parts of the chapter. Obviously, tax arrears have a significant and negative im-
pact on the retention rate. The number of audits is positive, but insignificant.
The most interesting part of the exercise, however, is regression (27). We simul-
taneously include the variable of tax collection (tax arrears) and tax auditing
(number of tax audits) activity in the regression. In this case one can interpret
the coefficient of tax arrears as an impact of tax arrears on the retention rate
conditional on tax auditing effort of the regional government. We still find a
negative and significant effect, supporting our conjecture that tax collection per
se has a significant impact on the de-facto fiscal decentralization. Of course, one
cannot immediately conclude from the estimation for 2006 that the same effect
was present in the whole sample; however, this is at least certain evidence in our
favor, especially because, as mentioned above, the problem of disentangling tax
collection and tax auditing is more important for Putin, and not for the Yeltsin
period.
Obviously a single cross-section is not sufficient to provide convincing evidence.
Moreover, small sample problems preclude solving a variety of potential prob-
lems, including endogeneity. However, as an additional experiment we estimate
all regressions from Table 3.5 excluding fiscal transfers (which are highly sig-
nificant and potentially endogenous). The results in terms of tax arrears do
not change, but also the number of tax audits in regressions (26) and (27) be-
comes significant and positive. On the one hand, the results still support our
hypotheses with respect to strategic tax collection. On the other hand, in terms
of strategic tax auditing, the regional tax authorities seem to act in favor of the
regional budget. Once again, it may suggest that the power shift in the struc-
ture of Russian fiscal federalism was not as decisive, as it may seem: however,
the issue certainly requires special investigation.
3.8 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to test whether the strategic manipulations of tax
arrears could be used when a central government does not have sufficient in-
formation and monitoring capacities for a regional influence on tax collection,
and regions are able to focus their tax auditing and collection efforts on taxes
mostly benefiting their budgets, in order to reallocate fiscal resources in favour
of the regions. Moreover, we have tested, whether federal governments have an
incentive to manipulate tax collection in their favour. In order to conduct these
tests, we analyze the case of the Russian Federation. Thus, we have tried to
understand whether strategic tax collection matters in general, and particularly
for fiscal decentralization.
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Table 3.5: Cross-section regression, 2006, dep. var.: retention rate
(24) (25) (26) (27)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared -2.438*** -2.770***
(0.700) (0.821)
Number of audits squared 37.003 49.782
(36.808) (37.432)
Tax structure
Average income per capita -0.021** -0.022*** -0.015* -0.018**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Capital funds 0.093* 0.108** 0.077 0.101*
(0.053) (0.051) (0.058) (0.055)
Political variables
Territory 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
Population -0.018 -0.023 -0.011 -0.02
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027)
Oil and gas share -0.864** -0.965*** -0.723* -0.882**
(0.345) (0.332) (0.371) (0.359)
Distance from Moscow 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dummy border region 0.03 0.035 0.028 0.035
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Dummy republic 0.14 0.131 0.218** 0.205**
(0.091) (0.092) (0.084) (0.085)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.015 -0.015* -0.014 -0.013
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Fiscal transfers 0.611*** 0.606*** 0.669*** 0.646***
(0.192) (0.191) (0.189) (0.186)
Share of Russians 0.498** 0.486** 0.686*** 0.681***
(0.207) (0.206) (0.204) (0.203)
Urbanization 6.174*** 6.183*** 5.030** 5.103**
(2.277) (2.3) (2.199) (2.236)
Constant -0.218 -0.191 -0.386 -0.363
(0.300) (0.299) (0.310) (0.312)
Observations 78 78 67 67
R2 0.487 0.499 0.528 0.544
F-test 28.61*** 28.60*** 34.46*** 36.47***
Jarque Bera 3.44 3.525 3.23 3.273
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Significant results are marked
bold.
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Generally speaking, our results partly confirm the intuition behind this chapter:
there is evidence that tax arrears are used strategically to manipulate distri-
bution of taxes between the fed-eral center and the regions. Our estimation
strategy, however, yields heterogeneous results. We show that under Yeltsin
the regions do use strategic tax collection to reallocate the tax revenue in their
favour. These results also survive the TSLS regressions in order to check for en-
dogeneity and various fixed effects specifications. Only the annual cross-sections
provide evidence in favour of the second conjecture that the federal government
was likely to use its power for tax arrears manipulation when it became strong.
These results, however, seem to be partly driven by a small number of regions
with extraordinarily high levels of per capita tax arrears.
Finally, given the data availability, we provide a short discussion of potential
effects of tax auditing on fiscal decentralization. According to our estimates
from the second term of Putin tax arrears have a negative impact on the rev-
enue split even controlling for the tax auditing activity; the latter, however,
depending upon the specification, has a positive and partially significant effect
on the retention rates.
To conclude, this chapter was able to show at least one particular mechanism of
decentralization, which exists ”beyond” the framework of formal constitutional
rules and creates strong differences between de-jure and de-facto devolution.
The fiscal decentralization is not limited to written norms: both constitution of
a highly centralized federation and power-sharing treaties of an asymmetrically
decentralized structure are not sufficient to explain the variation of retention
rates in the Russian context. The studies of fiscal federalism have been well
aware of the fact, that ex-post distribution of funds and, hence, ability of gov-
ernments to influence economic processes, is often significantly different, than
the ex-ante rules of decentralization, since the governments may implement
some transfer scheme. However, this chapter shows, that even if the transfers
are not considered, there may be some systematic differences between allocation
of fiscal resources and legal rules, which are driven by strategic behavior of the
governments. Or, even ignoring the interaction after the initial allocation of fis-
cal resources (decentralization in the narrow sense), one still finds a systematic
gap between de-jure and de-facto states, which is not simply a result of using
bad proxies for a given institutional framework.
This chapter, however, reveals an additional problem. Even moving from cross-
section to panel data does not yield any robust results in terms of influence
of democracy on fiscal decentralization. Democratization is, however, often
claimed to be causally interrelated with decentralization. The case of Spanish
asymmetric federalism, or of restoration of federalism in Germany after World
War 2, or even of the establishment of the Russian Federation after the collapse
of the totalitarian rule, are just several examples of decentralization processes
triggered by democratization. There are of course examples when federalism
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and decentralization do not go hand in hand (like in China). Anyway, it seems
that the interrelation between democracy and decentralization might be even
more complex, than one often claims. The next chapter looks at this problem
in greater detail.
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Chapter 4
Devolution in
(Non-)Democracies
4.1 Introduction
The lack of research on asymmetric and non-democratic federations is present
in both empirical and theoretical literature. This chapter provides a very simple
model of endogenous decentralization in a politically asymmetric country with
various political regimes on different levels of government. The only source of
revenue for the government is a unique split tax, but the retention rates may
differ for regions with different economic fundamentals (secession costs, popula-
tion, effects of public goods). Political systems (democracy and non-democracy)
can vary separately at the federal and regional levels. The chapter defines de-
centralization as decentralization of (tax) revenue; expenditure decentralization
is not considered.1 The decentralization problem is one-dimensional: the federal
government and the region decide only on the distribution of the fiscal revenue
produced by the regional population, but not on the size of the public sector.2
The main idea is to establish a causal link from the characteristics of the region
(political system, size, effects of regional public goods, secession costs) and of
the federal government (political regime) to the split of tax revenue. The eco-
nomic and political differences between regions are exogenous, while the split of
tax revenue is endogenous.
From this point of view, the chapter is related to several strands of literature
dealing with endogenous decentralization.
1This approach makes sense: in asymmetric federations the revenue decentralization (re-
tention rates) can be easily measured, while analysis of expenditure decentralization implies
assessing allocation of federal spending over the territory, what is virtually never possible.
2This simplification is without loss of generality: as it will follow from the model, the
results in terms of distribution of revenue between governments are valid regardless of the
government share in output.
92
• The recent ”second generation fiscal federalism” approach empathizes the
impact of democratization on economic policy in developing federations.
For example, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2006) and Weingast (2007) describe
the problem of the ”tragic brilliance” when the federal center uses decen-
tralization to fight its competitors in more democratic regions. Yet this
literature still does not model explicitly the endogeneity of the federal de-
sign: the democratization (or de-democratization) process spreading over
the country usually imposes the new round of bargaining over the degree
of fiscal decentralization and allocation of authorities.3
• There is a extremely small literature dealing with formal modeling of
asymmetric decentralization.4 Congleton, Kyriacou and Bacaria (2003)
and Congleton (2006) look at decentralization process as an issue of bar-
gaining between the federal government and an individual region. Their
main argument is that the differences in degree of decentralization (for
example, retention rates), are a function of a ”decentralization price” (or
”costs of autonomy”) a region is willing to pay. The model presented be-
low to a certain extent disentangles the concept of decentralization price
looking at individual factors influencing it.5
• There exists a huge formal literature dealing with causes of secession.
Starting with the seminal work of Buchanan and Faith (1987) on seces-
sion, the incomplete list of contributions to the studies of secession in
economics includes Bordignon and Brusco (2001), Le Breton and Weber
(2003) and Olofsgad (2003). Several papers look at the influence of politi-
cal systems on secession.6 However, these studies, first, do not account for
differences in political systems within a country, what is the main focus
3Myerson (2006) and Inman and Rubinfeld (2006) provide two models introducing the
extension of political franchise process in a federal country. However, both contributions are
rather concerned with the degree of democratization and stability of constitution, than with
the distribution of fiscal revenue, which is the focus of this chapter.
4Although there are several papers look at how differences in economic fundamentals
of regions in a federation influence the process symmetric decentralization, cf. Bolton and
Roland, 1997, Ellingsen, 1998 or Goyal and Staal, 2004.
5Moreover, Abbink and Brandts (2005) in their mostly experimental paper develop a
framework where two regions (a dominant and a subordinate) bargain about their relative
autonomy; however, their aim is not to predict the relevant grade of autonomy, but rather to
show whether the bargaining is successful or leads to a political conflict (secession). Their
paper includes strictly democratic jurisdictions. Finally, since the results of asymmetric de-
volution in the sense used in this chapter can be identical to the outcomes of redistribution
through transfers, it is possible that the literature predicting asymmetries in division of federal
pool of resources (e.g. Wa¨rneryd, 1998) actually may be helpful in deriving predictions for
asymmetries in de-jure retention rates.
6Alesina and Spolaore (2003) explore this issue in models of the size of nation, showing that
the equilibrium size of nations in a non-democratic world is larger, than in a democratic one.
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) develop a model of internal exit of a region and solve it under
perfect democracy and imperfect democracy (Leviathan government) conditions. While under
perfect democracy secession is promoted by income and population growth, relative income
and population growth in the secessionist region, lower costs of government for this region
and higher spatial decay of federal public services, imperfect democracy adds greater degree
of democratic culture in the secessionist region, than in the country in general.
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of our analysis. Second, this chapter is interested not in secession per se,
but in the equilibrium (varying) degree of decentralization in the shadow
of secession.
The three main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows: (i) For
all political regimes (including different combinations of subnational and federal
regimes) regions with small population, high secession costs and low relative ef-
fectiveness of regional public goods in terms of productivity enhancement for
private production contribute higher share of fiscal revenue to the federal budget;
(ii) Democracies are more decentralized, than non-democracies, only if relative
effectiveness of regional public goods is small enough and secession costs are
high enough and (iii) Democratization at one level of political system, with per-
sistent authoritarianism on the other, leads to higher centralization under broad
parameter combinations. The first result provides clear testable implications for
possible determinants of asymmetry in federations, which - at least at the level
of anecdotal evidence - seem to be plausible, as I will show in what follows.
The second result is important from the point of view of better understanding
the partially contradicting empirical evidence on decentralization and democ-
ratization and, even more, the difference between federations and international
alliances. Finally, the last result also challenges the common expectations of
”decentralizing” effect of democratization, thus being relevant for both empiri-
cal findings and policy advice.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model; the
third section solves it and reports the main results. The fourth section provides
a discussion of the results from the point of view of the existing empirical evi-
dence. The fifths section checks the robustness of the results relaxing a number
of assumptions, and the last section concludes.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Basics
The model sets up a relatively simple world, which, however, still allows some
relevant conclusions. Basically, it is similar to the world of vertical tax competi-
tion: two governments (a federal and a regional) rely on the same tax base as the
only source of revenue. However, while in the vertical tax competition models
all governments are allowed to set their own tax rates, in this model govern-
ments simply try to split the revenue for a given tax rate. The revenue received
by the government is used to finance the public goods provision, which, in turn,
enhance productivity of the population (and hence, increase the tax base). The
difference between the tax revenue and the public goods spending may be used
to finance luxury goods; however, the optimization problem the government has
to solve depends upon the political regime (and will be specified below). The
distribution of tax revenue is an outcome of bargaining between federal and
regional governments ”in shadow” of secession: the federal government offers
94
the retention rate, which is then either accepted by the region, or rejected: in
the last case regional government declares independence and has to suffer under
additional costs. As I will show below, the model is driven by three trade-offs,
which generate the main results. In what follows I systematically present the
economics and the politics of the model.
4.2.2 Economy
The economy of the country includes three main groups of agents:
1. Farmers: The country has a population of agents of mass 1, which are
identical from the point of view of their productivity and endowment.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of a resource (land, L), which is
used to produce consumption goods Y = Y (L) and pay taxes to the
government.
2. Local bureaucrats: The bureaucrats may be employed by the govern-
ment, which then uses them to produce public goods in exchange for
wages. I assume that there are no constraints on the number of employed
bureaucrats, however, the costs of hiring additional officials are increasing
quadratically.
3. Government: As mentioned, the government collects taxes from farmers
and pays the bureaucrats. The difference between the tax revenue and the
costs of bureaucracy can be used to purchase luxury goods G abroad.7 The
price of goods G is normalized to unity.8
The public goods in this model are, specifically, productivity-enhancing public
inputs rather than public consumption goods.9 The technology for production
of consumer goods is
Y = 2((1− β)f + βr)L (4.1)
where f and r are the federal and the regional public goods, and β is an ex-
ogenous parameter determining the relative effectiveness of federal and regional
public goods supply in the respective region with β ∈ (0.5, 1). Hence, the model
assumes that the local public goods are ”better suited” to fit the specifics of
the regional population, which increases its productivity. There are once again
two interpretations for this effect (and I do not differentiate between them):
advantages of regional government in information acquisition and preference
distance.10
7Since I assume a small country, it is a price-taker on the market for luxury goods.
8Introducing any further rules for market of G, including non-linear increase in prices, is
without loss of generality.
9For example, construction of roads or public education may per se produce no addi-
tional utility to the public, but make individuals more productive. There is non-rivalry in
consumption of public goods among farmers.
10First, regional government may have advantage in information acquisition (an idea which
could be traced back to Hayek); the regional public goods are ”better” for the public, because
their ”producer” had better idea about public’s preferences. Second, β may be related to a
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The government then charges a proportional tax, so that the revenue of the
farmers is given by
C = (1− τ)Y (4.2)
where τ is an exogenous tax rate. Without loss of generality and to simplify the
notation, set τ = .5. Since all farmers are identical, there is no trade between
them; each agent simply consumes what is left after the taxes.11 The utility
function of the agents is as usually U(C) with U ′(C) > 0. Hence, the utility of
farmers is increasing in Y for given τ , and therefore, is also increasing in both f
and r: larger output of public goods makes farmers happy. The tax revenue of
the government is then split between the federal and the regional government,
so that the federation receives tτY and the region (1 − t)τY , where t is the
”tax split rate” (share of the tax revenue attributed to the federal government).
The country consists of two regions i = P,A; each region has its own govern-
ment in addition to the federal government. I denote the regional governments
with the subscript A and P and the federal government with the subscript F
respectively. The population of the region P is equal to dP = d, region A is
populated by individuals of mass dA = 1 − d. For each region the tax rate τ
is identical; however, tA and tP are set individually. As I will show in what
follows, the model can be easily generalized to a case of n regions; in fact, it
simply requires the proper interpretation of results. The technology of public
goods provision is identical for regional regions and the federation; differences
in βi reflect differences in the effects of public goods on economic performance.
12
The provision of public goods for specific regions requires the services of lo-
cal bureaucrats. I assume, however, that the costs of the government associated
with public goods provision are quadratic. This assumption (which can be en-
countered quite often in the literature, see e.g. Gradstein, 2004, for a similar
model) can be justified by existence of corruption costs. Perotti (1993), Bolton
and Roland (1997) and Bearse et al. (2000) discuss a revenue collection tech-
nology with a revenue tax τ and a quadratic loss function due to corruption
or evasion. One could assume that similar reasons are driving the structure
larger ”distance” between the region and the rest of the federation in terms of preferences or
any other specifics. Think about linguistic differences: if the public services are provided in
a foreign language (e.g. language of the federal government), they are by far less useful for
the population; the time costs and effort to study a new language just to be able to consume
public services reduces the effort which could be invested in production and therefore the
overall productivity. If a region is really different from the rest of the federation, it is likely
that the federal government will face greater problems while adjusting the public goods output
to its needs. One can of course interpret this assumption in a way that the differences between
regions result in preference differences; is reasonable, but empirically not always true.
11Or, equivalently, also purchase luxury goods abroad as bureaucrats and government do.
12One may probably ask why the federation exists in the model world of this chapter in
the first place. On the one hand, empirically federations are not always outcome of efficiency
maximizing behavior - on the contrary, countries experiencing devolution were often brought
together by military power, history or mere luck in the past. On the other hand, this chapter
may also be considered as an approach to the issue of stability of federations, which are not
necessarily efficient.
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of costs for public goods provision: public goods provision is a huge source of
rent appropriation and corruption as well as the revenue collection, which could
lead to additional costs. Or, stated otherwise, bureaucrats can simply ”steal”
more for large projects of public goods provision. The revenue of the bureau-
crats is spent for luxury goods abroad. There are alternative justifications for
quadratic costs. For example, in many developing countries bureaucrats require
training abroad to perform their duties; however, it is much more costly to hire
an internationally educated expert for work in distant provinces, than for work
in the capital. Countries like India, China or Russia are excellent examples of
the problem. While in the reality costs of provision of public goods in distant
areas decrease while country’s development level goes up, I abstract from this
dynamic effects, concentrating on a static case. Anyway, I assume that each
additional bureaucrat is more expensive than the previous one for the govern-
ment. Denoting the salary of i − th bureaucrat si (the salary is increasing for
i→∞ by construction), the problem of a bureaucrat is maxUb(G) s.t. G ≤ si
with U ′b(.) > 0. The bureaucrats do not pay taxes (and do not vote at elections,
what becomes important in the next section).
In order to produce public goods in region A or P only local bureaucracy is
required, and there are no spillovers.13 Hence the federal government has to
optimize the provision of public goods for each region separately and indepen-
dently of other region(s); therefore it is possible to assume that federal govern-
ment produces two types of public goods: fA and fP for each region separately
(for the aims of notation). The budget constraint for the federal government
can be written as
τ
∑
i∈{A;P}
tiYi ≥
∑
i∈{A;P}
f2i
2
(4.3)
or, equivalently
∑
i∈{A;P}
diti((1− βi)fi + βiri) ≥
∑
i∈{A;P}
f2i
2
(4.4)
and for the regional government, analogously, one can obtain
(1− ti)di((1− βi)fi + βiri) ≥ r
2
i
2
(4.5)
There is no borrowing, and there are no transfers between budgets. The dif-
ference between public goods costs and revenue can be spent for luxury goods
consumed by the government, which are also purchased at the international
market for a constant price of 1; however, as mentioned, the problem of gov-
ernment is different for democracy and non-democracy, as I will discuss in what
follows.
13This is a restrictive assumption, which I partly relax in the last section; it is motivated
by both technical tractability of the model and the empirical cases, which I have in mind, as
I will show in the discussion
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4.2.3 Politics
Political regime. The behavior of the governments on federal and regional
level depends on the specifics of the political system, which, as mentioned, may
be democratic or non-democratic. While the budget constraint is the same
for both regimes, the objective functions are different.14 In a non-democracy
the elites are free to maximize their utility (which is increasing in production of
luxury goods). The problem of the government is then similar to that of bureau-
crats: denoting the utility of the government UG(G) the problem is maxUG(G)
s.t. budget constraints specified above. In what follows I will talk about ”net
revenue” or ”profit” of the government and hence denote it as π. In this case
they face the McGuire-Olson (1996) type problem: on the one hand, increas-
ing public goods provision they improve the productivity of their population
(and, hence, the size of the pie increases), but on the other hand, they have
to pay overproportionally higher costs for each additional unit of public goods
(so that their share of the pie decreases). Hence, the federal government, if
non-democratic, faces the problem:
max
fA,fP
πF =
∑
i∈{A;P}
(diti((1− βi)fi + βiri)− f
2
i
2
) s.t. πF ≥ 0 (4.6)
The regional government, if non-democratic, faces the problem:
max
ri
πRi = (1− ti)di((1− βi)fi + βiri)− r
2
i
2
s.t. πRi ≥ 0 (4.7)
In a democracy the government is controlled by the electorate (i.e. farmers),
and not by the elites. As already shown, population prefers larger provision
of public goods (in order to increase the production and ceteris paribus the
consumption of private goods). I assume, that the population can perfectly dis-
tinguish between different sources of public goods supply (federal and regional
governments).15 Hence, people take into the account only the specific public
14There is currently a growing literature on modeling non-democracies, which of course
includes many different assumptions as to what (non-)democracy means exactly (cf. Besley
and Kudamatsu, 2008). In this chapter I follow the framework of Inman and Rubinfeld (2006)
Assume as above that the government spends part of its fiscal revenue on public goods and the
rest on luxury goods (once again, being a price-taker and normalizing price of luxury goods
to one; the results of Zubrikas (2008) to a certain extent can be interpreted as exploration
of what happens if the outside market adjusts its price to the actions of the dictator). The
idea is that the population prefers higher public goods provision and disregards luxury goods,
while the elites get utility only from luxury goods but not (at least, directly) from public
goods. This is a reasonable assumption if one considers the developing countries: elites have
much better access to private goods, acting as ”substitutes” for poor public good protection
(say, private security agencies, universities, medical facilities etc.), as well as are able to move
abroad to consume services provided by other countries: receive medical services from foreign
cliniques (or hire foreign specialists), educate their children in foreign schools and universities
etc. On the other hand, the population is significantly less mobile, and its income is too low
to purchase the substitutes of public goods.
15This is a less realistic assumption, yet we are going to maintain it for the aims of simplicity
at this stage of analysis. Otherwise a problem of commitment in the negotiations between
98
goods output of a region (or the federation) while voting at regional (or federal)
elections. Elections take place in each jurisdiction separately; the federal gov-
ernment has to obtain majority in both jurisdictions in order to be re-elected.16
Obviously, the electoral success depends upon the provision of public goods at-
tributed to a particular jurisdiction. It is straightforward to assume that in this
environment the surviving government produces the maximal possible amount
of public goods given the budget is still balanced. In this case the utility func-
tion of the government is UG(fi) for federal and UG(ri) for regional governments,
with U ′G(.) > 0 and the budget constraints specified above. It means that the
governments in a democracy solve the following problem:
max fi s.t. diti((1− βi)fi + βiri)− f
2
i
2
= 0 for i = A,P (4.8)
max ri s.t. (1− ti)di((1− βi)fi + βiri)− r
2
i
2
= 0 (4.9)
Devolution game. Let me now specifically describe how the devolution game
works. In the region A the government can decide on the production of regional
public goods, but has no discretion over the tax split (A refers here to adminis-
trative decentralization). In the region P the regional government, once again,
can freely decide on production of regional public goods, but can bargain with
the federal government over the retention rate in the way specified below (and
hence P refers to political decentralization, cf. Treisman, 2007). The decentral-
ization in this chapter is defined as a pair {tA; tP }, where ti should be referred
to as the tax split rate. The devolution game has the following timing:
1. The federal government proposes tP ∈ [0; 1] to the government of the
region P and sets unilaterally tA.
2. The government of the region P accepts or rejects the proposed tP . If
the tax split rate is accepted, the revenue of the federal and the regional
governments is determined as described above. Otherwise the regional
government secedes: in this case the federal government does not receive
any revenue from its territory and solves the respective problem only for
region A, and the regional government receives the whole revenue from
its territory, does not receive any benefit from the federal public goods
provision (i.e. f1 = 0 in the respective problem), but has to suffer un-
der secession costs C > 0. Therefore its revenue is determined by the
the federation and the region becomes crucial (one government can be interested to ”shift the
blame” to its counterpart), and it requires a more careful modeling of dynamics than used in
this chapter.
16This assumption is not restrictive in a world without cross-regional spillovers: otherwise
the federal government will just produce enough public goods in the larger region to get
re-elected, and in the second region act as a non-democracy.
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expression:
πRP = dP τβP rP − r
2
P
2
− C.17 (4.10)
A special case when the federal government proposes tP = 0 and the
region accepts it should be referred to as a de-facto secession. Materially
it corresponds to the situation, when region still remains part of the federal
system, but does not receive any public goods from the federation and does
not pay taxes, while there is no secession costs C imposed on it.
3. All governments determine the provision of public goods given the tax
split rates and
4. Payoffs are realized.18
Although, as I will show, in equilibrium the tax split rates tA and tP are inde-
pendent of each other given the absence of spillovers, they may be interesting
for the comparison of the political and administrative decentralization.
Summary: The structure of the model can be simply visualized by the Figure
4.1. Now all three trade-offs can be identified. First, as already mentioned,
non-democracies have to optimize their spending for public goods to obtain
maximum net revenue. Second, however, regardless of the political regime, cen-
tral government, while choosing the offer to the region (even regardless of the
possibility of secession), faces yet another trade-off: since regional public inputs
are ”better” in terms of increasing productivity, a smaller tax split rate increases
the size of the pie for redistribution; however, at the same time smaller tax split
rate reduces the share of the pie federal government receives (to produce public
goods and luxury goods). Third, the regional government has to confront the
secession costs with the need to pay part of the revenue to the federal govern-
ment (with ”worse” public goods). The results are mostly determined by the
influence of parameters (C, di and βi) and political regimes on the way these
three trade-offs are solved.
4.3 Devolution in different political regimes
4.3.1 Solution of the model
To start with, the problem is ”separable” in two problems for pairs ”region A -
federation” and ”region P - federation”. More formally, first,
17Although in the model i assume that the difference between A and P is their right to
seced, this is equivalent to saying that A has too high secession costs (in extreme case, equal
to ∞) and then the equilibrium behavior is the same.
18This game tree may seem inconsistent, since farmers use public goods (produces at stage
3 for generating output at stage 1; however, the model is mostly static, and the production of
public and private goods is assumed to be almost simultaneous. Stated otherwise, the model
restricts attention to ”steady states” where in each period production of private and public
goods is balanced off.
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Figure 4.1: Logic of the model
Lemma 1 (independence property): For the non-democratic federal gov-
ernment, tax split rates tA and tP are in equilibrium independent of each other.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition for this fact (which is instrumental in terms of solving the model)
is straightforward. The only source of interdependence (if there are no direct
spillovers and there are two public goods fA and fP ) is the cross-subsidization
of regions: for example, tax revenue of region A is used to finance public goods
in region P and vice versa. The key for the independence property is that fed-
eral public goods are functions of tax split rates of respective regions only: fA
depends on tA, but not tP . Intuitively, by cross-subsidizing the government
removes part of its resources from one region to produce additional revenue in
another region; however, the government receives only a fraction of this addi-
tional revenue, which depends on the tax split rate. The Lemma 1 shows that
this additional revenue is smaller than the lost revenue from the other region.
For the case of democratic federal government, the situation is more complex.
By cross-subsidizing public goods, the federal government necessarily reduces
public goods provision in one of the regions. As notices, I assume that the
federal government has to win the elections in both regions. Hence, allowing
cross-subsidization for democratic federal governments I make the model un-
stable: opposition can always challenge the incumbent in at least one region,
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requesting additional funds from another region. In order to avoid this prob-
lem, I assume that there is no cross-subsidization also in the case of democratic
federal government.
For the model with two regions eight combinations of political regimes are pos-
sible. But since there are no spillovers, one can focus on four combinations for
a pair ”federation - region”. By construction of the model, the public goods
output is uniquely determined by the set of parameters and the tax split rate.
In particular, for the non-democratic federal and non-democratic regional gov-
ernments (regardless of political systems of other jurisdictions) the output of
public goods for a region i given ti is fi = (1− βi)tidi and ri = βi(1− ti)di. If
the federal government is democratic, the output of public goods fi for a demo-
cratic region i is determined by the equations (4.3) and (4.4). Basically, they
imply that it is necessary to choose the larger root of the quadratic equations
as the size of the public goods provision. Hence the provision of public goods
by the federation and the region i can be derived from the system of equations
diti((1− βi)fi + βiri)− f
2
i
2
= 0; (4.11)
(1− ti)di((1− βi)fi + βiri)− r
2
i
2
= 0 (4.12)
If one considers the larger roots of quadratic equations, the provision of public
goods by the federal government is given by
fi = 2di((1− βi)ti + βi
√
ti(1− ti)) (4.13)
and for the regional government
ri = 2di((1− ti)βi + βi
√
ti(1− ti)) (4.14)
The solution always exists for ti and βi satisfying the assumptions described
above.19 If the regional government is non-democratic, the federal government’s
choice of public goods provision is
fi = di(ti(1− βi) +
√
ti(ti − 2βiti − β2i (ti − 2))) (4.15)
Once again, the solution always exists for βi and d. Finally, if the federal gov-
ernment is non-democratic and the region is democratic, the region produces20
ri = di(βi(1− ti) +
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti))) (4.16)
In both hybrid regimes the public goods output of the democratic agent is a
sum of the non-democratic public goods output and an additional term, which
19One can notice that the ratio of squared output of public goods is proportional to ratio
of shares of tax revenue:
f2i
r2
i
= ti
1−ti
.
20For the given assumptions on βi and ti the expression under the root sign in both (4.15)
and (4.16) is non-negative.
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reflects the need of democracies to produce more public goods. To conclude,
one can reduce the model to an one-dimensional problem of choosing the tax
split rate.
In what follows let me first identify the possible equilibria in the model. In
order to do that, let me first introduce two definitions:
Definition 1: Federal optimum is a tax split rate solving the problem (4.6)
if federal government is non-democratic and problem (4.8) if federal government
is democratic. If the solutions of respective problems are larger 1, federal op-
timum is assumed to be equal to 1; if they are smaller 0, federal optimum is
assumed to be equal to 0.
Hence, federal optimum is a tax split rate for which the federal government
maximizes its net revenue for non-democracies and maximizes its public goods
output for democracies.
Definition 2: Equalizing tax split rate is a tax split rate for which re-
gional government is indifferent between secession and staying in federation.
Hence, equalizing tax split rate for non-democratic regional government is a
tax split rate for which net revenue of the regional government under secession
(expression (4.10)) and while staying in federation (expression (4.7)) are iden-
tical. If the regional government is democratic, the equalizing tax split rate is
given by identical output of regional public goods in case of secession and while
staying in the federation. The tiebreaking rule for the decisions of regional
government is than that if secession and non-secession are equally attractive
non-secession is preferred (what seems to be a completely realistic and probably
even too weak assumption - non-secession is often preferred even if it is costly as
opposed to secession). The democratic federal government is assumed to prefer
non-secession as well.21 Then it is straightforward to show that
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, if it exists, (i) tA is the federal optimum and (ii) tP
is either the federal optimum, or the equalizing tax split rate, depending upon
the set of parameters C, βP and dP .
Proof: See Appendix
In order to get the intuition for the Lemma, notice, that this chapter presents
21It may be less plausible, because, unlike the non-democratic case, both secession and
non-secession generate equal revenue to the federation (which is zero), and, given the elec-
toral system assumed, the motivation of the federation is not clear enough. However, the
assumption seems still to be reasonable given the experience of central government behavior
in the secession cases.
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a one-period model, and the re-negotiations are impossible.22 So, the region
cannot exercise a credible threat that it will not accept a tax split, which guar-
antees larger net revenue (for non-democracy) or larger public goods output
(for democracy) than in case of secession. The result restricts the attention
for all further analysis to the properties of the federal optimum (as function of
parameters) for region A. For region P it is required to look at the properties
of both federal optimum and equalizing tax split rate, as well as possible choice
of one of these equilibria depending upon the set of parameters. That is what
I am going to do in the next two subsections. Notice, however, that I still did
not make any claims regarding to existence of the equilibria: this should, once
again, be investigated in what follows.
4.3.2 Asymmetric federations
To start with, consider the problem of asymmetric federalism specified in the
motivation, i.e. how fundamentals map into the tax split rate. The main results
of the model can be summarizes in the following statement:
Proposition 1: For any combination of political regimes, i.e. democratic
federal and regional governments; non-democratic federal and regional gov-
ernments; democratic federal and non-democratic regional governments; and
non-democratic federal and democratic regional governments, (i) there exists a
tax split rate tp > 0 such that the regional government (weakly) prefers non-
secession and federal government (weakly) prefers offering this tax split rate
rather than any tax split rate under which region P secedes; (ii) the federal
optimum and equilibrium tax split rate A is strictly positive, decreasing in βi
and independent of C and di; (iii) the federal optimum and the equilibrium tax
split rates in both regions for pairs where both regimes are identical is strictly
smaller 1; (iv) the tax split rates tA ≤ tP if regions A and P have identical polit-
ical regimes and βA = βP and (v) the equilibrium tax split rate P is decreasing
in βP , weakly decreasing in dP and increasing in C.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first claim of the proposition provides, first of all, the existence result; se-
cession or de-facto secession never happens regardless of political system. The
federal government can always find a reasonable equalizing tax split rate, which
is non-negative (i.e. without any transfers) and guarantees the stability of the
federation. Second claim is intuitively straightforward: if the federal govern-
ment produces relatively less efficient public inputs, the ”size of the pie” con-
siderations outweight that of the ”share of the pie”, and the federal optimum
decreases. Obviously, federal optimum is independent of secession costs and,
given all individuals are identical, from the size of the population. The third
22This is, by the way, a quite realistic approach to secessions; the situations when regions
after successful secession returned to the federation by other means than crude force are
extremely rare.
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statement demonstrates that in pure non-democracies and pure democracies
the trade-off is resolved in a way that the federal government never prefers
complete centralization. It is however not true for hybrid regimes, where the
corner solution may be chosen (which will be discussed in greater detail in the
next section). The fourth result shows an intuitively straightforward fact: the
secession option leads to ceteris paribus smaller or equal tax split rate, than in
the region without secession. Interestingly, the size of the jurisdictions does not
matter.
In the last part the proposition claims that for the region P in the equilib-
rium increasing effectiveness of the regional public goods vis-a-vis the federal
once (larger information advantage / preference distance) leads to higher fiscal
decentralization; if secession costs are high, the federal government is able to
appropriate a higher portion of tax revenue; finally, large regions are likely to
hold a higher share of their tax revenue. Now the results with respect to C and
d are interrelated. It is intuitively clear that lower secession costs increase the
region’s ”safe zone” where it can reject the federal offers. The effect of d on tP
is driven by the fact, that C is independent of the size of the jurisdiction (it
seems to be reasonable: there is no reasons to assume, that larger jurisdictions
encounter larger costs of secession; on the contrary, a quite reasonable assump-
tion is that large jurisdictions can better survive the secession, especially in a
protectionist world economy, where national borders matter, and therefore se-
cession is associated with loss of market access, but also from the point of view
of their potential to survive in military conflicts). The modeling implicitly as-
sumed that for large jurisdictions the per capita costs of secession C/d go down.
In fact, there is more in part (v) than just description of factors driving the
devolution of region P. It is straightforward to generalize the model to a case
of n P-regions with different C, d and β. In this case part (v) describes how
the differences in degree of devolution achieved by individual regions in this fed-
eration will be explained by their fundamentals, and hence, generates testable
predictions for this case - assuming, of course, that there are no policy spillovers
between regions.
In the Figures 4.2 and 4.3 I simulate the path of the optimal tax split rate
tP for different βP , C and d values in pure non-democracy. One can see that
the equilibrium tax split rates for larger d and smaller C are higher, and the tax
split rate decreases in βP Notice, that some of graphs exhibit a kink, resulting
from the switch from the equilibrium with tP federal optimum to tP equalizing
tax split rate; however, if C and / or d are high and / or small enough, either
only federal optimum, or the equalizing tax split rate are realized. Moreover,
one can obviously see, that for βP → .5 the federal optimum is converging
towards 1, and for βP → 1 towards .5
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy for different d,
C = .0005
Figure 4.3: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy for different C,
d = .5
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4.3.3 Political regimes and decentralization
In the next step consider the differences in the patterns of devolution between
different combinations of political regimes. I take the pure non-democracy as the
reference point, as it may be reasonable for the study of developing countries
(which almost always evolve in a shadow of (more or less) recent authoritar-
ian past or are autocratic). First compare the pure non-democracy and the
pure-democracy case. Proposition 2 summarizes the main results for the federal
optimum (and equilibrium tax split for region A).
Proposition 2: There exists βˆi such that for all βi < βˆi federal government
prefers higher decentralization in a democracy than in a non democracy and for
all βi > βˆi vice versa.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result indicates that if the relative productivity-enhancing effect of the
public goods produced by the federal government is strong enough (i.e. β is
small), the non-democracies turn out to be more centralized than democracies
if the secession option is absent. On the contrary, if regional public goods have
a much stronger relative productivity-enhancing effect, democracies prefer ac-
quiring a higher share of revenue generated by the region: competition on the
federal level drives the federal politics towards overproduction of federal public
goods on costs of the regional budget. Basically, this result relates the differ-
ences in the degree of fiscal decentralization between two pure regimes to the
quality of information acquisition at different levels of political system or to the
preference distance.
Now consider region P. Does a pure democracy always achieve a higher de-
centralization level than a pure non-democracy? Different constellations are
possible. I report some simulated results in Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. The
non-democracy can be strictly less centralized, than a democracy (Figure 4.4
), more centralized than a democracy for βP small enough (Figure 4.5) large
enough and small enough (Figure 4.6) or vice versa (Figure 4.7). Analytically,
however, one can show that
Proposition 3: There exist Cˆ and βˆP such that for all C > Cˆ, βP < βˆP
holding simultaneously the pure democracy is strictly more decentralized than
pure non-democracy.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, federations with very high secession costs and similar productivity-
enhancing effects of public goods of the federal and regional government are
likely to become more decentralized if democratization occurs. The result is
straightforward: for low secession costs region P can achieve higher decentral-
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy and a pure
democracy, C = .001, d = 1
Figure 4.5: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy and a pure
democracy, C = .5, d = .5
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Figure 4.6: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy and a pure
democracy, C = .06, d = .5
Figure 4.7: Equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy and a pure
democracy, C = .002, d = .5
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ization regardless of the preferences of the federal government simply by forcing
the equalizing tax split rate, and hence, one needs an additional condition to
that of Proposition 2.
In the hybrid regimes the region and the federation have different political sys-
tems: either a democratic federation interacts with a non-democratic region or
vice versa. Once again, it is possible to obtain more structure for federal opti-
mum (which is independent from all parameters but β), claiming that
Proposition 4: (i) Federal optimum is strictly higher in any hybrid regime
than in a pure non-democracy; (ii) there exists a threshold βˆi such that for all
βi < βˆi the federal optimum is higher in a the hybrid with democratic federal
government than in a pure democracy, and for all βi > βˆi the opposite holds.
Proof: See Appendix
Although the result is the same for both democratic federations with non-
democratic regions and non-democratic federations with democratic regions,
the intuition behind the proposition is different. From the point of view of a
democratic federation a non-democratic region is characterized by underprovi-
sion of public goods (since the fiscal revenue is at least partly spend for luxury
goods). Hence, it makes sense to ”take away” a higher share of tax revenue from
the region. From the point of view of a non-democratic federation the situation
is exactly the opposite: a democratic region is characterized by overprovision of
public goods. Knowing that, the autocrat can allow herself to extract a higher
share of revenue from the region without ruining the productivity. Figure 4.8
summarizes the simulation of the equilibrium tax split rates for two pure regimes
and the hybrid regime with democratic federation.
The results for the equilibrium tax split rate in P are slightly different depending
upon which type of asymmetry is considered, as follows from the next statement.
Proposition 5: Equilibrium tax split rate in region P (i) is strictly higher
in a hybrid regime with democratic federation, than in a pure non-democracy
and (ii) is strictly higher in a hybrid regime with non-democratic federation for
βP large enough and d large enough.
The results obtained in this section actually suggest several predictions. First,
if a pure non-democracy starts democratizing on the federal level, while regions
still remain autocratic, it is likely to cause stronger centralization. On the other
hand, if democratization accelerates at the regional level, the decentralization
may be observed if region is small enough and preference distance / information
disadvantage of the federation is low enough (so that the federal government is
unable to gain a lot from the region producing larger amount of public goods).
Otherwise the federal government will just capture higher share of rents, in-
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Figure 4.8: Federal optimum for a pure democracy, pure non-democracy and
hybrid regime with democratic federation
creased through democratization.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Validity of assumptions
Before proceeding to discussion of results and relating it to empirical evidence, it
might be necessary to clearly select the cases where the limitations of the model
are less important. Probably, the most restrictive assumption made by con-
structing the model is the absence of spillovers between regions. It implies that,
first, it is possible to make a clear distinction between A-regions and P-regions
(and the federal government bargains unilaterally with each political entity),
and second, that there are no linkages between regions through private goods
markets and migration (reacting to the differences in public goods provision
between regions). However, considering the experience of asymmetric federal
arrangements, one can see that these assumptions are in fact not as restrictive
as one could believe. On the one hand, there are indeed countries where the
negotiations with potential secessionists turn into a federation-wide bargaining:
for example, Canadian provinces have shown a fast reaction to the new demands
of Quebec; in Sudan and Nigeria attempts to construct asymmetric federations
resulted in similar tensions (which were, however, resolved by far less peaceful
methods than in Canada). However, in most cases separatism is limited to a
small number of regions with distinct historical, ethnic or cultural specifics, and
hence, only these regions can use secession as a credible threat (as it is implied
by this model). The abundance of federacies is therefore not surprising: the
central government usually does not need to make concessions to a wide vari-
111
ety of regions.23 On the other hand, the economic linkages between territories,
which seem to be straightforward in developed countries, are very often weak in
developing federations with high costs of mobility and virtually absent market
integration.
A good example of the logic of this model is the Russian system, as it is de-
scribed in the Introduction. First, as already mentioned, in the early 1990s
the negotiations were basically implemented by the federal government and the
coalition of republics. Interestingly enough, several oblast attempted to raise
their status in negotiations by proclaiming themselves republics: however, fed-
eral government, mostly tolerant to all kinds of demands and claims of republics,
demonstrated a fast and strong reaction in this case, preventing the formation
of new republics. After the coalition of republics was broken and the period
of bilateral negotiations started, the subset of regions aiming to receive higher
retention rate and degree of autonomy was still limited to a relatively stable
group (though not identical to the group of ethnic republics). In terms of the
model, the distinction between A-regions and P-regions seems to be robust for
both separate periods. Second, Russia of the 1990s with it large geographical
distances, enormous costs of internal transportation, underdeveloped institu-
tions, very low degree of interregional market integration (Glushchenko, 2002)
and still existing administrative barriers for migration is also a good case for
very weak private market linkages between regions, thus justifying another as-
sumption of the model.
So, the assumptions of the model are, though restrictive, not entirely unre-
alistic. From this point of view I will attempt to discuss three main groups of
results obtained in the model. Given the lack of valid econometric evidence, the
discussion will mostly focus on anecdotal cases, and hence, simply aims to ”get
a feeling” of relation between data and reality, as well as to demonstrate the
relevance of results, without attempting to replace rigorous empirical research.
4.4.2 Result 1: Asymmetric federations
To start with, consider the main results for asymmetric federations: regions with
higher β, lower C and higher d seem to exhibit higher degree of devolution. In
this case the outcomes of the model are first, intuitively clear, and second,
closely related to the evidence:
• As already said above, most autonomous regions in federacies appear as
attempts to deal with ethnic and linguistic differences or with overseas
regions; therefore the existence of a distance between preferences of the
23One more interesting case is the Spanish example: in an environment where provinces
were able to select the desired level of decentralization, many decided to ”take over” a lower
share of responsibilities and rights from the central government, while others moved towards
stronger autonomy. Hence, the distinction between A-regions and P-regions may also result
from behavior of regional politicians, and the devolution does not necessarily result into a
domino effect.
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region and the rest of the federation seems to be at hand. On the other
hand, it is very difficult to find examples of secessions where no linguistic,
ethnic or religious differences are present, and therefore the very bar-
gaining ”in shadow of secession” is applied to the regions where these
differences exist.
• The ability of regions with lower costs of secession to obtain higher portion
of the tax pie in the negotiations seems also plausible. However, in several
cases the situation is more complex: the potential of secession may result
in increasing central control to avoid formation of strong and independent
regional elites or to limit their access to resources (China’s actions with re-
spect to more advanced Eastern provinces are a good example, see Sheng,
2007). It implies that the central government attempts to ”manipulate”
C, which, in fact, is partly a function of the past actions of the govern-
ments on both levels, what is obviously not captured in a static model like
presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, the attempts to manipulate the
capacity to secede seem to be valid only until a certain threshold; after
this threshold the central government is forced to start bargaining with
strong regional elites. The experience of Russian Empire and USSR in
dealing with emerging Ukrainian nation in the last two century is a good
example for these processes (see Miller, 2000).
• The last piece of evidence: the ability of large regions to obtain higher
share of the pie - is probably the most controversial. For example, my re-
sult is different from Wa¨rneryd (1998), who predicts that smaller regions
get an overproportionally large share of federal grants; the reason is that
the driving force of asymmetry by Wa¨rneryd is the effort allocated in con-
flict in Tullock contest framework, while in this chapter it is the differences
in per capita costs of secession. Hence, large regions are characterized not
(only) by stronger internal redistribution struggles, but (also) by larger
self-sustaining capacity. One should, however, be cautions with the em-
pirical definition of this ”size of the region”: it may as well be the size of
the territory, and not of population (if one assumes that larger territory
is ceteris paribus associated with larger resources, so that the per capita
costs of secession are still small).24
From the point of view of more rigorous econometric evidence, Chapter 3 of
this thesis reports for the bilateral bargaining stage of the development of the
Russian Federation in 1995-2000 that regions with higher secession opportunities
(border regions and regions with high geographical distance from the capital)
and large regions in terms of territory obtained a significantly higher share of
the tax revenue generated from its territory. Although the overall revenue of the
24Yet another empirically established reason for overproportionally large share of grants
obtained by small jurisdictions is the malapportionment: their representation in decision-
making bodies on the supranational or central level is usually higher than their share in the
population. This argument seems to be of greater relevance for democracies than for non-
democracies, although similar forces could be at work there.
113
federation from large regions is definitively larger, than from the smaller ones,
the relative retention rate is also larger for large territorial units. To conclude,
this first set of results seems to be consistent with what little evidence we have
on asymmetric federations.
4.4.3 Result 2: Pure political regimes
The second observation the model was able to generate is related to the degree
of devolution of pure non-democracies as opposed to pure democracies: pure
non-democracies are more centralized, than pure democracies, only if C is large
enough and β is small enough. This prediction seems to differ substantially
from the claim usually made in the literature. The intuition probably shared
by the majority of observers and formalized by Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
is that democratic countries experience higher decentralization. The empirical
results of several studies confirm this statement (Panizza, 1999; Diaz-Cayeros,
2004; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Landry, 2005), while others do not find any
clear effect of duration and degree of democracy on decentralization (Treisman,
2006).25
However, it is possible to show that more careful interpretation is at least partly
able to resolve this differences. Consider first the effect of β on differences be-
tween democracies and non-democracies. Recall, that β may be interpreted the
”information advantage” of regional governments over federation. From that
point of view one can actually expect β to be connected to the political regime:
non-democracies have well-known problems of communication, which may even
increase if the number of levels of hierarchy increases, while in democracies
β should be close to .5. Given the inherent communication problems in non-
democracies, it is likely that exactly the existing democratic regimes belong to
the small-β group: hence, the empirical results observed in democratic countries
without political decentralization can be driven by this fact. Or, stated other-
wise, higher decentralization observed empirically can result not directly from
the democratic decision-making, but from the information procession technology
combined with decision-making.26 For the purpose of interpretation one can also
relate C and political regime. It seems plausible that costs of secession increase
in more integrated economies. On the one hand, democracies exhibit higher de-
gree of internal economic integration than non-democracies (which, for example,
use internal barriers to extract additional rents or impose restrictions on move-
ment of people between regions). But, on the other hand, a non-democracy can
use much more severe measures to ”deal” with a separatist region, which are
excluded from the toolbox of a democracy. So, the interpretation is less evident.
25It goes without saying that several autocratic unitary states call themselves federations,
although in fact the regions do not possess any autonomy (at least based on the provisions of
the constitution). The Soviet Union is a good example of this pseudo-federal structures.
26Note, that the claim regarding the interrelation of β and political regime is needed only
for the interpretation of the results, and not to derive any predictions in the model.
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However, differences in terms of C may be instrumental to resolve yet another
problem, which is hidden in the discussion of influence of political regimes on
decentralization. It is at least to a certain extent useful to compare the de-
centralization within federations to the regional economic integration, which
could be conceptualized as a process of centralizing at least some of political
authorities of countries.27 The surprising thing is that for regional integration
the consensus regarding the relation between democracy and decentralization is
different: Mansfield et al. (2002) show empirically that democracies are more
likely to form an FTA than the non-democracies (moreover, see Hillman, 2005).
It looks like identical political regimes produce different predictions for decen-
tralization on different arenas. The results obtained in this chapter may at least
partly explain this contradiction between two literatures. If C is an indicator
of internal integration, then it is hardly disputable that the degree of economic
interdependence in federations is higher, than in international alliances. Hence,
the difference between the degree of centralization in unions and federations
may just reflect the secession costs.
To conclude, this group of results also seems to be consistent with the empirical
evidence, if one notices, that β and C are correlated with political regimes. It
also implies, that to establish a clear link between political regimes and decen-
tralization controls for preference distance, information advantage and costs of
secession become important and should be implemented in empirical research.
Moreover, the result extends the intuition towards accommodating the differ-
ences between international alliances and federations, and therefore may be
instrumental in constructing a more general approach to multi-jurisdictional
interactions.
4.4.4 Result 3: Hybrid regimes
The third group of results is related to, probably, the most important inno-
vation of this chapter, which allows for different types of political regimes at
different levels of a single federal state. The chapter claims that under broad
set of parameters democratization at one level of political system results in
stronger centralization. Obviously, this result is particularly difficult to test.
First, the research on subnational variation of political regimes is still limited.
Second, the stage of partial democratization (at one particular level of govern-
ment) is often relatively short and does not allow for clear observations. Third,
it is often very difficult to compare the political regimes in regions and on the
federal level even verbally, yet alone obtain quantitative data. Nevertheless,
if one considers the existing empirical evidence more carefully, there may be
27Of course, the policies subject to (de)centralization debate in international unions and
federations are different, as are the institutional settings in even most advanced unions and
less centralized federations; moreover, the reference point of the bargaining in case of devolu-
tion and in case of integration is not the same (although one should notice, that virtually all
endogenous decentralization models - unlike that presented in this chapter - assume the inte-
gration rather than devolution perspective). The comparison of federalism and international
alliances is not rare in the international relations literature, see Rector, 2009.
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some relations to the results of this chapter. On the one hand, for the case of
non-democratic federation with partial democratization in regions, this chapter
may simply provide another story for the ”tragic brilliance”: non-democratic
central governments often reduce transfers to more democratic regions (where
opposition is victorious). As already mentioned, transfer allocation may act as
substitute for retention rate renegotiations in symmetric federations. The orig-
inal idea of ”tragic brilliance” is that the central governments aims to ”punish”
regions for ”deviating” from its control. This chapter, however, provides an
additional explanation: increasing provision of public goods under democracy
makes redistribution of rents in favor of the federal government for more ”demo-
cratic” territories attractive. In the real world both motives may be present.
The case of democratic federations with non-democratic regions (where my
evidence is in fact even more robust) may be once again discussed using the
example of the Russian Federation. I have already mentioned the significant
variation of subnational political regimes in Russia in the 1990s; in the eth-
nic republics the regimes emerged and stabilized relatively early (in the first
half of the 1990s) as opposed to the whole sample of Russian regions. More
importantly, the federal political scene was (although probably far from West-
ern democratic standards) still more democratic, than several regions, where
governors and presidents maintained an uncontested political monopoly (partly
resulting from the old party rule). In the early 1990s the coalition of republics
mostly aimed to increase its independence from the center (also receiving higher
share of tax revenue). However, under the bilateral bargaining (which is also
more applicable for the analysis because of more stable politics in regions) the
situation changed dramatically. Although some relatively non-democratic re-
gions (like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) received high portion of revenues,
most strict non-democracies among ethnic republics (mostly located in North-
ern Caucasus) in fact seemed to prefer low retention rates, exchanged for federal
support (which, in fact, has an effect similar to public goods provision in my
model). On the other hand, relatively more democratic republics (like Karelia
at the Finnish border) seem to obtain higher share of tax revenue (also through
special Presidential decrees). On the one hand, most regions in Northern Cau-
casus are relatively small in terms of population and territory; but on the other
hand, they are also characterized by an extremely large ”preference distance”
from other regions (resulting from substantial cultural, ethnic and religious dif-
ferences and a very high portion of non-Russian population, even as opposed
to other republics) and very bad quality of information obtained by the federal
government (this problem seems to plague this region even under the more au-
tocratic Putin regime).
For the sample of 20 ethnic republics (excluding Chechnya) the positive cor-
relation between level of democracy (measured by an index of Carnegie Center)
and the retention rates for 1995-1999 (period of bilateral bargaining) is statis-
tically significant (see also Figure 4.9). Naturally, this observation should not
be mistaken for econometric evidence; it requires further careful testing and
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Figure 4.9: Average retention rates 1995-1999 vs. index of democracy, Carnegie
Center
investigation. Moreover, the results are not robust to outliers: in particular, if
simultaneously regions with very large level of democracy (Karelia) and regions
with large distance to regression line (Kalmykia and Ingushetia) are removed,
the slope becomes negative - although removing either Karelia or Kalmykia and
Ingushetia does not cause any changes. However, it may provide at least some
basic ideas regarding the effect in question.
4.5 Extensions
After establishing the main results, the aim of this section is to provide some
intuition for what happens when some further assumptions are relaxed. It may
also account for a specific constellations in the center-region bargaining. My
discussion will partly be informal, simply to get a feeling as to how the model
reacts on changes in parameters and extensions in bargaining process.
4.5.1 Transfers
The model so far ignored at least one important instrument, which may be used
by the government. It may be possible to replace the public goods provision
by direct ”cash” transfers from the federal government’s share to the regional
budgets. The existence of this channel is not unambiguous and are restricted
to societies with efficient redistribution systems. However, it is an important
option, which should be carefully discussed. To start with, it is clear that a non-
democracy never makes transfers to the population in this model in equilibrium
(because then there is always an incentive to deviate). Hence, I concentrate on
democratic governments. Consider first the hybrid regimes. By paying trans-
fer, government reduces the provision of public goods and, hence, the output
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of private goods, but, on the other hand, increases the share of public goods
received by the farmers. The problem of determining transfer is very similar to
endogenizing tax rate τ ; however, the distinction is that τ simultaneously influ-
ences two budgets (federal and regional government), while transfer is relevant
only for one budget. Denote mi the transfer rate, i.e. share of government’s
revenue transferred to the population as a transfer. In this case if transfers are
allowed, what is equivalent to saying that the government’s share of tax revenue
is (1−mi)diti[(1−βi)fi+βiri] for federal government (for regional government
simply replace ti by 1 − ti). Hence, in order to determine the public goods
output for given transfer one can simply replace di in the problem of the main
model by (1−mi)di.
To conclude, for hybrid regime with non-democratic region the problem of de-
termining the transfer is given by
max
mi
(1 +miti)[di(1− βi)(1−mi)((1− βi)ti + βi
√
ti(ti − 2βiti − β2i (ti − 2))) + β
2
i (1− ti)di]
(4.17)
where mi ∈ [0; 1]. i.e. the federal government maximizes the revenue of the
farmer; the farmer loses some revenue due to the smaller provision of public
goods, but receives a fixed transfer. Solving the problem, one obtains the opti-
mal transfer, which looks like
mi =
(1− βi)ΞF (ti − 1) + tiΨF
2ti(1− βi)ΞF (4.18)
where ΞF = (1−βi)ti+βi
√
ti(ti − 2βiti − β2i (ti − 2)) and ΨF = β2i (1−ti). The
solution does not depend on the size of the region, is increasing in βi for any
ti and decreasing in ti for any βi (that means, that governments with ”worse”
public goods should pay larger transfers). For small βi, regardless of degree of
centralization, transfer is zero; however, there exist no βi such that for any ti
transfer is equal to 1 - at least for complete centralization ti = 1 transfer is zero.
It is clear: if regional government does not produce any public goods, federal
government is forced to produce some, because otherwise the output of private
goods is (by construction of technology) zero - and, for zero pie, even the largest
share is still zero. Now consider the behavior of the regional government. If the
transfer is zero, the problem does not change; so, the results of the basic model
are valid if transfers are allowed at least for regions where federal government
is relatively inefficient. On the other hand, if transfer is non-zero, for regional
government it simply implies smaller production of federal public goods; in this
case the equalizing tax split rate goes down (even more; if, for some values of
parameters, mi = 1, the regional government prefers secession if ti > 0: indeed,
any tax revenue received by the federal government is returned to the people
and not used to produce public goods, which is what the regional government
benefits from). However, if the share of the federal government goes down, the
optimal transfer increases. Hence, one can conclude, that for βi large enough
allowing for transfers results in decentralization of tax revenue as opposed to
case without transfers. If βi → 1, de-facto secession is achieved (if one maintains
the assumption that secession is never preferred by the federal government).28
28Unfortunately, it means that I cannot maintain my results for comparison of political
regimes after introducing transfers: as noticed, for small βi the results are identical to that
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Now consider the hybrid regime with the regional democratic government. In
this case the problem can be written as
max
mi
(1 +mi(1− ti))[diβi(1−mi)((1− ti)βi + βi
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti))) + (1− βi)
2
tidi]
(4.19)
which gives
mi =
−βitiΞR + (1− ti)ΨR
2(1− ti)βiΞR (4.20)
where ΞR = (1 − ti)βi + βi
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti)) and ΨR = (1 −
βi)
2ti. The transfer is equal to 0 for any ti and βi (it is predictable, since region
is by definition more efficient, than the federation, and hence, the problem is
equivalent to that of the main model. Hence, introducing transfers in hybrid
regimes with democratic regions does not change the results.
Finally, consider the case of pure democracy. Now both regional and federal
governments can pay transfers (which I will denote mRi and m
F
i respectively).
Consider first the regional government. The problem of the regional government
for given federal transfer can be written as
max
mRi
2di(1 +m
R
i (1− ti) +mFi ti)[ΞD(1−mFi )(1− βi) + ΨDβi(1−mRi )]
(4.21)
where ΞD = (1−βi)ti+βi
√
ti(1− ti) and ΨD = (1− ti)βi+βi
√
ti(1− ti). The
solution is
mRi =
(1− ti)(1− βi)(1−mFi )ΞD − βiti(1 +mFi )ΨD
2(1− ti)βiΨD (4.22)
It is clear that the transfer of the region is decreasing in the federal transfer
- since the latter also reduces the total output of public goods, which should
then be substituted by the region. Consider the case the federation sets its
transfers to zero. In this case regional government pays non-negative transfers
for any βi and di. The transfer is increasing in ti (so that lower fiscal capacity
of regional government makes it may higher transfers) and decreases in βi (so
that lower quality of federal public goods makes transfers less attractive - since
more regional public goods are needed to guarantee output). The problem of
the federal government can be obtained by simply solving the same problem for
mFi and yields symmetric expression
mFi =
(1− βi)(ti − 1)(1 +mRi )ΞD + βiti(1−mRi )ΨD
2ti(1− βi)ΞD (4.23)
of the basic model - so that the hybrid is more centralized, than pure non-democracy, but
for large βi de-facto secession is possible, which means higher decentralization, than in pure
non-democracy. The result is, however, of some empirical interest. If the democratic fed-
eral government starts heavy redistribution programs in a world with very bad information
transmission from regions, non-democratic regions may force de-facto secession, effectively
undermining the federal redistribution programs as well - since the federal budget goes down.
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which implies that for the case of zero transfer at the regional level federal gov-
ernment pays transfer equal to its total revenue. However, the transfer of federal
government is once again decreasing in regional transfer; nevertheless, even if
the regional transfer rate is 1, federation still pays some non-zero transfer for
any combination of βi and ti.
One can see that transfers of federal and regional governments are substitutes.
The federal government always pays transfers, while the regional government
pays transfers only if the federal government’s transfers are small enough. For
the purpose of this chapter one should conclude that the output of public goods
of both governments under democracy is smaller, than under non-democracy.
In particular, if federal government is inefficient enough (βi → 1), mFi → 1 and
fi → 0. In this case regional government requests equalizing tax split rate ap-
proaching de-facto secession. Unfortunately, further conclusions are impossible
and depend on parameter values.
4.5.2 Regional autocrats and federal elections
A problem typical for many hybrid regimes with non-democratic regional gov-
ernment is that the regional autocrat can act as a kind of ”manager for electoral
pool”, i.e. determine the outcomes of federal elections. For example, in Russia
the federal parliamentary elections 1999 seemed to be heavily influenced by the
positions of the regional governors, which mostly directly or indirectly supported
the main competing parties Otechestvo and Edinstvo. The question is therefore
how the tax split rate could react on the ability of the regional government to
control federal elections.
As demonstrated above, in a hybrid political system with non-democratic region
there may exist a non-zero regional optimum if federation is productive enough.
In order to obtain support of the regional government, the federal government
sets the tax split rate to be exactly equal to regional optimum. Therefore if the
regional government is able to manipulate the outcome of federal elections and
the productivity-enhancing effect of the public goods of the federation is small
enough, it leads to a de-facto secession as defined above (note, that it is the first
time the chapter encounters this outcome). Once again, the result is intuitively
clear: regional government able to have an influence on the federation in turn
of the federal elections is able to obtain higher autonomy without paying costs
of secession. This is also what one could observe in the countries where such
manipulation took place: the federal government had to ”repay” to its loyal
regions either through transfers or concessions in tax collection. However, if the
federation has sufficiently good public goods, the equilibrium is still different
from zero.
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4.5.3 Tinpots and totalitarians
The assumptions on the dictatorial behavior I made so far mostly fit that for a
tinpot dictator (Wintrobe, 2000), who is focusing on rent maximization. How-
ever, an extension to a totalitarian dictator is obvious. The problem of a total-
itarian has the same constraint, as of a democratic system (i.e. regional budget
should be balanced off), but the region maximizes the tax split rate (ti for the
federation and 1− ti for the region), and not the public goods provision, i.e.
max ti s.t. diti((1− βi)fi + βiri)− f
2
i
2
= 0 for i = A,P (4.24)
min tP s.t. (1− ti)d((1− βi)fi + βiri)− r
2
i
2
= 0 (4.25)
Obviously, it is reasonable to consider this extension only for the region P and
the federation. In case of the tax split ratio between the federation and the
region A the former just sets tA = 1 and chooses the public goods provision
accordingly. If the federation is a totalitarian and region 1 is either a tinpot, or
a democracy, the following happens: the federal optimum is now equal to 1; it is
accepted by the governments if their revenue under secession is strictly negative
(i.e. C is sufficiently high). Otherwise the federal government has to propose
an equalizing tax split rate (which is still larger zero - a tax split rate in case
of secession). If the region is governed by a non-democratic tinpot, it produces
rP = d(1−tP )β. For simplicity, I assume that in case there are multiple solutions
for fP , rP the larger root is chosen. But in this case the equalizing tax split rate
is identical to that of hybrid regime with democratic federal government. The
federal optimum does not depend on βP , C and d, and the equalizing tax split
rate is decreasing in βP and d and increasing in C (as already shown for the hy-
brid regime). Therefore one can claim that the tax split demonstrates the usual
properties discussed above (weakly decreasing in d, weakly increasing in C and
decreasing in βP ). Moreover, one can easily show that the equilibrium tax split
rate is larger than for a hybrid regime with democratic federal government: the
federal optimum with a totalitarian federal government is weakly larger, than
for the hybrid regime; the equalizing tax split rate is identical; hence, for all
cases when in both regimes equalizing tax split rate is chosen, for both regimes
federal optimum is chosen and for totalitarian federation federal optimum and
for hybrid regime equalizing tax split rate is chosen the result is obvious. In
case the regime with totalitarian federation has the equalizing tax split rate as
an equilibrium, and the hybrid regime chooses federal optimum, the result still
holds: otherwise the totalitarian federation would propose a tax rate identical
to the federal optimum in a hybrid regime, and it would be accepted. Therefore
the totalitarian federation with a tinpot region exhibits a higher centralization,
than the democratic federation with a tinpot region and obviously than the pure
non-democracy. If the region is governed by a democracy, the equalizing tax
split rate is identical to a pure democracy case. Hence, one can conclude that
the the totalitarian federation with a democratic region exhibits a weakly higher
centralization than the pure democracy, but no conclusions for the comparison
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to pure non-democracy are still possible.
If the region is a totalitarian dictatorship and the federation is either demo-
cratic or tinpot dictatorship, the region strictly prefers zero tax split rate in
any case it can produce any public goods under secession. Hence, if C is small
enough, the only equilibrium is the de-facto secession. If C is large enough,
the region cannot produce under secession and accepts any offer of the federa-
tion. Hence, the federation with a totalitarian region and non-totalitarian federal
government is weakly less centralized than the regime with a tinpot region and
non-totalitarian government. Finally, if both governments are totalitarian, if
the region can produce any public goods under secession, the only equilibrium
tax split rate is zero. If the region is unable to produce any public goods under
secession, it is equal to 1. Hence, the system with two totalitarians is either
completely centralized or completely decentralized.
4.5.4 Negative secession costs
The assumption of positive secession costs can also be relaxed: it is quite possible
to imagine a case when a secession in fact generates additional utility for the
regional elites. For example, in presence of a vivid nationalism and significant
ethnic differences the independence per se can become attractive, whether it
generates further rents or not. The discussion is very similar to the idea of
”ego-rents” in elections literature. The simplest way to model it is to allow for
C ≤ 0. If the absolute value of negative secession costs is high enough, the
region never accepts any offer from the federal government and the secession
happens. Otherwise the equalizing tax split rates and the set of parameters
where the federal optimum is accepted go down for all regimes. However, there
are no differences from the point of view of dependence of the new equilibrium
from βP or d.
4.5.5 Fixed costs of public goods provision
To relax the restrictions resulting from the quadratic costs assumption, it may
be reasonable to assume that there exists a fixed costs component in the public
goods provision. For the democracy the existence of fixed costs does not change
anything (assuming the costs are not prohibitive and the provision of public
goods is generally possible), though they shift the equilibrium value of public
goods output. However, in case of non-democracy, where the objective is not
the output, but the net revenue, the existence of positive fixed costs may make
withdrawing from public goods provision more attractive than producing any
public goods at all. Fixed costs for the region change the results of the chap-
ter only if they are prohibitive, since regions produce public goods both after
secession and without secession. In case of the fixed costs for the federation,
however, it is possible that the federal government prefers secession if it is the
only way to avoid losses due to high fixed costs.
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4.5.6 Region as a Stackelberg leader
So far I assumed that the federal government is the Stackelberg leader in the
model. This is a reasonable assumption in many devolution scenarios, but it
also happens quite often that the federal government is in fact the Stackelberg
follower, forced to deal with separatist or autonomist desires of the regional
elites. It implies, that the regional government proposes a tax split rate to the
federation, which can either accept or reject it. While rejecting, it ”forces the
region to seced”: it stops the production of the public good and imposes sanc-
tions causing costs of C. I consider the problem only for tP , since it hardly
seems to be reasonable for the region A per construction. Assume moreover
that C is not prohibitively high; otherwise the regional government proposes
the equalizing tax splits identified in the previous sections of the chapter.
As already noticed, in the pure non-democracy the regional government al-
ways prefers tP equal to zero. However, in this case the federation is indifferent
between rejecting and accepting the tax split rate. If the federation rejects the
tax split rate, the region has to pay secession costs. Hence, it is going to offer tP
positive, but closed to zero. In this case the federation cannot reject it any more,
since it is not indifferent. Hence, the outcome of decentralization is an infinitely
small tax split rate. In a pure democracy the production of regional public goods
is increasing in tP ; hence, by the same logic, the region proposes tP = 0, but the
federation can impose secession costs. Hence, the region proposes an infinitely
small tax split rate, which is than accepted by the federation. In a hybrid regime
with democratic region the production of regional public goods is decreasing in
tP , and the same logic applies. In a hybrid regime with non-democratic region
the optimum for the region may be different from zero; in this special case region
proposes its optimum and the federation accepts. To conclude, the outcome of
the devolution game leads to a strictly lower centralization in all settings (with
the possible exception of hybrid with non-democratic region), but still does not
allow for secession equilibrium or de-facto secession, like in case of totalitarian
governments. The intuition is straightforward - the totalitarian government is
ready to sacrifice its revenue or provision of public goods for lower tP , while the
region acting as a Stackelberg leader in ”normal” regimes is not.
4.5.7 Small β
The next assumption to be relaxed is that regarding the β. Although arguments
of information advantage and preference distance seem to be reasonable to jus-
tify the assumptions made in this chapter, it is certainly possible to imagine a
federation, where the regional government is less informed about the situation
in its territory than the federal center. However, assuming β < .5 makes the
model to a great extent trivial, since it takes away at least one of the trade-
offs, which were driving the results so far. For β < .5 the federal government
has no incentive to decentralize in order to increase the ”size of the pie”; the
federal optimum for all regimes is achieved at t = 1. Hence, the region A is
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always completely centralized. Obviously, regardless of β and political regime,
the regional government never accepts complete centralization, except for the
case it is unable to produce public goods under secession given very high C. It
means that in region P is either completely centralized, or, if independence is
feasible, remains part of the federation with tP equalizing tax split rate, which
is determined by the already specified conditions. Obviously, for this specific
case any political regime can be only weakly less centralized, than the others:
if secession costs are high enough, in any regime federation is completely cen-
tralized. Consider the case when the equilibrium tax split rate is the equalizing
one. Evaluating equalizing tax split rate of a pure non-democracy for βP = .5
yields
√
C/d. One can claim that if this ratio is large enough, non-democracies
have higher equilibrium tax split rate at βP = .5 than democracies. Using the
monotonicity of tax split rates one can claim that if (i) ratio of C and d is small
enough, (ii) βP < .5 is large enough and (iii) secession is feasible under both
regimes, democracy is more decentralized than non-democracy.
4.5.8 Migration
So far I have avoided any form of interregional spillovers mostly for the reason
of tractability. This section will at least partly relax this very strict assumption,
introducing the movement of population between regions. Assume that people
can migrate from one region to another after the tax split rates are determined
and declared (public knowledge), but before decisions on provision of public
goods are made, regardless of whether secession happened or not. This timing
describes individuals as not completely myopic (and thus able to make infer-
ence from the center-regions bargaining on future economic policies), but is also
helpful from the technical point of view, since under this condition the provision
of public goods is still set uniquely and the only way for the governments to
manipulate the migration flows is to change the tax split rate. People migrate
to the region where they can obtain higher utility. People migrate to regions
with large post-tax output Ci. Ci is a function of Yi, and hence, of public goods
provision (assuming the land is free and each new migrant still receives one unit
of it).29 Assume that both regions are identical in terms of d = .5 and also β.
Thus one avoids agglomeration effects when people move from small region to a
large region (notice, that public goods output is a function of d, and since f and
r denote pure public goods with non-rivalry in consumption, additional popu-
lation increases both total output (through changing d and r / f) and output
per capita (through changing r and f)). Migration goes always from A to P or
vice versa; hence, even if people take into account that their migration decision
will change the population size of the region and the public goods output, it
will just increase the absolute value of the migration flow, but not its direction.
29I abstract from possible effects of migration on price of land; basically, this section deals
with a world of ”Wild West” migration where individuals move freely to other territories.
For the approach of modeling migration used in this extension, however, the ”costs” of this
simplification are very low: one can in fact claim that potentially scarce land will simply
influence the shape of θ, which I do not specify.
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For the purpose of our analysis it is irrelevant, and hence migration from A to
P is described by a function θ(tP − tA), where θ(.) ∈ (−1.1). If θ(.) < 0, there
is a population outflow from A to P, but the share of migrants is always smaller
than the original population of the region. The population of A after migration
is .5(1 + θ(.)), and of P, respectively, .5(1− θ(.)). θ(.) is continuous and differ-
entiable; its absolute value is increasing in the function’s argument (and hence,
finding out the direction of migration, one can exactly claim whether function
is increasing or decreasing).
First look at the case of pure democracy (all three jurisdictions are democratic).
For any β > .5 k is too small if the federal optimum is chosen as opposed to
the case with higher devolution; hence, people always migrate from A to P. The
federal government increase change tP (since it would lead to secession). Evalu-
ating the first derivative of the public goods output in A at t∗ federal optimum
gives
−θ′(.)((1−β)t+β
√
t∗(1− t∗))+(1+θ(.))
(
1− β + β(1− 2t
∗)
2
√
t∗(1− t∗)
)
< 0 (4.26)
and hence for any tP federation selects tA smaller than the federal optimum
with zero migration. It means that migration enforces decentralization in A.
Without specifying θ(.), it is impossible to make exact claims about the new
equilibrium (and even prove its existence), and tP can also be smaller in equi-
librium with migration than without migration. It is straightforward, however,
that tA = 0; tP = 0 is never an equilibrium, since the federal government has
incentive to deviate from it. However, if the equilibrium exists, it would imply
tA < t
∗.
For the case of pure non-democracy (all three jurisdictions are non-democratic)
the direction of migration is still the same from A to P. However, while in case of
pure democracy the federal government cared about public goods output in each
region (because of the assumption of elections), now it maximizes the overall
net revenue from both regions. In this case federation prefers lower migration
only for intermediate β, while for too large and too small β migration is in fact
increasing the revenues (or additional revenues from P outweigh the losses from
A). Assuming that β is in the range where migration is costly, the condition for
the new equilibrium to imply tA < t
∗ (if the equilibrium exists) is
RP
RA
1− θ(.)
1 + θ(.) t=t∗
< 1 (4.27)
where RP , RA - per capita revenue of the federation from the respective regions.
(0,0), once again is never an equilibrium.
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4.6 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to identify how economic and political characteris-
tics of regions and federation may influence the decentralization outcome in a
framework of an asymmetric federalism. There are several main results which
could be obtained from the chapter. First, if secession is an option, regions with
higher secession costs, smaller population and smaller productivity-enhancing
effect of regional public goods (which may be related to information advantages,
preference heterogeneity or simply efficiency of public administration) system-
atically pay higher share of the tax revenue collected on their territory to the
federal government. Moreover, option for secession leads to higher decentral-
ization for two regions with identical effectiveness of public goods, regardless of
their size, but assuming they have identical political regimes. Both results seem
to be intuitively reasonable and well related to the (quite limited) empirical
evidence in the field.
Second, different political regimes have a specific impact on decentralization.
It is impossible to claim that pure democracies are strictly more decentralized
than pure non-democracies; however, it is true for β small enough and secession
costs large enough (or no secession option). If the differences in the size of β are
caused by the quality of information acquisition by different levels of govern-
ment, it is likely that exactly democracies with smaller problems of information
transmission may have smaller β. That may explain the higher decentraliza-
tion observed in several democracies. However, if the size of β is driven by
preferences, this explanation hardly applies. Similarly, it is difficult to clearly
establish the relation between C and political regimes: while in democracies
high C may reflect high market integration, in non-democracies high C results
from repressions against secessionists. Hybrid regimes are always more central-
ized than pure non-democracies, if there is no secession option. If secession is
possible, hybrids with non-democratic regions are more centralized, than pure
non-democracies, but for hybrids with non-democratic federations no clear con-
clusion may be made, the result depends on β and d. Basically, it means that
the democratization at the federal level leads to increasing centralization of tax-
ation, and at the regional level has ambiguous effects. One should notice that
this claim covers only revenue centralization.
Finally, the chapter relaxes a number of assumptions to understand the robust-
ness of the model. Probably, the most interesting conclusion is that introducing
migration supports devolution in region A in democracies, but not necessarily
in non-democracies. Hence, the model predicts a very specific form of compe-
tition for mobile factors of production in a world with exogenous public sector:
in this case the adjustments are made not by changing tax pressure, but by
redistributing tax revenue between levels of government, i.e. through fiscal de-
centralization. Further extensions include positive gains from secession, fixed
costs of public goods provision, changed timing of events (regions as Stackelberg
leaders), as well as varieties of non-democracies (tinpots and totalitarians) and
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non-democratic regions controlling federal elections on their territory.
The model, nevertheless, still leaves the dimension of credibility and time-
consistency out of discussion. For example, the exogenous secession costs actu-
ally depend on endogenous investments in internal conflict made by governments
at both levels. It is questionable whether the federal government (democratic
or non-democratic) can indeed ”keep its promises” in terms of secession costs
or tax split rates, once they are set. The fact that autocracies have hard time
making credible commitments is well-known (cf. Myerson, 2008); however, the
ability of democracies to provide commitment (also in terms of tax splits or
secession costs) is not unambiguous - one can actually claim, that due to the
abundance of veto players in a democracy this political system is more likely
to credibly commit, but less likely to make any commitment at all. On the
other hand, this chapter does not model the interaction between households or
businesses and governments in an autocracy, as most of the literature does - the
goal is to understand how individual autocratic governments interact with each
other. And it is quite possible to argue, that the ability of autocratic agencies
to make commitments to other autocratic agencies is at least in several regimes
relatively high: for example, the whole Soviet economy after 1960 was based
on bargaining between individual territorial and industrial agencies, which were
able to follow their (informal!) contracts. The ”autocratic peace” hypothe-
sis basically assumes that non-democracies can make commitments to similar
non-democracies (Weart, 2000; Peceny et al., 2002). Anyway, this issue is let
aside in this model. Finally, the chapter ignores the interaction between con-
stitutional choice (secession clause) and post-constitutional bargaining over tax
revenue. Nevertheless, even with these caveats the results of the chapter pro-
vide at least some insights into the logic of devolution in asymmetric federations.
The results of this chapter confirm the basic intuition that the complexity of
democratization process leads to ambiguous results in terms of decentralization.
However, from this point of view an additional question becomes important. I
have listed a substantial number of case studies showing that there may exist
a high variation of democracy within one federation. The model assumes that
differences in political regimes influence the bargaining process between govern-
ments. However, it is at least equally important to understand, whether the
differences in regimes have also a direct impact on economic performance in
individual regions. This question can also be re-phrased as follows: are differ-
ences in political regimes, which seem to be politically relevant, of any economic
importance? If the latter is true, it becomes an additional argument supporting
my claim that the intranational differences in political systems have to be taken
into account. The next chapter looks at this problem in greater detail.
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Chapter 5
Democracy, Size of
Bureaucracy, and Economic
Growth: Evidence from
Russian Regions
5.1 Introduction
As I have already mentioned in the Introduction, the huge literature on impact
of political regimes on economic growth mostly explores the international varia-
tion of the level of democratization; these data are usually subject to a number
of well-known problems of compatibility, causing self-selection and measurement
error biases. However, political systems vary not only internationally, but also
within individual countries (especially federations), where the data are often
more compatible (i.e. because they are collected by a single statistical author-
ity). Developing and transition countries often demonstrate the co-existence
of significantly different political systems in different regions of the same coun-
try. This chapter takes advantage of this fact, studying the impact of political
regimes on economic growth in different regions of the Russian Federation.
Russia seems to be an appropriate field for the analysis of intra-national differ-
ences of political institutions. First, the Russian Federation consists of a large
number of regions, making statistical analysis technically possible. Second, and
more important, the variation of political systems across Russian regions, as
already discussed, seems to be enormous. Third, there is also a significant vari-
ation in the economic performance of Russian regions, contributing to large
economic asymmetries in the structure of the Russian federalism. However, the
Russian Federation as a ”laboratory” for study of economic growth and polit-
ical systems has also specific problems. The political decisions at the regional
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level (both constitutional and post-constitutional) are subject not only to the
bargaining process and institutions of the regional political system, but also to
the influence of the center. Therefore it is necessary to restrict attention to a
period of relative stability on the federal arena. That is why I focus on the
time frame between 2000 and 2004. The year 2000 marks the final transition
of power from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin, thus establishing a completely
new power structure in Russia and opening the way for a number of political
reforms of the federal system. In September 2004 Vladimir Putin abolished
the free elections of governors, therefore changing dramatically the specifics of
regional politics.1 Finally, unlike the 1990s, which is probably the period most
empirical research on Russian regions is devoted to, the period studied in this
chapter was characterized by stable economic growth in the Russian Federation.
One of the main controversies over the political determinants of economic growth
confronts two dimensions of the organization of the government. On the one
hand, growth can be driven by the political system, i.e. degree of democracy.
However, the recent literature on economic governance (Ahrens, 2006) challenges
this view by considering the quality of public administration the relevant
factor for economic growth. While the first line of the literature claims, that the
organization and the efficiency of bureaucracy depend upon the development of
democratic institutions, the second argues, that the crucial issue is how the
public bureaucracy is organized; any political regime can become both source of
good and bad governance. This chapter attempts to contribute to this discus-
sion by directly considering these two dimensions of the public policy. On the
one hand, it finds that democracy has a non-linear impact on economic growth:
regions with intermediate level of democracy seem to have worse performance
than more developed democratic and autocratic regions. This conclusion is in
line with the recent theoretical literature on ”non-linearity of effects of democ-
racy”, though to my knowledge it is the first empirical evidence with respect
to economic growth. On the other hand, the size of bureaucracy has a nega-
tive impact on economic growth. Moreover, there is evidence of the interaction
between the size of bureaucratic apparatus and political regime as factors of
economic growth.
There are extremely few studies exploring the links between democracy and
/ or size of bureaucracy and economic growth using the variation of political
regimes in subnational units. Hiskey (2005) looks at the economic recovery in
Mexico and finds an inverse U-shape relation between the level of democracy
and economic growth. Brown et al. (2009) focus on the interregional differences
in size of bureaucracy in Russia in 1995-2004 to explore the effects of size of
bureaucracy on the outcome of privatization. They find, that larger bureaucra-
cies are associated with better post-privatization environment and hence with
higher performance of the firms (measured using the microlevel data). On the
1Since the decision was announced after the terrorist attack in Beslan and motivated by
the needs of national security, it is unlikely that the actors anticipated that change, adjusting
their behavior accordingly.
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other hand, Dininio and Orttung (2005) report that increase of bureaucracy
size in Russian regions is associated with higher corruption. This chapter may
thus be considered as complementary to Brown et al. and Dininio and Ort-
tung, looking at a different dimension of the relation between bureaucracy and
growth. Moreover, there is some related literature addressing the impact of
the direct democracy on economic performance. While for the ”overall” democ-
racy the best laboratory are developing and transition countries like Russia, the
laboratory for direct democracy studies is Switzerland: Swiss cantons vary sig-
nificantly in terms of introduction of direct democratic institutions. The Swiss
data were used by Feld and Savoiz (1997).2
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section surveys the existing
literature and empirical findings in the field and relates this work to other stud-
ies of economic growth of Russian regions. The third section presents the model
and the data. The fourth section provides the main results. In the following
section I discuss possible robustness checks. Finally, the last section concludes.
5.2 Literature
The relation between democracy and economic growth belongs to the most con-
troversial fields of political economics. The consensus seems to be that there is
an inconclusive relationship between democracy and growth, depending upon
the specifics of channels observed, regions and countries.3 This fact opens the
way to two lines of research. The first approach looks at the varieties of non-
democracies and democracies, searching for the possible non-linearity of growth
along the continuum of political regimes from autocracy to democracy. The ex-
isting literature mostly considers two types of potential non-linearities of impact
of democracy on economic growth, though more sophisticated relations resulting
from detailed studies of autocracies (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008) and democ-
racies (Persson and Tabellini, 2006) are possible (however, less applicable for
the sample of this chapter).4
The first line of research, originating from Barro’s (1996) work, predicts an
”inverted U-shaped” reaction of growth on democracy, i.e. movement from
2Further related literature includes Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2000), who survey a broader
literature dealing with the impact of direct democracy in Switzerland on economic and policy
variables. Santerre (1986) considers the potential efficiency gains of direct democracies on local
level using an indirect test based on Tiebout migration assumptions. Moreover, Frey, Kucher
and Stutzer (2001) and Matsusaka (2007, 2007a) examine several possible links between direct
democracy and the functioning of bureaucracy, which are, however, not directly related to the
research question of this chapter: they look at the influence of direct democracy on the
financial benefits received by public officials and the organization of the executive branch.
3Although the recent meta-regression analysis literature challenges this result, replacing
it by ”no direct impact” and ”significant indirect impact” of democracy on economic growth,
see Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008.
4John von Neumann once referred to the term ”non-linear function” as equivalent to
”non-elephant animals” (Page, 2006:90).
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authoritarianism to democracy first encourages economic growth, but after a
certain threshold hampers it. Barro (1996:14) himself explains the inverted U-
shape by the fact that ”in the worst dictatorship, an increase in political rights
might be growth-enhancing because of the benefit from limitations on govern-
mental power. But in places that have already achieved a moderate amount of
democracy, a further increase in political rights might impair growth because
of the intensified concern with income redistribution”. Thus the ”moderate”
democracy appears to be the optimal choice in the trade-off between governmen-
tal rent-seeking and public desire for redistribution.5 In a similar way Plumper
and Martin (2003) consider the impact of political participation on growth. In
a semi-democracy as opposed to a pure autocracy, government is unable to
use rents as an instrument to achieve political support anymore due to larger
selectorate. Thus the rent-seeking goes down. However, in a democracy the
government tends to overinvest in the provision of public goods and therefore
reduces growth rates. Barro (1996), Comeau (2003) and Plumper and Martin
(2003) also provide empirical evidence in favor of the ”inverted U-shaped” re-
lation between economic growth and democracy (and the latter chapter also
demonstrates a ”U-shaped relation” between democracy and public share of
GDP), though this effect was rejected for productivity growth (Faust, 2007);
Murphy et al. (2005) give some evidence in favor of ”inverted U-shaped” rela-
tion between democracy and economic reforms for the post-Soviet countries.
The opposite approach suggests that the non-linearity takes the form of the
”direct U-curve” , i.e. exactly the ”hybrids” or ”weak democracies” perform
worse, than pure autocracies and pure democracies. This point of view is obvi-
ously motivated by the case of rapid growth in several autocracies (like China)
and well-being of Western developed democracies, opposite to the instability
and crises of intermediate political forms. One can basically use three argu-
ments in favor of this hypothesis.
First, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) relate the potential U-shaped effect to
the desire of the government to implement economic reforms, which differs for
different regimes. Economic reforms in democracies may appear as a result of
electoral competition, restricting the ability of the government to ignore eco-
nomic problems; in autocracies reforms are pursued to improve economic situ-
ation and therefore increase the rents. However, in hybrids the public pressure
to implement reforms is lower, and the threat of power loss from changes of eco-
nomic institutions and therefore redistribution of wealth and bargaining power
is significant, so, the reforms are postponed.
The second argument assumes that in a hybrid regime the government is rather
limited in its ability to use direct coercion (which is at least one of the foun-
5This argument could be compared to the idea of the ”institutional possibility frontier”
(Djankov et al., 2003), which describes a political regime as a trade-off between ”costs of
dictatorship” and ”cost of anarchy”, where a moderate democracy could also be a preferred
solution (depending upon the distance of the institutional possibility frontier from the origin).
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dations of a pure autocracy), however, is still able to manipulate economic in-
stitutions to eliminate the threat of development of potential alternative power
centers. In this case weak economic institutions could become an instrument
of ”taking hostages”, i.e. making any business activity dependent on the loy-
alty to the ruling group and reducing economic autonomy of potential political
actors, thus maintaining control over politics (McMann, 2006). For example,
if the taxation system is intransparent and overwhelming, the only way to re-
main economically competitive is to pursue aggressive tax avoidance. For this
purpose a company requires support from the public agencies , which can use
their power to ”blackmail” businesses in order to extract rents, but, what is
especially important, to prevent any support of opposition (Darden, 2001; Bar-
sukova, 2006).6 ”The blood of the regime” in this case is not repressions, but
corruption (Mau et al., 2007:100). Acemoglu et al. (2004) show that inefficient
regimes based on bribes can be quite persistent. However, low-quality economic
institutions as substitutes for direct violence have a negative effect on economic
growth.
Finally, semi-democracies, like democracies, are characterized by a large num-
ber of (vaguely speaking) veto players, originating from both formal system and
(more importantly) informal power relations in the society.7 Therefore they
share with democracies the problem of slow decision making and reform dead-
locks if consensus is impossible. A strong autocrat can ignore the constraints
present for his weaker counterpart. On the other hand, relations between veto
players in semi-democracy (unlike pure democracy) are intransparent, hence,
generating problems typical for autocracies with weak formal institutions. So,
the semi-democratic system combines the weaknesses of both democracies and
non-democracies rather than uniting their advantages.8
There has been no direct evidence of U-shape effects of democracy on economic
growth reported on the international level.9 However, as already mentioned, on
6The experience of government-business relations in the shadow of Yukos in Russia is a
good example of this ”blackmail” tactics.
7Although there are democracies with a low number of veto players, like the Westminster
system, emergence of alternative power centers (and increase of the number of veto players)
seems to be a quite logical element of any democratization.
8A somehow similar approach of ”U-shaped” reaction of growth on institutional system
comes from the sociological literature on varieties of capitalism. It claims, that the regimes
”at the corners” of distribution can achieve higher growth rates because of their comparative
institutional advantages, than mixed regimes with inconsistent institutions (Amable, 2004).
This literature, however, does not address political systems.
9However, the empirical studies suggest that semi-democracies are characterized by lower
quality of institutions (Leonida et al., 2007), higher political uncertainty and investment risk
(Kenyon, Naoi, 2007), higher probability of civil conflicts and disorder (Hegre et al., 2001,
Vreeland, 2003, Gleditch et al., 2007), lower quality of bureaucracy (Ba¨ck and Hadenius, 2008)
and higher corruption (Rock, 2007), than both democracies and autocracies. Moreover, these
regimes have short duration due to political instability (Gates et al., 2006). The impact of veto
player structure is more ambiguous. Henisz and Mansfield (2006) argue that smaller number
of veto players is more likely to increase trade protectionism under bad macroeconomic condi-
tions, but the impact of the number of veto players per se is lower in non-democracies (so, even
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the intra-national level it is the U-shaped hypothesis which has been confirmed
empirically for the Mexican case.
The second approach to the puzzle of ”ambiguous effects of democracy on
growth” either disregards democracy as a relevant factor for economic perfor-
mance and looks for other dimensions of political-economic systems able to have
a profound impact on growth or condition the effect of democracy on other pa-
rameters like rule of law, regime duration etc. Clearly, the number of these
alternatives may be very large; however, for sure the impact of political regime
on economic performance depends on the quality and size of bureaucracy.
The relations between politicians and bureaucrats can be crucial for under-
standing the predatory or market-enhancing behavior of the governments in
emerging economies (Dixit, 2006). There is a huge literature dealing with the
size of public sector and government expenditures and its impact on economic
growth; however, this aspect represents only a fraction of potential influence
of bureaucracy on economic process - it may be even more important to study
the impact of bureaucracy through regulation and quality of public administra-
tion, and the size of bureaucracy could be an interesting dimension from this
point of view. The size of bureaucracy matters, first, because of direct costs for
sustaining the bureaucratic machine, second, as a proxy for capacity and / or
power of bureaucracy, and third, as a proxy for competition inside the bureau-
cracy. The first dimension is relatively straightforward: large bureaucracies are
more expensive to sustain. From the point of view of the second dimension,
two perspectives may be distinguished. A public choice perspective in the line
of William Niskanen and Ludwig von Mises, which has recently been developed
in the ”grabbing hand” literature (Frye and Shleifer, 1997), would suggest that
the increase of discretionary power of agencies is used for the rent-seeking and
budget maximization and therefore decreases the economic performance. Hence,
countries or regions with large bureaucracies should exhibit lower growth rates.
However, a ”Weberian” approach to ”rational bureaucracy” able to enhance
economic growth (or the ”helping hand” view of bureaucrats involved in pro-
moting economic activity) has also a long history in social sciences. From this
point of view large bureaucracy could rather improve the quality of public ser-
vices and therefore foster economic growth. 10 Finally, the effects of the size of
bureaucracy may differ depending upon its structure: co-existence of many com-
large number of veto players may be irrelevant for politics in countries close to non-democratic
pole). Moreover, Frye and Mansfield (2003) demonstrate that in the post-Socialist world au-
tocracies with higher number of veto players (fragmented regimes, i.e. ”semi-autocracies”)
are more likely to liberalize foreign trade, while consolidated autocracies are characterized by
protectionist trade policy. This result rather provides evidence for the ”inverted U-shape”
hypothesis.
10This argument is non-negligible in countries with poor protection of property rights and
bad governance. For example, a typical excuse of Russian agencies explaining the poor quality
of services (like long waiting time) is the lack of personnel. In fact, the literature on Russian
bureaucracy has shown both lack of its Weberian properties (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000;
Brym and Gimpelson, 2004) and its relatively small size given the level of development of
Russia (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004).
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peting agencies may provide additional incentives, while subdivision of public
functions between many agencies acting as complement may lead to increasing
bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
As mentioned, empirical literature dealing with the problem is, to my knowledge,
surprisingly small. Two papers dealing with Russia were already mentioned in
the introduction. Moreover Okten (2001) for a sample of countries shows that
increase of number of regulators adversely affects private investment decisions.
Kochetkova and Nureev (2005) provide a correlation analysis of the relation
between the number of deputy prime ministers and macroeconomic indicators
in Russia (which per construction lets potential causality out of the considera-
tions). Further studies work with different indicators of quality of bureaucracy.
Ayal and Karras (1996) construct a ”bureaucracy inefficiency ratio” measuring
the relation between the share of public employment in the overall employment
and the share of government in the GDP for an international sample. Rauch
and Evans (1999) apply an indicator of ”Weberian” properties of the bureau-
cratic machine in a sample of countries country. Finally, there is a related large
literature dealing with the ”quality of governance” and ”quality of institutions”
indicators of different sort (Hyden et al., 2003) and not with its size.
Therefore the chapter basically aims to discriminate among two contradicting
approaches to the impact of democracy and bureaucracy on economic perfor-
mance. On the one hand, regions with both high and low level of democracy
can perform better or worse, than regions with average level of democracy.
On the other hand, increase of the size of bureaucracy can be associated with
lower growth rates (public choice bureaucracy) or higher growth rates (Webe-
rian bureaucracy). Finally, it is possible to expect some interaction between the
democratic development and the size of bureaucracy. One could assume, that
a high developed democracy (or a strong autocracy, or both) is able to control
the rent-seeking activities of the bureaucrats - via the pressure of public opinion
or threat of repressions.11 On the other hand, some of the ”inverse U-shape
literature” (dealing with state capacity and corruption) explicitly builds upon a
U-shaped relation between democracy and quality of bureaucracy. On the other
hand, the quality of bureaucracy could change the impact of particular political
system on economic growth.12 This chapter does not aim to establish the exact
11Andrews and Montinola (2004) show that the increasing number of veto players (often
associated with democracy) increases the quality of the rule of law (a parameter also encom-
passing the functioning of political system). In a theoretical model, Dixit (2008) claims that
authoritarian rulers are likely to end up in a less efficient equilibrium attempting to solve the
principal-agent problem with the bureaucrats, than democratic regimes because the former
are less interested in giving up rents. Moreover, different regimes are likely to hire different
bureaucrats - a result somewhat similar to Egorov and Sonin (2006), who, however, empathize
the power struggle aspect of the problem.
12For example, Polterovich and Popov (2007) differentiate between democracies with high
rule of law and democracies with low rule of law, which could significantly underperform
autocracies. The development of the bureaucratic machine and hence its limited capacity
could have similar effects.
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causal link in the interplay of democracy and bureaucracy, but rather is looking
for the conditional impact of these two characteristics of regional governments
on economic growth.
The heterogeneity of growth among Russian regions has already been subject
to a number of studies, which, however, mostly do not consider the impact of
political factors on growth.13 There are only few exceptions. Ahrend (2005) ex-
plicitly addresses political determinants of growth in a panel of Russian regions
from 1990 to 1998, applying a variety of variables, including political orienta-
tion of the governor or outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections,
and does not find any significant impact of politics on economic growth. It
should be noted, however, that this chapter applies the variables characterizing
the current political situation rather than formal and informal political institu-
tions (although given the short experience of Russian post-Communist regime
the distinction is vague). Moreover, the period of early 1990s was characterized
by significant political shifts in regions, also because of instability and changes
on the federal level, which have been less pronounced in the early 2000s. De-
sai et al. (2005) in a cross-section setting consider the impact of institutions
on recovery of Russian regions and other variables characterizing the success
of reforms; their focus is, however, the interaction between the region and the
federation and not internal political structures of the region. Vainberg and Ryb-
nikova (2006) study a cross-section of averaged indicators for Russian regions
using as dependent variables indices of quality of life, quality of social sphere,
welfare and of population and find either insignificant or negative impact of
democratization on economic and social performance. However, they focus on
levels, and not on growth rates and the construction of indices may also be
subject to criticism. Finally, Mau and Yanovskiy (2002) evaluate the impact of
institutions on economic performance using principal component analysis and
claim, that variables of political freedom (like independence of media) have a
positive impact; however, the methodology of study is quite different from the
standard regression analysis in economics. To conclude, there is still place for
studying the impact of political regimes on economic performance in Russian
regions.14
13Solanko (2006), Libman (2006), Lugovoy et al. (2007), Buccellato (2007), Lavrovskyi
and Shiltsin (2007), Kolomak (2008) and Ledyaeva and Linden (2008), among others, focus
on the issue of σ- and β-convergence in Russia (for different periods) in cross-section and
panel data frameworks; Mikheeva (1999) looks at the β-convergence factors of interregional
differentiation of income and production in the 1990s. Van Selm (1998), Popov (2000) and
Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) study the differentiation of economic decline of Russian regions
in the 1990s; while the first paper does not establish any impact of economic policies on growth
and attributes it only to industrial structure, the second does find a significant and positive
impact of the ”state capacity” (but not reforms) on recovery, and the third shows that reform
progress (in particular, price liberalization) leads to economic growth. In addition, Berkowitz
and DeJong (2005) find a positive impact of the size of entrepreneurial activity on economic
growth. Mikheeva (2004) focuses on a short period of 1999-2001, examining only the economic
determinants of growth.
14There is a number of papers dealing with other aspects of institutional environment in
Russian regions. For example, Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005) examine the impact
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5.3 Model and data
This chapter considers the period of five years (2000-2004). The choice of the
period, as already mentioned, is motivated by both coverage of the previous
studies (mostly focusing on the 1990s, and not on the Putin age) and the need
to consider a relatively stable political environment on the federal and regional
level. The 1990s witnessed very strong differentiation of political development
paths of Russian regions and significant internal political struggle with differ-
ent outcomes. Statistical evidence suggests, that since mid 2005 the reforms of
federal system reduced the impact of regional institutional differences on eco-
nomic performance (Yanovskiy et al., 2007). A short period of study and a
short life of post-Soviet Russian political system in general provide an addi-
tional feature, which may be perceived as both advantage and disadvantage.
It is unlikely that the political regime could have indirect impact on economic
growth, say, by affecting the accumulation of human capital or long-term polit-
ical stability, which seem to be quite important in international panels (Tavares
and Wacziarg, 2001).15 It is an advantage, because it makes the modeling of the
processes much simpler. But on the demerit side it leads to questions concern-
ing the ability to generalize results to settings with long evolution of political
regimes. The sample includes 79 regions, i.e. all regions of Russia excluding and
the so-called autonomous okrugs and Chechnya because of lack of information.
As it is usually done in the growth regressions, I average all dependent and
independent variables over 5 years and estimate a cross-section.16
The basic dependent variable is the gross regional product growth rate re-
ported by the federal statistical authority Goskomstat. All data are inflation-
corrected. The explanatory variable measuring democracy is the index devel-
oped by Moscow Carnegie Center and based on expert opinion. Since I am
interested in non-linearity of effects of democracy on economic growth, the re-
gression includes both democracy index and squared democracy index. Size of
bureaucracy is measured by the logarithm of share of public officials in the popu-
lation of respective region, once again reported by the Russian federal statistics.
of state capture on economic performance on the microlevel. Brock (2005) reports that there
is no evidence of impact of corruption on economic growth in the 1990s. This chapter is to
a certain extent complementary to these studies, since it looks at yet another institutional
dimension of growth.
15It is possible to question whether the link between growth and political system originated
even in the Soviet period. As already mentioned, several territories enjoyed a higher de-facto
autonomy in the USSR and were able to successfully ensure the continuation of local regimes.
The centrally planned Soviet economy does not seem, however, to provide opportunity for
regional regimes to influence significantly the economic development; all decisions were made
at the central level. Nevertheless, the central planning in the Soviet Union is also sometimes
interpreted as an outcome of bargaining, where influential local elites could in fact achieve their
economic goals through the central agencies. Anyway, there is definitively not enough data
to identify the regime differences (if any) in the Soviet period, and the discussion definitively
goes well beyond the scope of this chapter.
16As an additional robustness check, I also estimate the panel where each observation
represents an individual region in a particular year. The results are briefly discussed below,
but not reported - although could be provided on request
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The democracy index reported by the Carnegie Center is based on a sur-
vey of a panel of experts carried out for each year and region in the period
2000-2004; the reported indicator is the average for the period. The experts are
requested to evaluate each region by a 5-point-scale (with 5 being the highest
indicator) for the following ten dimensions:
• Regional political organization: real balance of power between the execu-
tive and the legislative, elections / appointments of crucial political actors,
independence of courts and police, protection of citizen rights;
• Openness of regional political life: transparency of regional politics and its
involvement in the overall national politics;
• Freedom of elections at all levels (national, regional, local);
• Political pluralism: existence of stable political parties, representation of
parties in regional legislatures;
• Independence of the media
• Corruption: this indicator, however, refers mostly to the state capture in
a broader sense, i.e. interconnections between political and business elites
and their interventions in the political decision-making;
• Economic liberalization: once again, the indicator does not really reflect
the common usage of the term, but rather refers to the specific directed
interventions of regional administration, ignoring property rights of influ-
ential players (e.g. potential opposition);
• Civil society: NGOs, referenda, freedom of public political activity;
• Elites: existence of a mechanism of leader changes through elections, exis-
tence of multiple political elites;
• Freedom of local municipalities vis-a-vis their dependence from the regional
government.
The sum of these ten indicators yields the final index. Basically, most variables
indeed cover different dimensions of what one would refer to as a democracy in a
broader sense: freedom of elections, multiple political parties, balance of powers.
The most questionable dimensions are corruption and economic liberalization,
even though they are used in a specific definition different from what one usually
applies. However, it is still reasonable to argue, that they reflect an important
dimension of the regional political regimes. The ”economic liberalization” as de-
fined in the index mostly applies to the usage of economic pressure by regional
elites in order to control (potential) opposition rather than the casual property
rights protection; economic instruments of control may be even more impor-
tant in a world where the ability to change formal legislature are still limited
(McMann, 2006). Thum and Choi (2010) show that the politically connected
firms may form a basis for stability of authoritarian regimes, substituting for
repressions. The ”corruption” dimension, as well, refers to the co-existence and
symbiosis of regional elites and large business groups, effectively able to control
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regional political landscape, rather than the usual administrative corruption.
But more importantly, second, excluding these two dimensions from the index
still yields an indicator, which is highly correlated with the original one (99.01
per cent) and is completely irrelevant for the results of this study. Hence, in
this chapter I apply the original index.
As I have already noticed, in this chapter I have decided to pursue an average
cross-section estimation instead of panel data. It it is done in agreement with
standard techniques in growth econometrics, which aim to eliminate the effects
of a business cycle. In addition, it is necessary to notice that the application of
the index poses additional problems for panel data analysis. Unfortunately, one
cannot be sure that in different years definition of ”high democracy” and ”low
democracy” used by experts was exactly the same. Hence, the variation across
time in the index may be simply due to different expectations and perceptions
of experts, and not because there are true changes in the level of democracy.
Anyway, using this index provides an additional argument in favor of focusing
on cross-sections and not on time series.
The size of bureaucracy reported by Goskomstat includes public officials
at all governmental agencies, as well as their supporting stuff. It does not in-
clude positions like university or high school teachers, which do not count as
civil service according to the Russian law. However, it does include civilian
personnel of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior Affairs (responsible
for police) and Federal Security Service. Officially the civil service in Russia is
divided in two categories B and C (the latter accounts for about 99 per cent
of all civil servants) (see Gimpel’son, 2003, for details). The group A refers
to highest elected and appointed officials (like ministers and governors) and is
not included in the civil service. The civil service as it is used in this chapter,
however, covers all three branches of power (though most of the bureaucrats are
obviously employed in the executive). It is reasonable because, as already men-
tioned, the very costs of sustaining the bureaucracy may be relevant for growth;
moreover, bureaucrats assisting the judges and parliament members may indeed
have a significant impact (e.g. controlling the access of third parties). The data
also includes municipal service (the regional and the federal level are treated as
”civil service”). The inclusion of technical and auxiliary personnel may overes-
timate the number of bureaucrats, but is still reasonable since it also influences
the costs of bureaucracy
Hence, the baseline regression estimated is the following
GROWTHi = β0+β1DEMOCi+β2DEMOC
2
i +β3LOGBURi+βnCONTROLSi+ǫi
(*)
whereGROWTH is the growth index,DEMOC the democracy index, LOGBUR
the size of bureaucracy and CONTROLS the set of control variables. In order
to identify the ceteris paribus effect of democracy and size of bureaucracy on
economic outcomes I apply the following set of controls (conventionally used in
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the studies of economic growth):
• Initial level of the GRP per capita in the year 2000; this approach also al-
lows for obtaining some hints regarding potentail conditional β-convergence
in the sample (although the limited time period forces me to interpret the
results for convergence with great caution);
• Openness to trade measured as share of exports plus imports in the gross
regional product;
• Share of foreign direct investments in gross regional product;
• Oil and gas extraction in the region; in order to obtain a unified measure
gas and oil are calculated in coal equivalent (1.2 for 1 squared meter of
natural gas and 1.4 for 1 kg of oil);
• Share of fixed capital investments in gross regional product (i.e., measure
of both external and internal investment activity);
• Share of population with university education (according to the Russian
census 2002);17
• Quality of health system (number of doctors per capita);
• Sereneness of climate, measured by the long-term average mid-January
temperature (Celsius), which has been identified as a significant problem
for economic growth in Russia (see Mikhailova, 2005).
All variables excluding the education indicator are reported by Goskomstat of
Russia in its databank on Regions of Russia. The data for regions comprising
autonomous okrugs also include these okrugs. The summary statistics and the
detailed description of variables are reported in Appendix E.1.
A typical problem of the analysis of federations is that the data contain out-
liers driving the results. It is in particular relevant for Russia because of huge
economic and political asymmetries in the country. Unsurprisingly Mikheeva
(2004) finds the dummies for geographic location of the regions to be highly
significant in the growth regressions. I have not used this approach, since it
partly hides the factors driving differences between parts of the country (and
one should not forget, that there are important geographical specifics of the
spread of political regimes as well. However, I have added three dummy vari-
ables for the regions which seem to have the most specific pattern of economic
development in Russia: Chukotka, Kalmykia and Ingushetia. Chukotka is an
autonomous district with a special status in the Far East (at the American
border), Ingushetia (as well as Kalmykia) is a republic in the Southern part of
Russia. Chukotka, a very poor and very remote region, during the 2000s was
governed by Roman Abramovich, one of the wealthiest persons in Russia, and
is often claimed to have benefited significantly from his investments, as well as
to have been used in the tax optimization schemes. In fact, it demonstrated an
17Since Russia is a country where the absolute majority of population is covered by primary
(and even secondary) education, the schooling indicators usually used for developing countries
is not applicable for this chapter.
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overproportionally high growth for its limited resource endowment. Ingushetia
is a direct neighbor of Chechnya with huge shadow economy, partly influenced
by the war (the same is true for another region, Dagestan, which, however, does
not influence the results). Ingushetia continued receiving substantial federal aid
during the period. More importantly, Ingushetia has been used as a tax heaven
for numerous tax optimization schemes in the 1990s.18 The same is true for
Kalmykia, which became even more important from this point of view in the
late 1990s-early 2000s, when large Russian corporations actively used Kalmykia
to reduce taxation. In fact, Kalmykia has been characterized by anomalous
behavior of fiscal policy and economic performance, driven by the development
of individual large taxpayers. Table 5.1 summarizes the Cook’s distance for the
three regions (based on a regression with democracy, squared democracy and
bureaucracy without dummies). In the cross-section setting Chukotka is a clear
outlier with Cook’s distance larger 1..19
Table 5.1: Cook’s distance for individual regions
Region Cross-section Panel
Chukotka 1.046 0.236
Kalmykia 0.087 1.500
Ingushetia 0.080 0.084
Moscow City 0.255 0.024
Notes: Cook’s distance obtained for regression including all controls, democracy, democracy
squared and bureaucracy. For panel data the largest Cook’s distance observed in individual
year is reported
Finally, I also estimate all regression while adding a dummy for the City of
Moscow. First, the capital of Russia is well-known to demonstrate an excep-
tional economic performance (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 2004). Second, the size
of bureaucracy in Moscow may be influenced by the status of the federal capi-
tal (although empirically the share of bureaucrats in the population of the city
does not seem to be too high). Basically, inclusion of the dummy for Moscow
City does not cause major changes to the results, with few exceptions. Dummy
Moscow is usually significant and positive. However, including or excluding the
City of Moscow matters a lot if the model is ”fine-tuned” for the impact of pop-
ulation changes, as I will discuss below. Exclusion of dummies for Chukotka,
Kalmykia and Ingushetia makes the results significantly less robust to specifica-
tion (in terms of significance, but not size), suggesting that these three regions
severely differ from the rest of the Russian Federation - as I will once again
discuss in what follows.
I estimate the regression (*) with both democracy and bureaucracy simulta-
18Chukotka and Ingushetia have been reported as outliers for other studies as well, see e.g.
Lugovoi et al., 2007.
19I also include Cook’s distance for the panel data robunstness test In the panel data setting
the outlier is Kalmykia.
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Figure 5.1: Interdependence between democracy and average size of bureau-
cracy; linear trend for all regions, non-linear trend excluding Chukotka and
Kalmykia
neously and with either democracy or bureaucracy. Unfortunately, both ap-
proaches are subject to problems: on the one hand, democracy (and democracy
squared) are highly (and significantly) correlated to bureaucracy may interact.
Indeed, democracy and bureaucracy are significantly correlated to each other.
Controlling for Kalmykia and Chukotka through inclusion of dummy variables,
one also finds a significant non-linear effect of democracy on bureaucracy (see
Figure 5.1). Therefore there may be a multicollinearity problem. Even worse,
there can be a causal relation between democracy and bureaucracy (which is,
nevertheless worth considering per se). This gives rise to two possibilities: if
both democracy and growth are determined by bureaucracy, the conditioning on
bureaucracy is necessary, since otherwise spurious correlation is possible (omit-
ted variable problem). If democracy determines both bureaucracy and growth,
on the contrary, one should not condition, since bureaucracy will block part
of the total effect, which I am interested in (Pearl, 2000). In order to avoid
strong assumptions, I provide both estimates whenever possible, and the results
practically do not change. Section 5 of this chapter also proposes an alternative
estimation approach for a system of equations.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Basic results
The Table 5.2 reports the main estimation results. Basically, all estimations
demonstrate a conditional β-convergence among Russian regions since the sign
of the coefficient for the initial level of gross regional product is negative (what
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is, however, consistent with results of previous literature). I also find signif-
icant positive influence of education and economic openness on the economic
growth. Health system, climate, investments and FDI are insignificant, though
the sign of most coefficients excluding health, fits the expectations. Oil and
gas extraction has also a significantly positive impact on economic growth in
most specifications, what is hardly surprising given the resource-based growth
model implemented in Russia in the 2000s. Moreover, as expected, dummy In-
gushetia and Chukotka are significant; Ingushetia demonstrates an on average
lower growth than the rest of the Russian Federation, while Chukotka performs
extraordinary good for its low resource endowment. Though the variable of
democracy in regression (2) is insignificant, inclusion of democracy and squared
democracy in regression (3) shows a highly significant non-linear relation be-
tween democracy and economic growth. Hence, the results of the regression
confirm the ”direct U-curve” hypothesis: regions with intermediate degree of
democracy perform worse than high and low democracy regions. The minimum
of the parabola is achieved for democracy score of about 30, corresponding to
regions like Orenburg, Tver, Kostroma, Tomsk or Buryatiya. To provide some
intuition regarding the economic significance of the results, take one region with
a very low level of democracy (and no oil extraction) and generate counterfac-
tual predictions regarding the economic growth. For example, Tyva (democracy
rating 17 - the lowest observed value) has actual growth of 6.36 per cent and
predicted growth for actual values of democracy of 6.70 per cent. Increasing
democracy level to 45 (the highest observed level in our sample) yields growth
rates of 6.82 per cent (i.e. change of plus 0.12 per cent points), which are vir-
tually identical to the original predictions. However, if one sets the democracy
level at 30 (around the extremum of the parabola), the growth rates predictions
go down to 5.08 per cent; 2 pp of economic growth are lost through incomplete
democratization. This is a very strong effect from the point of view of typical
results of growth regressions.
The results of regression (4) also indicate strong and significantly negative im-
pact of the size of bureaucracy on the economic growth. It can be interpreted as
both high costs of bureaucracy and massive interventions of bureaucrats in the
economic processes following the ”public choice” rather than ”Weberian” ap-
proach. In fact, the increase of the share of bureaucracy by one per cent reduces
the growth rates by more than 3 pp.20 Finally, in regression (5) democracy and
bureaucracy are significant, while democracy squared loses its significance. It
may, however, be related to the described multicollinearity problem, as well
as the interaction between these two dimensions of political system. Since the
Jarque-Bera test is significant, one can reject the hypothesis of normal dis-
20This interpretation is rather helpful as opposed to the increase of the share of bureaucracy
by 1 pp, which could be obtained by including share of bureaucracy instead of log of this
value in the regression; the reason is that in most Russian regions the size of bureaucracy
is significantly below 1 per cent of the population - so, the increase of bureaucracy by 1 pp
indicates an incredible growth of bureaucratic apparatus, which is hardly relevant for any
discussion.
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Figure 5.2: Marginal effects of democracy on growth conditional on bureaucracy
size, cross-section, specification (6)
tribution of outliers. Thus I exclude outliers until Jarque-Bera test becomes
significant, and then re-estimate the regressions and look at the stability of the
results. There are no changes in the specifications (1) - (4), though in specifi-
cation (5) the results are not robust.
Regression (6) and (7) approach the problem of interaction between democracy
and bureaucracy. The interaction term (product of democracy and bureaucracy)
included in the regressions is insignificant, although negative. However, the joint
significance tests in most specifications still reject the null; hence, one cannot
exclude the existence of an interaction. In fact, the significance of the effect
may vary for different levels of bureaucracy, see e.g. Figure 5.2. Moreover, the
approach used cannot differentiate between reaction of effects of democracy on
an increase of the size of the bureaucratic machine and the reaction of the size of
bureaucracy on the democratic progress. These problems are considered in the
specification in Table 5.3. The basic idea is to compare the impact of bureau-
cracy on economic growth for different quartiles of distribution of democracy
over the sample and the impact of democracy (accounting for both linear and
non-linear effects) for different quartiles of the size of bureaucracy in the sam-
ple. In particular, for regression (8) I calculate four indicators for bureaucracy,
which are equal to the log share of bureaucracy if the region is in respective
quartile of the distribution of democracy and zero otherwise. In regressions (9)
and (10) the indicators are equal to the index of democracy (squared index of
democracy) if the region is in the respective quartile of the distribution of the
size of bureaucracy and zero otherwise.
First of all, one can see that the indicators of bureaucracy for all quartiles are
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Table 5.2: Effects of democracy and size of bureaucracy on average growth rate,
2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.057** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.058** -0.058**
(-2.74) (-2.68) (-2.46) (-3.09) (-2.77) (-2.59) (-2.48)
Oil and gas 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009**
(2.61) (2.58) (2.43) (3.04) (2.83) (2.74) (2.46)
Education 30.557*** 30.570*** 29.498*** 23.575** 22.603** 21.002* 21.741**
(3.15) (3.16) (3.01) (2.31) (2.23) (1.98) (2.09)
Openness 31.983 31.816 32.665* 35.227** 39.182** 38.749** 39.508**
(1.64) (1.60) (1.68) (2.07) (2.17) (2.20) (2.16)
FDI 0.095 0.095 0.100 0.160 0.168 0.171 0.169
(0.91) (0.89) (0.94) (1.46) (1.45) (1.51) (1.46)
Investments 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(1.28) (1.26) (1.31) (1.43) (1.43) (1.42) (1.43)
Health -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
(-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.39)
Temperature -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.060 -0.057 -0.055 -0.054
(-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.18) (-1.45) (-1.36) (-1.24) (-1.21)
Dummy Chukotka 12.951*** 12.969*** 12.120** 16.980*** 15.910*** 15.294*** 15.250**
(8.44) (8.65) (7.81) (6.54) (5.72) (3.61) (3.63)
Dummy Kalmykia 0.490 0.501 -0.357 2.540 1.618 1.694 1.332
(0.22) (0.22) (-0.15) (1.02) (0.60) (0.56) (0.43)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.486** -2.470* -3.808** -4.278*** -5.595*** -5.268** -5.595***
(-2.14) (-1.96) (-2.65) (-3.08) (-3.46) (-2.08) (-2.65)
Democracy 0.001 -0.532** -0.437* -0.820 -0.781
(0.03) (-2.15) (-1.74) (-0.60) (-0.59)
Democracy squared 0.009** 0.007 0.006
(2.09) (1.59) (1.51)
Bureaucracy -3.353** -3.300** -0.329 -1.823
(-2.19) (-2.01) (-0.05) (-0.30)
Democracy * Bureaucracy -0.112 -0.052
(-0.58) (-0.28)
Constant 1.508 1.474 9.410** -21.084** -13.964 1.285 -3.759
(0.96) (0.79) (2.39) (-2.03) (-1.11) (0.03) (-0.09)
R2 0.441 0.441 0.460 0.491 0.505 0.496 0.505
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (democracy, democracy squared) 2.36 1.82 1.27
F (democracy, democracy squared,
bureaucracy) 3.41** 3.57**
F (democracy, bureaucracy
democracy * bureaucracy 2.32*
F (democracy, democracy squared,
bureaucracy, democracy * bureaucracy 2.69*
J.-B. test 20.07*** 20.00*** 32.04*** 14.4*** 22.63*** 17.78*** 23.71***
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Robust Huber/White standard errors are
applied. *** significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent level, * significant at
10 per cent level. F-tests test the joint significance of the specified variables. Outliers are
Arkhangelsk and Dagestan in all regressions, as well as Omsk in regression (4). After
exclusion of outliers Bureaucracy in regression (5) becomes insignificant, but maintains its
sign; Democracy squared becomes significant and maintains its sign.
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significant and negative; there is no statistically significant difference between
the coefficients for individual quartiles. Hence, from this estimation approach
one can conclude, that increasing bureaucracy hampers economic growth regard-
less the level of development of political democracy; both ”good” democracies,
semi-democracies and autocracies are equally bad in controlling the bureaucratic
machine in Russia. While looking at the indicators of democracy, the situation
is quite different. If one does not account for non-linear effects (regression (9)),
all indices of democracy are insignificant, excluding that for the IV quartile of
the size of bureaucracy (the result is, however, not robust after exclusion of
outliers), though all indices are negative. However, coefficient for the II quartile
is significantly smaller (p-value: 0.057) than for the I quartile; coefficient for
the IV quartile is significantly smaller (p-value: 0.067) than for the III quartile.
So, one possible interpretation could be that increasing democracy has a neg-
ative impact on economic growth for regions with relatively large bureaucracy.
Russian bureaucracy seems to be able to use the higher democratization in its
favor, while there is no impact for low level of democracy.
The effect, however, vanishes if non-linearity (regression (10)) is introduced.
Basically, all coefficients match the predictions of public choice few on bureau-
cracy, with the only exception of the coefficient for squared democracy for the
IV quartile; however, most coefficients are insignificant. There is a significant
difference between the coefficients of democracy of the I and the II quartiles
(p-value: 0.022) and III and IV quartile (p-value: 0.017). However, the sign of
the difference for quartiles I-II could not be established (neither the hypothesis
that the coefficient for the I quartile is larger, than for the II one, nor the con-
trary could be rejected at any reasonable confidence level). On the contrary, for
quartile IV the indicator of democracy is significantly larger than for quartile
III (p-value: 0.034). Therefore the interaction may be even more complex. For
squared democracy coefficients of the I and the II quartiles (p-value: 0.017) and
the III and the IV quartile (p-value: 0.069), are significantly different. Moreover,
although individual t-tests do not reject the null in the last two specifications,
the joint significance F-test rejects the null, indicating the existence of impact of
democracy on growth. Controlling for democracy and democracy squared in bu-
reaucracy regressions does not change the result, though the outcomes become
not robust after exclusion of outliers. Controlling for bureaucracy in democracy
regressions also does not have any important impact on the estimations.
5.4.2 Endogeneity
A general problem of the democracy and growth studies is the existence of
reverse causality (Sunde, 2006). As usually, ”the only motor of history is en-
dogeneity” (Przeworski, 2004:168). It is difficult to claim whether the problem
of endogeneity is as acute in the specific sample of Russian regions as usually:
the political systems of the regions seem to be mostly inherited from the 1990s,
and there is no systematic impact on economic growth on regime change (from
both internal political forces and the federation), as discussed above. In a sim-
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Table 5.3: Interaction of democracy and size of bureaucracy, 2000-2004,
dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.055** -0.061** -0.063*** -0.057**
(-2.77) (-2.80) (-2.41) (-2.55) (-3.11) (-2.59)
Oil and gas 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.011***
(2.69) (2.91) (3.01) (2.52) (3.08) (3.09)
Education 22.109** 28.317*** 25.653*** 22.855** 24.374** 22.805**
(2.10) (2.77) (2.85) (2.05) (2.26) (2.35)
Openness 40.010* 33.331* 30.597 40.390** 36.957* 33.256
(2.00) (1.71) (1.52) (2.02) (1.88) (1.64)
FDI 0.172 0.166 0.234* 0.173 0.192 0.254**
(1.44) (1.41) (1.99) (1.38) (1.51) (2.07)
Investments 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.006
(1.50) (1.35) (0.96) (1.57) (1.18) (0.87)
Health -0.010 -0.023 -0.009 -0.018 -0.019 -0.008
(-0.28) (-0.59) (-0.26) (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.21)
Temperature -0.065 -0.055 -0.003 -0.059 -0.067 -0.012
(-1.40) (-1.33) (-0.07) (-1.21) (-1.56) (-0.24)
Dummy Chukotka 16.543*** 12.643*** 12.060*** 15.9628** 16.030*** 14.475***
(5.88) (8.51) (6.55) (5.60) (4.55) (4.11)
Dummy Kalmykia 2.075 1.070 -0.039 1.451 2.367 0.756
(0.84) (0.45) (-0.01) (0.55) (0.82) (0.25)
Dummy Ingushetia -5.016*** -3.747** -4.633*** -5.836*** -4.719*** -5.266***
(-3.01) (-2.52) (-2.95) (-3.34) (-2.84) (-2.92)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: I quartile) -3.718** -3.344*
(-2.18) (-1.85)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: II quartile) -3.616** -3.348*
(-2.16) (-1.91)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: III quartile) -3.608** -3.371*
(-2.11) (-1.89)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: IV quartile) -3.601** -3.311*
(-2.16) (-1.87)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: I quartile) -0.011 -0.185 -0.028 -0.225
(-0.27) (-0.45) (-0.66) (-0.52)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: II quartile) -0.046 -0.535 -0.050 -0.535
(-0.80) (-1.49) (-0.85) (-1.45)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: III quartile) -0.045 -0.408 -0.035 -0.400
(-0.82) (-1.21) (-0.62) (-1.18)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: IV quartile) -0.095* -0.141 -0.061 -0.108
(-1.69) (-0.36) (-1.06) (-0.28)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: I quartile) 0.002 0.002
(0.23) (0.31)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: II quartile) 0.012* 0.012*
(1.80) (1.73)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: III quartile) 0.008 0.007
(1.26) (1.24)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: IV quartile) -0.003 -0.003
(-0.36) (-0.42)
Democracy -0.513
(-1.13)
Democracy squared 0.008
(1.22)
Bureaucracy -2.721 -2.057
(-1.19) (-0.85)
Constant -23.204** 2.987 7.565 -13.348 -15.532 -6.307
(-2.01) (1.25) (1.48) (-0.85) (-0.99) (-0.41)
R2 0.499 0.491 0.554 0.506 0.502 0.559
N 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (bureaucracy for all quartiles
of democracy) 1.53 0.99
F (democracy for all quartiles
of bureaucracy) 1.49 3.14** 0.48 2.99**
F (democracy squared for all
quartiles of bureaucracy) 3.11** 2.92**
F (democracy and democracy
squared for all quartiles of
bureaucracy) 2.58** 2.37**
F (bureaucracy for all quartiles
of democracy, democracy,
democracy squared) 1.90*
F (democracy for all quartiles
of bureaucracy, bureaucracy) 1.32
F (democracy and democracy
squared for all quartiles of
bureaucracy, bureaucracy) 2.59**
J.-B. test 19.12*** 11.76*** 7.64** 23.33*** 12.02*** 9.673***
Notes: see Table 5.2. After exclusion of outliers Democracy (Bureaucracy: IV quartile) in
regression (9) loses significance, but maintains its sign; all variables for Bureaucracy in
regression (11) lose their significance, but maintain their sign. Outliers are Omsk and
Dagestan in regressions (9)-(13) and Dagestan and Arkhangelsk in regression (8).
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ilar way, regression results make endogeneity of bureaucracy questionable: it is
difficult to come up with an explanation for a government to reduce the size
of bureaucracy if the growth is accelerating; it could happen if some kind of a
”New Deal” style policy with huge public projects implemented, and after the
initial investments in the public projects paid off (i.e. the growth went up), the
necessary political infrastructure was reduced.21 However, even in the case of
such public interventions abolished after the problem was solved agencies are
quite often able to survive, even if their initial function is lost; a much more
likely case is, however, that the bureaucracy expands if the growth goes up and
the opportunities for budget maximization increase. Nevertheless, to rule out
the possibility of biased results, in this section I try to account for endogeneity
using the instrumental variables approach.
An additional advantage of intranational analysis is that it may provide op-
portunity for identification strategy, based on specifics of particular country
and impossible in general. It is also true for the choice for instrumental vari-
ables. As instruments I used share of ethnically Russian population in the region
(according to the latest census) and distance from Moscow for democracy and
democracy squared; squared distance from Moscow for bureaucracy and dis-
tance from Moscow and share of Russians for the interaction term (in different
specifications). The share of Russians is an important characteristic for the
development of political systems of regions. First, the ethnic composition of
the population may be relevant from the point of view of political culture and
distribution of power in the regional elite, which are crucial for the democratiza-
tion process (Matsuzato, 2004). Second, regions with high share of non-Russian
population (mostly republics) were often relatively more successful in restrict-
ing federal influence on their internal political process. On the other hand, the
ethnic composition is usually quite stable and is unlikely to change fast, reacting
on differences in economic growth. There have been migration flows in Russia
with a certain impact on ethnic structure (in particular, in Northern Cauca-
sus), but in this case economic growth does not seem to be the main driving
force (unlike the level of economic development or ethnic controversies). A more
difficult question is whether the share of Russians per se can have an impact
on economic growth. Basically, three issues should be considered. First, there
is empirical literature estimating the impact of ethnic fractionalization on eco-
nomic growth, surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). However, low share
of Russians is not identical to the ethnic fractionalization: in fact, regions with
both high and low share of Russians may be ethnically homogenous; regions
with low share of Russians may be homogenous (like Ingushetia) or extremely
heterogeneous (like Dagestan). Moreover, the ethnic fractionalization either in-
fluences the development through political system (e.g. public goods provision)
or has an impact on long-term economic performance rather than short-term
21One should differentiate between the increase of professional bureaucracy (which I am
studying in this chapter) and of mass employment in public sector or mass party membership
in non-democracies (Schnytzer and Sustersic, 1998), where the increase as a countercyclical
measure is possible.
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growth levels examined in this chapter. Second, share of Russians may have
an impact on current growth through initial GRP level: regions with Russian
majority may be more developed and hence, have lower growth rates. In fact,
they may be more developed because of Russian majority, since the large migra-
tion flows of the Soviet time were strongly associated with transferring experts
and specialists to the regions in need for development. However, there is no
correlation between initial GRP level and share of Russians. In a similar way,
higher share of Russians may indicate higher share of population with better
education, providing yet another channel of impact of the instrument on the
dependent variable - but, once again, there is no significant correlation between
the education variable and the share of Russians.
Third, regions with foremost non-Russian population may receive more (or less)
fiscal transfers from the center or obtain higher (or lower) tax retention rates,
influencing the economic performance. In response to the last potential criticism
three issues should be mentioned. First, this chapter focuses on ”Putin period”
of the development of the Russian federalism, when the bargaining power of
regions and their ability to receive additional grants or higher retention rates
went down significantly. Second, the effect of grants and retention rates is un-
clear: given low effectiveness of Russian economic policy and low quality of
public administration, the ability of the redistribution of revenue between levels
of government and transfers to generate growth is questionable. The literature
is quite inconclusive, but it seems that GRP growth is even negatively affected
by federal transfers (Lugovoi et al., 2007), which also can act as a disincentive
for public investments (Matheson, 2005). Berkowitz and DeJong (2002) claim
that the federal transfers were insignificant in their growth regressions and hence
were omitted, though they explain it by quality of data. This chapter, as shown
below, also does not find any significant impact of public expenditures on eco-
nomic growth. For retention rates Desai et al. (2005) find a positive effect on
recovery, and retention rates under Putin are significantly higher for regions
with higher Russian population. However, third, the efficiency of public ex-
penditures (Hauner, 2007) and bargaining process between the regions and the
federation obviously depend upon the structure of political system. So, in fact,
share of Russians seems to influence the size of transfers / retention rates and
their effect on economic growth, however, because it influences political pro-
cesses and, therefore, political regime. Unsurprisingly, adding average retention
rate to regression (5) (which already controls for political systems specifics) does
not yield any significant results.22 However, the problem from the point of view
of the instruments is present if they have another channel of impact on the de-
pendent variable rather than through the instrumented covariate. Is does not
seem to be the problem in this setting.
22Surely, the situation could be different if there were an acute danger of popular uprising
or civil disorder; however, the only region where this problem may actually be present is
Chechnya, which is anyway excluded from the sample. Although the terrorist activity seemed
to spread over the whole North Caucasus region towards the second term of Putin, once again,
it was heavily influenced by political systems rather than by pure ethnic factor.
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The distance from Moscow may have an impact on regional political devel-
opment through two channels. First, it is a proxy for secession ability of the
region, which therefore also reduces the ability of federation to interfere with its
internal affairs. Second, distance my simply increase the costs of direct federal
intervention per se. Third, it reflects differences in preferences, which could
result in differences in political culture as well. Since it is a geographical vari-
able, it is obviously independent from growth. It is however not sufficient to
state that: geographical variables may become bad instruments for economic
performance, if they have an influence on growth per se (Durlauf et al., 2005).
Basically, there are two factors which should be considered in this framework.
First, regions close to Moscow may benefit from the positive effects of Moscow
agglomeration. Second, they may receive higher benefits from federal budget.
Fidrmuc (2003) uses distance from Brussels in an analogous study of economic
growth in transition countries of the CEE. Berkowitz and DeJong (2005) and
Solanko (2006) include distance from Moscow in their regressions, but it turns
out to be insignificant. It is possible to claim, however, that in Russian case
both channels are irrelevant. There are very limited spillovers from the Moscow
agglomeration (besides its immediate suburbs in the Moscow region) (Balackii
and Gusev, 2007). Large distances and low mobility of population also prevent
negative New Economic Geography concentration effects around large agglom-
eration. As for the grants issue, the previously discussed arguments for share of
Russians apply. Moreover, there is no evidence that geographical distance from
Moscow has boosted secessionist tensions; on the contrary, Far East has been
always quite supportive of nationalist parties in federal elections.
Hence, it is possible to use the distance from Moscow and share of Russians
as instruments for democracy and democracy squared. Statistically they are
significant in first-stage regressions (but F-statistics is still lower than 10) and
insignificant once included in the growth regression. The results of the TSLS
estimates are reported in Table 5.4 and confirm the OLS estimations presented
in the previous subsections. Finally, one should be aware, that the OLS is bi-
ased if one includes endogenous controls. This problem always exists in growth
regressions; it is very simple to come up with a reasoning why a socioeconomic
variable could be caused by growth and could cause growth. In several cases it
is possible to rule the endogeneity out due to the short time period considered;
for example, education seems to be heavily influenced by the Soviet past (in
fact, one should recall, that in the 2000s Russia moved to a nearly full coverage
of the high school graduates by the university education). The situation with
openness, FDI and investments is much more complicated: it is quite possible
to assume, that trade flows and inward investment activity specifically focus on
regions with high growth rates. One possible approach to eliminating potential
effects could be to estimate regressions without potentially endogenous controls
(see specification (I4) - (I6)), which still provides the same results. Obviously
in this case on faces an omitted variable bias. However, if the results are robust
for both specifications, one could assume, that it is unlikely that both biases
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(due to endogeneity and to omitted variables) lead to the same results.
Table 5.4: Effects of democracy and size of bureaucracy on average growth rate,
2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (I1) (I2) (I3) (I4) (I5) (I6)
TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
Initial GRP -0.061** -0.066* -0.071*** -0.001 -0.024 -0.008
(-2.17) (-1.71) (-3.30) (-0.06) (-0.88) (-0.58)
Oil and gas 0.009** 0.009* 0.011***
(2.30) (1.79) (3.58)
Education 30.588*** 27.339* 12.666
(3.24) (1.68) (0.91)
Openness 31.582 8.820 40.295*
(1.38) (0.36) (1.91)
FDI 0.094 0.085 0.262**
(0.89) (0.69) (2.19)
Investments 0.007 0.010 0.009
(1.26) (1.51) (1.46)
Health -0.010 -0.027 -0.023
(-0.28) (-0.61) (-0.59)
Temperature -0.009 -0.002 -0.140*
(-0.25) (-0.04) (-1.86)
Dummy Chukotka 12.994*** 11.614*** 23.275*** 11.373*** 11.020*** 19.760***
(4.99) (3.79) (5.15) (5.50) (3.65) (4.54)
Dummy Kalmykia 0.517 -1.903 5.742* 3.307** 1.914 6.874***
(0.18) (-0.54) (1.84) (2.11) (0.74) (4.07)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.448 -6.542* -7.077** -0.938 -6.642 -2.503
(-0.92) (-1.73) (-2.89) (-0.48) (-1.37) (-1.56)
Democracy 0.003 -2.439* -0.104 -4.206*
(0.02) (-1.71) (-0.62) (-1.69)
Democracy squared 0.043* 0.075*
(1.73) (1.69)
Bureaucracy -8.593** -5.006*
(-2.28) (-1.68)
Constant 1.427 35.568* -56.381** 9.645** 63.627* -28.049
(0.27) (1.73) (-2.17) (2.05) (1.87) (-1.35)
R2 0.441 0.266 0.368 0.195 0.084 0.322
N 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (democracy, democracy squared) 1.60 1.43
F (first-stage instruments,
democracy) 7.84*** 7.84*** 8.02*** 8.02***
F (first-stage instruments,
democracy squared) 6.28*** 5.99***
F (first-stage instruments,
bureaucracy) 11.71*** 26.24***
Notes: see Table 5.2. Instruments are distance to Moscow and share of Russians in
regressions (I1), (I2), (I4) and (I5) squared distance to Moscow in regressions (I3) and (I6).
First-stage regressions for unrestricted specifications (I1)-(I3) are reported in the Appendix
5.5 Extensions and robustness
5.5.1 Alternative measures of democracy and bureaucracy
A systematic problem of any quantitative research dealing with political and
institutional variables is the quality of indicators. Hence it is reasonable to
consider potential alternative measures of democracy and bureaucracy and to
check for robustness and/or alternative explanations of the results.
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Application of democracy indicators for cross-national studies already demon-
strates potential problems associated with this issue (Munck and Verlikulen,
2002). The first set of alternative indicators is given by construction of the
data. Since the index of democracy is composed of several elements, it is prob-
ably reasonable to look at individual components of index in order to identify
the potential effects. Unfortunately, most of them are highly collinear and the
sample is relatively small, therefore I report estimations including each one di-
mension of democracy from the index in Table 5.5. The idea is not really to find
out ceteris paribus effects, but rather to understand which components of the
index trigger the results observed in the chapter. Since each of the dimensions
of democracy has a significantly smaller variation, than the overall index, it is
not surprising that many components are insignificant. All of them maintain
the expected sign though (with the only exception of civil society). Significant
results are obtained for the variables of freedom of elections, freedom of the
media, structure of elites and freedom of local municipalities. With two first
variables being the main traditionally recognized dimensions of democracy, it
gives additional reassurance that the results actually measure the impact of
democracy on growth.
Moreover, there are two alternative measures provided by the Institute of Public
Expertise (Institut Obshchestvennaya Ekspertiza) and represent the freedom of
elections and the freedom of press. A clear disadvantage of the first indicator
is that it covers not only the early 2000s, which are analyzed in this chapter,
but also the development of the 1990s, which, as mentioned above, has been
substantially less stable. The freedom of the press is measured only for one
year; one should be aware of the fact, that media freedom was among the first
parameters to change under the new administration of Vladimir Putin. The
outcomes of the regressions are presented in Table 5.6. The indicator of free
press confirms the results with respect to the non-linearity of the democracy
effect (though the joint significance test cannot reject the null). However, from
the indicator of free elections one could obtain a negative impact of democ-
racy on growth; in non-linear specification both covariates become insignificant.
Theoretically both indicators correspond to certain elements of democracy: so,
it is reasonable to provide a regression where both variables are present as co-
variates;23 both free press squared, free elections and free elections squared are
insignificant, obviously because of the collinearity problem (nevertheless, joint
significance test rejects the null). Controlling for bureaucracy does not change
the result, moreover, one obtains significant results for the joint significance test
as well.
23It is not reasonable to regress the growth rate on the Carnegie index of democracy and one
(or both) of Institute of Public Expertise indices simultaneously: Carnegie index is designed
to cover a broader range of aspects of democracy
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Table 5.5: Effects of components of democracy index on average growth rate, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate
(inflation-corrected)
Variable Openness Election Pluralism Media Liberalization Civil society Political organization Elites Corruption Municipalities
Initial GRP -0.058** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.057** -0.061** -0.063** -0.060** -0.056** -0.057** -0.064***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Oil and gas 0.008** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 30.029*** 29.706*** 30.547*** 27.667*** 30.678*** 30.748*** 28.650*** 28.934*** 28.422*** 27.507**
(10.039) (9.411) (9.672) (9.794) (9.682) (10.152) (10.210) (9.845) (9.351) (10.746)
Openness 32.563 36.279* 27.342 36.803* 30.776 27.821 30.347 34.428* 32.897 33.262*
(21.353) (20.299) (20.461) (19.106) (18.618) (19.435) (21.683) (19.313) (20.530) (18.514)
FDI 0.096 0.128 0.098 0.116 0.089 0.091 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.121
(0.112) (0.115) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.105) (0.107) (0.102) (0.107) (0.105)
Investments 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Health -0.009 -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.019 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 0.006
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
Temperature -0.002 -0.015 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.012
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Dummy Chukotka 12.751*** 10.797*** 11.343*** 12.286*** 12.900*** 13.413*** 12.622*** 13.044*** 12.861*** 12.760***
(1.556) (1.629) (2.236) (1.614) (1.765) (1.566) (1.630) (1.533) (1.583) (1.550)
Dummy Kalmykia 0.527 0.581 -0.030 0.047 0.417 0.690 0.115 0.266 0.109 -0.860
(2.311) (2.376) (2.407) (2.427) (2.515) (2.328) (2.373) (2.156) (2.415) (2.336)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.712** -2.815** -2.716** -4.314** -2.797 -2.383* -2.813** -2.489** -2.780** -3.747**
(1.283) (1.283) (1.225) (1.629) (1.988) (1.227) (1.327) (1.125) (1.325) (1.500)
Democracy -1.129 -3.213** -2.728 -2.920** -0.638 0.037 -2.148 -2.662** -0.911 -3.297**
(1.644) (1.274) (2.231) (1.437) (1.764) (2.225) (2.414) (1.270) (2.700) (1.531)
Democracy squared 0.161 0.481** 0.461 0.438* 0.111 0.059 0.346 0.466** 0.089 0.583**
(0.260) (0.199) (0.363) (0.222) (0.256) (0.339) (0.379) (0.231) (0.398) (0.255)
Constant 3.418 6.574** 5.341 5.880** 2.324 1.319 5.099 4.986** 3.485 5.830**
(3.197) (2.791) (3.577) (2.801) (3.015) (3.754) (4.413) (2.221) (4.945) (2.516)
No. obs 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
R2 0.443 0.461 0.453 0.461 0.442 0.450 0.446 0.462 0.449 0.471
J.-B. test 24.1*** 24.34*** 26.59*** 33.02*** 20.35*** 16.85*** 24.06*** 27.26*** 15.30*** 18.25***
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. Robust Huber/White standard errors are applied. *** significant at 1 per cent level, **
significant at 5 per cent level, * significant at 10 per cent level. Outliers are Arkhangelsk, Dagestan and Omsk for all regressions, as well as
Kamchatka for ”Media”. There are no changes in terms of sign and significance for democracy and democracy squared variables.
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For the size of bureaucracy several modifications (Table 5.7) are possible.
First, though this chapter basically focuses on non-fiscal effects of democracy,
I have used the share of public expenditures in the GRP and the bureaucracy
inefficiency ratio (Ayal and Karras, 1996) as covariates. The problem with the
share of public expenditures is that in a federation one can easily account for ex-
penditures on the regional level, but faces great difficulties with attributing the
federal expenditures to particular regions24, although the latter are obviously
important for economic development. In a federation with heavy fiscal asymme-
tries like Russia the spatial distribution of federal expenditures can also vary a
lot, so, the information utilized in the regression is incomplete. The bureaucracy
inefficiency ratio is an index, where the numerator is the share of bureaucrats in
population, and the denominator - the share of public expenditures in the GRP.
The idea is that a larger bureaucratic apparatus can be necessary to manage
larger public expenditures. Of course, given that the data accounts only from
expenditures of regional budgets, I use the public officials of regional and mu-
nicipal level to calculate this index. Second, it is reasonable to consider not
only the overall impact of bureaucracy on economic growth, but to differentiate
between the levels of bureaucracy. I regress economic growth on the log of the
share of local bureaucracy (that of the executive agencies of regional and munic-
ipal level) and of the local federal bureaucracy, i.e. local branches of the federal
agencies, which are particularly important in the modern Russia (Leksin, 2007).
As the Table 5.7 shows, both public expenditures and inefficient bureaucracy are
not significant.25 It can both indicate the measurement problems and confirm
the idea that the size of bureaucracy measures the non-fiscal effects of the bu-
reaucratization on growth. Obviously, both variables differ substantially from
the size of bureaucracy (staff) applied above from the point of view of their
economic impact. Hence, I have also estimated regressions where the size of bu-
reaucracy is also included, and do not find any differences in the results. This is
actually a good sign for the choice of instruments discussed in the previous sec-
tion. The existing literature provides some evidence that public expenditures in
Russia could be even negatively correlated with growth (Sharipova, 2001), which
is, however, based only on correlation analysis. While local federal bureaucracy
has a negative impact on growth, the local bureaucracy is insignificant. How-
ever, F-test rejects the hypothesis that both variables are simultaneously equal
to zero. Controlling for democracy does not change the results (Table 5.8).
24East-West Institute (2001) provides a discussion of this problem for the Russian Federa-
tion.
25Obviously, my analysis ignores the potential interaction between expenditures and busi-
ness cycle, see e.g. Akhmetov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Kwon and Spilimbergo (2005).
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Table 5.6: Alternative measures of democracy, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average
GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.056** -0.056** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.074***
(-2.62) (-2.51) (-2.83) (-3.39) (-3.12) (-3.87)
Oil and gas 0.008** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011***
(2.46) (2.42) (2.69) (3.21) (3.00) (3.78)
Education 25.079*** 24.882*** 30.348*** 22.049** 15.298* 13.689
(2.86) (2.85) (3.11) (2.32) (1.83) (1.39)
Openness 45.238** 45.152** 31.074 36.906* 48.334** 44.893***
(2.29) (2.30) (1.63) (1.91) (2.52) (2.67)
FDI 0.111 0.108 0.091 0.081 0.079 0.172
(1.04) (1.04) (0.85) (0.76) (0.75) (1.50)
Investments 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010*
(1.26) (1.29) (1.28) (1.54) (1.61) (1.73)
Health 0.009 0.009 -0.011 -0.005 0.014 -0.006
(0.25) (0.27) (-0.29) (-0.13) (0.42) (-0.18)
Temperature -0.017 -0.015 -0.011 -0.017 -0.026 -0.070*
(-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.29) (-0.49) (-0.82) (-1.75)
Dummy Chukotka 11.707*** 11.769*** 13.091*** 12.019*** 11.184*** 15.940***
(8.54) (8.02) (8.65) (7.30) (7.06) (6.67)
Dummy Kalmykia -0.025 -0.024 0.582 -0.481 -0.827 1.363
(-0.01) (-0.01) (0.26) (-0.20) (-0.35) (0.56)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.607** -2.601**
(-2.12) (-2.11)
Free elections -0.291* -0.093 0.049
(-1.71) (-0.10) (0.05)
Free elections squared -0.035 -0.068
(-0.20) (-0.39)
Free press 0.861 -31.811* -28.217 -39.700**
(0.29) (-1.78) (-1.64) (-2.20)
Free press squared 48.181* 46.538* 54.991**
(1.90) (1.92) (2.24)
Bureaucracy -3.833**
(-2.43)
Constant 2.036 1.807 1.298 7.455* 6.871** -16.701
(1.36) (1.03) (0.70) (1.99) (2.00) (-1.66)
R2 0.486 0.487 0.441 0.461 0.514 0.520
N 78 78 78 78 77 78
F (free elections,
free elections squared) 3.162 1.49
F (free press,
free press squared) 1.93 2.90** 2.50*
F (free press, free
press squared, free
elections, free
elections squared) 1.83
F( free press, free
press squared, bureaucracy) 3.79**
J.-B. test 13.1*** 13.01*** 19.66*** 27.09*** 21.28*** 18.57***
Notes: see Table 5.2. Results do not change after exclusion of outliers. Outliers are Omsk in
all regressions, as well as Dagestan in regressions (16), (17) and (18).
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Table 5.7: Public sector and economic growth, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average
GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.059** -0.055** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.051** -0.062***
(-2.29) (-2.35) (-2.74) (-3.39) (-3.37) (-2.39) (-2.76)
Oil and gas share 0.008** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009***
(2.29) (2.51) (2.74) (3.19) (3.16) (2.62) (2.94)
Education 30.014*** 26.114** 24.896** 26.061** 27.148** 15.020 21.847**
(3.15) (2.60) (2.44) (2.60) (2.64) (1.40) (2.08)
Openness 32.500* 33.760* 29.720 43.649** 45.363** 41.893*** 35.906**
(1.77) (1.78) (1.62) (2.52) (2.39) (2.77) (2.19)
FDI 0.095 0.111 0.103 0.206* 0.214* 0.193* 0.165
(0.91) (1.08) (1.00) (1.79) (1.79) (1.81) (1.54)
Investments 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008
(1.27) (1.29) (1.58) (1.09) (0.91) (1.33) (1.42)
Health -0.009 -0.007 -0.020 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.014
(-0.24) (-0.19) (-0.53) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.11) (-0.39)
Temperature -0.005 -0.004 -0.035 -0.059 -0.057 -0.042 -0.057
(-0.11) (-0.10) (-1.00) (-1.48) (-1.42) (-0.94) (-1.22)
Dummy Chukotka 12.561*** 12.947*** 15.438*** 17.041*** 16.765*** 14.746*** 16.872***
(4.62) (8.36) (6.29) (7.72) (6.94) (5.57) (6.41)
Dummy Kalmykia 0.348 0.297 1.103 3.282 3.384 1.982 2.403
(0.14) (0.13) (0.49) (1.29) (1.30) (0.79) (0.92)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.958 -3.199* -3.847** -3.961*** -3.738** -9.861** -4.537**
(-0.97) (-1.92) (-2.54) (-3.20) (-2.52) (-2.50) (-2.62)
Public expenditures 0.773 7.870
(0.18) (1.65)
Inefficient bureaucracy -37.065 -15.953
(-0.77) (-0.33)
Local bureaucracy -2.174 0.581
(-1.52) (0.39)
Local federal bureaucracy -3.361*** -3.681***
(-2.99) (-3.00)
Bureaucracy -4.806*** -3.265**
(-2.83) (-2.05)
Constant 1.384 2.909 -9.320 -17.786*** -16.724** -32.127*** -19.885*
(0.84) (1.06) (-1.29) (-2.69) (-2.20) (-2.72) (-1.73)
R2 0.441 0.446 0.462 0.511 0.512 0.516 0.492
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy) 5.14***
F (public expenditures,
bureaucracy) 4.01**
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
bureaucracy) 2.49*
J.-B. test 19.85*** 17.03*** 14.58*** 15.71*** 19.19*** 10.29*** 13.12***
Notes: see Table 5.2. After exclusion of outliers Public expenditures in regression (20)
change the sign (but are still insignificant) and Bureaucracy in regression (26) loses
significance, but maintains its sign. Outliers are Dagestan and Omsk in all regressions, as
well as Arkhangelsk in regression (24).
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Table 5.8: Public sector and economic growth (controlling for democracy), 2000-
2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected)
Variable (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.058** -0.055** -0.056** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.051** -0.060***
(-2.24) (-2.27) (-2.47) (-3.03) (-3.09) (-2.37) (-2.67)
Oil and gas 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009***
(2.26) (2.40) (2.52) (2.96) (2.93) (2.59) (2.80)
Education 29.964*** 27.466** 24.848** 25.267** 27.605*** 15.949 23.306**
(3.04) (2.61) (2.46) (2.53) (2.75) (1.40) (2.19)
Openness 32.691 33.006* 32.490* 45.283** 47.925** 41.324** 39.133**
(1.66) (1.72) (1.72) (2.47) (2.48) (2.48) (2.16)
FDI 0.100 0.107 0.108 0.208* 0.224* 0.188 0.166
(0.92) (1.01) (1.01) (1.74) (1.83) (1.67) (1.46)
Investments 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.008
(1.34) (1.31) (1.56) (1.12) (0.86) (1.33) (1.41)
Health -0.012 -0.010 -0.018 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.015
(-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.49) (-0.09) (0.08) (-0.15) (-0.42)
Temperature -0.010 -0.004 -0.029 -0.055 -0.049 -0.042 -0.058
(-0.20) (-0.11) (-0.80) (-1.39) (-1.27) (-0.88) (-1.24)
Dummy Chukotka 12.427*** 12.232*** 14.227*** 16.059*** 15.404*** 14.554*** 15.915***
(4.35) (7.27) (5.13) (6.80) (5.75) (5.14) (5.68)
Dummy Kalmykia -0.278 -0.351 0.246 2.394 2.531 1.638 1.641
(-0.11) (-0.15) (0.10) (0.88) (0.92) (0.62) (0.59)
Dummy Ingushetia -3.429 -4.004** -4.799*** -5.108*** -4.689*** -9.607** -5.541***
(-1.03) (-2.42) (-2.84) (-3.50) (-2.81) (-2.16) (-3.20)
Public expenditures -0.769 6.839
(-0.13) (1.04)
Inefficient bureaucracy -17.953 6.988
(-0.31) (0.12)
Local bureaucracy -1.833 1.255
(-1.16) (0.80)
Local federal bureaucracy -3.234*** -3.880***
(-2.76) (-3.22)
Democracy -0.554* -0.487 -0.412 -0.438* -0.502* -0.213 -0.453
(-1.82) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-1.76) (-1.81) (-0.59) (-1.51)
Democracy squared 0.009* 0.008 0.006 0.007* 0.008* 0.003 0.007
(1.87) (1.60) (1.35) (1.71) (1.77) (0.61) (1.43)
Bureaucracy -4.500** -3.342*
(-2.25) (-1.96)
Constant 9.890* 9.371** -1.354 -10.426 -7.020 -26.730 -14.247
(1.84) (2.31) (-0.13) (-1.22) (-0.67) (-1.49) (-1.10)
R2 0.460 0.461 0.473 0.523 0.527 0.519 0.505
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy) 5.34***
F (public expenditures,
bureaucracy) 3.65*
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
bureaucracy) 1.98
F (public expenditures,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.58
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.61
F (local bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 2.10
F (local federal bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 4.35***
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 4.14***
F (public expenditures,
democracy, democracy
squared, bureaucracy) 2.94**
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared, bureaucracy) 2.56**
J.-B. test 33.26*** 28.49*** 24.25*** 27.48*** 31.16*** 13.28*** 23.87***
Notes: see Table 5.2. After exclusion of outliers Inefficient bureaucracy in regression (28)
changes its sign, but is still insignificant. Outliers are Dagestan and Omsk in all regressions,
as well as Arkhangelsk in regressions (30), (31) and (33)
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5.5.2 Spatial interdependence
It is clear that regional growth could exhibit spatial interdependence, which
I have ignored so far. It can result, from example, from the interdependence
of economic processes in spatially close regions or from deviation of spatial
economic activity units from administrative regions of Russia.26 In order to
consider these effects I apply the standard spatial econometrics toolbox. Basi-
cally, it assumes that the regression (*) should be modified as follows to obtain
a spatial lag model:
GROWTHi = β0 + β1DEMOCi + β2DEMOC
2
i + β3LOGBURi +
βnCONTROLSi + ρ
∑
j∈Nj
wijGROWTHj + ǫi (**)
where N j denotes the set of neighboring regions, and wij come from the weight-
ing matrix W . In this specification ρ is the spatial correlation coefficient, mea-
suring the spatial interdependence, or the impact of neighbor regions’ perfor-
mance on economic performance of the observed region. In the model I apply
the most obvious way to determine the neighbors based on existence of common
borders across the regions. Given the problem of endogeneity in the specifica-
tion above, I apply the maximum likelihood estimator as described by Anselin
(1988). Moreover, suggests that in the presence of possible spatial correlation in
error term due to common unobserved shocks (i.e. ǫ = λWǫ+v), it is necessary
to estimate the LM-tests for non-zero ρ and zero λ, and if one cannot reject
these hypotheses, apply the spatial lag model (see also Brueckner, 1998:452)).
Otherwise both spatial lag and spatial error models are estimated. The results
of the estimations are reported in Table 5.9. It does not show any significant
spatial effect (in both lag and error models) and mostly confirms the results of
the previous estimations.
Robust regressions: As already mentioned, the outliers may have a sig-
nificant impact on the regressions outcomes. Hence, it may be reasonable to
check the robustness of results given the outlier problem. I report the results
of robust regressions (re-weighted least squares) in Table 5.10. The predictions
with respect to democracy hold for robust regressions. The bureaucracy is sig-
nificant, if the democracy variables are included.
26The simplest way to look at spatial effects is to introduce dummies for large territories (the
so-called ”federal districts”). A problem is of course that the democracy is also clustered; for
example non-democratic regions are more often observed in Northern Caucasus. Moreover, the
small size of the sample restricts the number of controls one may introduce. However, I have
also estimated which include six dummy variables for federal districts - South, Volga, Northern
Caucasus, Siberia, Far East and North-West (to avoid dummy variable trap no dummy for
Central Federal District is included). Though none of the dummy variables is significant,
democracy loses significance in this specification, likely because of multicollinearity problem.
Bureaucracy is not affected by inclusion of dummies for federal okrugs and is significant and
negative regardless as whether controlling for democracy or not (although it is not robust
after exclusion of outliers in this specification, which are, as previously, Dagestan, Omsk and
Arkhangelsk).
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Table 5.9: Spatial model, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate
(inflation-corrected)
Variable (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
ML (lag) ML (lag) ML (lag) ML (error)
Initial GRP -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.059
(-2.82) (-3.30) (-3.06) (-1.45)
Oil and gas 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008
(2.76) (3.36) (3.22) (0.80)
Education 26.490*** 20.494** 19.724** 22.356*
(2.95) (2.16) (2.10) (1.71)
Openness 67.885 53.333 58.679 50.513
(1.59) (1.26) (1.31) (1.14)
FDI 0.126 0.184* 0.190* 0.160
(1.24) (1.72) (1.71) (1.61)
Investments 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
(1.45) (1.55) (1.57) (1.60)
Health -0.015 -0.019 -0.018 -0.022
(-0.45) (-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.49)
Temperature -0.009 -0.061* -0.057 -0.049
(-0.29) (-1.65) (-1.55) (-0.85)
Dummy Chukotka 13.082*** 17.796*** 16.671*** 16.992***
(6.85) (6.50) (5.73) (7.09)
Dummy Kalmykia -0.967 1.954 1.050 1.531
(-0.48) (0.85) (0.44) (0.32)
Dummy Ingushetia -5.206*** -5.124*** -6.440*** -4.769***
(-3.00) (-2.98) (-3.29) (-2.69)
Democracy -0.512** -0.425*
(-2.19) (-1.84)
Democracy squared 0.008** 0.006*
(2.10) (1.67)
Bureaucracy -3.208** -3.151** - 2.975
(-2.18) (-2.07) (-1.46)
Constant 8.538** -20.672** -13.674 -18.113
(2.13) (-2.08) (-1.17) (-1.17)
ρ 0.155 0.170 0.161
(0.77) (0.90) (0.85)
λ 0.139
(0.20)
Variance ratio 0.463 0.489 0.503 0.467
Robust LM-test no spatial lag dependence 0.596 3.646** 3.360* 3.646**
(0.440) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056)
Robust LM-test no spatial error dependence 0.202 2.757* 2.539 2.757*
(0.653) (0.097) (0.111) (0.097)
N 78 78 78 78
Notes: see Table 5.2. For the LM-test for spatial lag and error dependence numbers in
parenthesis are p-values.
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Table 5.10: Effects of democracy and size of bureaucracy on average growth
rate, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), robust
regressions
Variable (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5)
RWLS RWLS RWLS RWLS RWLS
Initial GRP -0.055*** -0.051** -0.047** -0.062*** -0.051**
(-2.86) (-2.60) (-2.47) (-3.17) (-2.62)
Oil and gas 0.051 0.050 0.044 0.044 0.039
(1.50) (1.47) (1.35) (1.24) (1.13)
Education 36.776*** 37.519*** 35.568*** 30.945*** 30.945***
(3.70) (3.82) (3.71) (2.91) (2.99)
Openness 27.499 28.434 29.422 32.644 35.181*
(1.39) (1.40) (1.49) (1.62) (1.72)
FDI 0.100 0.106 0.096 0.157 0.142
(0.68) (0.72) (0.67) (1.02) (0.96)
Investments 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008
(1.29) (1.24) (1.55) (1.34) (1.58)
Health -0.031 -0.031 -0.034 -0.030 -0.033
(-0.91) (-0.92) (-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.99)
Temperature -0.027 -0.026 -0.022 -0.058 -0.046
(-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.60) (-1.34) (-1.09)
Dummy Chukotka
Dummy Kalmykia 1.377
(0.46)
Dummy Ingushetia -2.275 -2.414 -3.930
(-0.96) (-1.00) (-1.60)
Democracy -0.023 -0.607* -0.569*
(-0.50) (-1.96) (-1.78)
Democracy squared 0.010* 0.009*
(1.93) (1.70)
Bureaucracy -2.390* -1.924
(-1.88) (-1.51)
Constant 0.867 1.320 9.935* -15.1036* -3.392
(0.48) (0.63) (1.99) (-1.72) (-0.33)
R2 0.301 0.341 0.354 0.337 0.374
N 76 77 76 75 75
F (democracy, democracy squared) 1.92 1.65
F (democracy, democracy squared,
bureaucracy) 2.01
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *** significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant
at 5 per cent level, * significant at 10 per cent level.
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5.5.3 Simultaneous equations
Given a complex nature of interaction between variables in the model (in par-
ticular, between democracy, bureaucracy and growth) an additional approach,
which should be considered, is to estimate a system of equations simultaneously.
That is what we provide in this section, using the 3SLS estimation technique
(where constant is excluded from instruments). Obviously, this approach does
not solve the potential endogeneity problem, but is interesting because of possi-
ble interrelations between two explanatory variables. I estimate four equations:
• The growth equation (*) with bureaucracy and democracy, described above;
• The democracy equation, where the level of democracy depends upon bu-
reaucracy, growth rate as well as additional controls listed below and
• The bureaucracy equation, where the size of bureaucracy depends upon
democracy, squared democracy, growth rate and additional controls
There are four endogenous variables which are instrumented in the first stage:
democracy, democracy squared, bucreaucracy and growth rate (in addition, I
have also estimated a specification with four regressions, where the fourth one
is that for democracy squared with the same covariates, as the equation for
democracy - it unsurprisingly does not change the results). Additional controls
for the democracy equation include (1) level of urbanization (share of urban
population); (2) share of ethnic Russian population in the region; (3) education
and (4) distance from Moscow. Additional controls for the bureaucracy equation
include (1) size of the territory, (2) population, (3) urbanization (these three
variables are likely to represent the size of the region and the ”difficulty” to
provide public services), (4) share of ethnic Russians, (5) distance from Moscow
as well as (6) share of public expenditures (which calls for a larger bureaucracy).
So, regressions for democracy and bureaucracy also include the instruments used
in the 2SLS regressions. All regressions are cross-sections with averaged data.
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 5.11. First, the basic results
obtained in the previous sections remain unchanged: one still gets the U-shaped
relation between democracy and growth. Bureaucracy is significant and main-
tains the negative sign. In the democracy regression one finds a significantly
positive impact of urbanization on democratic development. Share of Russians
is also significant and positive. Finally, bureaucracy is not significant, as well as
the level of education and GRP growth rates (the last fact confirms the intuition
that the endogeneity should not be a problem). In the bureaucracy equation
we find some weak evidence of inverse U-shape relation between democracy and
bureaucracy, reported in Figure 5.1, but only the squared term is significant.
Regions with larger territory and smaller population seem to have larger bu-
reaucracies. It could indicate, that in Russia the share of bureaucracy does not
increase even proportionally to the population size (and there can be at least
some truth in the claims of Russian bureaucrats to face a ”overwhelming bur-
den of demand for public services” or reflect the existence of returns to scale in
public bureaucracy). On the other hand, the result for territory and population
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may come from lower population density in Russian regions with large territory.
There is a significant positive relation between economic growth and the size of
bureaucracy (which, as discussed above, could be expected). Finally, share of
Russians is significant and positive.
5.5.4 Is population driving the results?
The discussion of simultaneous equations outcome raises an additional question,
which should be addressed. It is possible that both size of bureaucracy and eco-
nomic growth are driven by the population size. First, it should be noted that
the study of impact of population size on economic growth for countries yields
extremely heterogeneous results.27 Moreover, there may exist an identification
problem: it is possible that population has impact on growth exactly because
it influences the ”bureaucratic load”. Nevertheless, I have estimated the basic
specifications including average population as an additional covariate in growth
regressions. Simply including population results in vanishing effects of democ-
racy and size of bureaucracy in cross-sections. However, this result at least
partly is determined by the impact of City of Moscow with extreme growth
rates and enormous population (Moscow with its more than 10 mln. citizens is
the largest region in Russia in terms of population). Controlling for this effect
with a dummy makes population insignificant in all specifications; the effects
of democracy become significant, but bureaucracy is still insignificant. In the
IV regressions the results with respect to democracy and bureaucracy do not
change regardless of controlling for Moscow or including average population as
an additional covariate.28
A further problem which should be mentioned is that it is often recommended
to look at the GDP per employed person.29 The latter specification has better
theoretical motivation, but for a short-term growth model (like presented in this
chapter) the effects should be negligible. Nevertheless, I re-calculate the GDP
per employed person measure and re-estimate the regressions. In cross-section
specifications bureaucracy sign and significance do not change. Democracy and
democracy squared maintain their sign and significance if one controls for the
City of Moscow with a dummy.30 Once again, the population dynamics and the
27In this case factors like remoteness or restriction of cross-border trade and factor flows
absent in a intranational comparison case are important, cf. e.g. Brandi, 2004
28In panel data regressions (time FE) democracy is always significant regardless of whether
population is included or not. Bureaucracy is insignificant, but controlling for Moscow reestab-
lishes the significance.
29Estimating regressions of this chapter for growth rates of GRP per capita (i.e. dividing
growth rate of GRP by the growth rate of the population) without including population in
the list of covariates has no effects on significance and sign of coefficients in regressions in
cross-section.
30In the specification with bureaucracy and democracy all three variables have the expected
sign and are significant.
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Table 5.11: System of equations, 2000-2004, 3SLS
Variable Dep. var.: Dep.var.: Dep. var.:
Index of GRP Democracy Bureaucracy
Initial GRP -0.034
(-1.52)
Oil and gas 0.006*
(1.74)
Education 21.790* 11.649
(1.81) (0.62)
Openness 49.719**
(2.12)
FDI 0.144
(0.92)
Investments 0.010*
(1.72)
Health -0.020
(-0.64)
Temperature -0.046
(-1.19)
Dummy Chukotka 12.197***
(3.98)
Dummy Kalmykia -0.034
(-0.01)
Dummy Ingushetia -10.314***
(-3.21)
Urbanization 159.899*** 9.435**
(2.56) (2.68)
Share of Russians 7.195** 0.749***
(2.49) (4.00)
Distance from Moscow -0.257 0.008
(-1.20) (0.61)
Public expenditures 0.465
(1.38)
Territory 0.191***
(2.67)
Population -0.000***
(-5.24)
Democracy -1.331*** 0.005
(-3.00) (0.16)
Democracy squared 0.020*** -0.001*
(2.99) (-1.98)
Bureaucracy -2.062* -1.135
(-1.70) (-0.98)
GRP growth rate -0.029 0.046***
(-0.10) (3.08)
Constant 7.997** 3.403 -7.720***
(2.49) (-2.08) (22.54)
N 79 79 79
Chi-sq 73.91*** 48.55*** 131.93***
Note: *** significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent level, * significant at 10
per cent level. Numbers in parenthesis are z-values. Constant excluded from the list of
instruments. Democracy squared is also an endogenous variable
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employment dynamics of this city seem to be relevant (it is sufficient to say that
Moscow is one of the few regions in Russia with high population growth (due
to migration) and was able to reduce unemployment to a virtually zero level
during the 2000s).31 One should, however, notice that the quality of unemploy-
ment statistics in Russia is extremely poor (due to huge shadow economy) and
hence considering much better population statistics may actually help avoiding
measurement bias.
5.5.5 Panel data
Application of yearly data in growth panel regressions, especially if the time
dimension is short, is problematic. Moreover, it is much more difficult to find
reasonable instruments for a panel; therefore endogeneity bias may have a sig-
nificant impact on the results. Therefore the results of the panel data approach
may be considered only as an additional robustness check to the main results,
obtained through the cross-sections with averaged data. Basically, I used the
following estimation techniques in order to check the main results
• Time fixed effects with both democracy and bureaucracy variables;
• Region fixed effects and two-way fixed effects with bureaucracy variable
(since democracy does not vary over time) and possibly an interaction
variable;
• Random fixed effects with both democracy and bureaucracy variables;32
• Besley and Coate (2003: 1195) type of estimator to check for democracy
impact on growth with region fixed effects.33
Basically, there are two findings to be reported. As for democracy, if the outliers
are excluded panel data estimations confirm the non-linear effects reported in
the previous parts of the chapter. For bureaucracy, unfortunately, situation
is more difficult: if region fixed effects are included, the observed effect for
bureaucracy disappears. Most of the bureaucracy variables are insignificant.
However, the interaction term between bureaucracy and democracy is significant
and positive.The most interesting observation is the positive and significant
interaction term: it looks like expansion of bureaucracy has a Weberian effect
in relatively democratic regions. So, while a cross-section, regions with large
bureaucracy lose growth if their democracy level increases, in the panel region
FE specification regions with high democracy could gain additional growth if
their bureaucracy is larger. Figure 5.3 reports the marginal effect of bureaucracy
31Similarly, the effects in panel data (time FE) are robust if City of Moscow dummy is
included.
32The Hausman-Wu test is does not reject the null for the majority of specifications, hence,
RE estimator is consistent and efficient. However, the result depends upon the specification.
33Besley and Case (2003) argue, that a simple pooled OLS estimation in this framework
imposes too strong assumptions, which are likely to be violated. The approach I use is the
following: estimate a ”standard” FE model (in their case a two-way fixed effects), save the
estimated fixed effects and regress them as a cross-section on the institutional parameter
(democracy and democracy squared).
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Figure 5.3: Marginal effects of bureaucracy on growth conditional on democracy
level, two-way FE with an interaction term
on economic growth conditional on democracy for two-way FE specification. It is
obvious, that the effect is increasing and becomes significant for large democracy
levels.
5.5.6 Including outliers
In addition to the main estimations, I also estimate almost all regression in-
cluding three outliers. The results are reported in Appendix E3. In the basic
specification I still find the non-linear effect of democracy, which is also present
if controlling for bureaucracy. On the other hand, bureaucracy is not significant.
The interaction term is highly significant and negative, providing more robust
empirical support to the claims made above. Finally, in the IV estimations the
results are insignificant. Basically, including outliers does not seem to influence
a lot the democracy results (with the exception of IV estimations, which may
be due to the statistical properties of instruments in this larger sample), but
has a strong impact on bureaucracy (which is not surprising given what I have
reported for panel data). The existence of the regional specifics may be related
to the fact that all three regions use the offshore strategy (already discussed in
the previous chapters).
5.6 Conclusion
The chapter considers the impact of political institutions, in particular level of
democracy and size of bureaucracy, on economic growth, using the sample of
Russian regions in 2000-2004. Basically, it finds that democracy has a non-linear
effect on growth. Regions with low democracy level and with high democracy
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level outperform regions with intermediate level of democratic development.
Thus it provides evidence for the growing literature on potential problems of
hybrid political regimes. Interestingly, this is exactly what the only other pa-
per dealing with subnational variation of democracy could establish for Mexico
(Hiskey, 2005) - probably, confirming the need to examine the subnational de-
mocratization more closely.
The results with respect to bureaucracy are more ambiguous. I find that in-
creasing share of bureaucracy is harmful for economic growth. It is true for both
federal and local bureaucracy and does not depend on the level of democrati-
zation. Hence, it confirms the ”grabbing hand” view on Russian bureaucracy.
Moreover, there is some evidence that regions with large bureaucracy demon-
strate worse performance for higher democracy levels. This result holds for
cross-section specifications. After inclusion of the fixed effects, bureaucracy
variable per se becomes insignificant; however, one can show that regions with
high level of democracy are characterized by efficient ”Weberian” bureaucracy.
It is important not to overemphasize this result: the panel data in the setting of
this chapter is very problematic (growth regressions usually work with average
growth rates for at least five years).
It is interesting to confront this result with two previously mentioned empir-
ical statements about Russian regions: larger bureaucracy seems to improve the
quality of regulation and post-privatization performance of enterprises (Brown
et al., 2009) and to increase corruption (Dininio and Orttung, 2005). While
the second observation is completely in line with my results, the first poses an
interesting contradiction. One can expect, that the source of the problem is
not the quality of data: both my results and that of Brown et al. are based
on the official statistics of Goskomstat (though from different levels of aggrega-
tion). A crucial issue different time period of analysis - and in this case Putin
bureaucracy could have a different effect than the Yeltsin bureaucracy - once
again, the reasons for this difference are extremely interesting. Moreover, there
are interesting questions concerning the interaction of productivity growth (the
main variable for Brown et al.) and GDP growth, which may be non-trivial in
a resource-driven economy like Russia. Even more interesting feature is that
Brown et al. find a strong positive relation between bureaucracy and quality
of regulation for the 2000s. In this case it raises questions as to whether the
quality of regulation and economic growth were related in the Russian regions?
It most certainly deserves further investigation.
Three caveats are required. First, caution is required with respect to gener-
alization of the obtained results can be generalized to make conclusions with
respect to the overall development. Krieckhaus (2006) shows that regional polit-
ical context for democracy matters a long for its impact on economic growth, and
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2004) conclude the same for the democracy dif-
fusion influenced by income per capita. For a study of intranational variance of
political regimes, one could probably expect an even stronger country-specificity.
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One could probably claim, that it is especially true for the bureaucracy results,
since they for sure build upon the overall organization of Russian bureaucracy
(including the ”soft” factors like culture), which can be quite different in other
regions. However, exactly given this regional specifics the coinciding results of
this chapter and of Hiskey (2005) are especially interesting. Second, definitively,
the distribution of democracy in Russian regions is ”skewed”. One can find out-
right autocracies and even semi-totalitarian regimes like Kalmykia in Russia,
but there are no developed Western-type democracies. Most regions turned
out to be more or less ”soft” authoritarian regimes controlled by the governors
(Turovskiy, 2009). Thus this chapter may be - in a surprising way - comple-
mentary to the studies of direct democracy (Feld and Savoiz, 1997), which deal
with countries ”skewed” on the other side of democracy spectrum (from ”good”
to ”very good” democracies). Finally, short time period may make it difficult
to distinguish between growth and business cycle effects. Although consider-
ing short-term growth has certain advantages (ignoring the indirect effects of
democracy), it is also possible that my results indicate not worse economic per-
formance of hybrids in general, but their lower ability to generate economic
growth during the upward part of the business cycle. ”Pure” political regimes
then may be able to better cope with arising opportunities. However, this result
is of certain interest for economic research as well.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis attempted to study selected problems related to economics of non-
democracies and economics of endogenous decentralization in federations in an
empirical and theoretical context of an asymmetric federal structure. Both prob-
lems of decentralization and democratization are of great importance, not only
from the scientific point of view, but also in the policy advice for economic and
institutional reforms in developing and transition countries. Therefore it seems
to be necessary to present some general conclusions regarding both branches of
the literature, which determined the choice of research agenda for this thesis.
The standard approach to research on decentralization in economics seems to
be straightforward. On the one hand, the theoretical literature explores the
determinants and the effects of constitutional decentralization, i.e. allocation
of authorities between governments on different levels. On the other hand, the
empirical research applies a number of (imperfect) proxies - most notably, share
of subnational fiscal revenues or expenditures - to test the predictions of the
theory (Figure 6.1). It means, certainly, that there exists a gap between what
is defined as decentralization in theory and what is used to measure decen-
tralization in empirical work, especially if the intergovernmental relations in the
federation are more complex. One aspect of this complexity is of course the well-
studied intergovernmental fiscal transfers issue; however, there may be further
forces at work, which make even the pure decentralization indicators (before
transfers) problematic. In particular, the problem is present if the fiscal flows
are attributed to regional budgets, but determined by the federal government
(centralized instead of decentralized federation) and / or federal government del-
egates its authorities to be implemented by regional bureaucracy (cooperative
instead of dual federation). Although U.S. is an example of dual decentralized
federations (and seemingly inspired a lion’s share of research in this area), most
European federations are at least either centralized or cooperative (and often
combine both features).
One possible reaction to the problem is to perceive the imperfection of em-
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pirical proxies as a measurement error: in this case the problem can be reduced
to finding better quantitative indicators, which account for ”real” authorities of
regional governments (Figure 6.2). In this case the ”traditional” retention rates
and shares of subnational revenue and expenditures simply do not measure the
intended aspect of the economic reality.
The results of this thesis, however, show that the relation between the em-
pirics and the theory may be even more complex: the gap is not simply a result
of measurement errors, but reflects the existence of the ”post-constitutional”
redistribution of de-facto authorities and (even more importantly) ability to in-
fluence economic processes, reflected in control over (fiscal) resources (Figure
6.3 ). Hence, the correct understanding of federal dynamics requires a detailed
analysis of all three aspects: (a) formal constitution, (b) resulting allocation
of resources and (c) the reasons for discrepancies between (a) and (b); a pro-
cess which Jenna Bednar (2008) describes as ”migration of authorities” in a
federation. Both formal and informal aspects matter in terms of economic per-
formance, but are not independent from each other.
The first paper of this thesis shows that the post-constitutional decentraliza-
tion may differ significantly from what is written in federal and even regional
constitutions; however, the design of formal constitution is crucial for the mech-
anisms generating these differences, as the second paper demonstrates using the
example of strategic tax collection. It is the centralized Russian state which gen-
erates an environment for the particular form of fiscal decentralization (through
manipulation of tax collection effort or ”war of laws”), which is in turn relevant
for economic behavior.
The second group of results of this paper is related to the interaction between
democracy and federalism. Once again, the relation between democracy and
economic performance, as well as other institutional characteristics of economy
is a standard field of investigation in both theoretical and empirical literature.
This thesis aims to show, that the discussion in economics so far missed at least
one important aspect of this problem (which has been, however, studied in po-
litical science to a certain extent): democratization in federations does never
influence both center and regions simultaneously. A more likely scenario is that
some regions turn into an ”oasis of democracy” or an area of the ”subnational
authoritarianism”. Although this finding is (as noticed) not really new for social
sciences, the thesis attempted to demonstrate that these differences in political
regimes are relevant for economic performance. The third paper of the thesis
in a theoretical framework showed how differences in regimes may influence de-
centralization process (which, in turn, sets the described complex machinery
in motion to generate economic results). The fourth paper looked directly at
the influence of subnational democracy on economic growth, as well as at the
interaction between democracy and size of the bureaucratic staff, and provided
strong evidence for economically significant effects.
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Figure 6.1: Standard approach of fiscal federalism
Figure 6.2: Measurement problem by empirical tests of theoretical predictions
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Figure 6.3: Gap between constitutional and post-constitutional decentralization:
results of this thesis
From this point of view, moreover, it is possible to notice the third general
contribution of the thesis. It demonstrated that the asymmetric federalism
(with individual degree of autonomy for each region) and subnational varia-
tion of political regimes are able to provide a good empirical playground for
studying general processes, so far discussed only in international cross-country
settings. Therefore focusing on intranational variation may support the theoret-
ical conclusions with better data and plausible identification strategies. There
is, of course, the problem of external validity to be mentioned; however, the
surprising similarity of studies dealing with Mexico and Russia in terms of the
”democracy-and-growth” nexus shows that in spite of all differences between
federations, studying their regions may be helpful from the point of view of
testing more general predictions of the theory.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Russian tax system
• The tax system comprises federal, regional and local taxes. The most im-
portant taxes (profit tax, VAT, personal income tax, excises on alcohol,
tobacco etc., rental payments for natural resources, and single social tax,
which replaced the contributions to public health, pension and unemploy-
ment insurance and was imposed on wages and paid by employers1) are
federal taxes. These taxes should be imposed in all regions of the Russian
Federation. However, the revenue from several of these taxes (profit tax,
personal income tax, several excises, payments for natural resources, and,
until Putin’s tax reform, VAT) are divided between different levels of gov-
ernment; the share of the federal center can even become equal to zero –
but the tax is still legally a federal one, because it is set by the federal cen-
ter. The tax rates for the federal taxes are set by the federal government
with only one exception: for the profit tax the federal government does not
set the tax rate, but the maximal tax rate, and the regions can reduce it
by several percentage points. Moreover, until 2000 regions had the right to
grant exemptions from their portions of federal taxes, and there were some
presidential decrees establishing special tax regime for individual regions
(like Ingushetia in 1994 or Karelia in 1992-1994). These options were used
in two ways. Many regions implemented specific tax regimes for individual
business groups with strong ties to the regional government (Yankovsky,
2001); the impact of these regimes is, however, quantitatively completely
opaque (it would require the knowledge of individual tax bases for hun-
dreds of enterprises). Few regions used the opportunity to lower federal
tax rates at a larger scope, and became “internal tax heavens”.
1We list only the main taxes, although the Russian fiscal system included a variety of minor
taxes. The overall description of the tax system is rather stylized than exact; nevertheless,
it is hardly possible to provide a detailed overview of the turbulent changes in the Russian
taxation for nearly a decade.
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• The division of tax revenue from the federal taxes was originally set in fed-
eral acts on individual taxes, which were consequently replaced by chapters
of the Tax Code. For several taxes (VAT, income tax) the division was
changed in annual budget acts (the so-called “regulating taxes”), which
were passed by the federal parliament. However, the proportions are iden-
tical for all regions of Russia, with the only exception of Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan. The distribution of tax revenue and tax rates was quite
volatile: for example, for the personal income tax the regions received 100%
in 1994; 90% in 1995-1996, once again 100% in 1997-1999, 84% in 2000,
99% in 2001 and 100% in 2003 and 2004. The tax rate moved from a pro-
gression system to the flat tax of 13%. For the VAT the regions received
25% until the first quarter of 1999, 15% from the second quarter of 1999
to 2000, and 0% afterwards; the overall tax rate was lowered from 28% in
the early 1990s (before the start of our sample) to 20%, and once again to
18% in 2004. For the corporate profit tax the federal government until the
first quarter of 1999 applied a tax rate of 13%, from the second quarter
of 1999 to 2001 of 11%, from 2002 to 2004 7.5%, and from 2004 6%. The
overall tax rate for the corporate profit tax was 35% until 2002 and 24%
afterwards, so the difference was attributed to the regions. However, re-
gions had the right to manipulate only part of “their” tax rate: from 2001
on they could reduce it only by 5 percent points.
• Regional and local taxes are set by the regions (which still may only
“choose” from the predetermined list of the federal government), which
may also choose the tax rate (within the range set by the federal gov-
ernment). This group includes, however, mostly property taxes (land tax,
personal and corporate real estate taxes). The specifics of the Russian
economy make these taxes unimportant (in fact, for the personal real es-
tate tax the costs of administration systematically exceed its tax revenue).
First, the structure of property rights for real estate and land is very vague
and provides for many options for tax avoidance. Second, the valuation of
many objects is far below their market value and based on outdated norms,
partly inherited from the Soviet past. The tax rates are small: those of
the real estate tax for individuals varied from 0.1 to 2% (depending on the
value of the real estate object) and for organizations it changed over time
from 2% to 2.2% (maximum rate determined by the federal government).
Most regions used the maximum tax rate,2 but granted countless excep-
tions. Another regional tax used from 1999 to 2003 was the sales tax of
5%, which was, however, introduced by practically all regions and did not
form any source of regional heterogeneity.
• Finally, the royalties for natural resources formed an important base for
regional tax revenue until Putin’s tax reform 2001. During this period the
regional consolidated budget received 60% for extraction of hydrocarbon
2In fact, in an environment of strategic tax collection this behavior is no surprise: it is
reasonable to set its ”own“ tax rate to the maximum and try to manipulate the tax collection
effort for the taxes mostly attributed to the other level of government.
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raw materials and 75% for other minerals. After the tax reform under Putin
the taxation of natural resources was redistributed towards the federal
center.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
Table B.1: Construction of the index of constitutional devolution
Region Natural International State of Branches of Restrictions on Interbudgetary Index
resources agreements emergency federal agencies federal law relations
Adygeia X X X 3
Altai (Rep.) X 1
Bashkortostan X X X X 4
Buryatia X X X 3
Chuvashia X X 2
Dagestan X X X X X 5
Ingushetia X X X X 4
Kabardino-Balkaria X X 2
Kalmykia X X 2
Karachaevo-Cherkessia X 1
Karelia X X 2
Khakassia X 1
Komi X X X 3
Mariy El X X 2
Mordovia X 1
Northern Ossetia X X X X 4
Sakha X X X X X 5
Tatarstan X X X X 4
Tyva X X X X X 5
Udmurtia X X 2
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Table B.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Declarations 88 2.821 0.498 1.6 4.33
Democratization 88 27.568 6.238 14 45
Distance 88 2.639 2.925 0 12.866
Distance from average income 88 0.466 0.492 0.244 3.191
Dummy autonomous okrug 88 0.102 0.305 0 1
Dummy border region 88 0.386 0.49 0 1
Dummy republic 88 0.227 0.421 0 1
Fiscal transfers 88 0.235 0.179 0.008 0.749
Income per capita 88 0.908 0.649 0.258 4.056
Net profit 88 3.036 7.264 -1.532 42.082
Number of negative conclusions 88 267.33 152.317 5 798
Oil and gas 88 0.02 0.103 0 0.786
Population 88 1.685 1.507 0.02 8.546
Power (RUIE) 88 2.341 0.676 1 3
Power (UI) 81 2.136 0.833 1 3
Power sharing agreement 88 0.523 0.502 0 1
Regional constitutions 20 2.8 1.399 1 5
Regulatory capture 73 0 0.137 -0.306 0.416
Retail trade 88 11.418 28.628 0.089 265.258
Share of negative conclusions 88 0.102 0.055 0.002 0.314
Share of Russians 88 0.746 0.238 0.012 0.966
Tax retention rate 88 0.643 0.096 0.213 0.92
Tension (MFK) 88 3.33 1.46 1 5
Tension (RUIE) 88 2.17 0.834 1 3
Territory 88 0.233 0.46 0 3.103
Urbanization 88 0.067 0.016 0.019 0.1
188
Table B.3: Description of variables
Variable Description Period Source
Bargaining power (RUIE) Index of bargaining power of the region vis-a-vis the federation, ranging from 1 to 3, 1996 Russian Union of
higher value indicates higher bargaining power Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Bargaining power (UI) Index of bargaining power of the region vis-a-vis the federal center, ranging from 1 1996 Institute of Urban
to 3, higher value indicates higher bargaining power. Components of index: violations of Economics
federal law by regional legislation, natural resources, vote against federal policies at
national elections
Declarations Index of declarations of regional elites in 1991-1995, based on count of events, e.g. 1995 Dowley, 1998
statements of sovereignty of the region, requests to reallocate power in the federation
etc. Higher value of index represents a greater support of decentralization
Democratization Index of democratization of the region, estimated by the experts of 1991-2001 Carnegie Center and
the Carnegie Center in Moscow. The higher value of index represents a Independent Institute
higher level of democracy. for Social Policy
Distance from Moscow Distance between the capital of the region and Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and Moscow NA Goskomstat
oblast, identical for St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg oblast
Distance of the average Absolute value (Average income per capita in the Russian Federation - Average income per capita 1995-1999 Goskomstat
income per capita in the region)
Dummy autonomous 1 if the region has the status of an autonomous okrug but Chukotka (which is not part of NA Own estimation
okrug any other region), 0 otherwise
Dummy border region 1 if the region has a border to any state NA Own estimation
outside the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise
Dummy power sharing 1 if there was a power sharing agreement in 1999 Garant, own
agreement 1999, 0 otherwise estimation
Dummy republic 1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 otherwise NA Own estimation
Income per capita Average income per capita of the region, thousands of RUR 1995-1999; Goskomstat
Net profit Net profit (profit - loss) of all region’s organizations, bln. RUR 1995-1999 Goskomstat
Number of negative Number of acts assessed as contradicting the 2006 Ministry of Justice
conclusions federal legislation
Oil and gas share (Share of oil extraction in the region in the total oil extraction in Russia 1995-1999 Goskomstat
+ Share of the gas extraction in the region to the total gas extraction in Russia) / 2
Population Population of the region, mln. people 1995-2003, 2006 Goskomstat
Power (Jarocinska) Index of power of regional governors, based on data like years in office, share on 1995-2000 Jarocinska, 2004
regional elections, control of parliament etc. The higher value of index represents a
higher influence of regional governor
Regional constitutions Index of autonomy incorporated in regional constitutions (see Table B.11) 1999 Own estimation, based
on data from Garant
Retail trade Average total retail trade revenue (current prices), bln. RUR 1995-1999 Goskomstat
Share of fiscal Average fiscal transfers from other budgets over total expenditures of the region’s 1995-1999 Until 1997: Freinkman,
transfers consolidated budget Treisman and Titov, 1999; since
1998: Ministry of Finance
Share of negative Number of acts assessed as contradicting the federal legislation over total number of 2006 Ministry of Justice
conclusions acts assessed as either contradicting or conforming the federal legislation
Share of Russians Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s population 2002 Russia’s Census, 2002
State capture Index of regulatory capture: residual average preferential treatment concentration after 2000 Slinko, Yakovlev and
controlling for the number of preferential treatments 1995-2000. The higher value of index Zhuravskaya, 2005
represents a higher capture degree.
Tax retention rate Average tax revenue of the consolidated regional budget executed over total 1995-1999 Until 1997: Freinkman,
tax collection on the territory of the region Treisman and Titov, 1999, since
1998: Ministry of Finance (for
budget data), State Tax Service
and Goskomstat (for tax collection
data)
Tensions (MFK) Index of tensions between the federal and the regional governments, ranging 1997 MFK Renaissance
from 1 to 5, higher value indicates higher level of tensions. Components of index:
number of critical statements of governors against the president, electoral support
of the president in the region and existence of power-sharing agreement
Tensions (RUIE) Index of tensions between the federal and the regional governments, ranging 1996 Russian Union
from 1 to 3, higher value indicates higher level of tensions of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs
Territory Territory of the region, mln. sq. km, 0 for Moscow and St. Petersburg NA Goskomstat
Urbanization Average share of urban population, % / 1000 1995-1999 Goskomstat
Notes: All Goskomstat (Russian statistical authority) data are provided on the annual basis in the regular publication Regions of Russia. In 1998 the Russian ruble was denominated;
therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000.
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B.2 Factors of decentralization, robustness to
specification
Table B.4: Factors of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention
rate, income per capita among the covariates
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.062*** 0.051** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.051** 0.046** 0.051**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Population 0 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Oil and gas -0.126 -0.107 0.014 -0.093 0.015 0.029 0.015
(0.209) (0.185) (0.193) (0.167) (0.180) (0.178) (0.181)
Income p.c. 0.021 0.012 -0.034 0.013 -0.042 -0.036 -0.042
(0.033) (0.035) (0.043) (0.028) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.017 0.022 0.134 0.09 0.077 0.089
(0.046) (0.048) (0.084) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
Dummy republic -0.001 0.003 0.088* 0.028 0.025 0.028
(0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Retail trade -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance 0.006 0.008** 0.006* 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Dummy border region 0.018 0.027 0.015 0.024 0.021 0.024
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Share of Russians 0.156 0.042
(0.137) (0.079)
Urbanization 1.457 1.134 0.941 1.123
(1.227) (1.109) (1.130) (1.110)
Fiscal transfers -0.14 -0.135 -0.141
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106)
Tensions (RUIE) 0.001
(0.008)
Power sharing agreement 0.017
(0.019)
Constant 0.626*** 0.607*** 0.391*** 0.585*** 0.597*** 0.601*** 0.597***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.147) (0.076) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.197 0.229 0.296 0.236 0.277 0.283 0.277
F-stat 20.59*** 20.35*** 11.72*** 19.14*** 10.57*** 9.68*** 9.62***
J.-B. test 166.1*** 240.3*** 80.05*** 143.9*** 195.3*** 174.0*** 194.5***
Notes: see Table 2.2. Outliers are Ingushetia, Kalmykia and City of Moscow in all
regressions; Sakha in regressions (B1)-(B9), (B11)-(B12); Altai Republic in regressions (B1)
- (B4), (B6) - (B8); Aginsk Buryat autonomous okrug in regressions (B2) - (B9),
(B11)-(B12); Taimyr autonomous okrug in regressions (B2) -(B4), (B6) - (B8); Tatarstan in
regressions (B2) - (B4), (B7); Bashkortostan in regression (B4), (B7). After exclusion of
outliers dummy republic loses significance in regression (B3), but maintains the sign.
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Table B.5: Factors of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention
rate, income per capita among the covariates (cont ’d)
(B8) (B9) (B10) (B11) (B12) (B13) (B14)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.051** 0.055** 0.013 0.049** 0.047** 0.01 0.009
(0.020) (0.0230) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
Population -0.01 -0.008 0 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Oil and gas 0.016 0.023 -0.636*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.257 -0.283*
(0.180) (0.186) (0.229) (0.181) (0.186) (0.160) (0.157)
Income p.c. -0.042 -0.043 0.06 -0.041 -0.039 0.033 0.05
(0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.09 0.093 0.038 0.09 0.076 -0.300*** -0.345***
(0.071) (0.070) (0.078) (0.071) (0.075) (0.105) (0.107)
Dummy republic 0.028 0.034 0.032 0.027 0.008 0.055** 0.026
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.021) (0.042)
Retail trade 0 0 -0.002* 0 0 -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.004 -0.003 0 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance 0.010** 0.011** 0.006 0.011** 0.010** 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Dummy border region 0.024 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.032** 0.031*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Urbanization 1.117 1.479 0.324 1.36 1.12 1.992 1.669
(1.128) (1.101) (1.034) (1.135) (1.265) (1.415) (1.538)
Fiscal transfers -0.142 -0.157 -0.107 -0.16 -0.156 -0.035 -0.035
(0.106) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) (0.073) (0.080)
Tensions (MFK) 0.001
(0.007)
Democratization -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.019 -0.013
(0.013) (0.012)
Power (UI) -0.003
(0.008)
Power (RUIE) -0.009
(0.012)
Declarations 0.017 0.032
(0.032) (0.031)
Regulatory capture -0.074 -0.081
(0.055 -0.053)
Constant 0.595*** 0.736*** 0.613*** 0.656*** 0.600*** 0.626*** 0.641***
(0.084) (0.103) (0.100) (0.093) (0.096) (0.077) (0.121)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
R2 0.277 0.293 0.279 0.286 0.284 0.543 0.565
F-stat 9.55*** 11.36*** 14.79*** 11.39*** 10.45*** - -
J.-B. test 190.5*** 211.8*** 351.0*** 213.6*** 249.2*** 0.123 0.157
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Table B.6: Factors of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention
rate, distance from average income per capita among the covariates
(B15) (B16) (B17) (B18) (B19) (B20) (B21)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.051***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Population -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Oil and gas 0.094 0.114 0.152 0.061 0.159 0.17 0.159
(0.109) (0.113) (0.136) (0.097) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133)
Distance from average income -0.062* -0.068* -0.093** -0.038* -0.102** -0.098** -0.102**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.020) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.06 0.06 0.157** 0.123* 0.114* 0.123*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.078) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
Dummy republic 0 0.006 0.085 0.038 0.035 0.038
(0.034) (0.034) (0.051) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Retail trade 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.004** -0.003* -0.004* -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance from Moscow 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Dummy border region 0.015 0.027 0.008 0.024 0.022 0.024
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Share of Russians 0.124 0.036
(0.130) (0.080)
Urbanization 1.588 1.312 1.204 1.313
(1.008) (1.062) (1.057) (1.060)
Fiscal transfers -0.106 -0.105 -0.106
(0.104) (0.105) (0.106)
Tensions (RUIE) 0
(0.008)
Power sharing agreement 0.012
(0.017)
Constant 0.664*** 0.638*** 0.421*** 0.614*** 0.583*** 0.586*** 0.583***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.137) (0.070) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.215 0.256 0.333 0.244 0.321 0.324 0.321
F-stat 22.07*** 19.94*** 9.74*** 18.83*** 9.90*** 9.19*** 9.11***
J.-B. test 176.3*** 246.0*** 66.34*** 163.1*** 134.3*** 125.6*** 134.3***
Notes: see Table 2.2. Outliers are Moscow City, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Aginsk Buryat
autonomous okrug in all regressions; Altai Republic in (B15)-(B23), (B25)-(B26); Tatarstan
in (B15), (B18)-(B19), (B21); Sakha in (B16), (B18)-(B26); Taimyr in (B16), (B18)-(B23),
(B25)-(B26), Bashkortostan in (B21). After exclusion of outliers net profit in (B15) - (B16),
(B19)-(B20), (B22)-(B23), (B25)-(B26) loses significance, but maintains its sign; dummy
autonomous region in (B17), (B19)-(B23), (B25) loses significance, but maintains its sign,
urbanization in (B23) loses significance, but maintains its sign.
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Table B.7: Factors of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention
rate, distance from average income per capita among the covariates (cont’d)
(B22) (B23) (B24) (B25) (B26) (B27) (B28)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.03 0.048*** 0.048** 0.01 0.011
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Population -0.014 -0.013 -0.01 -0.014 -0.014 -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Oil and gas 0.159 0.182 -0.142 0.15 0.153 -0.271 -0.277
(0.131) (0.138) (0.465) (0.128) (0.141) (0.184) (0.178)
Distance from average income -0.102** -0.110** -0.037 -0.107** -0.106** 0.056 0.066
(0.046) (0.046) (0.095) (0.046) (0.049) (0.076) (0.072)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.123* 0.131* 0.07 0.126* 0.12 -0.341** -0.366**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067) (0.073) (0.160) (0.152)
Dummy republic 0.038 0.045* 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.054** 0.022
(0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.022) (0.043)
Retail trade 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net profit -0.004** -0.004* -0.002 -0.004* -0.004** 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance from Moscow 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Dummy border region 0.024 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.032* 0.031*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016)
Urbanization 1.315 1.800* 0.832 1.652 1.525 2.099* 1.851
(1.067) (1.033) (0.975) (1.059) (1.185) (1.227) (1.329)
Fiscal transfers -0.106 -0.129 -0.128 -0.132 -0.128 -0.061 -0.067
(0.106) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.075) (0.080)
Tensions (MFK) 0
(0.006)
Democratization -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.021 -0.01
(0.013) (0.012)
Power (UI) -0.003
(0.008)
Power (RUIE) -0.008
(0.011)
Declarations 0.008 0.033
(0.035) (0.031)
Regulatory capture -0.07 -0.073
(0.057) (0.054)
Constant 0.583*** 0.746*** 0.634*** 0.651*** 0.613*** 0.619*** 0.616***
(0.087) (0.106) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096) (0.077) (0.124)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
R2 0.321 0.345 0.266 0.334 0.331 0.544 0.562
F-stat 9.37*** 9.92*** 12.9*** 9.81*** 9.30*** - -
J.-B. test 134.6*** 153.7*** 315.3*** 160.8*** 182.0*** 0.358 0.1198
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Table B.8: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: share of
negative conclusions to all conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register,
income per capita among the covariates
(B29) (B30) (B31) (B32) (B33) (B34) (B35)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.018* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.01)
Population 0 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Oil and gas -0.006 0.048 0.044 0.036 0.042 0.017 0.05
(0.049) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.04) (0.041) (0.041)
Income per capita -0.019** -0.028*** -0.019 -0.021** -0.019 -0.023 -0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.045 0.043* 0.056* 0.045*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025)
Dummy republic 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Distance from Moscow 0.007** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Dummy border region 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.009 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Share of Russians 0.009 -0.096***
(0.043) (0.023)
Urbanization -0.641 -0.636 -0.426 -0.491
(0.424) (0.472) (0.524) (0.501)
Fiscal transfers -0.003 -0.006 0.01
(0.039) (0.041) (0.036)
Tension (RUIE) -0.011
(0.007)
Power sharing agreement -0.02
-0.013
Constant 0.096*** 0.077*** 0.108** 0.174*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.123***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.052) (0.023) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.295 0.394 0.407 0.327 0.407 0.432 0.431
F-stat 6.74*** 7.35*** 7.75*** 5.95*** 7.53*** 6.65*** 7.35***
J.-B. test 161.7*** 35.94*** 55.91*** 31.36*** 56.37*** 32.7*** 34.41***
Notes: see Table 2.2. Outliers are Primorski krai in all regressions and City of Moscow in
regressions (B29)-(B37) and (B39)-(B40). After exclusion of outliers distance from Moscow
in regressions (B31) (p=0.102), (B37), (B39) (p=0.102); (B40) becomes insignificant but
maintains the sign; dummy autonomous okrug in regression (B39) becomes insignificant
(p=0.102) but maintains the sign.
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Table B.9: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: share of
negative conclusions to all conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register,
income per capita among the covariates (cont’d)
(B36) (B37) (B38) (B39) (B40) (B41) (B42)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Population 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Oil and gas 0.05 0.048 -0.067 0.041 0.042 0.057** 0.084**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.097) (0.042) (0.044) (0.026) (0.033)
Income p.c. -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 -0.009 -0.01
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.042 0.044 0.074** 0.043* 0.042 -0.026 -0.016
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024)
Dummy republic 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.052** 0.059*** 0.086***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025)
Distance from Moscow 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 0.007* 0.006* 0.008* 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Dummy border region 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Urbanization -0.54 -0.56 -0.077 -0.588 -0.605 -0.394 -0.138
(0.501) (0.573) (0.703) (0.548) (0.573) (0.528) (0.606)
Fiscal transfers 0.005 -0.006 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.018
(0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.047)
Tensions (MFK) -0.006
(0.004)
Democratization 0 -0.001 0 0 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.005 -0.013
(0.008) (0.010)
Power (UI) -0.009
(0.007)
Power (RUIE) -0.003
(0.007)
Declarations 0.001 -0.018
(0.015) (0.018)
Regulatory capture -0.027 -0.027
(0.039) (0.040)
Constant 0.126*** 0.148** 0.112*** 0.131*** 0.121** 0.091** 0.190**
(0.036) (0.063) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.038) (0.085)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
R2 0.43 0.409 0.433 0.409 0.407 0.375 0.402
F-stat 7.72*** 6.29*** 6.97*** 6.25*** 6.27*** - -
J.-B. test 32.28*** 48.23*** 36.48*** 56.56*** 52.7*** 51.78*** 37.7***
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Table B.10: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: share
of negative conclusions to all conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register,
distance from average income per capita among the covariates
(B43) (B44) (B45) (B46) (B47) (B48) (B49)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Population 0 0.004 0.005 0 0.005 0.007 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Oil and gas -0.004 0.032 0.039 0.024 0.041 0.016 0.051
(0.050) (0.047) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Distance from average income -0.023* -0.028** -0.018 -0.022** -0.019 -0.023 -0.017
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.039 0.039 0.052* 0.043*
(0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Dummy republic 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Distance from Moscow 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.006* 0.005 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy border region 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.01 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Share of Russians 0.001 -0.105***
(0.042) (0.023)
Urbanization -0.829** -0.765* -0.589 -0.588
(0.377) (0.454) (0.485) (0.478)
Fiscal transfers 0.009 0.009 0.021
(0.040) (0.043) (0.038)
Tensions (RUIE) -0.011
(0.007)
Power sharing agreement -0.019
(0.013)
Constant 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.122** 0.176*** 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.123***
(0.009) (0.01) (0.049) (0.023) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.29 0.373 0.403 0.317 0.404 0.428 0.43
F-stat 7.47*** 6.98*** 8.14*** 6.04*** 8.10*** 6.86*** 7.72***
J.-B. test 144.2*** 31.36*** 62.2*** 30.75*** 63.15*** 39.89*** 37.79***
Notes: see Table 2.2. Outliers are City of Moscow for regressions (B43)-(B51) and
(B53)-(B54) and Primorski krai for all regressions. After exclusion of outliers distance from
Moscow in regression (B45)-(B47), (B49), (B50), (B53) loses significance, but maintains the
sign; population in regression (B49) loses significance, but maintains its sign.
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Table B.11: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: share
of negative conclusions to all conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register,
distance from average income per capita among the covariates (cont’d)
(B50) (B51) (B52) (B53) (B54) (B55) (B56)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Territory 0.002 0.001 0.001 0 0 -0.004 0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Population 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Oil and gas 0.052 0.049 -0.07 0.041 0.041 0.055** 0.086**
(0.038) (0.042) (0.107) (0.038) (0.040) (0.025) (0.033)
Distance from average income -0.019 -0.02 -0.01 -0.019 -0.02 -0.01 -0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Dummy autonomous okrug 0.04 0.041 0.068* 0.04 0.039 -0.025 -0.01
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027)
Dummy republic 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.051** 0.059*** 0.087***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.025)
Distance from Moscow 0.006* 0.006 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.007* 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dummy border region 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Urbanization -0.63 -0.671 -0.221 -0.702 -0.733 -0.45 -0.153
(0.478) (0.548) (0.654) (0.517) (0.551) (0.493) (0.576)
Fiscal transfers 0.018 0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.006 -0.007 -0.01
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046)
Tensions (MFK) -0.006
(0.004)
Democratization 0 -0.001 0 0 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.005 -0.013
(0.009) (0.010)
Power (UI) -0.01
(0.007)
Power (RUIE) -0.003
(0.007)
Declarations 0.002 -0.018
(0.016) (0.019)
Regulatory capture -0.029 -0.028
(0.039) (0.040)
Constant 0.125*** 0.152** 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.121** 0.093** 0.194**
(0.038) (0.064) (0.040) (0.044) (0.049) (0.038) (0.086)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
R2 0.43 0.407 0.43 0.406 0.405 0.374 0.403
F-stat 7.89*** 6.82*** 7.83*** 6.77*** 6.78*** - -
J.-B. test 34.38*** 52.86*** 40.13*** 62.35*** 58.21*** 52.59*** 36.3***
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Table B.12: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: num-
ber of negative conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register, income per
capita among the covariates
(B57) (B58) (B59) (B60) (B61) (B62) (B63)
Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial
Territory 0.247*** 0.119 0.116 0.204** 0.129 0.156* 0.139*
(0.083) (0.080) (0.079) (0.103) (0.085) (0.087) (0.074)
Population 0.086*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.140***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034)
Oil and gas 0.04 0.473 0.453 0.079 0.46 0.358 0.517
(0.370) (0.330) (0.321) (0.431) (0.307) (0.314) (0.315)
Income p.c. -0.041 -0.133* -0.084 -0.179* -0.087 -0.105 -0.067
(0.073) (0.078) (0.093) (0.101) (0.091) (0.099) (0.088)
Dummy autonomous okrug -0.104 -0.081 -0.191 -0.188 -0.138 -0.175
(0.127) (0.138) (0.237) (0.199) (0.211) (0.195)
Dummy republic 0.570*** 0.632*** 0.596*** 0.581*** 0.586*** 0.605***
(0.112) (0.109) (0.210) (0.120) (0.118) (0.125)
Distance from Moscow 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.041* 0.057** 0.055** 0.055***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Dummy border region 0.071 0.066 0.11 0.065 0.074 0.064
(0.102) (0.104) (0.119) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
Share of Russians 0.027 -0.848***
(0.343) (0.197)
Urbanization -3.531 -2.44 -1.509 -1.361
(3.199) (4.135) (4.289) (4.196)
Fiscal transfers 0.154 0.179 0.259
(0.415) (0.422) (0.395)
Tensions (RUIE) -0.082
(0.064)
Power sharing agreement -0.087
(0.109)
Constant 5.259*** 5.066*** 5.258*** 5.919*** 5.173*** 5.138*** 5.230***
(0.094) (0.110) (0.411) (0.183) (0.368) (0.371) (0.356)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.039
Wald Chi-stat 73.63*** 87.12*** 91.55*** 46.41*** 90.61*** 89.66*** 101.29***
Goodness of the fit 4565.166*** 3986.862*** 3941.261*** 4856.018*** 3937.14*** 3876.313*** 3803.926***
Notes: see Table 2.2. Goodness of the fit is the statistics showing the overdispersion in
Poisson regressions
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Table B.13: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: num-
ber of negative conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register, income per
capita among the covariates (cont’d)
(B64) (B65) (B66) (B67) (B68) (B69) (B70)
Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial
Territory 0.142** 0.142* 0.136* 0.134 0.122 0.105 0.122
(0.072) (0.084) (0.077) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.079)
Population 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.125***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039)
Oil and gas 0.521 0.49 -0.863 0.444 0.389 0.558*** 0.608*
(0.327) (0.346) (0.640) (0.305) (0.327) (0.214) (0.319)
Income p.c. -0.067 -0.073 0.008 -0.071 -0.058 -0.003 0.025
(0.089) (0.095) (0.099) (0.095) (0.100) (0.117) (0.113)
Dummy autonomous okrug -0.203 -0.191 0.008 -0.195 -0.276 -0.602** -0.694**
(0.202) (0.200) (0.221) (0.198) (0.237) (0.263) (0.282)
Dummy republic 0.610*** 0.608*** 0.659*** 0.596*** 0.489** 0.653*** 0.625**
(0.127) (0.140) (0.129) (0.123) (0.213) (0.124) (0.265)
Distance from Moscow 0.055*** 0.058** 0.052** 0.057** 0.056** 0.066** 0.070**
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030)
Dummy border region 0.045 0.07 0.131 0.077 0.074 0.109 0.098
(0.110) (0.108) (0.104) (0.099) (0.101) (0.110) (0.119)
Urbanization -1.901 -3.305 0.28 -3.433 -4.731 -2.518 -2.829
(4.176) (4.344) (5.043) (4.303) (4.670) (4.878) (5.039)
Fiscal transfers 0.218 0.256 0.107 0.25 0.237 0.177 0.122
(0.403) (0.449) (0.435) (0.448) (0.436) (0.551) (0.540)
Tensions (MFK) -0.047
(0.036)
Democratization 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.01
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.03 -0.097
(0.094) (0.105)
Power (UI) -0.067
(0.065)
Power (RUIE) -0.019
(0.074)
Declarations 0.093 0.077
(0.161) (0.201)
Regulatory capture -0.166 -0.212
(0.350) (0.341)
Constant 5.267*** 5.158*** 4.952*** 5.039*** 4.843*** 4.849*** 5.272***
(0.376) (0.687) (0.408) (0.459) (0.499) (0.464) (0.908)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039
Wald Chi-stat 106.5*** 85.08*** 336.20*** 84.79*** 87.44*** - -
Goodness of the fit 3804.677*** 3925.622*** 3345.643*** 3932.684*** 3920.009*** 3350.097*** 3282.421***
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Table B.14: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: num-
ber of negative conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register, distance
from average income per capita among the covariates
(B71) (B72) (B73) (B74) (B75) (B76) (B77)
Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial
Territory 0.238*** 0.096 0.103 0.175* 0.119 0.143 0.132*
(0.076) (0.08) (0.081) (0.105) (0.086) (0.088) (0.075)
Population 0.087*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.140***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034)
Oil and gas 0.066 0.376 0.408 0.049 0.442 0.343 0.514*
(0.359) (0.338) (0.300) (0.397) (0.286) (0.294) (0.299)
Distance from average income -0.062 -0.111 -0.066 -0.209* -0.082 -0.099 -0.068
(0.096) (0.092) (0.092) (0.110) (0.094) (0.101) (0.093)
Dummy autonomous okrug -0.09 -0.087 -0.236 -0.213 -0.169 -0.187
(0.128) (0.147) (0.224) (0.201) (0.207) (0.195)
Dummy republic 0.582*** 0.651*** 0.578*** 0.579*** 0.583*** 0.605***
(0.111) (0.109) (0.205) (0.121) (0.119) (0.126)
Distance 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.036 0.053** 0.051** 0.052***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Dummy border region 0.082 0.067 0.115 0.066 0.075 0.065
(0.101) (0.103) (0.112) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102)
Share of Russians -0.007 -0.938***
(0.339) (0.199)
Urbanization -4.545 -3.175 -2.418 -1.804
(2.814) (4.038) (4.108) (4.101)
Fiscal transfers 0.205 0.239 0.306
(0.429) (0.440) (0.408)
Tensions (RUIE) -0.084
(0.064)
Power sharing agreement -0.083
(0.108)
Constant 5.247*** 5.027*** 5.332*** 5.950*** 5.185*** 5.153*** 5.233***
(0.090) (0.105) (0.386) (0.186) (0.382) (0.384) (0.366)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.038
Wald Chi-stat 71.21*** 83.57*** 92.76*** 47.43*** 91.28*** 90.15*** 102.04***
Goodness of the fit 4565.822*** 4015.856*** 3944.694*** 4869.309*** 3939.985*** 3883.001*** 3803.945***
Note: see Table 2.2
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Table B.15: Factors of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: num-
ber of negative conclusions on regional acts in the Federal Register, distance
from average income per capita among the covariates (cont’d)
(B78) (B79) (B80) (B81) (B82) (B83) (B84)
Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative
binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial binomial
Territory 0.137* 0.134 0.130* 0.125 0.114 0.092 0.115
(0.072) (0.085) (0.076) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.076)
Population 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.109*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 0.118***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040)
Oil and gas 0.534* 0.463 -1.113 0.409 0.345 0.506*** 0.563*
(0.314) (0.338) (0.712) (0.294) (0.315) (0.194) (0.320)
Distance from average income -0.077 -0.059 0.059 -0.055 -0.038 0.066 0.081
(0.094) (0.102) (0.106) (0.103) (0.107) (0.119) (0.115)
Dummy autonomous okrug -0.208 -0.218 -0.014 -0.225 -0.313 -0.728*** -0.796***
(0.200) (0.203) (0.209) (0.201) (0.241) (0.260) (0.277)
Dummy republic 0.612*** 0.605*** 0.655*** 0.592*** 0.475** 0.646*** 0.607**
(0.129) (0.141) (0.129) (0.123) (0.216) (0.124) (0.267)
Distance from Moscow 0.053*** 0.055** 0.052** 0.054** 0.054** 0.067** 0.072**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
Dummy border region 0.045 0.072 0.134 0.079 0.076 0.112 0.1
(0.109) (0.107) (0.104) (0.099) (0.100) (0.109) (0.119)
Urbanization -2.213 -4.037 -0.244 -4.197 -5.554 -3.501 -3.498
(4.068) (4.238) (4.765) (4.183) (4.500) (4.638) (4.691)
Fiscal transfers 0.274 0.286 0.048 0.277 0.253 0.093 0.048
(0.416) (0.455) (0.452) (0.453) (0.441) (0.570) (0.548)
Tensions (MFK) -0.049
(0.036)
Democratization 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Power (Jarocinska) -0.032 -0.095
(0.095) (0.104)
Power (UI) -0.068
(0.065)
Power (RUIE) -0.02
(0.075)
Declarations 0.102 0.088
(0.163) (0.202)
Regulatory capture -0.17 -0.212
(0.350) (0.339)
Constant 5.262*** 5.194*** 4.983*** 5.069*** 4.855*** 4.902*** 5.278***
(0.383) (0.695) (0.408) (0.470) (0.504) (0.461) (0.895)
Observations 88 88 81 88 88 73 73
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.037 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039
Wald Chi-stat 107.46*** 85.65*** 351.77*** 85.04*** 87.71*** - -
Goodness of the fit 3805.283*** 3927.816*** 3333.526*** 3934.713*** 3919.845*** 3342.792*** 3279.356***
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Table B.16: Factors of constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: constitutional decentralization index, income per
capita among the covariates
(B85) (B86) (B87) (B88) (B89) (B90) (B91) (B92) (B93) (B94) (B95)
Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Territory 8.281 9.384 10.187 12.158* 16.755 10.333 21.257 14.187** 4.605 17.190* 8.957
(5.135) (6.673) (7.507) (7.07) (12.564) (9.933) (15.817) (6.744) (25.413) (10.112) (8.482)
Population 0.648 0.713 0.622 1.551 1.622 1.48 3.065 1.471 1.433 2.204** 1.378
(0.689) (0.624) (0.748) (1.377) (1.168) (1.480) (3.995) (0.933) (1.335) (1.013) (0.867)
Oil and gas 17.247 8.272 11.529 62.7 76.132 65.326 28.244 -10.751 84.904 -71.597 95.876
(61.866) (57.017) (61.054) (47.665) (51.753) (54.473) (113.903) (141.264) (133.434) (90.346) (143.094)
Income p.c. -4.141 -4.329* -5.259 -3.477 -6.617 -3.555 0.364 -13.825 0.688 0.978 1.84
(2.564) (2.527) (3.839) (5.883) (9.024) (6.292) (9.303) (14.134) (8.427) (6.223) (6.492)
Distance from Moscow -0.133 -0.112 -0.158 -0.203 -0.071 -0.575 0.338 0.216 -0.549 0.837
(0.556) (0.578) (0.708) (0.690) (0.886) (1.305) (0.821) (1.312) (0.732) (0.726)
Dummy border region 1.131 1.086 -0.353 -0.517 -0.52 -0.535 -0.217 -0.726 0.757 -1.857
(1.046) (1.070) (1.385) (1.239) (1.829) (0.979) (1.625) (3.771) (1.454) (2.694)
Urbanization 18.536 145.978** 207.130* 138.781* 146.054** 300.506 42.781 171.271** 212.057*
(62.558) (71.089) (121.873) (77.381) (61.731) (224.012) (180.545) (86.229) (113.072)
Fiscal transfers 16.065** 16.985** 14.232 29.196 17.956*** 13.475 25.494*** 17.297*
(8.051) (7.098) (10.058) (28.223) (6.069) (10.047) (6.740) (9.758)
Share of Russians -13.396**
(6.583)
Power sharing agreement -1.503
(2.091)
Tension (RUIE) 0.561
(1.557)
Tension (MFK) -1.331
(1.938)
Democratization 0.048 0.017 -0.164
(0.079) (0.228) (0.134)
Declarations 6.946**
(2.782)
Power (UI) 0.501
(3.579)
Power (Jarocinska) 4.759
(6.315)
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.188 0.19 0.319 0.335 0.323 0.363 0.37 0.316 0.423 0.49
Wald Chi-stat 10.59** 31.65*** 43.69*** 24.57*** 31.70*** 22.50*** 40.93*** 57.56*** 33.80*** 63.10*** 26.08***
LR test proportional odds 15.91 30.71** 28.56 44.36*** 43.09** 43.92** 42.92** 40.45* 38.75 36.62 32.28
Note: see Table 2.2. Likelihood ratio test is significant if proportional odds assumption is violated
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Table B.17: Factors of constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. var.: constitutional decentralization index, distance
from average income per capita among the covariates
(B96) (B97) (B98) (B99) (B100) (B101) (B102) (B103) (B104) (B105) (B106)
Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Territory 2.675 -0.561 -3.09 -0.961 0.522 -4.347 3.329 -11.624** -6.804 10.765 6.247
(2.840) (2.467) (4.326) (6.754) (6.342) (15.447) (26.100) (5.736) (12.859) (13.285) (9.804)
Population 1.364 1.608* 1.703** 3.512** 4.297** 3.392** 3.714 7.005** 4.180* 3.949** 2.044
(0.840) (0.842) (0.801) (1.529) (2.011) (1.724) (2.402) (3.298) (2.217) (1.571) (1.775)
Oil and gas -33.382 -1.196 -3.859 75.503 57.761 86.567 70.237 41.409 133.747 -5.602 124.153
(48.850) (48.476) (47.236) (89.689) (78.973) (132.735) (101.261) (113.211) (180.434) (81.622) (172.252)
Distance from
average income 9.746* 14.663** 19.264*** 29.503** 31.743*** 30.951* 27.002 53.494** 37.430* 32.142*** 13.23
(5.790) (6.284) (7.329) (12.553) (10.138) (18.338) (16.808) (23.743) (19.114) (11.225) (19.367)
Distance
from Moscow 0.677 1.022 1.441 1.478* 1.664 1.194 2.889*** 1.993 1.038 1.364
(0.480) (0.876) (1.115) (0.786) (1.883) (1.972) (0.929) (1.679) (0.717) (1.754)
Dummy border
region 0.76 0.528 -1.615 -1.724 -1.899 -1.626 -3.314* -2.887 -1.074 -2.453
(1.128) (1.340) (2.217) (1.457) (3.342) (2.234) -2.004 -4.672 -1.222 (4.226)
Urbanization 46.169 284.313** 342.852** 278.198** 282.662** 502.178** 279.68 409.681*** 281.125
(68.056) (113.121) (145.456) (135.311) (116.715) (207.717) (191.121) (138.63) (185.913)
Fiscal transfers 24.312** 27.934** 21.757 27.255 48.128** 28.862* 39.671*** 21.011
(11.014) (11.886) (13.583) (22.604) (22.447) (17.103) (13.113) (19.225)
Share of Russians -10.592
(7.801)
Power sharing
agreement -1.493 0.75
(1.846) (2.104)
Tension (RUIE) -0.332
(1.833)
Tension (MFK) 0.299 0.182 -0.117
(0.218) (0.151) (0.249)
Democratization 8.674**
(4.141)
Declarations 0.907
(2.350)
Power (UI) 2.972
(1.965)
Power (Jarocinska) -4.347 3.329 -11.624** -6.804 10.765
(15.447) (26.100) (5.736) (12.859) (13.285)
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.237 0.249 0.431 0.446 0.436 0.433 0.477 0.43 0.542 0.503
Wald Chi-stat 4.36 12.07* 12.27* 36.46*** 50.51*** 51.99*** 45.13*** 29.53*** 22.48** 38.90*** 36.63***
LR test
proportional odds 23.61** 30.36** 29.97* 37.17** 35.98 36.32 37.20* 34.25 32.4 29.35 31.44
Note: see Table 2.2
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data
Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average income per capita 945 3.05 3.27 0.12 29.8
Capital funds 945 0.3 0.52 0 6.46
Democratization 945 28.59 6.25 14 45
Distance from Moscow 945 2.37 2.74 0 11.88
Dummy border region 945 0.43 0.5 0 1
Dummy Putin 945 0.58 0.49 0 1
Dummy republic 945 0.25 0.43 0 1
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 945 0.01 0.1 0 1
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) 945 0.01 0.12 0 1
Fiscal transfers 945 0.25 0.19 -0.03 1.11
Net profit 945 18.29 115.06 -78.59 2797.69
Number of audits per unit of GRP squared 67 0 0 0 0
Oil and gas share 945 0.01 0.09 0 0.8
Overrepresentation in the State Duma 945 1.26 1.26 0.22 12.54
Population 945 1.83 1.54 0.05 10.44
Power (1995-2000) 945 3.51 3.53 0 8.5
Power (2001-2006) 945 3.49 3.53 0 8.5
Retail trade 942 41.86 119.27 0.1 1817.77
Retention rate 945 0.61 0.14 0.05 1
Share of Russians 945 0.77 0.24 0.01 0.97
Tax arrears squared 945 0.02 0.2 0 4.27
Tax arrears squared (Putin) 945 0.02 0.2 0 4.27
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 945 0 0.01 0 0.06
Territory 945 0.22 0.47 0 3.1
Urbanization 945 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.1
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Table C.2: Description of variables
Variable Description Period Source
Average income per capita Average income per capita of the region, 1995-2006 Goskomstat
thousands of RUR
Capital funds Value of tangible assets of all enterprises, 1995-2006 Goskomstat
bln. RUR
Democratization Index of democratization of the region, estimated 1995-2006 Carnegie Center and
by the experts of the Carnegie Center in Moscow. Independent Institute for Social Policy
The higher value of index represents a higher
democratization level
Distance from Moscow Distance between the capital of the region and NA Goskomstat
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and Moscow
oblast, identical for St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg oblast
Dummy border region 1 if the region has a border to any state NA Own estimation
outside the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise
Dummy Putin 1 if Putin was president or acting president, NA Own estimation
0 otherwise
Dummy republic 1 if the region has the status of a republic, NA Own estimation
0 otherwise
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 1 for Tatarstan or Bashkortostan in 1995-1999, 0 otherwise NA Own estimation
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) 1 for Tatarstan or Bashkortostan in 2000-2006, 0 otherwise NA Own estimation
Net profit Net profit (profit - loss) of all region’s 1995-2006 Goskomstat
organizations, bln. RUR
Number of audits squared (Number of audits / GRP (in mln. RUR))2 2006 Local branches of the
State Tax Service
Oil and gas share (Share of oil extraction in the region in the total 1995-2006 Goskomstat
oil extraction in Russia + Share of the gas extraction
in the region to the total gas extraction in Russia) / 2
Overrepresentation in the State Duma Share of seats of the region in the State Duma 1995-2006 Goskomstat,
(calculated on 225 deputies basis) / Share of region in State Duma,
Russian population own estimation
Population Population of the region, mln. people 1995-2006 Goskomstat
Power (1995-2000) Index of power of regional governors, based on data like years 1995-2000 Jarocinska, 2004
in office, share on regional elections, control of parliament (applied for all years)
etc. The higher value of index represents a higher influence
of regional governor. The index is equal to the index of power (time-
invariant) in 1995-2000 and 0 otherwise.
Power (2001-2006) The variable is equal to the time-invariant index of 1995-2000 Jarocinska, 2004
power (calculated for 1995-2000) in 2001-2006 and zero otherwise (applied for all years)
Retail trade Total retail trade revenue (current prices), bln. RUR 1995-2006 Goskomstat
Retention rate Tax revenue of the consolidated regional budget executed 1995-2006 Until 1997: Freinkman,
/ Total tax collection on the territory of the region Treisman and Titov, 1999;
Since 1998: Ministry of Finance and
State Treasury (for budget data),
State Tax Service and Goskomstat (for tax
collection data)
Share of fiscal transfers Fiscal transfers from other governments 1995-2006 Until 1997: Freinkman,
/ Total expenditures of the region’s consolidated budget Treisman and Titov, 1999
Since 1998: Ministry of Finance
and State Treasury
Share of Russians Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s population 2002 (applied for all years) Russia’s Census, 2002
Tax arrears squared (Total tax arrears / GRP)2 1995-2006 State Tax Service and Goskomstat
Territory Territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 0 NA Goskomstat
for Moscow and St. Petersburg
Urbanization Share of urban population (in %) / 1000 1995-2006 Goskomstat
Notes: All Goskomstat (Russian statistical authority) data are provided on the annual basis in the regular publication Regions of Russia. In 1998 the Russian ruble was denominated;
therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000.
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C.2 Annual cross-sections
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Table C.3: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections, 1995-2006, dependent variable: retention rate
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Tax arrears squared -1.692 0.977 0.897 -0.676 -1.646 -2.031*** -1.209*** -0.180*** -0.279*** -0.043*** -0.034* -1.878**
(5.355) (2.395) (1.788) (1.458) (2.085) (0.696) (0.394) (0.054) (0.055) (0.013) (0.020) (0.868)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.167** 0.075 -0.001 0.044 0.064* 0.015 0.013 -0.008 -0.01 -0.002 -0.018* -0.021***
(0.072) (0.048) (0.055) (0.052) (0.038) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Capital funds -2.075** -0.646** -0.301 -0.655** -0.919*** -0.355 -0.302* -0.011 0.002 -0.077 0.091 0.100*
(0.901) (0.278) (0.399) (0.318) (0.308) (0.237) (0.178) (0.178) (0.128) (0.082) (0.074) (0.056)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 0.232*** 0.278*** 0.143* 0.284*** 0.361*** 0.266*** 0.055 -0.075 -0.012 -0.114** -0.127 -0.03
(0.082) (0.087) (0.072) (0.066) (0.075) (0.093) (0.108) (0.081) (0.058) (0.054) (0.085) (0.110)
Political variables
Territory 0.084*** 0.035* 0.054** 0.04 0.055** 0.053** 0.040* 0.042* 0.048* 0.071*** 0.050* 0.048**
(0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.024)
Population 0.052* 0.026 0.001 0.031 0.059** 0.019 0.033 0.006 0 0.02 -0.02 -0.017
(0.028) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.026)
Oil and gas share 0.781** 0.379** 0.211 0.351* 0.396*** 0.316 0.725* -0.087 -0.213 -0.018 -0.827** -0.871**
(0.345) (0.156) (0.208) (0.179) (0.139) (0.235) (0.422) (0.556) (0.422) (0.309) (0.361) (0.355)
Dummy border region 0.006 0.018 0.028 0.033 0.02 0.043 0.018 0.028 0.02 0.038 0.025 0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.042) (0.037)
Distance from Moscow 0.009** 0.007* 0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.010* 0.007 0.012* -0.001 0.015* 0.022***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Dummy republic 0.090** 0.068 0.065 0.011 0.066 0.039 0.15 0.138 0.073 0.091 0.038 0.134
(0.045) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.090) (0.098) (0.098) (0.066) (0.058) (0.094) (0.091)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.031* 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 0.001 0.005 -0.024 -0.014 -0.013 0.013** 0.022** -0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Power -0.017 -0.015 -0.019 0.004 -0.014 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.043* -0.049 -0.055*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.0230) (0.038) (0.031)
Fiscal transfers 0.192 -0.045 -0.102 -0.035 0.133 0.065 0.202 0.249* 0.269* 0.499** 0.182 0.556***
(0.163) (0.134) (0.138) (0.101) (0.111) (0.118) (0.124) (0.137) (0.156) (0.199) (0.149) (0.195)
Democratization 0.001 0.002 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0 0
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Share of Russians 0.17 0.193 0.167 -0.009 0.243* 0.122 0.263 0.258* 0.260** 0.197* 0.113 0.415**
(0.160) (0.166) (0.145) (0.121) (0.135) (0.180) (0.171) (0.135) (0.108) (0.109) (0.202) (0.192)
Urbanization 0.237 0.825 1.927 1.853 3.777* 3.2 3.609** 3.260* 2.739 4.753*** 3.519 6.623***
(0.961) (0.947) (1.594) (2.054) (2.255) (2.250) (1.605) (1.797) (1.882) (1.509) (2.462) (2.160)
Constant 0.476* 0.422* 0.548*** 0.544*** 0.191 0.312 -0.007 0.085 0.199 0.37 0.646** 0.205
(0.248) (0.234) (0.203) (0.173) (0.207) (0.238) (0.266) (0.306) (0.285) (0.281) (0.308) (0.350)
No. obs. 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 77 78
R2 0.533 0.403 0.335 0.43 0.486 0.367 0.421 0.424 0.508 0.547 0.342 0.531
F-test 12.51*** 8.40*** 13.42*** 36.89*** 25.51*** 8.57*** 37.56*** 404.10*** 36.22*** 65.95*** 22.73*** 35.21***
Jarque Bera 577.3*** 404.5*** 24.22*** 7.066** 9.838*** 14.18*** 81.95*** 46.89*** 7.465** 7.317** 137.5*** 5.291*
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are robust Huber/White standard errors; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10%
level. Significant results are marked bold.
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Table C.4: Regressions for individual annual cross-sections after exclusion of outliers (until Jarque Bera test becomes insignif-
icant), 1995-2006, dependent variable: retention rate
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Tax arrears squared -5.791* -0.492 0.623 1.377** -2.873 -3.178*** -1.443*** -0.233*** -0.308*** -0.031*** -0.024 -1.681**
(3.190) (1.940) (1.490) (0.634) (1.946) (0.560) (0.189) (0.040) (0.051) (0.011) (0.018) (0.742)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.112** 0.034 -0.055 -0.016 0.028 -0.015 -0.008 -0.019 -0.022 0.002 -0.013 -0.019**
(0.052) (0.034) (0.049) (0.031) (0.027) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Capital funds -1.296** -0.424** 0.089 -0.012 -0.667*** 0.014 -0.103 0.089 0.091 -0.137* 0.048 0.081
(0.639) (0.207) (0.341) (0.171) (0.228) (0.136) (0.112) (0.153) (0.112) (0.069) (0.053) (0.052)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 0.147*** 0.204*** 0.075 0.226*** 0.295*** 0.166*** 0.015 -0.156*** -0.031 -0.114** -0.125 -0.032
(0.034) (0.052) (0.054) (0.038) (0.055) (0.059) (0.063) (0.053) (0.059) (0.052) (0.081) (0.108)
Political variables
Territory 0.066*** 0.030** 0.048** 0.028 0.055*** 0.036** 0.054*** 0.038 0.049** 0.089*** 0.066** 0.056**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023)
Population 0.026 0.008 -0.028 -0.017 0.040** -0.012 0.015 -0.001 -0.012 0.039** -0.004 -0.008
(0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
Oil and gas share 0.500** 0.247** 0 -0.001 0.276*** 0.002 0.232 -0.383 -0.518 0.213 -0.621** -0.769**
(0.249) (0.109) (0.168) (0.104) (0.103) (0.137) (0.251) (0.479) (0.369) (0.259) (0.263) (0.332)
Dummy border region 0.017 0.025* 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.033* 0.033 0.037 0.059** 0.046 0.033
(0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034)
Distance from Moscow 0.009*** 0.006* 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.013** -0.003 0.011 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Dummy republic 0.049* 0.029 0.041 0.029 0.039 0.122** 0.116** 0.211*** 0.083 0.122** 0.061 0.146
(0.028) (0.038) (0.045) (0.036) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.070) (0.067) (0.049) (0.085) (0.088)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.016* 0.011 0.004 0.012* 0.013 0.035*** -0.020** -0.01 -0.008 0.013** 0.022** -0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Power -0.020** -0.016 -0.011 0.013 -0.013 -0.004 0.011 0.004 -0.004 -0.048** -0.072** -0.068**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029)
Fiscal transfers 0.039 -0.127 -0.041 0.069 0.091 -0.008 0.233*** 0.133 0.154 0.667*** 0.250* 0.570***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.111) (0.061) (0.086) (0.075) (0.067) (0.109) (0.127) (0.141) (0.132) (0.191)
Democratization 0 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 0 0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Russians -0.015 0.026 0.054 0.011 0.116 0.181* 0.149* 0.337*** 0.257** 0.266*** 0.206 0.455**
(0.053) (0.071) (0.087) (0.059) (0.094) (0.097) (0.082) (0.106) (0.107) (0.089) (0.179) (0.187)
Urbanization -0.072 1.11 2.092 -1.357 4.414** 0.686 3.280** 2.453 1.447 5.741*** 3.011 6.312***
(0.874) (0.740) (1.724) (1.066) (2.163) (1.210) (1.303) (1.543) (1.545) (1.303) (2.417) (2.115)
Constant 0.746*** 0.639*** 0.670*** 0.612*** 0.350** 0.456*** 0.064 0.185 0.355 0.191 0.694** 0.251
(0.098) (0.115) (0.168) (0.126) (0.169) (0.152) (0.162) (0.263) (0.243) (0.207) (0.289) (0.336)
No. obs. 78 78 77 75 78 74 73 77 78 76 76 77
R2 0.718 0.519 0.363 0.726 0.503 0.601 0.688 0.575 0.548 0.69 0.471 0.578
F-test 18.76*** 14.05*** 14.94*** 46.32*** 100.14*** 9.80*** 45.98*** 263.11*** 43.36*** 93.73*** 31.63*** 34.49***
Jarque Bera 0.385 1.177 0.678 0.535 4.436 0.011 2.264 1.416 0.643 1.076 3.217 0.789
Outliers Ingushetia Ingushetia Ingushetia Altai Rep. Ingushetia Altai Rep. Kabardino-Balkaria Magadan Magadan Lipetsk Voronezh Voronezh
Kalmykia Ingushetia Omsk Khakassia Mordovia Novgorod
Kalmykia Mordovia Mordovia Briansk
Vologda Ingushetia Ingushetia
Magadan Lipetsk
Magadan
Notes: see Table C.3.
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C.3 Robust regressions and regressions with lagged
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Table C.5: Robust regressions after exclusion of outliers (until Jarque Bera test becomes insignificant), 1995-2006, dep. var.:
retention rate
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8) (C9) (C10)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.555 -0.194 -0.064*** -0.117 0.049** -0.726 0.033*** -0.08
(0.007) (0.007) (0.608) (0.452) (0.005) (0.343) (0.025) (0.520) (0.012) (0.297)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 2.575*** 1.719*** 2.566*** 1.662*** 1.121** 1.338*** 3.772*** 3.719*** 0.975** 1.185*
(0.426) (0.433) (0.433) (0.427) (0.494) (0.499) (0.630) (0.661) (0.452) (0.611)
Dummy Putin -0.069*** -0.067***
(0.011) (0.011)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.021*** -0.001 0.002 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Capital funds -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.044** -0.041** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.080*** -0.085***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) -0.061* -0.070** -0.062* -0.132*** -0.130***
-0.065*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.153***
0.170***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
Political variables
Territory 0.024** 0.025** 0.015 0.015 0.031*** 0.025***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Population -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0 -0.002 0.081** 0.067** 0.107*** 0.105***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026)
Oil and gas share -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 -0.001 -0.035 -0.046 2.865 1.955 5.255 5.756
(0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (4.750) (4.711) (3.727) (3.870)
Dummy border region 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.017** 0.016* 0.020*** 0.016**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Distance from Moscow 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy republic 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.105***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.003 0.008** 0.010*** 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Power (2001-2006) -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.018** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Power (1995-2000) -0.018** -0.021*** -0.009 -0.012* -0.006 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Fiscal transfers 0.053 0.072** 0.060* 0.076** 0.080*** 0.083*** -0.182*** -0.231*** -0.021 -0.047
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.028)
Democratization -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006** 0 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of Russians 0.138*** 0.145*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.152*** 0.177***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029)
Urbanization 0.266 0.365 -1.079** -1.044** 0.636 -0.28 3.173 5.642 1.469 4.206
(0.570) (0.547) (0.510) (0.491) (0.429) (0.396) (3.558) (3.463) (2.469) (2.66)
Constant 0.615*** 0.633*** 0.580*** 0.605*** 0.700*** 0.665*** 0.501* 0.344 0.335* -0.702***
(0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.075) (0.075) (0.261) (0.252) (0.189) (0.204)
Region fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Kalmykia, Altai Rep. and Ingushetia included Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 899 895 884 884 875 866 924 901 879 870
R2 0.363 0.394 0.392 0.413 0.61 0.613
F-test 27.87*** 29.61*** 24.70*** 25.38*** 45.34*** 37.91*** 13.55*** 13.58*** 34.84*** 69.64***
Jarque Bera 4.442 4.275 1.463 3.965 4.548 1.044 4.294 3.276 2.083 4.447
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Notes for Table C.5: see tables 3.1 and 3.2. Outliers include (Moscow = City of Moscow, K.-Balkaria = Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkort. = Bashkortostan)
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8) (C9) (C10)
Evereyskaia 2004 Evereyskaia 2004 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2001 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2001 Chukotka 2001
Evereyskaia 2005 Evereyskaia 2005 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2002
Evereyskaia 2006 Evereyskaia 2006 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2003
Chukotka 2002 Chukotka 2002 Magadan 2003 Magadan 2003 Moscow 1998 Chukotka 2006 Omsk 2000 Omsk 2000 Chukotka 2005 Chukotka 2005
Chukotka 2003 Chukotka 2003 Magadan 2004 Magadan 2004 Moscow 2006 Arkhangelsk 2005 Tula 2006 Voronezh 2005 Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2006
Chukotka 2006 Chukotka 2006 Omsk 2000 Omsk 2000 Arkhangelsk 2005 Arkhangelsk 2006 Voronezh 2005 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Moscow 2006 Moscow 2006
Novgorod 2004 Lipetsk 2004 Riazan 2001 Riazan 2001 Arkhangelsk 2006 Magadan 2001 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1996 Amur 1996 Arkhangelsk 2005
Novgorod 2005 Magadan 2003 Riazan 2002 Riazan 2002 Lipetsk 2000 Magadan 2002 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Altai (Rep.) 1997 Arkhangelsk 2005 Arkhangelsk 2006
Omsk 2000 Novgorod 2004 Tomsk 2004 Tomsk 2004 Lipetsk 2002 Magadan 2003 Ingushetia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Arkhangelsk 2006 Cheliabinsk 2005
Riazan 2001 Novgorod 2005 Tomsk 2005 Tomsk 2005 Magadan 2001 Magadan 2004 Ingushetia 1996 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Cheliabinsk 1999 Magadan 1998
Riazan 2002 Novgorod 2006 Tomsk 2006 Tomsk 2006 Magadan 2002 Novgorod 2004 Ingushetia 2001 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Cheliabinsk 2005 Magadan 2003
Tomsk 2004 Omsk 2000 Tula 2004 Tula 2004 Magadan 2003 Novgorod 2005 Ingushetia 2004 Altai (Rep.) 2001 Cheliabinsk 2006 Omsk 2000
Tomsk 2005 Riazan 2001 Tula 2006 Tula 2006 Magadan 2004 Omsk 2000 Ingushetia 2005 Altai (Rep.) 2002 Lipetsk 1995 Omsk 2002
Tomsk 2006 Riazan 2002 Voronezh 2005 Voronezh 2005 Novgorod 2004 Orenburg 2005 Ingushetia 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2003 Magadan 1995 Orenburg 2005
Tula 2004 Tomsk 2004 Voronezh 2006 Voronezh 2006 Novgorod 2005 Orenburg 2006 K.-Balkaria 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2004 Magadan 1998 Orenburg 2006
Tula 2006 Tomsk 2005 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Novgorod 2006 Riazan 2001 Kalmykia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 2005 Magadan 2003 Tomsk 2004
Vologda 1998 Tomsk 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1996 Altai (Rep.) 1996 Omsk 2000 Tomsk 2004 Mordovia 1998 Altai (Rep.) 2006 Omsk 2000 Tomsk 2005
Voronezh 2005 Tula 2004 Altai (Rep.) 1997 Altai (Rep.) 1997 Orenburg 2005 Tomsk 2005 Mordovia 2000 Ingushetia 1995 Omsk 2002 Tomsk 2006
Voronezh 2006 Tula 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Orenburg 2006 Tomsk 2006 Mordovia 2001 Ingushetia 1996 Orenburg 2005 Tula 2004
Altai (Rep.) 1998 Vologda 1998 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Riazan 2001 Tula 2004 Mordovia 2002 Ingushetia 1997 Orenburg 2006 Tula 2006
Altai (Rep.) 1999 Voronezh 2005 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Tomsk 2004 Tula 2006 Sakha 1995 Ingushetia 1998 Tomsk 1997 Voronezh 2005
Altai (Rep.) 2000 Voronezh 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2001 Altai (Rep.) 2001 Tomsk 2005 Vologda 1998 Ingushetia 1999 Tomsk 2004 Voronezh 2006
Ingushetia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Altai (Rep.) 2002 Altai (Rep.) 2002 Tomsk 2006 Voronezh 2005 Ingushetia 2000 Tomsk 2005 Altai (Rep.) 1995
Ingushetia 1996 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Altai (Rep.) 2003 Altai (Rep.) 2003 Tula 2006 Voronezh 2006 Ingushetia 2001 Tomsk 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1996
Ingushetia 1997 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2004 Altai (Rep.) 2004 Vologda 1998 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Ingushetia 2002 Tula 2004 Altai (Rep.) 1997
Ingushetia 1999 Ingushetia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 2005 Altai (Rep.) 2005 Voronezh 2005 Altai (Rep.) 1996 Ingushetia 2003 Tula 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1998
Ingushetia 2000 Ingushetia 1996 Altai (Rep.) 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2006 Voronezh 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1997 Ingushetia 2004 Voronezh 2004 Altai (Rep.) 1999
Ingushetia 2001 Ingushetia 1997 Ingushetia 1995 Ingushetia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1997 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Ingushetia 2005 Voronezh 2005 Altai (Rep.) 2000
Ingushetia 2006 Ingushetia 1999 Ingushetia 1996 Ingushetia 1996 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Ingushetia 2006 Voronezh 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2001
K.-Balkaria 2006 Ingushetia 2001 Ingushetia 1997 Ingushetia 1997 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Altai (Rep.) 2000 K.-Balkaria 2006 Altai (Rep.) 1995 Altai (Rep.) 2002
Kalmykia 1998 Ingushetia 2006 Ingushetia 1998 Ingushetia 1998 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2001 Kalmykia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 1996 Altai (Rep.) 2003
Kalmykia 1999 K.-Balkaria 2006 Ingushetia 1999 Ingushetia 1999 Altai (Rep.) 2001 Altai (Rep.) 2002 Kalmykia 1996 Altai (Rep.) 1998 Altai (Rep.) 2004
Kalmykia 2000 Kalmykia 1997 Ingushetia 2000 Ingushetia 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2005 Altai (Rep.) 2003 Kalmykia 1997 Altai (Rep.) 1999 Altai (Rep.) 2005
Kalmykia 2001 Kalmykia 1998 Ingushetia 2001 Ingushetia 2001 Altai (Rep.) 2006 Altai (Rep.) 2004 Kalmykia 1998 Altai (Rep.) 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2006
Kalmykia 2002 Kalmykia 1999 Ingushetia 2002 Ingushetia 2002 Bashkort. 2000 Altai (Rep.) 2005 Kalmykia 1999 Bashkort. 1998 Ingushetia 1995
Kalmykia 2003 Kalmykia 2000 Ingushetia 2003 Ingushetia 2003 Ingushetia 1995 Altai (Rep.) 2006 Kalmykia 2000 Bashkort. 2005 Ingushetia 1996
Komi 2005 Kalmykia 2001 Ingushetia 2004 Ingushetia 2004 Ingushetia 1996 Bashkort. 2000 Kalmykia 2001 Ingushetia 1995 Ingushetia 1997
Komi 2006 Kalmykia 2002 Ingushetia 2005 Ingushetia 2005 Ingushetia 1997 Ingushetia 1995 Kalmykia 2002 Ingushetia 1996 Ingushetia 1998
Mordovia 2000 Kalmykia 2003 Ingushetia 2006 Ingushetia 2006 Ingushetia 1999 Ingushetia 1996 Kalmykia 2003 Ingushetia 1997 Ingushetia 1999
Mordovia 2001 Komi 2005 K.-Balkaria 2006 K.-Balkaria 2006 Ingushetia 2000 Ingushetia 1997 Kalmykia 2004 Ingushetia 1999 Ingushetia 2000
Mordovia 2002 Komi 2006 Kalmykia 1995 Kalmykia 1995 Ingushetia 2001 Ingushetia 1998 Kalmykia 2005 Ingushetia 2001 Ingushetia 2001
Sakha 1995 Mordovia 2000 Kalmykia 1996 Kalmykia 1996 K.-Balkaria 2001 Ingushetia 1999 Mordovia 2000 Ingushetia 2002 Ingushetia 2002
Tatarstan 2000 Mordovia 2001 Kalmykia 1997 Kalmykia 1997 K.-Balkaria 2006 Ingushetia 2000 Mordovia 2001 Ingushetia 2003 Ingushetia 2003
Tyva 2004 Mordovia 2002 Kalmykia 1998 Kalmykia 1998 Kalmykia 1996 Ingushetia 2001 Mordovia 2002 Ingushetia 2004 Ingushetia 2004
Tyva 2005 N. Ossetia 2005 Kalmykia 1999 Kalmykia 1999 Kalmykia 1997 Ingushetia 2002 Ingushetia 2005 Ingushetia 2005
Udmurtia 2006 Sakha 1995 Kalmykia 2000 Kalmykia 2000 Kalmykia 1998 Ingushetia 2003 Ingushetia 2006 Ingushetia 2006
Tatarstan 2000 Kalmykia 2001 Kalmykia 2001 Kalmykia 1999 Ingushetia 2004 K.-Balkaria 2001 K.-Balkaria 2001
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Tyva 2004 Kalmykia 2002 Kalmykia 2002 Kalmykia 2000 Ingushetia 2005 K.-Balkaria 2005 K.-Balkaria 2005
Tyva 2005 Kalmykia 2003 Kalmykia 2003 Kalmykia 2001 Ingushetia 2006 K.-Balkaria 2006 K.-Balkaria 2006
Udmurtia 2006 Kalmykia 2004 Kalmykia 2004 Kalmykia 2002 K.-Balkaria 2001 Kalmykia 1995 Kalmykia 1995
Kalmykia 2005 Kalmykia 2005 Kalmykia 2003 K.-Balkaria 2006 Kalmykia 1996 Kalmykia 1996
Komi 2005 Komi 2005 Karelia 2002 Kalmykia 1995 Khakassia 2001 Kalmykia 1997
Komi 2006 Komi 2006 Khakassia 2001 Kalmykia 1996 Komi 2005 Kalmykia 1998
Mordovia 2000 Mordovia 2000 Khakassia 2002 Kalmykia 1997 Komi 2006 Kalmykia 1999
Mordovia 2001 Mordovia 2001 Komi 2005 Kalmykia 1998 Mordovia 1995 Kalmykia 2000
Mordovia 2002 Mordovia 2002 Komi 2006 Kalmykia 1999 Mordovia 1998 Kalmykia 2001
N. Ossetia 2005 N. Ossetia 2005 Mordovia 2000 Kalmykia 2000 Mordovia 2000 Kalmykia 2002
Sakha 1995 Sakha 1995 Mordovia 2001 Kalmykia 2001 Mordovia 2001 Kalmykia 2003
Tatarstan 2000 Tatarstan 2000 Mordovia 2002 Kalmykia 2002 Mordovia 2002 Kalmykia 2004
Tyva 2005 Tyva 2005 Mordovia 2003 Kalmykia 2003 N. Ossetia 2005 Kalmykia 2005
Udmurtia 2006 Udmurtia 2006 Mordovia 2005 Kalmykia 2004 Sakha 1995 Khakassia 2001
N. Ossetia 2003 Kalmykia 2005 Tatarstan 2000 Komi 2005
N. Ossetia 2005 Khakassia 2001 Tatarstan 2005 Komi 2006
Sakha 1995 Khakassia 2002 Tatarstan 2006 Mordovia 1995
Tatarstan 2000 Komi 2004 Udmurtia 2005 Mordovia 1998
Tatarstan 2001 Komi 2005 Udmurtia 2006 Mordovia 2000
Tyva 2005 Komi 2006 Mordovia 2001
Udmurtia 2004 Mordovia 2000 Mordovia 2002
Udmurtia 2005 Mordovia 2001 N. Ossetia 2005
Udmurtia 2006 Mordovia 2002 Sakha 1995
Mordovia 2003 Tatarstan 2000
Mordovia 2005 Tatarstan 2005
N. Ossetia 2005 Tatarstan 2006
Sakha 1995 Udmurtia 2005
Tatarstan 2000 Udmurtia 2006
Tatarstan 2001
Udmurtia 2004
Udmurtia 2005
Udmurtia 2006
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Table C.6: Robust regressions after exclusion of political variables, 1995-2006, dep. var.: retention rate
(C11) (C12) (C13) (C14) (C15) (C16) (C17) (C18) (C19) (C20)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.084** -0.074** -0.086*** 0.039 0.027 -0.439 0.019 0.193 -0.474 0.206
(0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.023) (0.661) (0.511) (0.318) (0.512) (0.249)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 2.266** 0.217 0.162 4.305*** 2.266** 3.175*** 1.270*** 1.286** 4.783*** 2.795***
(1.028) (1.123) (1.264) (0.786) (0.904) (0.522) (0.487) (0.587) (0.783) (0.933)
Dummy Putin -0.074*** -0.067***
(0.017) (0.015)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.009*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.006 0.009*** 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Capital funds -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.079*** -0.056*** -0.044** -0.089*** -0.098*** -0.083*** -0.055*** -0.046**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) -0.039 -0.044 -0.060* -0.043 -0.049
-0.058
(0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.035) (0.038) (0.045)
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.143***
0.169***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022)
Constant 0.601*** 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.201*** 0.542*** 0.611*** 0.641*** 0.646*** 0.532*** 0.528***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.051) (0.044) (0.008) (0.006) (0.023) (0.050) (0.042)
Region fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Kalmykia, Altai Rep. and Ingushetia included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 910 910 910 910 910
R2 0.108 0.143 0.23 0.137 0.419 0.265
F-test 20.59*** 25.23*** 19.81*** 13.09*** 17.10*** 22.59*** 25.76*** 22.05*** 10.57*** 17.19***
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table C.7: Lagged regressions, 1996-2006, dep. var.: retention rate of the period t+1
(C21) (C22) (C23) (C24) (C25) (C26) (C27) (C28) (C29) (C30)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.021 -0.016 -0.031 0.078*** 0.057*** -1.28 -0.66 -0.442 -1.312* -0.3
(0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.927) (0.620) (0.427) (0.754) (0.348)
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 0.182 -1.5 -0.525 1.492** 1.238 1.104* -0.364 0.874 1.515** 1.588*
(1.032) (1.070) (1.173) (0.746) (0.862) (0.594) (0.617) (0.626) (0.764) (0.936)
Dummy Putin -0.125*** -0.109***
(0.017) (0.015)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.007 0.011** -0.006 0.014*** -0.007 0.006 0.010* -0.003 0.013*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Capital funds -0.062** -0.071*** -0.034 -0.093*** -0.073*** -0.041 -0.049* -0.018 -0.075*** -0.063**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Yeltsin) 0.269*** 0.244*** 0.215*** 0.227*** 0.204***
0.257***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Putin) -0.035 -0.04 -0.080** -0.058 -0.056
-0.060*
(0.035) (0.041) (0.048) (0.033) (0.038) (0.045)
Political variables
Territory 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.021* 0.020* 0.029***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Population -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.091** 0.141*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 0.047 0.097**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.050) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.043)
Oil and gas share -0.06 -0.045 -0.076 4.743 7.732 -0.083 -0.071 -0.1 2.326 5.323
(0.078) (0.072) (0.066) (5.814) (6.020) (0.083) (0.079) (0.069) (5.662) (5.819)
Dummy border region 0.029** 0.027** 0.028*** 0.015 0.014 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Distance from Moscow 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy republic 0.072** 0.068** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.083***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.018 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.012 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013)
Power (2001-2006) -0.024** -0.017* -0.036*** -0.016 -0.01 -0.032**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Power (1995-2000) -0.025** -0.029*** -0.012 -0.017* -0.020** -0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Fiscal transfers 0.116** 0.147*** 0.169*** -0.027 0.074 0.077* 0.106** 0.134*** -0.168*** -0.054
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.059) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.039)
Democratization -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.005** 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Share of Russians 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.191*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.177***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.059) (0.052) (0.051) (0.045)
Urbanization 2.371*** 2.398*** 3.100*** 3.792 0.415 0.189 0.215 0.702 8.015* 3.053
(0.779) (0.754) (0.770) (4.739) (4.574) (0.674) (0.646) (0.625) (4.595) (4.585)
Constant 0.448*** 0.490*** 0.550*** 0.509 0.284 0.561*** 0.595*** 0.674*** 0.242 0.207
(0.112) (0.107) (0.131) (0.575) (0.329) (0.091) (0.088) (0.112) (0.351) (0.332)
Region fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Kalmykia, Altai Rep. and Ingushetia included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 834 834 834 834 834
R2 0.188 0.209 0.292 0.216 0.231 0.311
F-test 15.13*** 17.45*** 19.92*** 36.11*** 20.67*** 14.21*** 19.18*** 25.05*** 10.65*** 19.95***
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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C.4 Separate regressions for Yeltsin and Putin
periods
Table C.8: Panel data regressions for Yeltsin period, 1995-1999, dep. var.:
retention rate
(D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) (D7) (D8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 0.282 -0.156 0.628 -0.615 1.362*** 1.131** 2.488*** 1.113**
(1.082) (1.260) (0.844) (0.795) (0.403) (0.529) (0.511) (0.531)
Tax structure
Average income per capita -0.030*** 0.021 -0.066*** 0.003 -0.040*** 0.006 -0.058*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Capital funds -0.027 -0.276*** 0.155** -0.076 0.073 -0.110* 0.091** -0.124*
(0.069) (0.096) (0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.063) (0.045) (0.068)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 0.218*** 0.247*** 0.145*** 0.176***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.024) (0.026)
Political variables
Territory 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.034***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Population -0.014** -0.001 -0.118 -0.254 -0.019*** -0.011** 0.248 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.275) (0.252) (0.005) (0.004) (0.232) (0.212)
Oil and gas share 0.039 0.135** -1.074 -4.588 -0.015 0.048 -1.821 -5.300*
(0.048) (0.057) (3.889) (3.695) (0.032) (0.036) (3.752) (2.955)
Dummy border region 0.023** 0.023** 0.014* 0.015**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
Distance from Moscow 0.006** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy republic 0.068** 0.058** 0.057*** 0.048***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018)
Overrepresentation in State Duma 0.001 -0.004 0.007 0.011 0.014*** 0.009* 0.007 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.041) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.029)
Power -0.015* -0.015* -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal transfers 0.054 0.039 0.085 0.059 0.012 0.011 -0.031 -0.042
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.057) (0.034) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035)
Democratization 0 0 -0.018 -0.003 0 0 -0.015 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008)
Share of Russians 0.160* 0.148 0.064* 0.059*
(0.094) (0.091) (0.035) (0.032)
Urbanization 2.425** 1.774* -7.467 -7.455 -0.082 -0.722 5.804 4.036
(0.963) (1.010) (7.731) (6.550) (0.51) (0.487) (5.300) (4.987)
Constant 0.437*** 0.409*** 2.812*** 3.446 0.640*** 0.605*** 0.588 0.355
(0.137) (0.135) (0.689) (2.515) (0.067) (0.063) (2.120) (1.947)
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
No. obs. 395 395 395 395 380 380 380 380
R2 0.304 0.372 0.486 0.566
F-test 19.52*** 14.72*** 54.67*** 19.30*** 23.83*** 28.35*** 108.13*** 17.78***
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table C.9: Median regressions for Yeltsin period, 1995-1999, dep. var.: retention
rate
(D9) (D10) (D11) (D12) (D13) (D14) (D15) (D16)
Median Median Median Median Median Median Median Median
Tax arrears squared (Yeltsin) 1.175** 0.763 1.688* 0.458 1.400*** 1.262* 2.160** 1.928*
(0.522) (0.828) (0.865) (1.029) (0.523) (0.764) (0.893) (0.986)
Tax structure
Average income per capita -0.041*** -0.002 -0.052*** -0.008 -0.044*** -0.001 -0.052*** 0.009
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025)
Capital funds 0.092 -0.08 0.109 -0.001 0.111* -0.05 0.1 -0.087
(0.058) (0.097) (0.071) (0.104) (0.060) (0.091) (0.066) (0.109)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 0.162*** 0.189*** 0.157*** 0.166***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.039)
Political variables
Territory 0.030** 0.022 0.025* 0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Population -0.022*** -0.013** 0.118 -0.14 -0.022*** -0.014** 0.175 -0.027
(0.005) (0.006) (0.312) (0.326) (0.005) (0.006) (0.294) (0.313)
Oil and gas share -0.013 0.059 0.996 -2.674 -0.007 0.039 0.68 -4.193
(0.093) (0.159) (7.687) (6.791) (0.094) (0.197) (7.760) (6.786)
Dummy border region 0.020** 0.018** 0.014* 0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance from Moscow 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy republic 0.044* 0.050** 0.046* 0.037
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
Overrepresentation in State Duma 0.01 0.011 -0.056 -0.018 0.016** 0.012 -0.041 -0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.066) (0.058) (0.007) (0.007) (0.066) (0.056)
Power -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 0
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Fiscal transfers 0.004 -0.007 0.086 0.044 0.01 0.005 0.036 0.005
(0.053) (0.049) (0.064) (0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.067) (0.053)
Democratization -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 0.003 -0.001 0 -0.013 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.03) (0.026)
Share of Russians 0.069 0.097** 0.046 0.049
(0.056) (0.049) (0.046) (0.043)
Urbanization 0.873 0.317 1.8 -2.002 0.084 -0.744 1.507 2.186
(0.549) (0.601) (10.738) (9.549) (0.508) (0.587) (10.944) (10.316)
Constant 0.604*** 0.531*** 1.3 0.977 0.653*** 0.593*** -0.712 0.374
(0.096) (0.078) (1.026) (0.933) (0.080) (0.075) (3.023) (3.187)
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
No. obs. 395 395 395 395 380 380 380 380
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.259 0.523 0.571 0.287 0.337 0.507 0.563
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table C.10: Panel data regressions for Putin period, 2000-2006, dep. var.:
retention rate
(D17) (D18) (D19) (D20) (D21) (D22) (D23) (D24)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.041 -0.056** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.063 -0.041 0.711* 0.596
(0.030) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.361) (0.317) (0.417) (0.365)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.017*** -0.009* 0.023*** -0.011 0.015*** -0.008 0.021*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Capital funds -0.080*** -0.03 -0.075** -0.046 -0.059** -0.019 -0.062* -0.041
(0.027) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan -0.011 -0.038 -0.017 -0.038
(0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.059)
Political variables
Territory 0.02 0.045*** 0.007 0.031***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Population 0.002 0.009 0.028 0.120*** -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.096**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.039) (0.045) (0.007) (0.007) (0.040) (0.040)
Oil and gas share -0.045 -0.096 2.064 5.411 -0.084 -0.12 0.505 3.899
(0.102) (0.132) (8.268) (8.678) (0.113) (0.137) (8.140) (8.513)
Dummy border region 0.035** 0.036** 0.018 0.022
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Distance from Moscow 0.005 0.008** 0.008** 0.009***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy republic 0.095** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.121***
(0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.018* -0.002 -0.016 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.018 -0.006
(0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010)
Fiscal transfers 0.229*** 0.270*** -0.202* -0.031 0.187*** 0.247*** -0.339*** -0.142
(0.063) (0.065) (0.112) (0.111) (0.059) (0.063) (0.094) (0.106)
Democratization -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009* 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011)
Share of Russians 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.284***
(0.077) (0.067) (0.070) (0.064)
Urbanization 1.749* 4.017*** -0.172 -6.228 -0.194 2.150** -0.896 -5.94
(0.940) (0.923) (4.424) (4.358) (0.856) (0.877) (4.407) (4.266)
Constant 0.178 0.194* 0.680** 0.851** 0.285*** 0.278*** 1.221*** 0.822**
(0.114) (0.111) (0.305) (0.396) (0.103) (0.106) (0.178) (0.385)
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
No. obs. 550 550 550 550 530 530 530 530
R2 0.244 0.409 0.235 0.389
F-test 16.42*** 17.08*** 15.36*** 29.91*** 12.37*** 18.33*** 16.42*** 28.96***
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table C.11: Median regressions for Putin period, 2000-2006, dep. var.: retention
rate
(D25) (D26) (D27) (D28) (D29) (D30) (D31) (D32)
Median Median Median Median Median Median Median Median
Tax arrears squared (Putin) -0.035 -0.061 0.062 0.04 0.289 -0.171 0.275 0.428
(0.227) (0.221) (0.105) (0.141) (0.827) (0.515) (0.592) (0.801)
Tax structure
Average income per capita 0.026*** -0.006 0.027*** -0.012* 0.025*** -0.003 0.026*** -0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Capital funds -0.119*** -0.074* -0.06 -0.012 -0.112*** -0.061 -0.056 -0.025
(0.025) (0.043) (0.045) (0.053) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051)
Legal factors
Dummy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan -0.072 -0.111** -0.083 -0.101*
(0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.054)
Political variables
Territory 0.009 0.050*** -0.005 0.045***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011)
Population 0.01 0.019** -0.001 0.063 0.007 0.015** 0.001 0.058
(0.007) (0.008) (0.103) (0.074) (0.007) (0.007) (0.107) (0.077)
Oil and gas share 0.067 0.044 -5.481 7.257 0.055 -0.021 -3.777 10.72
(0.274) (0.233) (15.24) (16.246) (0.296) (0.339) (14.845) (16.976)
Dummy border region 0.028* 0.025** 0.017 0.021*
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Distance from Moscow 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy republic 0.122*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.043) (0.023)
Overrepresentation in State Duma -0.015 0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.014 0.01 -0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.021) (0.016)
Fiscal transfers 0.127* 0.196*** -0.307*** -0.073 0.084 0.195*** -0.376*** -0.088
(0.068) (0.050) (0.078) (0.068) (0.066) (0.051) (0.076) (0.077)
Democratization -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.013 0.009 -0.003** -0.003** -0.016** -0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012)
Share of Russians 0.300*** 0.243*** 0.283*** 0.255***
(0.076) (0.046) (0.075) (0.042)
Urbanization -0.137 2.453*** 4.763 -2.357 -1.038 1.497** 5.22 -3.354
(0.845) (0.753) (5.462) (4.916) (0.820) (0.638) (5.706) (4.818)
Constant 0.327*** 0.377*** 0.897*** 0.779*** 0.409*** 0.402*** 0.989*** 1.386***
(0.111) (0.088) (0.309) (0.243) (0.113) (0.081) (0.217) (0.264)
Region FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Outliers included Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
No. obs. 550 550 550 550 530 530 530 530
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.311 0.504 0.572 0.199 0.323 0.506 0.565
Notes: see Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: First consider the case of non-democratic federal government. By differenti-
ating (4.6) with respect to fA and fP one can show, that optimal fA does not depend on tP and
vice versa, i.e. fi = (1− βi)tidi. Given that, from (4.7) and (4.9) follows that rA does not depend
on tP (and vice versa) either for both democratic and non-democratic regional governments. In this
case expression (4.6) can be re-written as
πF =
d2t2P (1− βP )2 + (1− d)2t2A(1− βA)2
2
+ d
2
(1− tP )tP β2P + (1− d)2(1− tA)tAβ2A (D.1)
By differentiating the expression with respect to tA and tP it follows that tA does not depend on
tP and vice versa.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
To (i): This part is trivial. Assume that for region A the equilibrium is different from federal
optimum. Then the federal government has incentive to deviate (and hence either increase the
public goods output for democracy or the net revenue for non-democracy) - a contradiction.
To (ii): Consider the following cases for region P. (1) Assume that the revenue of the region
(non-democratic) under federal optimum is larger, than in case of secession, or the provision of
public goods of the region (democratic) is larger, than in case of secession. Then neither the region
nor the federal government deviate from federal optimum, and the equilibrium is federal optimum.
(2) Assume that the previous condition does not hold, and the federal government offers any other
tax split rate than the equalizing tax split rate. Then two outcomes are possible (a) for region
secession is ”more attractive” (depending upon the political regime). Then the region secedes. The
non-democratic federal government (weakly) prefers non-secession: obviously, in case of secession its
revenue from the region P is exactly zero, while if there is no secession, the revenue is non-negative.
Democratic federal government is indifferent, and hence, tiebreaking rule is in effect - and hence the
federal government deviates from the offer, a contradiction; (b) for region the secession is not at-
tractive, and it remains part of the federation. But, since federal optimum is rejected, it is possible
only if the revenue of the federation for non-democracies (public goods provision of the federation
for democracies) is not single-peaked. Consider first the case of pure non-democracy. Knowing the
public goods output, the revenue of the federation and the regions can be re-written as shown in
Lemma 1. The objective function is then concave in tA and tP , and therefore single-peaked. For
case of pure democracy twice differentiating the federal public goods output by t yields
− βP d
4(tP (1− tP ))
3
2
(1 + 2tP − 2t2P ) < 0 (D.2)
for tP 6= 0, and therefore the result also holds. For the federal democratic and regional non-
democratic government identical operation yields
− d
4(t2
P
γ + 2tP β2)
3
2
(tP γ(1− 2tP γ) + 2β2P (1− 4tP γ)) (D.3)
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with γ = 1 − 2βP − β2P < 0, which is also negative, and hence, the concavity can be established.
Finally, for the case of non-democratic federal and democratic regional government, the objective
function of the federation can be re-written as
max d
2
i [
t2i (1− βi)2
2
+ β
2
i ti(1− ti) + βiti
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti
+β
2
i (1 + ti))]
(D.4)
for i = A,P . One can easily see that the problem of the federation is very similar to that in
case of pure non-democracy, except for an additional term added. First, notice, that output of
public goods by the region is increasing in tP (it is unavoidable since the regional public goods
have stronger productivity enhancing effect). Hence, if region rejects federal optimum, the tax split
rates acceptable for the region are smaller, than the federal optimum. Denote A =
t2i (1−βi)
2
2 +
β2i ti(1 − ti) and B = βiti
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti)) (A is the component present in pure
non-democracies, B is an additional component). For tP ≤ .5 both first derivatives of A and B are
positive; hence the function is increasing in tP . Now consider the second derivative of the function.
Since the first two terms (A) constitute a concave function, it is sufficient to show that the last term
(B) is also a concave function, and then the sum of concave functions with positive coefficients (d2i
and d2iβi is also concave. The last term B can be re-written as√
(4βP − β2P − 2)t4P + (2− 4βP )t3P + t2P β2P (D.5)
The squared root is nondecreasing and concave; hence, in order to show that the expression is con-
cave it suffices to prove that the expression under the root is a concave function. Second derivative
yields
12t
2
P (4βP − β2P − 2) + 6tP (2− 4βP ) + 2β2P (D.6)
However, the expression changes it sign. One can show that the expression is negative for βP and
tP small enough and for βP and tP large enough. First, it is easy to show that for tP = .5 the
expression is negative, therefore the function is concave. First derivatives of A and B are positive
for tP ≤ .5. Hence, the function is monotonously increasing at tP ∈ [0; .5]. Now consider tP > .5:
for βP small enough the expression is concave for the whole area [.5; 1], and hence, the maximum
is unique. However, for βP large enough there are areas for .5 < tP ≤ 1, such that the concavity
cannot be established. In particular, it is true for
tP ≥
3(4− 2βP ) +
√
9(5− 2βP )2 − 24β2P (4βP − β2P − 2)
12(4βP − β2P − 2)
(D.7)
This root is located in the area [0; 1] only for βP large enough. In particular, βP > .8. Evaluating
first derivative of A at βP = .8, one can see, that for tP satisfying condition (D.7), the expression
is negative. Since the maximum of A is decreasing in βP and by concavity, it can be claimed that
if 4βP − β2P − 2)t4P + (2− 4βP )t3P + t2P β2P is convex (for tP and βP large enough), the expression
A is decreasing. Similarly, expression B is decreasing (because expression under the root in (D.5)
is decreasing, and squared root of a decreasing function is a decreasing function). Hence, for area
where no concavity of B can be established, the function is decreasing. But then the maximum is
achieved in the area where function is concave, and therefore single-peakedness can be established.
Hence, federal government has incentives to deviate from an equilibrium different than equalizing
tax split rate, if the latter is chosen. To conclude, if federal optimum is rejected by the region, the
equalizing tax split rate is chosen, and the proof is complete.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
To (i): The equilibrium tax split rate tP is either a federal optimum or an equalizing tax split
rate. The latter is given by an equalizing condition: the equality of net revenues with and without
secession for non-democracies and the equality of public goods provision with and without secession
for democracies. In order to prove the claim, one has to show that (a) federal optimum is strictly
positive (so, no corner solution tP = 0 is possible) and (b) there exists a tax split rate tP different
from zero such that the net revenue (public goods output) under secession is at least weakly smaller
than without secession. First consider the pure non-democracy. The problem of the federal
government has been formulated in Lemma 1. For the regional government, analogously, one can
state
πRi =
d2iβ
2
i (1− ti)2
2
+ d
2
i (1− βi)2(1− ti)ti (D.8)
One can immediately notice that the revenue of the federal government from each region and the
revenue of each region are strictly positive. Hence, there is no problem with satisfying the non-
negativity constraint. Consider the federation problem. The maximum with respect to ti is achieved
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at
β2i
2β2
i
−(1−βi)2
; the federal optimum is therefore strictly positive (as part (iv) shows, it is decreasing
in βi and for βi = 1 the federal optimum is .5, i.e. non-negative). The revenue of the region P in
case of secession is dβP rP − rP2 − C, where rP = dβP is the optimal provision of public goods.
Hence the federal optimum is accepted if
d2β2P (1− tP )2
2
+ d
2
(1− βP )2(1− tP )tP −
d2β2P
2
+ C ≥ 0 (D.9)
This condition is a quadratic inequality, with the coefficient for the quadratic term negative for
βP <
√
2
1+
√
2
and larger or equal to zero otherwise. Consider first the negative coefficient for the
quadratic term. For tP = 1 the expression is equal to
2C
d2
−β2i , which may be positive as well as neg-
ative. For tP = 0 it is strictly positive. If the expression is positive at both bounds of the interval,
it is strictly positive in between (given it is an inverse parabola). Otherwise it has one root at the
interval, and hence, there at least some tP for which the inequality holds. In order to hold only for
tP = 0, this should be the root; it is however never the case for positive C. If the coefficient by the
quadratic term is larger zero, the same applies: either the inequality holds for all tP (from the real
line), or at least for some tP . Finally, for βP =
√
2
1+
√
2
the expression is a linear function with a posi-
tive root and hence, the inequality holds for at least some tP , and (b) holds for pure non-democracy.
Now assume the pure democracy. The maximum provision of public goods of the federation
is achieved for
ti =
1− 2βi + 2β2i + (1− βi)
√
1 + 2β2i − 2βi
2− 4βi + 4β2i
= .5 + (1− βi)
√
1 + 2β2i − 2βi
2− 4βi + 4β2i
> .5 (D.10)
and therefore obviously strictly positive. Now one has to identify the equalizing condition. Consider
first the secession case. Than the region produces the maximum amount of public goods satisfying
the condition
dβP rP −
r2P
2
− C = 0 (D.11)
which is than given by rP = βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− 2C. The provision of public goods in the region and
in the federation is identified by the following system of equations:
d(tP (1− βP )fP + βP rP )−
f2P
2
= 0; (D.12)
(1− tP )d((1− βP )fP + βP rP )−
r2P
2
= 0. (D.13)
The federal optimum is accepted if rP solving this system is greater or equal βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− 2C.
Otherwise one solves the system substituting rP for βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− 2C and obtains the equalizing
tax split rate
tP =
(1− 2βP + 2β2P )d+ (1− βP )
√
2C + (1− βP )2d2 − βP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
2d(1− 2βP + 2β2P )
(D.14)
which exists if C ≤ β
2
P
d2
2 and is strictly positive. The case when C >
β2d2
2 corresponds to the
inability of a democratic government to produce any public goods in case of a secession. Then it
obviously accepts the federal optimum. Interestingly, the region never accepts federal optimum if
it is able to produce public goods under secession. It is straightforward: while the equalizing tax
split guarantees the provision of public goods at the secession level, for the federal optimum the
provision of public goods is lower, than in case of a secession.
For the case of a democratic federal government and non-democratic region, since fi is
a concave function in ti, federal optimum may be established through the simple first order condi-
tion. The closed-form solution to the optimization problem is
ti =
2β2i + βi(1− βi)
√
2
2(β2i + 2βi − 1)
> 0 (D.15)
The condition for accepting the federal optimum is that the revenue of the region P exceeds that in
case of secession (i.e. dβ2P /2−C). Otherwise the region rejects the federal offer, and the equalizing
tax split rate is suggested. As in case of pure democracy, evaluate the equalizing condition at tP = 0
and tP = 1. Obviously, the results are the same as for pure democracy. Moreover, the expression
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is continuous at the interval [0; 1] (as a combination of continuous functions). Therefore it is either
strictly positive for the whole interval, or has at least one root in the interval, which is different
from zero (follows from continuity), and the condition (b) holds for this combination of regimes as
well.
For the case of a democratic region and non-democratic federal government, the prob-
lem of the federation has been formulated in Lemma 2. The expression is always positive, so, the
non-negativity constraint is never binding. Evaluating the first derivative at zero one can show that
it is positive (and equal to 2β2); so, the solution to the problem is positive as well. Now consider the
equalizing condition. The region produces βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− C in case of secession. If the production
under secession is impossible, the region accepts the federal optimum. Otherwise the region accepts
the offer of the federal government if the federal offer provides a weakly larger amount of public
goods as in case of secession. Otherwise the equalizing condition should be satisfied, which is given
by
d(1− tP )(βP (βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− 2C) + (1− βP )2dtP )− .5(βP d+
√
d2β2
P
− 2C)2 = 0 (D.16)
The closed form solution to the problem is
tP =
1
2(1− βP )2d2
(−d(−d+ 2βP d+ βP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C) + [d2(−d+ 2βP d+ βP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C)2 − 4(1− βP )2d2(−.5C − .5β2P d2 − .5βP d1
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C)].5)
(D.17)
Evaluating the equalizing condition at tP = 0 yields a positive value and at tP = 1 a negative one.
Hence, by continuity, the root is between these two values and is hence positive (and also obviously
always exists if provision of public goods under secession is feasible). Thus result (i) could be es-
tablished for all four combinations of pairs of regimes in a region and the federation.
To (ii): Part (i) derives closed-form solutions for the federal optimum for all regimes but demo-
cratic region and non-democratic federation and shows that the federal optimum is non-negative.
Moreover, none of the conditions depends on d and C (in case of hybrid with democratic region d
obviously cancels out in the FOC). Show that the federal optimum is decreasing in βi. The first
derivatives of the federal optima can be shown to be negative for βi within the range of parameters
considered in the model. For pure non democracy
∂ti
∂βi
= (−3β2i − 2βi + 2)
βi
(2β2i − (1− βi)2)2
< 0 (D.18)
For pure democracy
∂ti
∂βi
= − 1
2
√
1 + 2β2i − 2βi
− 1− βi
2
2(2βi − 1)
(1 + 2β2i − 2βi)1.5
< 0 (D.19)
For hybrid with democratic federal government
∂ti
∂βi
=
1
2(β2i + 2βi − 1)2
((2(2−
√
2)βi+1)(β
2
i +2βi−1)−(2βi+2)(2β2i +βi(1−βi)
√
2)) < 0 (D.20)
For the hybrid with democratic region one has to calculate the first order condition, which is given
by
ti(1− βi)2 + βi(1− 2ti) + βi
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti))+
βiti
2
√
(1− ti)(2ti − 4βiti + β2i (1 + ti))
[2ti(4βi − β2i − 2) + 2− 4βi] = 0
(D.21)
Evaluate the equation at ti = .5 and see that the expression is positive; hence, one has to consider
only ti > .5. For these values from the implicit function theorem follows that ti is decreasing in
βi. Since the federal optimum and the equilibrium tax split rate A are identical, and the proof is
complete.
To (iii): First consider the closed-form federal optima for pure non-democracies and pure democ-
racies derived in part (i) to see that they are strictly smaller 1 (federal optimum is decreasing in
βi; for non-democracy for βi = .5 the federal optimum is exactly one, and the condition on βi
is that it is strictly smaller 1; for pure non-democracy for βi = .5 it is .5 + .5
√
.5 < 1). Hence
for federal optima and equilibria in A the result holds. Consider equalizing tax split rates. For
non-democracy, as follows from part (i), equalizing tax split rate is strictly positive (if it exists). It
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may be equal to 1 if βP = d
√
2
3C, but, since the federal optimum is smaller one, it implies, that
the region would accept the federal optimum at this value of βP . In a similar way, in a democracy
the equalizing tax split rate can be equal to 1 only if region is unable to produce public goods
under secession. But in this case federal optimum is chosen, and it is smaller 1. So, the proof is
complete. However, for other political regimes this result could not be established. For example, for
the hybrid with democratic federal government it is straightforward to show that the closed-form so-
lution maximizing the federal problem is larger 1 for small βi and hence the corner solution is chosen.
To (iv): In region A the equilibrium tax split rate is the federal optimum. If in region P the
equilibrium is also the federal optimum and βA = βP , the equilibrium tax split rates are identical
in both jurisdictions (since they do not depend on d). If in region P equalizing tax split rate is
chosen, one can show that it is smaller than the respective federal optimum (which is, as mentioned
above, identical for all regions). In case of pure non-democracy it follows from the fact that the net
revenue of the region is strictly declining in tP ∈ [0; 1] (since for βP > 2−
√
2 it is convex with the
minimum at
β2
P
−(1−βP )
2
β2
P
−2(1−βP )2
> 1, and for βP < 2−
√
2 it is concave with the maximum smaller zero;
for βP = 2 −
√
2 it is strictly decreasing for any real tP ). For a democracy the region increases
its public goods provision in reducing t, because federal public goods are less efficient in terms of
productivity increase of the population. This is obviously true for the hybrid with non-democratic
government (which produces even less public goods than the democracy), and the proposition holds.
However, if the region is non-democratic and the federation is democratic, one has to take into
account the ”additional” term in the public goods output of the federation, which actually makes
region prefer a non-zero level of centralization (the situation is a mirror image of the reasons why
the federation prefers a non-zero level of decentralization) if β is small enough. Assume that the
equalizing tax split rate actually chosen is larger than the rejected federal optimum. It implies that
the revenue of the region was smaller under secession for federal optimum. That means that the
federal optimum is smaller than the smallest root of the equalizing condition. The reason for that
is that if the region provides a larger portion of its revenue to the federal government, it increases
the provision of public goods and hence the tax base, from which the regional government can also
benefit. But it implies that there exists a tax split rate for which federal government can produce
more public goods than for the federal optimum - contradiction to the definition of federal optimum.
Hence, equalizing condition is (weakly) smaller than federal optimum. If region P has the equalizing
tax split rate, it is more decentralized, than region A.
To (v): First show, that the equalizing condition is decreasing in βP , decreasing in C and in-
creasing in d. For the pure non-democracy, by the implicit function theorem
∂tP
∂βP
= − 2βP (1− tP )
2 − 2(1− βP )(1− tP )tP − 1
2(1− βP )2 − 2β2P (1− tP )− 4(1− βP )tP
< 0 (D.22)
∂tP
∂C
= − 2
2(1− βP )2 − 2β2P (1− tP )− 4(1− βP )tP
> 0 (D.23)
(and the closed-form solution for equalizing tax split rate is
(1−2βP )d
2+
√
d2(2(2−4βP+β2P )C+(1−2βP )
2d2)
d2(2−4βP+β2P )
).
For the hybrid with democratic government denote the equalizing constraint E. Divide both sides
of the equation by d2. Then
∂E
∂tP
= −βP (1− tP )− (1− βP )[tP (1− βP ) +
√
tP (tP − 2βP tP − β2P (tP − 2))]+
(1− βP )(1− tP )[(1− βP ) +
tP − 2βP − β2P√
tP (tP − 2βP tP − β2P (tP − 2))
] < 0
(D.24)
(since all terms are smaller zero),
∂E
∂C
= 1/d
2
> 0 (D.25)
∂E
∂d
= −2C/d3 < 0 (D.26)
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Following the implicit function theorem, one can state, that the equalizing condition is increasing
in C and decreasing in d. Finally, consider:
∂E
∂βP
= 2βP tP (tP − 2)− (1− tP )[tP (1− βP )+
√
tP (tP − 2βP tP − β2P (tP − 2))] + (1− tP )(1− βP )
[−tP +
(2− tP )tP βP − t2P√
tP (tP − 2βP tP − β2P (tP − 2))
]
(D.27)
This expression can be both positive and negative. In fact, one can find that the derivative is pos-
itive for some tP < t˜P and negative otherwise. However, if tP → 1, the expression E is negative.
Hence, the larger root of the expression (which is chosen by the federal government) is on the de-
clining part of the curve (if it exists). Hence, for the tP solving E the first derivative with respect
to βP is negative. Using the implicit function theorem, one can derive that tP is decreasing in βP .
For the hybrid regime with the democratic region apply implicit function theorem in the same
way. Let the left-hand side of (D.16) be denoted as E. Than
∂E
∂tP
= −d[βP (βP d+
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C) + (1− βP )2dt] + (1− t)d(1− βP )2d =
−dβP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C − d2β2P + d2(1− βP )2(1− 2tP ) < 0
(D.28)
(evaluate the only positive term at tP = 0, when it is maximum, and see that the overall expression
is negative),
∂E
∂C
=
1√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
[−d(1− t)βP + dβP +
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C] > 0 (D.29)
and thus the equalizing tax split rate is increasing in C.
∂E
∂d
= −tP (2β2P d+ βP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C + β
3
P d
2
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
) + 2(1− βP )2dtP (1− tP ) < 0 (D.30)
(evaluate at tP = .5, when the positive term is maximal, and see that the expression is still negative),
and hence the equalizing tax split rate is decreasing in d.
∂E
∂βP
= −tP (2d2βP + d
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C + d
3β2P√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
)− 2(1− βP )d2tP < 0 (D.31)
and thus the equalizing tax split rate is decreasing in βP .
For the pure democracy implicit function theorem is not applicable, because the equalizing con-
dition is actually a system of equations. So, one is forced to straightforwardly differentiate the
closed-form solution. One can show that
∂tP
∂C
=
1− βP
2d(1− 2βP + 2β2P )
[
1√
2C + (1− βP )2d2
+
βP√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
] > 0 (D.32)
(all terms positive) and
∂tP
∂βP
=
A
2d(1− 2βP + 2β2P )
+ B
2βP − 1
2d2(1− 2βP + 2β2P )2
< 0. (D.33)
where
A = −
√
2C + (1− βP )2d2 −
(1− βP )2√
2C + (1− βP )2d2
−
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C − β
2
P√
β2
P
d2 − 2C
(D.34)
B = (1− βP )
√
2C + (1− βP )2d2 − βP
√
β2
P
d2 − 2C (D.35)
(the only positive term is the first term in B:
√
2C + (1− βP )2d2, which can be shown to be smaller
than the sum of negative terms.
Now the proofs work as follows. Consider a pair βˆP < βˇP and distinguish among four cases:
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• For both βˆP and βˇP the equilibrium is the federal optimum. Than the equilibrium is de-
creasing in βP , as demonstrated above and tP (βˆP ) > tP (βˇP ).
• For both βˆP and βˇP the equilibrium is the equalizing tax split rate and tP (βˆP ) > tP (βˇP ).
• For βˆP the equilibrium is the federal optimum, and for βˇP it is the equalizing tax split rate.
But then the equalizing tax split rat is smaller than the federal optimum calculated for the
same βP (otherwise the region would prefer federal optimum from results of (iv)), and the
federal optimum calculated for βˇP is smaller than for βˆP . Hence, tP (βˆP ) > tP (βˇP ).
• For βˆP the equilibrium is the equalizing tax split rate, and for βˇP it is the federal optimum.
Obviously, the equilibrium is always the smallest value of federal optimum and equalizing
tax split rate. At βˆP the equalizing tax split rate was smaller, than the respective federal
optimum, at βˇP vice versa. Now recall that the equalizing tax split rate is declining in βP .
Therefore for βˇP the federal optimum is smaller than some value, which is smaller than the
equalizing tax split rate for βˆP , and hence tP (βˆP ) > tP (βˇP ).
In the same way, consider a pair Cˆ < Cˇ. The following combinations are possible:
• If for both Cˆ and Cˇ the equilibrium tax split rate is the federal optimum, it is constant in C.
• If for both Cˆ and Cˇ the equilibrium tax split rate is the equalizing tax split rate and therefore
tP (Cˆ) < tP (Cˇ)
• If for Cˆ the equilibrium is the equalizing tax split rate, and for Cˇ it is the federal optimum,
tP (Cˆ) < tP (Cˇ) holds by the logic equivalent to that presented above, because the federal
optimum for both Cˆ and βC is identical, and the equalizing tax split rate for Cˆ is smaller
than the federal optimum for the same parameters.
• Finally, the combination when for Cˆ the equilibrium is the federal optimum, and for Cˇ it is
the equalizing tax split rate is impossible; if the region was not able to reject the federal offer
under smaller secession costs, it will not be able to do it under larger costs (since its secession
revenue / public goods output decreases in C).
Finally, consider a pair dˆ < dˇ and distinguish among the following combinations
• For both dˆ and dˇ the federal optimum is chosen: in this case the equilibrium tax split rate
does not change.
• For both dˆ and dˇ the equalizing tax split rate is chosen: in this case the equilibrium tax split
rate for dˆ is larger than for dˇ.
• For dˆ the federal optimum and for dˇ the equalizing tax split rate are chosen: in this case
recall that for any combination of parameters respective equalizing tax split rate is smaller
than the federal optimum and that the equalizing tax split rate is decreasing in d, hence the
equilibrium tax split rate for dˆ is larger than for dˇ.
• For dˆ the equalizing tax split rate and for dˇ the federal optimum is chosen. That would imply
that for dˇ the equalizing tax split rate is larger than the federal optimum, and for dˆ vice versa.
Bur the federal optimum is constant in d and the equalizing tax split rate is decreasing in d.
Therefore there may be only one point of intersection between these functions (or no points
of intersection at all), and, since at d the equalizing tax split rate is already smaller than the
federal optimum, it may not have yet another point of intersection for larger d, which would
be implied by the fact that for dˇ the federal optimum becomes smaller than the equalizing
condition - a contradiction; hence, this combination is impossible.
For pure non-democracy the results for d can be obtained in a simpler way: it is sufficient to multiply
both sides of equalizing condition with 2/d2. In this case d drops out of all terms except for the
last one. Then one can replace 2C/d2 = C˜ and make the proof in full analogy to C. Similarly for
the pure democracy it is sufficient to divide both numerator and denominator of the equalizing tax
split rate by d and take derivative with respect to C˜ = 2C/d2, which is positive, and therefore the
expression is decreasing in d.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: First notice, that both expressions for federal optima under different
political regimes are declining in βi. Moreover, there exists a unique point of interception (since
the equation .5 +
(1−βi)
√
1+2β2
i
−2βi
2−4βi+4β2i
=
β2i
β2
i
+2βi−1
has exactly two roots: one root in the interval
(0.5;1) and one root equal to 1. Evaluate both expressions for βi → .5. One can show that
limβi→.5 2− 4βi + 4β2i = 1, while limβi→.5 .5 +
(1−βi)
√
1+2β2
i
−2β
2−4βi+4β2i
< 1. Hence, one can conclude,
that the federal optimum for non-democracy for βi → .5 is larger in a democracy, while for βi larger
than the unique interception point between two functions it is smaller than in a democracy.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Assume that C is large enough, so that under both regimes the federal
optimum is chosen. Then, applying the result from Proposition 2, the proof is complete.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
To (i): For hybrid regime with democratic federation federal optimum can be written as
β2i
2β2
i
−(1−βi)2
+
βi(1−βi)
√
2
2(2β2
i
−(1−βi)2)
. The first term is the equilibrium tax split rate in a pure non-democracy, and the
second is purely negative. So the result holds. For hybrid regime with democratic region it is
straightforward that the problem of the federation is strictly larger than the problem of the feder-
ation in non-democracy (except for ti = 0 and ti = 1, when both expressions are equal). If for two
functions p(ti) ≥ l(ti) for a certain interval, than max p(ti) ≥ max l(ti). Moreover, one can easily
show that the maximum is never achieved at ti = 0 or ti = 1 (because in both cases the revenue of
the federation is zero, either because the share of the federal government in the tax revenue is zero,
or because the region produces zero public goods). Hence, the proposition holds.
To (ii) The federal optima in pure democracy and hybrid regime can be shown to be strictly
declining in βi. Moreover, they intersect at one point, which is in the interval (0.5;1) (exactly
4
7 (4−
√
2) (the other point of intersection is 1). It has been shown that the federal optimum for a
hybrid regime for βi → .5 is larger than for a pure non-democracy, which, in turn, is larger than
for a pure democracy. Given a unique point of intersection and monotonicity in βi the proof is
complete.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
To (i): it has been shown that the federal optimum in the hybrid regime is larger than in a
non-democracy. Now consider the equalizing tax split rate. The federal government produces
strictly more public goods in the hybrid regime, than in the non-democracy. Hence the equalizing
condition for the hybrid regime can be written as sum of the equalizing condition for the pure non-
democracy and an additional positive term (let us call it A). The equalizing condition for the pure
non-democracy is decreasing in tP , as shown above. Assume that the solution for the equalizing
condition for the hybrid regime is equal to that for the non-democracy - a contradiction, because it
implies 0 + A = 0 for a strictly positive A. Assume that the solution for the equalizing condition
for the hybrid regime is smaller than for the pure non-democracy: but in this case for a smaller tP
the equalizing condition for the pure non-democracy becomes positive (due to its monotonicity in
tP ), and A remains positive - a contradiction. Hence, the equalizing tax split rate for the hybrid
regime is larger than for the pure non-democracy. Now consider four cases:
• Assume that for certain parameters the equilibrium for both regimes is the federal optimum
- than the equilibrium for the hybrid regime is larger, than for the non-democracy.
• Assume that for certain parameters the equilibrium for both regimes is equalizing tax split
rate - again, the equilibrium for the hybrid regime is larger, than for the non-democracy.
• Assume that for certain parameters the equilibrium for the non-democracy is the equalizing
tax split rate, and for the hybrid regime the federal optimum - than, since any federal optimum
is larger or equal to the equalizing tax split rate, the equilibrium for the hybrid regime is
larger, than for the non-democracy.
• Finally, assume that for certain parameters the equilibrium for the hybrid regimes the equal-
izing tax split rate, and for the pure non-democracy the federal optimum. Hence, for these
parameters federal optimum in non-democracy is smaller than the equalizing tax split rate
in non-democracy. As shown above, the latter is smaller than the equalizing tax split rate in
hybrid regime. Hence, the equilibrium for non-democracy is smaller, than for hybrid regime.
To (ii): In order to establish this result, consider the limit of the equalizing tax split rates for
d → 1, βP → 1 (recall that they are monotonously declining in both arguments). For the hybrid
regime the limit is equal to .5, for the pure non democracy it is zero (by applying the L’Hospital
rule). Now recall the following theorem from analysis: if the limit of the function is equal to, say,
a, and a < p, than the function itself is smaller p from a certain point. It completes the proof of
this proposition.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix E
Appendix to Chapter 5
E.1 Data
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Table E.1: Description of variables
Variable Description Period Source
Bureaucracy Log (Number of public officials / 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Population (people))
Democracy Index of democracy, based on expert 2000-2004 and Moscow
expert opinion, 1991-2001 Carnegie Center
higher value represents higher
level of democracy
Democracy squared Squared index of democracy 2000-2004 and Own calculation
Described above 1991-2001
Distance from Moscow Distance from regional capital NA Goskomstat
to Moscow, ’000 km, 0 for Moscow and
Moscow region, identical for St. Petersburg
and St. Petersburg region
Distance squared Square of distance from Moscow NA Own calculation
Dummy republic 1 for a republic, 0 otherwise NA Own calculation
Education Share of population with university education, percent 2002 Russian Census
FDI Foreign direct investments (’000 USD) / GRP (mln. RUR) 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Free elections Index of the freedom of elections, estimated 1996-2005 Institute of
according to number of seats of the pro- Public Expertise
Presidential party, number of competitors,
distance between the winner and the second
competitor, share of votes against all parties,
share of votes required to enter the
parliament, difference between share of votes
and share of seats in the regional legislature,
higher value represents higher freedom of elections
Free elections squared Squared index of free elections 1996-2005 Own calculation
Free press Index of the freedom of the press, estimated 2000 Institute of
according to the freedom of access to Public Expertise
information, production of information and
distribution of information, higher
value represents higher level of press freedom
Free press squared Squared index of free press 2000 Own calculation
GRP growth rate Growth rate of 2000-2004 Goskomstat
the gross regional product (in per cent)
inflation-corrected
Health Doctors per 10.000 people 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Inefficient bureaucracy Local bureaucracy per capita / 2000-2004 Own calculation
Public expenditures as percent of GRP
Initial GRP Gross regional product per capita, ’000 RUR 2000 Goskomstat
Investments (Fixed capital investments per capita (RUR) / 2000-2004 Goskomstat
GRP per capita (RUR)) * 1000
Local bureaucracy Log (Number of public officials 2000-2004 Goskomstat
of regional and municipal level /
Population (people))
Local federal bureaucracy Log (Number of public officials of 2000-2004 Goskomstat
regional branches of federal agencies /
Population (people))
Oil and gas Extraction of oil (mln. tons) * 1.4 + 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Extraction of gas (bln. sq. m) * 1.2
Openness (Export + Import) (mln. USD) / 2000-2004 Goskomstat
GRP (mln. RUR)
Population Population of the region, mln., 2000-2004 Goskomstat
end of the year
Public expenditures Public expenditures as per cent of GRP 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Share of Russians Share of ethnic Russians in the 2002 Russia’s Census, 2002
population
Temperature Average long-term mid-January temperature, NA Goskomstat
Celsius
Territory Territory of the region, mln. sq. km. NA Goskomstat
0 for Moscow and St. Petersburg
Urbanization Share of urban population (in %) / 1000 2000-2004 Goskomstat
Note: in the cross-section regressions the variables are averaged over 5 years
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Table E.2: Summary statistics, cross-section
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Bureaucracy 79 -6.947 0.316 -7.684 -5.528
Democracy 79 29.013 6.289 17 45
Democracy squared 79 880.734 382.246 289 2025
Distance from Moscow 79 2.367 2.748 0 11.876
Distance squared 79 13.062 27.301 0 141.039
Dummy republic 79 0.253 0.438 0 1
Education 79 0.172 0.036 0.112 0.35968
FDI 79 0.543 2.194 0 19.383
Free elections 78 3.122 1.146 1 5
Free elections squared 78 11.042 6.636 1 25
Free press 78 0.343 0.089 0.146 0.629
Free press squared 78 0.126 0.063 0.021 0.396
Growth rate 79 6.781 2.971 -0.280 18.88
Health 79 45.531 10.385 21.62 76.72
Inefficient bureaucracy 79 0.026 0.008 0.004 0.042
Initial GRP 79 32.759 24.413 6.668 176.918
Investments 79 211.244 84.133 97.666 605.868
local bureaucracy 79 -5.309 .323 -6.237 -3.846
Local federal bureaucracy 79 -5.747 .326 -6.312 -4.399
Oil and gas 79 15.987 114.598 0 1019.12
Openness 79 0.014 0.014 0.001 0.109
Population 79 1820.562 1619.616 53.6 10313.8
Public expenditures 79 0.227 0.125 0.133 0.868
Share of Russians 79 0.769 0.238 0.012 0.966
Temperature 79 -11.480 8.446 -35.6 0
Territory 79 0.216 0.470 0 3.103
Urbanization 79 0.069 0.013 0.026 0.1
Table E.3: Summary statistics, panel data
Variable Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations
Bureaucracy overall -6.947 0.322 -7.825 -5.403 N = 395
between 0.315 -7.684 -5.528 n = 79
within 0.077 -7.223 -6.769 T = 5
FDI overall 0.543 2.630 0 35.671 N = 395
between 2.194 0 19.383 n = 79
within 1.467 -11.762 16.831 T = 5
Growth rates overall 6.781 6.865 -22.8 78.7 N = 395
between 2.971 -0.280 18.88 n = 79
within 6.197 -26.879 74.621 T = 5
Health overall 45.531 10.411 20.5 80.3 N = 395
between 10.385 21.62 76.72 n = 79
within 1.278 35.771 56.571 T = 5
Inefficient bureaucracy overall 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.057 N = 395
between 0.008 0.004 0.042 n = 79
within 0.003 0.012 0.038 T = 5
Investments overall 211.244 101.548 78.499 1064.068 N = 395
between 84.133 97.666 605.868 n = 79
within 57.492 -128.574 669.444 T = 5
Local bureaucracy overall -5.309 0.328 -6.367 -3.755 N = 395
between 0.323 -6.237 -3.846 n = 79
within 0.064 -5.788 -4.857 T = 5
Local federal bureaucracy overall -5.747 0.342 -6.614 -4.209 N = 395
between 0.326 -6.312 -4.399 n = 79
within 0.106 -6.165 -5.471 T = 5
Oil and gas overall 15.987 114.308 0 1127.334 N = 395
between 114.598 0 1019.12 n = 79
within 8.178 -67.847 124.200 T = 5
Openness overall 0.014 0.020 0.000 0.349 N = 395
between 0.014 0.001 0.109 n = 79
within 0.015 -0.053 0.254 T = 5
Public expenditures overall 0.227 0.135 0.121 1.324 N = 395
between 0.125 0.133 0.868 n = 79
within 0.051 0.026 0.683 T = 5
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E.2 First-stage regressions
Table E.4: First-stage regressions
Variable (I1) (I2) (I2) (I3)
Democracy Democracy Democracy squared Bureaucracy
Initial GRP 0.070 0.070 4.027 -0.001
(1.51) (1.51) (1.38) (-0.67)
Oil and gas -0.007 -0.007 -0.448 0.000
(-0.88) (-0.88) (-0.84) (0.95)
Education 10.796 10.796 677.780 -2.405***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (-2.73)
Openness 90.161* 90.161* 5761.307* 1.447
(1.84) (1.84) (1.85) (0.79)
FDI 0.356 0.356 24.353 0.001
(0.90) (0.90) (0.97) (0.04)
Investments 0.005 0.005 0.224 0.000
(0.42) (0.42) (0.27) (0.18)
Health 0.030 0.030 2.312 -0.002
(0.37) (0.37) (0.45) (-0.59)
Temperature -0.204 -0.204 -13.591 -0.007*
(-1.57) (-1.57) (-1.65) (-1.78)
Dummy Chukotka -9.705 -9.705 -514.475 1.105***
(-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.22) (4.41)
Dummy Kalmykia -6.194 -6.194 -300.328 0.604**
(-0.85) (-0.85) (-0.65) (2.19)
Dummy Ingushetia -5.026 -5.026 -218.767 -0.568**
(-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.56) (-2.58)
Share of Russians 8.228*** 8.228*** 408.875**
(2.77) (2.77) (2.17)
Distance -0.825** -0.825** -54.458**
(-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.36)
Distance squared 0.004***
(3.42)
Constant 14.565*** 14.565*** 62.963 -6.610***
(2.79) (2.79) (0.19) (-38.45)
R2 0.417 0.417 0.364 0.660
F 3.576*** 3.576*** 2.862** 10.670***
N 79 79 79 79
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *** significant at 1 per cent level, ** significant
at 5 per cent level, * significant at 10 per cent level. F-test tests for the overall significance
of the variables in the first-stage regression
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E.3 Regressions with outliers
Table E.5: Effects of democracy and size of bureaucracy on average growth rate,
2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without
dummies for outliers
Variable (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.045* -0.043* -0.039 -0.045** -0.039* -0.032
(-1.99) (-1.76) (-1.60) (-2.00) (-1.67) (-1.45)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005*
(1.40) (1.31) (1.31) (1.47) (1.42) (1.76)
Education 25.180** 24.721** 22.822** 25.371** 23.269** 13.150
(2.59) (2.57) (2.28) (2.47) (2.29) (1.18)
Openness 27.068 30.425* 29.164 27.072 28.968 39.414**
(1.55) (1.71) (1.63) (1.54) (1.55) (2.09)
FDI -0.056 -0.040 -0.007 -0.055 -0.007 0.120
(-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.06) (-0.41) (-0.06) (1.15)
Investments 0.015** 0.014** 0.013** 0.015** 0.013** 0.010**
(2.14) (2.19) (2.11) (2.63) (2.45) (2.16)
Health 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.005
(0.44) (0.49) (0.56) (0.44) (0.56) (0.14)
Temperature -0.040 -0.037 -0.031 -0.038 -0.028 -0.013
(-0.86) (-0.84) (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.65) (-0.32)
Democracy -0.030 -0.587* -0.592* -4.165***
(-0.59) (-1.92) (-1.82) (-2.73)
Democracy squared 0.009* 0.009* 0.004
(1.90) (1.77) (0.89)
Democracy * Bureaucracy -0.547**
(-2.57)
Bureaucracy 0.073 0.170 14.003**
(0.03) (0.08) (2.32)
Constant -0.871 -0.028 8.442* -0.355 9.686 106.061**
(-0.39) (-0.01) (1.88) (-0.03) (0.59) (2.44)
R2 0.262 0.265 0.289 0.262 0.290 0.384
N 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (democracy, democracy squared) 1.85 1.70 3.87**
F (democracy, democracy squared
bureaucracy) 3.86**
F (democracy, democracy squared,
bureaucracy, democracy * bureaucracy) 3.02**
Notes: see Table 5.2
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Table E.6: Interaction of democracy and size of bureaucracy, 2000-2004,
dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without dummies for
outliers
Variable (A7) (A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.040 -0.039* -0.034 -0.036 -0.041* -0.038*
(-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.39) (-1.37) (-1.84) (-1.70)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.006 0.008* 0.004 0.008** 0.009**
(1.20) (1.53) (1.93) (1.07) (2.32) (2.57)
Education 23.430** 21.023* 18.119* 23.439** 28.906*** 26.487***
(2.22) (1.99) (1.87) (2.13) (2.68) (2.74)
Openness 28.282 31.347 27.588 26.378 27.293 22.946
(1.42) (1.63) (1.48) (1.28) (1.50) (1.31)
FDI -0.035 0.020 0.147 -0.023 0.064 0.167
(-0.26) (0.16) (1.15) (-0.17) (0.68) (1.50)
Investments 0.013** 0.016** 0.011* 0.012** 0.013** 0.008
(2.56) (2.41) (1.74) (2.44) (2.53) (1.65)
Health 0.028 0.012 0.023 0.024 -0.006 0.009
(0.67) (0.29) (0.59) (0.54) (-0.16) (0.28)
Temperature -0.034 -0.080 -0.017 -0.020 -0.054 0.005
(-0.73) (-1.62) (-0.33) (-0.39) (-1.25) (0.12)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: I quartile) -0.109 0.449
(-0.05) (0.19)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: II quartile) -0.003 0.352
(-0.00) (0.15)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: III quartile) 0.071 0.369
(0.03) (0.16)
Bureaucracy (Democracy: IV quartile) -0.017 0.252
(-0.01) (0.11)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: I quartile) -0.035 -0.172 -0.002 -0.054
(-0.72) (-0.39) (-0.05) (-0.13)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: II quartile) -0.064 -0.462 -0.052 -0.449
(-1.01) (-1.17) (-0.91) (-1.30)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: III quartile) -0.078 -0.345 -0.079 -0.349
(-1.19) (-0.92) (-1.36) (-1.05)
Democracy (Bureaucracy: IV quartile) -0.119* 0.019 -0.160** -0.088
(-1.75) (0.04) (-2.19) (-0.22)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: I quartile) 0.002 -0.000
(0.23) (-0.04)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: II quartile) 0.010 0.011*
(1.48) (1.72)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: III quartile) 0.006 0.006
(0.94) (1.07)
Democracy squared (Bureaucracy: IV quartile) -0.008 -0.005
(-0.83) (-0.59)
Democracy -0.701
(-1.26)
Democracy squared 0.010
(1.25)
Bureaucracy 3.854 4.307
(1.41) (1.43)
Constant -0.877 1.254 5.134 13.603 28.400 34.872*
(-0.06) (0.53) (0.91) (0.62) (1.49) (1.68)
R2 0.280 0.319 0.387 0.293 0.365 0.435
N 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (bureaucracy for all quartiles
of democracy) 0.52 0.12
F (democracy for all quartiles
of bureaucracy) 1.31 3.49** 0.74 3.40**
F (democracy squared for all
quartiles of bureaucracy) 3.54** 2.33**
F (democracy and democracy
squared for all quartiles of
bureaucracy) 2.08* 3.41***
F (bureaucracy for all quartiles
of democracy, democracy,
democracy squared) 0.68
F (democracy for all quartiles
of bureaucracy, bureaucracy) 1.56
F (democracy and democracy
squared for all quartiles of
bureaucracy, bureaucracy) 2.08**
Notes: see Table 5.2.
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Table E.7: Effects of democracy and size of bureaucracy on average growth rate,
2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without
dummies for outliers
Variable (AI1) (AI2) (AI3)
TSLS TSLS TSLS
Initial GRP -0.043 -0.049 -0.044*
(-1.49) (-1.39) (-1.71)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.006 0.004
(1.26) (1.25) (1.01)
Education 24.808*** 20.537 9.124
(2.65) (1.38) (0.55)
Openness 29.791* 3.569 26.721
(1.69) (0.12) (1.10)
FDI -0.043 -0.013 -0.072
(-0.31) (-0.09) (-0.39)
Investments 0.014* 0.014* 0.023**
(1.97) (1.93) (2.53)
Health 0.019 0.014 0.026
(0.49) (0.30) (0.56)
Temperature -0.038 -0.027 -0.150
(-0.79) (-0.51) (-1.63)
Democracy -0.024 -1.945
(-0.14) (-1.47)
Democracy squared 0.035
(1.45)
Bureaucracy -6.161
(-1.28)
Constant -0.187 26.549 -44.366
(-0.04) (1.40) (-1.34)
R2 0.265 0.159 0.018
N 79 79 79
F (democracy, democracy squared) 1.09
Notes: see Table 5.2. Instruments are distance to Moscow and share of Russians in
regressions (AI1), (AI2) and (AI4), squared distance to Moscow in regression (AI3).
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Table E.8: Alternative measures of democracy, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average
GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without dummies for outliers
Variable (A13) (A14) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.042* -0.041* -0.046* -0.061*** -0.060** -0.061***
(-1.92) (-1.80) (-1.86) (-2.80) (-2.59) (-2.82)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(1.39) (1.40) (1.34) (2.34) (2.23) (2.36)
Education 17.839* 18.476* 27.102*** 15.213 8.649 12.421
(1.84) (1.97) (2.70) (1.44) (0.85) (1.18)
Openness 44.302*** 44.482** 31.827* 40.187** 53.108*** 42.655**
(2.70) (2.64) (1.82) (2.26) (2.89) (2.36)
FDI 0.002 0.014 -0.049 -0.022 0.004 -0.016
(0.02) (0.13) (-0.39) (-0.18) (0.04) (-0.11)
Investments 0.013** 0.012** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.016***
(2.11) (2.16) (2.22) (2.23) (2.25) (2.72)
Health 0.041 0.038 0.010 0.019 0.036 0.020
(1.08) (1.03) (0.26) (0.46) (0.94) (0.49)
Temperature -0.042 -0.045 -0.039 -0.044 -0.056 -0.061
(-1.00) (-1.05) (-0.89) (-1.04) (-1.32) (-1.38)
Free elections -0.456* -1.010 -0.666
(-1.92) (-0.84) (-0.58)
Free elections squared 0.098 0.035
(0.49) (0.18)
Free press -1.853 -47.538** -38.549** -51.578**
(-0.48) (-2.32) (-2.15) (-2.59)
Free press squared 67.956** 59.954** 72.255***
(2.47) (2.47) (2.71)
Bureaucracy -1.044
(-0.45)
Constant 0.645 1.306 -0.306 8.786** 8.466** 2.330
(0.36) (0.71) (-0.14) (2.29) (2.37) (0.16)
R2 0.323 0.325 0.271 0.313 0.372 0.318
N 78 78 78 78 77 78
F (free elections,
free elections squared) 1.83 1.91
F (free press,
free press squared) 3,27** 4.11** 3.78**
F (free press, free
press squared, free
elections, free
elections squared) 2.37*
F( free press, free
press squared, bureaucracy) 2.58*
Notes: see Table 5.2.
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Table E.9: Public sector and economic growth, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average
GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without dummies for outliers
Variable (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) (A24) (A25)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.037 -0.043* -0.047** -0.046* -0.053** -0.036 -0.042
(-1.40) (-1.78) (-2.19) (-1.96) (-2.41) (-1.45) (-1.65)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.26) (1.35) (1.55) (1.44) (1.53) (1.30) (1.39)
Education 21.277** 22.910** 28.384*** 23.840** 30.886*** 19.238* 23.176**
(2.01) (2.36) (2.75) (2.45) (3.07) (1.78) (2.37)
Openness 27.395 27.528 29.073 28.975 40.688** 27.400 27.582
(1.55) (1.62) (1.64) (1.53) (2.03) (1.54) (1.62)
FDI -0.007 -0.045 -0.044 -0.051 0.002 -0.003 -0.044
(-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.38) (-0.33) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.35)
Investments 0.012** 0.015** 0.013** 0.016** 0.013** 0.013** 0.015**
(2.38) (2.11) (2.57) (2.52) (2.58) (2.59) (2.58)
Health 0.030 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.032 0.033 0.019
(0.72) (0.53) (0.46) (0.53) (0.80) (0.80) (0.52)
Temperature -0.011 -0.037 -0.026 -0.053 -0.044 -0.018 -0.033
(-0.24) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-1.21) (-0.96) (-0.37) (-0.68)
Public expenditures 3.942 4.412
(0.85) (0.89)
Inefficient bureaucracy -16.999 -18.601
(-0.39) (-0.38)
Local bureaucracy 0.981 3.249
(0.52) (1.59)
Local federal bureaucracy -0.770 -2.818*
(-0.43) (-1.67)
Bureaucracy -0.604 0.184
(-0.29) (0.08)
Constant -1.056 -0.217 4.268 -5.569 -1.049 -5.340 1.144
(-0.49) (-0.07) (0.49) (-0.57) (-0.10) (-0.39) (0.07)
R2 0.281 0.263 0.268 0.267 0.300 0.283 0.263
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy) 1.87
F (public expenditures,
bureaucracy) 0.40
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
bureaucracy) 0.08
Notes: see Table 5.2.
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Table E.10: Public sector and economic growth (controlling for democracy),
2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), without
dummies for outliers
Variable (A26) (A27) (A28) (A29) (A30) (A31) (A32)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Initial GRP -0.037 -0.042* -0.043* -0.039 -0.050** -0.037 -0.042
(-1.38) (-1.70) (-1.89) (-1.59) (-2.20) (-1.46) (-1.65)
Oil and gas 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.27) (1.35) (1.54) (1.36) (1.56) (1.34) (1.42)
Education 21.089* 25.169** 27.610*** 21.537** 30.747*** 20.484* 25.222**
(1.92) (2.54) (2.77) (2.19) (3.22) (1.84) (2.51)
Openness 27.140 29.099 30.415* 31.527 43.598** 27.205 29.053
(1.42) (1.61) (1.68) (1.58) (2.15) (1.40) (1.53)
FDI 0.006 -0.013 0.011 -0.001 0.072 0.007 -0.013
(0.06) (-0.11) (0.11) (-0.01) (0.69) (0.06) (-0.11)
Investments 0.012** 0.013** 0.011** 0.014** 0.010** 0.012** 0.013**
(2.28) (2.11) (2.18) (2.47) (2.09) (2.45) (2.45)
Health 0.028 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.041 0.029 0.020
(0.66) (0.52) (0.58) (0.66) (0.98) (0.70) (0.52)
Temperature -0.015 -0.033 -0.009 -0.043 -0.027 -0.017 -0.032
(-0.32) (-0.72) (-0.24) (-1.02) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.65)
Public expenditures 2.474 2.652
(0.44) (0.46)
Inefficient bureaucracy 19.460 19.002
(0.34) (0.32)
Local bureaucracy 1.517 4.376**
(0.80) (2.11)
Local federal bureaucracy -0.734 -3.362**
(-0.42) (-2.19)
Democracy -0.454 -0.643* -0.686* -0.573* -0.809** -0.440 -0.643*
(-1.35) (-1.72) (-1.96) (-1.76) (-2.20) (-1.24) (-1.72)
Democracy squared 0.007 0.010* 0.011* 0.009* 0.013** 0.007 0.010*
(1.38) (1.72) (1.93) (1.73) (2.22) (1.26) (1.69)
Bureaucracy -0.182 0.041
(-0.09) (0.02)
Constant 6.018 8.607* 17.705 3.815 13.962 4.507 8.903
(1.01) (1.92) (1.37) (0.32) (1.03) (0.26) (0.53)
R2 0.294 0.291 0.302 0.294 0.346 0.294 0.291
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy) 3.22**
F (public expenditrues,
bureaucracy) 0.10
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
bureaucracy) 0.06
F (public expenditures,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.14
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.27
F (local bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.42
F (local federal bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 1.41
F (local bureaucracy,
local federal bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared) 2.18*
F (public expenditres,
democracy, democracy
squared, bureaucracy) 0.83
F (inefficient bureaucracy,
democracy, democracy
squared, bureaucracy) 1.00
Notes: see Table 5.2.
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Table E.11: Spatial model, 2000-2004, dep.var.: average GRP growth rate
(inflation-corrected), without dummies for outliers
Variable (AS1) (AS2) (AS3)
ML (lag) ML (lag) ML (lag)
Iniial GRP -0.043** -0.050** -0.043**
(-2.01) (-2.54) (-2.14)
Oil and gas 0.006* 0.006** 0.006**
(1.88) (2.08) (2.01)
Education 25.936*** 28.081*** 26.063***
(2.92) (2.69) (2.66)
Openness 30.469 34.832 30.813
(0.68) (0.88) (0.72)
FDI -0.023 -0.070 -0.023
(-0.18) (-0.49) (-0.19)
Investments 0.013** 0.015*** 0.013***
(2.30) (2.75) (2.67)
Health 0.024 0.019 0.024
(0.63) (0.51) (0.64)
Temperature -0.027 -0.036 -0.026
(-0.71) (-0.88) (-0.67)
Democracy -0.592** -0.593**
(-2.04) (-1.99)
Democracy squared 0.009** 0.009*
(2.00) (1.92)
Bureaucracy 0.066 0.059
(0.04) (0.03)
Constant 8.963* -0.067 9.382
(1.88) (-0.01) (0.66)
ρ -0.132 -0.120 -0.131
(-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.54)
Variance ratio 0.282 0.254 0.409
Robust LM-test no spatial lag dependence 0.279 0.730 0.281
(0.597) (0.393) (0.596)
Robust LM-test no spatial error dependence 0.804 1.455 0.789
(0.370) (0.228) (0.374)
N 78 78 78
Notes: see Table 5.2. For the LM-test for spatial lag and error dependence numbers in
parenthesis are p-values.
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